The Police and the Media. Dangerous Liaisons

Olivier Fillieule

The relative pacification in the preserving of law and order in western democracies has now been established as fact by a considerable body of research[1]. In parallel to this development in police doctrine and practice, recourse to demonstrations seems to have become institutionalized in a lasting manner since the late 60s, both in the increasing number of demonstrations and their extension through all levels of society[2].

In this context, a major feature in the development of law and order enforcement is its decreasing reliance on *the power of injunction* (i.e. on the exercise or threat of exercising coercion) and increasingly on *the power of influence.* From this standpoint, although the police/demonstrator relationship remains an inherently unequal test of power where the use of force always looms, there is a noticeable transition from a relationship of domination (with the choice, for demonstrators, of either submission or refusal and sanction) to a relationship of negotiated exchange, obviously still unequal, but in which negotiation prevails over a straightforward imposition of the rules of the game. This shift from powers of injunction to powers of influence brings us back to the notion that preserving law and order in a democracy is always best assured when based on the consent of its citizens (Fillieule, 1997b).

One notes, too, that the perpetuation of a coercive conception as the guiding principle of efficient preserving of public order poses a fundamental problem of credibility in a democratic regime. In effect, injunction can only function if the link between injunction and the use of coercion is real or at the very least plausible. Now, the practical implementation of coercion in a democratic regime is likely to erode the legitimacy of the governing authorities, and thus remains confined to the register of threats or is exercised with the minimum of publicity. This last point highlights the possible role of the mass media in the practical management of social conflicts in the field.

For several years now, the sociology of social movements has taken an interest in the role of the media in the construction of social problems and in their contribution to the success or failure of such movements[3]. However, with a few isolated exceptions, these studies concentrate on the methods used by movements to attract media attention, on the internal logic governing the workings of press corporations, and on the role played by political authorities in these relationships (subordination of the media to the government, relative independence due to competition among the media, etc). In these studies, the role of the police is generally seen as passive, as an armed branch of the authorities[4]. For example, and restricting ourselves solely to French-language studies, Patrick Champagne (1990) stresses the growing role of the demonstration as media event, but makes no mention of police forces and their possible influence in shaping events *in situ* and the subsequent interpretation of these events by journalists.

Ethnographic observation of these conflicts, however, suggests a more central role in the relationship linking the media and police forces in the field. Although television and newspapers have catalyzed changes in the strategies used by demonstrating groups (which Patrick Champagne terms "paper demonstrations"), we must pose the question as regards the police: Has media presence at sites of social conflict modified the nature of demonstrations by imposing changes in police practice or on the

---

[1] Waddington, 1994 ; Bruneteaux, 1996 ; *Les Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure*, 1997 ; Fillieule, 1997 ; Della Porta and Reiter, 1998 ; Wisler and Tackenberg, forthcoming.

[2] Tarrow, 1996; Dalton, 1996 ; Kriesi and alii, 1995 ; Fillieule, 1997a, b ; Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhart, 1998.

[3] See for example Glasgow Media Group, 1976 & 1980; Molotch, 1979; Schlesinger, 1990; Von Zoonen, 1990, Gamson et Modigliani 1989, Anderson, 1997.

[4] For a notable exception, see Wisler and Tackenberg, 1998 and 1999.

contrary, does the latter remain, for reasons that require explication, structurally indifferent to the "power of the media"? Moreover, what is the role of the police in the "co-construction" of the news, both as an actor in the field (by the security forces' adapting a strategy and tactics so as to influence the course of events) and, more traditionally, as a source of information? These two questions are based in the observation that the police forces have some latitude with regard to the political authorities they answer to. Before the recent development of studies on preserving law and order (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998), it was common practice to consider that the only actor protesters were confronted with was the holder of political power. In a legal perspective inherited from Max Weber, the police would then be merely the armed branch of political power, with a purely instrumental role. In opposition to this reifying vision, studies on the policing of protest have helped to "fracture" the black box of the state by emphasizing the latitude that the various state actors — including police forces — enjoy both in the practical management of conflicts and in describing them.

Finally, we should stipulate that the questions treated here, and in general all the questions generally related to the growing role of the media in social movements, only apply to a mere handful of cases. If, for some time now, research into the media has shown the latter to be highly selective in their reporting, it is the recent development of protest events analysis, based on both press clippings and bureaucratic follow-up reports, which have proven incontrovertibly that the press only covers a minute number of demonstrations (about 2% for the national press)[5]. This selectivity is far more obvious where television is concerned. We must keep in mind then that the following observations apply first of all to demonstrations which arouse a priori media interest, i.e. which involve at least one of the following features: expectations of a large turnout, possible violence, a new or unusual angle in terms of the nature of the cause, the demonstrators or the form of action taken.

In this paper, without claiming to exhaust the still largely unexplored issue of the relationship between the forces maintaining public order and the media, we wish to suggest some directions for future research, based on the parsing of government and press archives, ethnographic observation and interviews with the police authorities[6]. We will look first at perceptions generally shared by the police forces of the role of the media at demonstrations and in society in general (I). We will see how distrust and, more generally, hostility are at the heart of the schemes of police perceptions, which is not without practical consequences for their relations with the media and which allows for a more nuanced consideration, if not a rejection, of the mediacentric approach which posits the media as a catalyst in the way demonstrations are handled and, more broadly, the increased pacification of social conflicts (II).

I/ Role and status of the media in patterns of police perceptions

Just as the increased role of the media partly stems from the way mobilized groups interiorize the imperatives of an action that they are publicizing, we can just as well hypothesize that the manner in which police perceive the media determines the importance they give to it, and, consequently, informs any possible changes in their methods at demonstrations. We will see here that these perceptions are grouped around three main themes: 1) the media are all-powerful 2) they are systematically hostile to the police and 3) their presence at demonstrations influences the behavior of both demonstrators and the police forces.

The myth of the media's omnipotence
The myth of the media's omnipotence is deeply rooted in the police authorities. To explain this, it should be noted that police notions of media power stem from their training (at the Saint-Cyr au Mont

---

[5] See research currently underway by McCarthy and McPhail on police permits in Washington D.C., Wisler on Geneva and Zurich, Hocke on Freiburg/Breisgau (Germany) Gentile on Switzerland and Fillieule on France, all presented in Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhart (1998).
[6] On these sources and their limits, see Fillieule, 1997a, p. 373-400.

d'Or commissioners' school, in in-house training and regular seminars for management). This teaching is largely based on a barely updated version of Gustave Le Bon's theories on crowd psychology and whose corollary in terms of sociology of the media goes back to the theories of "mass culture" developed in the 30s by the first Frankfort school. Serge Tchakotine's book (1952) and other works of social psychology constitute the basic reading list and contribute to forging this image of manipulative news reporting.

Furthermore, and this goes for both Paris and the provinces, the fact that political authorities are highly sensitive to "the state of public opinion" serves to reinforce this belief in the omnipotence of the media, so much so that political authorities would now tend to judge the success or failure of an operation of public order maintenance in terms of how it comes across in the media, as is suggested by the director of public safety in Paris:

> "I wait for the AFP (Agence France Press) release to know if we've been successful or not. It's not until then that I hear from the prefect. Deciding on police action has become much more complicated than it was before, especially because of the media and sophisticated means of communication. The decision-maker, subject to pressure from the "ministry," forms his opinion after the fact, by reading press agency releases, and thus tends more towards a "push-button," video-game kind of response. "

The police blues
The police are strikingly unanimous in declaring that the media are always hostile to them, and that whatever they do, they will always shoulder the blame.

In their eyes, the media never provide an accurate account of law enforcement that they purport to report. The reasons given for this fall into three categories: journalists are "on the side of" demonstrators and display a "natural" hostility to the police, whatever the latter might do; media logic dictates that recording the facts always comes second to commercial exigencies, with sensationalism - hence violent incidents - taking precedence over other aspects of the event; or, journalists are simply the kind of people who "don't understand anything at all" about keeping law and order, they cannot even distinguish the CRS (republican security forces) from urban police or gendarmes.[7]

This extremely pessimistic viewpoint results in either a frank hostility vis-à-vis the media, or in disillusion and fatalism:

> "whatever the tactics employed, there is no denying that the judicial, social, cultural context of our advanced industrial societies makes it difficult to get beyond Flaubert's definition of the police in his famous *Dictionary of Received Ideas*: "Police = Always in the wrong." Everywhere, after an incident, public opinion demands to know what the police are doing to stop these outrageous acts of violence. If the police intervene, it's provocation, hateful repression, an error of judgment, an infringement of civil liberties, thoughtlessness... If the police show caution, its officers must be incompetent, if not actually in collusion! Every time, there will be loud criticism of the choice of route, the positioning and numbers of forces deployed, their attitude in such and such a case. Injury reports are belabored, and always to the disadvantage of the commanding police officer. Whatever the strategy employed, they will be looking for some political motivation. "

> "What is shown on television is never to the police's advantage, it's always the shocking stuff. But the media exist, you have to live with that fact. It's hard to see how it could be otherwise. They're part of life. Everything these days is done for the media. The ceremonies on Bastille

---

[7] The rank and file policemen share this view. This is particularly evident in the way reports on demonstrations are filed by the various police services: the officers concientiously collect press cuttings which cite their actions, pasting them up with captions usually underlining the errors committed (in identifying a particular squad, the nature of the operation or the number of injured), sometimes accompanied by caustic commentaries.

Day, they're for the media's benefit. They go where they want, they do what they want. These are the people we have to contend with and who will, I think, be increasingly present at demonstrations. They have always been there. And the way they report things basically depends on the reasons for the demonstration, and the newspaper you happen to read. One thing has always amazed me: when you read the papers you have to ask yourself if they were actually at the demonstration."

Several "traumatic" experiences in police/media relations have marked the last ten years in France and illustrate the extent to which police authorities feel themselves maligned by the press and TV. First of all, the student demonstrations of November-December 1986, which ended in the death of a demonstrator, the dismissal of the education minister and two parliamentary inquiries are constantly brought up by the police officers interviewed: For example, on the evening of December 4, the incidents began at 5:15 p.m. but there was no police action until 8:10 p.m., after a long wait: a Gendarmerie captain who was at the police cordon at the spot where the trouble broke out declared to the commission of inquiry :

" We deplore the fact – but this is a problem we've almost always had - that the press didn't tell it as it should have, i.e. the truth. In the end, the reader or TV viewer isn't interested in hearing about platoons of gendarmes being trounced for four hours defending the Assemblée Nationale building. What they want to hear about is how gendarmes or CRS charged and injured the people in front of them. We simply regret that, apart from a few blurbs, which got lost in the overall coverage, the truth wasn't told at that particular moment: that it really was a question of provocateurs. There was nothing said about what happened between 5:30 and 8:30 p.m. (…) *Figaro*, the *Matin de Paris* wrote about the confrontations. But what I regret – and where I am critical - is the laughable amount of information, the mere three or four lines about what happened afterwards. " (Aubert, 1986, p. 190).

The interviewees also retain a bitter memory of the documentary footage broadcast on the 8 p.m. news report on channel TF1 (French private television network) on Sunday, December 7. This was in fact made up of two different reports. The first, filmed during the afternoon of December 4, shows a CRS officer letting young people pass wearing helmets but with no weapons. The second, filmed during the night of December 4th to 5th, shows helmeted individuals armed with pickax handles preparing for confrontation in the Latin Quarter. The commentary links the two reports in these terms: *"a CRS officer takes responsibility for letting them through. It is clear however that with their helmets and pickax handles, they're hardly on their way home. Listen to them…"*

Another example: numerous police officers cited the high school student demonstration of November 12, 1990 as a typical example of the media's bad faith towards them. During this demonstration, very violent confrontations caused a large number of injuries among the policemen at the barricades on the Pont de l'Alma. However, a systematic analysis of clippings from the entire press coverage (national and regional) and all the TV news programs (on TF1 and A2) invalidate this impression of ill treatment by the press. On the contrary, the reports stress (with, of course, different nuances) the stoicism of police during the confrontations, the presence of vandals "foreign to the student movement" and the large number of injured policemen. On the other hand, several journalists condemned the government's last minute decision to alter the route initially planned with a view to break up the demonstration earlier than scheduled. This example reveals the tenacity of the stereotype of "media bad faith" in that, in this particular case, it was unjustified and derives from their imaginary constructs[8].

---

[8] This remarks echoes, for example, the report of the British Royal commission on the police in 1962 which concluded that there was « no general lack of sympathy in the press and that the police's impression that they receive a bad press was due to their isolation from the rest of the community, which inclines them to be over-sensitive to criticism » Chinball. S, *Law and Order News*, Tavistock, London, 1979. See also the conclusions of P. A. J Waddington on that point : « Accounts of relations between the media and the police have tended to portray a supportive, even cosy relationship (D. Waddington, 1992) This is not how the relationship is perceived

New rules of the game

In addition to this denunciation of systematic bias the police feel that the presence of the media has contributed to changing the rules of the game during demonstrations.

It's primarily a question of the sensation-hungry nature of media coverage and the subsequent effects of copy-cat violence which comes up most often in interviews. The media are accused of exaggerating the violence, which their systematic reporting makes the focus of any story. For example, concerning the demonstration of November 12, 1990 and the incidents on the Pont de l'Alma, one police captain said:

> "You can see the vandalism... There were about a hundred of them. They clashed with the police on the bridge and then they turned into the Rue de Grenelle. It wasn't that spectacular, really. It's easy enough to smash windows, it makes a show, setting cars on fire, very showy. There's footage, even on the Pont de l'Alma. You just place yourself with a camera behind a group of thirty youngsters who are throwing paving-stones, more in their hands, there's smoke everywhere, and there you are: you'd think it was the Los Angeles riots. It's unbelievable. From our point of view, you've got to put things into perspective. The two neighboring bridges were clear. You could get around, it restricted movement a little, but mainly concentrated on the Pont de l'Alma. No big deal".

> "A camera rarely plays down an event. The journalist doesn't want to show how well things are going, but how badly... I don't blame him. That's his job. And the camera's viewpoint is so reductive, it's more taken with what's moving, what's shocking."[9]

However, when one asks for more precise comments on the role the media has played generally on the changing nature of demonstrations, opinions vary. They tend to agree that the groups' need to attract media coverage pushes them to adapt their repertoire of initiatives, with increasing recourse to symbolic and/or violent action, within certain limits. On one hand, then, violence is incited through the media's demand for it, but on the other, to remain acceptable to the public and not provoke counter-productive reactions, this violence needs to be measured and, in point of fact, ritualized.[10]

> "For demonstrators, the aim is to get attention. We're aware of that, and to some extent respond accordingly. They're looking for a media event. There's 1,000 of them, there's 10,000, so you've got a procession. Nobody gives a damn about how many there were actually. A demonstration with 2,000 people doesn't amount to much. So the point is to get media attention. And for that, first off, there doesn't need to be that many of you. That's fine for smaller organizations, so they can get what they want... and then to generate coverage, they tip off the journalists beforehand. So then they do their little number. It's a new kind of demonstration.

---

by senior officers in command of public order operations. On the contrary, the media are seen as a threat that has two prongs : first camera personnel are physically difficult to control in the immediate vicinity of a demonstration, and secondly the media are the ultimate "challengers", able to offer a version of event authoritatively at variance with that of the police. (...) Wherever they are located, the press are able to put a construction on events that might conflict with police interest » (Waddington, 1994, p.124).

[9] This view has become all the more consolidated over the last year, following the rising spate of criminal car-burning in December 1998 in the Strasbourg suburbs, which came to a head on New Year's Eve. The fact that the media gave wide coverage to these events and drew up a comparative league table score betwen the different towns was deemed responsible for the spread of arson incidents. In a special report published on January 12, 1998, *Libération* provided a chronological account of the events and spoke of a night of "media-violence."

[10] Which would tend to confirm, for example, the analysis made by Nathalie Duclos in his book on peasant violence during the fifth Republic (Duclos, 1998).

"The demonstrator is always looking for attention. There's also the role of the press. For the demonstrator, a demonstration's only successful if there are incidents, so they want to disturb the population, they want to do some damage. There's a certain balance that's established with the local politicians. I remember once in Angers, the farmers had wreaked havoc on that lovely town, on the town center which is after all rather lovely, the lawns. They put weed-killer on the grass and this had a very adverse effect on public opinion about the organizers. It was counter-productive, and they never did it again."

Finally, the officers interviewed also stated that the permanent media presence at demonstrations had effectively modified their own methods of keeping order, both in their deployment of the men (deployment of the forces - wanting to keep a low profile) and in terms of action decided on the spot (driving back or rushing demonstrators, etc...). In other words, police authorities seem to think that media presence limited their scope for maneuver by obliging them to adhere to the rules. If one bears in mind the propensity of the rank and file to take illegal punitive measures against demonstrators (Fillieule, 1997a, Fillieule and Jobard, 1998), the significance of this point is clear.

Furthermore, beyond the inconvenience occasioned by these restrictions of their actions, police also cited a series of potential problems linked to the mere presence of the press amongst demonstrators. Journalists are accused of not wearing their ID armbands at all times, of trying to pass from one "camp" to the other without taking the situation into consideration, and finally of impeding whatever negotiations might be taking place during the events between liaison officers and organizers:

"Before, when we negotiated with organizers, we'd use all sorts of arguments to get what we wanted: to preserve law and order. But now you can't talk to an organizer without there being a microphone around. And that's a pity. It alters the relationship. It changes the way you can talk. There's a mike and a camera, I'm talking to an organizer, I'm going to play the police captain. When the journalist isn't around, my approach is very different. The journalist gets in my way because he boxes me in to an institutional role. I can't say: 'The prefect's given his orders, but I've had a word with headquarters and it should be all right. We'll set up another plan of action.' If there's a mike, what can I say? "Orders are orders." And that's no good."

More generally, media presence at demonstrations is thought to have disastrous effects in terms of the deployment of forces and tactical resources. For instance, one recent mishap that befell Paris police is repeatedly mentioned by officers of the Préfecture de Police: during a nurses demonstration in 1989, police used water tanks to drive back demonstrators determined to reach the gates of the presidential residence. Despite the absence of injuries and the effectiveness of this method of dispersion, considered less dangerous than a baton charge, the press denounced police violence and a lot of soaked nurses were splashed across the newspapers. In the following week, the political authorities told the prefecture to stop using this tactic. Police authorities were highly resentful about this:

"The demonstration went well but it was misrepresented. Water cannons were used because we were overrun. This had been planned, and was a decision taken advisedly. The water hose is gentler and much less brutal than truncheons and grenades. That was a typical example of a demonstration which went successfully, technically speaking, but a failure from a political and media point of view. The minister had backed us at the time. I considered the water tank the best method. It is annoying and humiliating, but it's certainly less violent than other methods. Physically it's less dangerous. For the record, I was there, and apart from a couple of them I saw later, they were all laughing about it. And my daughter loudest of all. It was the morning after that everything was blown up because of a series of articles. The media really went to town... on the recklessness and stupidity of the police who dared to hose down the nurses."

"Another cock-up. It wasn't incorrectly used, but the media's latching on to the thing has now made it impossible for us to use the water cannon. But what else should we have done? Have gendarmes go and smash the heads of 50 women and then see them carried off on stretchers,

because when a charge gets going it's almost impossible to stop it. We hosed them down, it was even fun in a way, especially since they were determined to reach the Elysée and it was off-limits. Water was the best way. But a woman in tears with the hair soaked comes across less well than a woman laughing through it all."

One concludes from these remarks that police authorities are highly mistrustful of the media, convinced they will always be maligned by them. This may explain why the rare police initiatives for greater transparency towards the media have been seen as useless, and indeed manipulatory:

"I'm not sure if it's such a good thing to leave an open door to the media, everywhere –that, no. I'm completely against having them at our side in the command cars. We've had requests like that, all in the interests of transparency. True, in Great Britain and in Japan... There's a special press room where they can listen to radio messages. We tried it once for a high school student demonstration. I brought a half dozen journalists to a police cordon. They could have gone without me. And all that because of this concern for transparency, while nothing's ever been really transparent at all. It was the famous demonstration on December 4, 1986 and we got as much flack from the press as if they hadn't been there at all. So..." [11].

This interview excerpt couldn't show more clearly the "siege" mentality that develops among police authorities as soon as one raises the issue of outside supervision of their actions in keeping order. The construction and the emphasis on accumulated expert knowledge is equally here a convenient way of claiming exclusivity for this operational expertise and of rejecting any interference. This aspect of police perceptions is incidentally not confined to issues of preserving law and order, and it is doubtless in the domain of "police blunders" that this "siege mentality" is most evident, with a systematic refusal to recognize mistakes made and the recurring accusation of a media machinations (Jobard, 1998).

II An ambivalent game

At the end of this inquiry into police perceptions of the status and role played by the media at demonstrations, it is difficult to arrive at a single conclusion. Police perceptions are in fact contradictory and we should therefore be wary of jumping to hasty conclusions based on "mediacentric" analyses and the literature about the media's pacifying effect on social conflicts.

Herbert Gans was one of the first to establish the softening effect of the media on protest policing in his analysis of social disorder news before and after the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968, when the media denounced a "police riot." [12]. Most writers have since agreed with his point of view.

---

[11] Waddington gives a similar exemple in his book on the London police : « Police attempted to counter this potential through the employment of professional area press and publicity officers (APPOs). The role of the APPO represents a policy of controlling the media through incorporation. This was taken even further on some operations. During two anti racist marches in southeast London a reporter from the local press was invited to attend the briefing and given a privileged insight into the policing operation, being escorted throughout by a sergeant. After the first operation a police commander confessed that he had been disappointed with the treatment the police received in the subsequent report, and so a different newspaper was given the opportunity to attend the second operation in hope that the report would prove more favourable » (Waddington, 1994, p.124-125)

[12] « at first, 'trouble' was defined as stone throwing and other physical or verbal violence against the police, or fights between demonstrators and hecklers, often from the American Nazi Party (…) Violence, as well as trouble, was perceived as action against constituted legal authority ; and until the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention, police violence against the demonstrators was viewed as action taken to restore order and was rarely called violence. What the demonstrators described as police brutality was at best shown in passing on television while day-to-day police brutality in the ghettos was no normally news, perhaps because it was routine. The turning point in treatment of anti-war demonstrators came in Chicago when the behavior of the police was reported almost universally as a « police riot », in Gans, 1979, p. 53ff. For a similar analysis about the Chicago

[13] This unanimity, however, conceals a lack of empirical research. The second part of this paper intends to demonstrate the infinitely more complex nature of this situation. On one hand, to counter a mediacentric vision of things, we should point out that changes in police methods derive from a set of phenomena among which the "mediatization of keeping law and order" undoubtedly plays only a secondary role; on the other hand, contrary to the illusion of an omnipotent media, it would seem that the way in which the police behave with the media is first of all determined by the pursuit of its own interests, to the extent that the latter appear as more of an instrument than a means of control; next, and perhaps most important, law and order enforcement is not carried out in the same way with all social groups, in that the sensitivity of the police forces to media surveillance is highly variable depending on the nature of the demonstrators. From this point of view, we note the extent to which the now constant presence of the media at the biggest demonstrations contributes to reinforcing the exclusion of certain groups of demonstrators, at the same time legitimating the use of brutal repression against them.

The "mediatization of the policing of protest"

The expression "mediatization of preserving law and order" comes from a perspective which sees changes in the handling of demonstrations as being a factor of media influence. A variant of this view argues that, henceforth, police/demonstrator interactions cannot be reduced to on-site interactions in that "paper demonstrations" have become as much an issue for the police forces as for the demonstrators. For example, Wisler and Tackenberg (1999) argue that "the portrayals of the police practices, as they are depicted in the mass media and within the political field (…) may be even more crucial for the development of major occurrences of public disorders than the "actual" police action in the streets" (our emphasis).

The idea of "mediatization of the policing of protest" however has the drawback of over-emphasizing "mediacentricism" and occludes rather than explains the roots of the development it claims to describe. What is presented as a result of autonomous action by the media, is due in fact to other causal sequences which we and others have written about (Waddington, 1994, Bruneteaux, 1996, Fillieule, 1997a, Fillieule and Jobard, 1998, Della Porta, Fillieule and Reiter, 1998): developments in the recruitment of the rank and files, improvement in the in-service training they are offered, modification of crowd containment techniques[14] and, of course, the development of the kinds of action taken by the demonstrating groups themselves. In this complex process, the role of the media appears more as a side effect than a cause. For example, it is because policing techniques have moved towards keeping demonstrators at a distance (with the particular aim of protecting police officers from being attacked) that television and newspapers, sheltered by the police barricades, can cover the event live and close-up.

Convention as a turning point in media coverage of protest demonstrations, see McCarthy and McPhail (1998), Marx (1998, p)

[13] See e.g. Geary (1985, p. 129-130) on Great Britain, Della Porta, Fillieule and Reiter (1998, p.127-128) on Italy and France, Favre (1990, p.161-162) on France, McCarthy and McPhail (1998) and the remark by Gary Marx in his afterword to Della porta and Reiter's book on policing protest: « with the mass media ever present, heavy-handed repression of crowds is not publicly acceptable in today's democracies. In addition, on pragmatic grounds contemporary softer approaches are seen to be more effective. They can be seen as a countermove in the face of some activists's strategy of trying to provoke police. Another very important factor in the United States is the fear financially strapped governments have of lawsuits from citizens claiming that they have been mistreated » Marx, (1998, page 267). On the deescalating role of lawsuits, see also McCarthy and McPhail (1998, p. 103) about Act Up in the United States.

[14] Mainly, a whole set of techniques based on the idea of a necessary distance between demonstrators and officers has been progressively implemented. These techniques lies on 1) the research of the aggression of demonstrators senses ; 2) on a necessary distance and 3) on the symbolisation of aggression.(Fillieule and Jobard, 1998).

Furthermore, we can point out that, historically, the development of media coverage of demonstrations has not gone hand in hand with the pacification of public order enforcement. For a very long time, press denunciation of police brutality, however virulent, had no effect whatsoever. One can see this in France, for example, by examining press cuttings we culled from *L'Illustration* at the turn of the century. Hardly noted for any anti-establishment leanings, this publication gave more than its fair share of attention to violence at demonstrations, as evidenced by the humorous cartoon included in annex to this paper. However, it took more than fifty years before any significant development in police operational modes took place.

Similarly, as Della Porta and Reiter have noted, (1998, p. 18), if "the mere presence of journalists, in fact, appears to have a de-escalating effect on the police, although the fact that this presence does not always discourage the police from a 'hard' style of intervention is testified by the very existence of media coverage of such interventions". That is clearly all the more true that in many cases (which cannot be quantified here), media coverage of events is in fact "covering up" police behavior.[15] All things considered, then, it is more tempting to talk about a "structural insensitivity within the police forces to media coverage" than of "mediatization of the policing of protest." This insensitivity might seem to contradict the statements of our interviewees for whom the omnipotence of the media is taken as fact. It is here that ethnographic field observation of the police at work usefully assists interpretation of their representations. This contradiction should no doubt be read as a further illustration of the incorporation of knowledge from the social sciences into statements by social actors (which sociology calls the effects of theory), yet without reality following suit.

The instrumentalization of the media

Contrary to what these interviews seem to suggest, the police do not submit passively and fatalistically to media influence. On the contrary, they seek, in a variety of ways, to instrumentalize the media for their own ends.

To be convinced of this, suffice it to take seriously the notion of the police as information source. This notion opens up a field of research largely unexplored in the sociology of social movements, although much groundwork has been done, for example, on the construction of the crime news (Crandon, 1992). Several writers have noted the extent to which the media have tended to privilege accredited sources. There are, for example, in Gary Marx (1974, 1979) and Gans (1979, p. 269; 274) numerous details on the ways the police may seek to feed disinformation to the media; Todd Gitlin (1980, p. 27 & ff), regarding the political power's strategies to discredit the SDS, suggests a typology of which several elements refer to police action.[16] We ourselves have shown that the disagreements about the number of demonstrators — the police figures as against those provided by the organizers (Fillieule, 1997a), or the official releases about the number of injured policemen (Fillieule, 1997a, p. 122-123) are part of this problematic[17]. The parsing of the national and regional printed and electronic press coverage of the November 1990 student movement also shows to what extent and with what disturbing facility journalists, in putting together accounts of violence during demonstrations, make use of the police categories to define the various types of demonstrators, with of course derogatory or discrediting connotations, such as "zulus," "vandals," "people foreign to the student movement,"

---

[15] Two examples suffice to demonstrate this: May 18, 1997 in Paris, the police broke up a demonstration of *sans papiers* in an extremely brutal manner. The press made no comment until some of the people concerned delivered to a judge four videocassettes which they had shot themselves and which gave incontrovertible evidence of these violent assaults (*Libération*, May 26, 1997). A similar scenario had unfolded in Nice a few days earlier and once again it was thanks to an amateur video that police violence was proven (*Libération*, May 30, 1997).

[16] Particularly by the increase in police blunders and the use of violence in demonstrations of the accusation of outside agitators, etc.

[17] Cf also Hall et al. 1978, Murdock, 1978 ; 1984, Fielding, 1991, Waddington. D, 1992, Della Porta et Reiter, 1998, Anderson, 1997, p. 38-72, etc..

"gangs from the projects," "wild hordes" that "swarm into" Paris, "invade" the city, "take" it, "set it ablaze."[18]

But these results remain for the most part inadequate in that generally, the police as a source is not really distinguished from a relatively opaque ensemble which includes the authorities, or the government. Here the remarks that Schlesinger (1990, p. 68) directed at Hall *et ali* (1978) need to be taken seriously, when he pointed out that the category of "primary definers" is extremely loose and that among all the actors located on the pole of authority, the chances for access to the media vary unequally according to the resources of each but also to the situations, and divergent interests can lead to a competitive rationale. In this game, the police forces at every level of rank have a role to play.

To increase our understanding of these phenomena, it would be wise, for example, to conduct specific research on the way the police sometimes develop strategies for maintaining public order in view of expected media coverage, particularly by recourse to the whole spectrum of provocation techniques (Fillieule, 1997a): the waiting game in the face of demonstrator violence, agents provocateurs (Marx, 1979), encouragement of resistance better to quash rebellion,[19] etc. A contrario, work needs to be done on the forms of cooperation observable between demonstrator groups and police forces during the event with the declared aim of "coproducing" a spectacle that will attract media attention. As Isabelle Sommier points out :

> "Cooperation with police forces can even be a personnalized services exchange between leaders on both sides or even a bargaining. Like this union representative who, to end an occupation of a public location without loosing the face, call with is "direct line" the *commissaire* X: "Listen, it could be OK if you come with 200 guys, but not in a drag queen fashion !" This is a special idiom for experts to mean "guys [some CRS] with riot helmets, with many tricks on them, so that they can be impressive. And we will say to our fellows: "The only way is to get out". Our honor is safe, we retreat under the pressure of the bayonets and my comrades are happy, you know. Everybody saw it, broadcasts were at the place, we could not escape but go out !" (sommier, 1990, p. 50).

In this case, the police forces openly instrumentalize the media (who are sometimes, but not always, complicit) with the objective of reducing tension during the event and avoiding any outbreaks of violence. We have ourselves observed a certain number of cases where, under the benevolent eyes of the police, demonstrators were allowed to set fire to a bus-shelter or a truck with the sole objective of allowing photographs to be taken by the media, before everyone then packed up and peacefully went home. (Bruneteaux, 1996, p. 272; Fillieule, 1997a; Fillieule and Jobard, 1998). What is striking in these practices, is that they sometimes go against the instructions to stand firm given by the political authorities (prefect, minister) and aim primarily to satisfy the ends pursued by professional order-keeping forces: not fight, not wound and not be wounded, in sum, avoid "on-the-job troubles" (Waddington, 1994).

In the case of France where there is a prolific regional press, it is also important to investigate the specific rationale of local journalists' dependency on police sources. Ethnographic observation of the everyday goings-on in the police stations of Nantes and Marseille has shown us to what extent city police information services play a role of an irreplaceable provider for a whole array of news stories that make up most of the local pages. Also, local journalists can serve as informers in numerous circumstances: for instance in Marseille and Nantes, it is often a phone call from a journalist that informs the police that a demonstration will take place in the days to come (Fillieule, 1997a). However, this remark is not sufficient evidence in that this "closeness to the source" is a structuring

---

[18]The headlines naturally differ considerably depending on the newspaper and although all media mention vandals, *Libération* and *Le Monde* only use the expression within quotes. On the other hand, the regional press fairly homogeneously makes direct use of the police categories.

[19]An age-old technique as attests Le Roy Ladurie's work on the troubles of the Romans carnaval during which, at the turn of the 16th century, a coalition of notables fueled a tax revolt among certain categories of the population better to repress it in blood and with terrifying cynicism (**Le Roy Ladurie, 1972**).

feature of the entire set of social relations that in the provinces links the police, the media and demonstrators (trade unions or associations, etc.).

In addition, without having conducted a specific study and on the basis merely of a provincial press analysis during the November 1990 movement, we will stick to a few hypotheses that for the moment have not been systematically checked: 1) the coverage of nationwide events (that generally take place in Paris), by the regional press depends first on press agencies (the AFP) and the national press; 2) due to the complex relations of dependency binding it, the local press is much more dependent on police sources than the national press for the coverage of local events; 3) the preeminence of police sources in covering local events varies according to the competition with other sources (coming from the authorities or demonstrators): the less social power the demonstrating group enjoys on the local level, the better the chances that the police will manage to impose its vision of the event.[20]

Finally, it would undoubtedly be highly useful to explore how police unions, wherever they exist in western democracies, exploit the media to put pressure on the police hierarchy and/or politicians to satisfy their demands. In France for example, we have shown (Fillieule, 1997a) how the 1977 police reforms and CRS discontent drove some unions to incite disturbances at demonstrations to prove, via the media, the ineffectiveness of reforms which had reduced them to a subordinate role. More recently, during the 1990 high school student movement, the astonishingly high number of police injuries and the alarmist statements of the unions to the press about "new threats" developing was contemporaneous with a lobbying offensive to the authorities for a renewal of defensive and offensive equipment (electric truncheons, flashballs).

Alice in the land of opinion-geared democracy

In earlier work, we provided detailed evidence that law and order enforcement is not applied in the same manner to all social groups, in that the sensitivity of the police forces to media surveillance is highly variable in relation to the nature of the demonstrators (Fillieule, 1997a, Fillieule and Jobard, 1998). In effect, police officials, all too often under orders from politicians, adapt their behavior to the media depending on the assumed popularity (particularly through polls[21]) of the demonstrating groups.

For example, when Act Up demonstrates, one knows that the press will be there and that the image of "Aids victims" being roughed up makes "good copy."

> "You know that I was there at dawn when Act Up covered the obelisk in the Place de la Concorde with a giant condom. And if we're talking about political analysis, I was in the room, I was finishing my night shift as usual, and I see it on the screen, and you ask yourself: 'What do we do? Pitch into them? Try to prevent them from going further?' We saw them arriving in platform, ladder trucks, etc. so you knew it was Act Up, that all the media were there filming and we froze things a bit, took things slowly, until the ministry managed to make the necessary contacts. Then he said to us: 'OK, you can withdraw and let them get on with it.' But there was a good half-hour where we had to cope by analyzing the situation. These weren't Kurds about to raze the obelisk on the Place de la Concorde, after all. And then there was also the issue of protecting the monument. If they'd damaged the obelisk, we'd never have heard the last of it".

---

[20]This point can scarcely be doubted. CGT demonstrations in Marseille regarding the closing of the Ciotat shipyards have always been covered "cautiously," even withComorians, or anti-racist demonstrations, because they do not activate considerable local resources ("foreigners," "Parisians"), result in highly "police-oriented" reports. Regarding the "empathetic" coverage of farmer demonstrations in Western France under the 5th republic, see the very thorough work by Nathalie Duclos (1998) and Molotch and Lester (1975) remarks in the United States.

[21] On the role of opinion polls in social movements, see Champagne, 1990 and Fillieule, 1993, p. 58-59.

On the other hand, in the case of groups with borderline support, the presence of the press (when, that is, they bother to turn up...) becomes far less important. Demonstrations "by foreigners" (Turks, Chinese, the *sans papiers*, etc…) are usually handled with little concern about media coverage (we have already cited one example of this in terms of the *sans papiers*), so much so that in certain cases, journalists are shoved aside quite roughly to avoid coverage of rounding-up operations.

This last point, regarding the differentiated management of demonstrating groups, for which one could doubtless find examples in other western democracies, should make researchers more wary when, working with macro-analysis of series statistics, they conclude there has been a general pacification in keeping law and order or a victory of the civil rights coalition over the law and order coalition. One must bear in mind that quantitative analysis of demonstrations, as it has developed over the last few years, and to which we ourselves have contributed, has, from this perspective, to a certain extent backfired by excluding certain questions which are neither politically nor socially neutral.

The myth of transparency and democratization of conflict by the media does raise some political issues which we would like to underline in conclusion.

In *Demonstration Democracy* (1970), Amitai Etzioni observed, at the beginning of the 70s, that recourse to direct expression of opinions was becoming increasingly common in democratic countries, visible both in the growth in number of demonstrations and their diffusion through all levels of society. Ten years later, in the last chapter of *Political Action* (1979), Barnes and Kaase were pleased to observe that demonstrations are now established as a normal aspect of political participation .

These accounts of the growing institutionalization of street action seems more timely than ever for the 80s and 90s. The current scope of direct participation prevents us from taking only the most visible manifestations, those which lead to or accompany political crises. Short of these rare occasions which create an "event," recourse to demonstrations in France but also in Europe (KRIESI *and alii*, 1995) seems to have become quite an everyday event. We also know that in addition to the highly developed mobilization of workers and the "educational community" (teachers, students, high school students and parents of schoolchildren), recourse to demonstrations affects most social categories. In the same way, the analysis of the doctrine and practice of maintaining public order leaves one to assume that today cooperation, or at least tolerance, takes precedence over direct confrontation (*Les Cahiers de la securite interieure*, 1997; Della Porta and Reiter, 1998).

This movement however embodies a paradox which is also to be found in the history of other protest actions: to the extent that demonstrations have become widespread, acceptable and more predictable, they seem to have lost political effectiveness. From this point of view, Frances Piven and Richard Cloward are undoubtedly right to prefer the term normalization to that of institutionalization to describe this kind of development (PIVEN and CLOWARD, 1991). In France, and in the period we have examined, this tendency to normalization has entailed at least two consequences.

On one hand, it has shifted the priority of protest movements from the need to "make trouble" to need to "make up the numbers," which clearly means that the resources that may contribute to the success of a demonstration have changed in nature and are, above all, accessible to groups with strong organization and powerful backing. The same would apply to strikes whose revolutionary potential has weakened as they have become institutionalized (PIVEN and CLOWARD, 1977; McCAMMON, 1990).

On the other hand, and here we are at the very heart of the issue of the role of the media, the dominant political discourse developed around the notion of "a communications society" aims to eliminate all traces of social conflict in favor of negotiation and dialogue (Neveu, 1994). In this world, conflict is increasingly perceived as a pathology and the rules of "good demonstrating" increasingly exclude the legitimacy of recourse to violence. Now, the fact that demonstrations are increasingly perceived as a peaceful and legitimate mode of expressing opinions effectively reinforces the exclusion of certain groups from the demonstration scene, groups for whom violence is perhaps the last recourse, but

which prevailing attitudes find decreasingly tolerable, justifying by the same token the selective, but quite real, resurgence of repression. Here we touch on a fascinating anthropological question with regard to the coexistence, in the same space and time, of various deep-seated forms of self-constraint that make recourse to violence seem to some as normal, even a natural part of the very identity of the group. But the distribution of resources that allows one to adapt to the new rules of the game of "opinion-geared democracy" is neither equally nor randomly distributed among social groups.[22] From this standpoint, the advantages that political domination can draw from the current changes in the public arena must not be underestimated. In this perspective, the occurrence of particularly violent demonstrations, the emergence of new forms of political protest — for example this vast macrocosm to which current idiom gives the generic term "(working-class) suburban rioting" — has maybe to do with these new forms of condemnation in which the constant presence of the media at the site of social conflict no doubt plays a role.

This last observation warns us not to give too much credence to the idea of a continual process of pacification of non-conventional participation which would fit into a process of euphemization of violence, inspired — often without much rigor — by the Elias school of sociology and for which one finds the exact counterpart in the idea of a civilizing process on the agents of state violence, due to the effect of greater transparency. It would be better in fact to avoid an eschatological vision which would tend to impose a meaning on the history of street conflict and of social movements, and hence a conclusion. Everything indicates that demonstrations, from the decision to hold one to the forms which it can take in action, is the product of a number of variables of which it is difficult to say if they have followed, are following or will follow, even tendentiously, a continuous process of institutionalization and routinization. The legitimacy of protest is always subject to contingent historical processes and nothing permits us to exclude a return to a delegitimized perspective which would bring in its wake a radicalization of street action and/or of repression[23].

To end, let us try to imagine the expression on Prefect Louis Lépine's face if he were to come back in our midst and visit his contemporary counterpart; he would be faced with modes of operation that he would never have dared imagine, even in his wildest dreams: by and large, demonstrators cooperate with the police, assemble at the previously agreed upon location, proceed along an agreed route and disperse peacefully, regardless of the perceived results of their action. And here we return to our introductory remarks regarding the nature of power relationships in a democracy and the idea that a gradual passing from a power of injunction to a power of influence has particularly had the effect of reinforcing domination.

---

[22]On the working-class culture see for instance Hoggart (1957); Verret (1996)

[23] This point has already been made by Chris Rootes (1981, p. 429) in his critique of *Political Action* .

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Anderson, Alison, 1997, *Media, Culture and the Environment*, UCL-Press.

Aubert. Emmanuel, 1996, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête relative aux événements de novembre et décembre 1986*, Assemblée nationale, 8°législature, (n°850).

Barnes. S, Kaase. M, et alii, 1979, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverley Hills, CA, Sage Publication.

Barranco José and Dominique Wisler (1999), « Validity and Systematicity of Newspaper Data in Event Analysis », *European Review of sociology* (forthcoming).

Bruneteaux, Patrick, 1996 *; Maintenir l'ordre,* Paris, Presses de Science Po.

Champagne, Patrick, 1990, *Faire l'opinion*, Paris, Minuit.

Crandon, Garth, 1992, *The Police and the Media. Information Management and the Construction of Crime News*, Bradford, Horton Publishing LTD.

Dalton, Russell, 1996, *Citizen Politics*, *******

Della Porta, Donatella and Reiter, Herbert, (eds), *Policing Protest. The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Della Porta, Donatella, Fillieule, Olivier and Reiter Herbert, 1998, « Policing Protest in France and Italy : From Intimidation to Cooperation ? », in Meyer, David, S and Tarrow, Sidney (eds*), The Social Movement Society. Contentious Politics for a New Century*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc, p. 111-130.

Duclos, Nathalie, 1998, *Les violences paysannes sous la cinquième République*, Paris, Economica.

Etzioni, Amitai, 1970, *Demonstration Democracy*, New York, Gordon and Breach.

Favre, Pierre, 1990, "Nature et statut de la violence dans les manifestations contemporaines", *Les Cahiers de La Sécurité Intérieure*, 1, p. 149-169.

Fielding, Nigel, 1991, *The Police and Social Conflict*, London, Athlone Press.

Fillieule, Olivier (ed), 1993, *Sociologie de la protestation. Les formes de l'action collective dans la France contemporaine*, Paris, L'Harmattan.

Fillieule, Olivier and Jobard, Fabien, 1998, « The Policing of Protest in France : Toward a Model of Protest Policing », in Della Porta, Donatella and Reiter, Herbert, (eds), *Policing Protest. The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p.70-90.

Fillieule, Olivier, 1997a, *Stratégies de la rue. Les manifestations en France*, Paris, Presses de Science Po.

Fillieule, Olivier, 1997b, « Du pouvoir d'injonction au pouvoir d'influence », *Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure*, n°27.

Fillieule, Olivier, 1998, « 'Plus ça change, moins ça change'. Demonstrations in France during the Nineteen-Eighties », in Rucht, Dieter, Koopmans, R and Neidhart, F (eds) *******

Gamson, William. A and Modigliani. A, 1989, « Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power : A Constructionist Approach », *American Journal of Sociology*, 95 (1), p . 1-37.

Gans, Herbert, J, 1979, *Deciding what's News : A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*, London, Constable.

Geary, Roger, 1985, *Policing Industrial Disputes. 1893 to 1985*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, *Bad News*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Glasgow University Media Group, 1980; *More Bad News*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hall et alii. 1978, *Policing the Crisis : Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*, London, MacMIllan.

Hoggart, Richard, 1957, *The Uses of Literacy*, Catto and Windus.

Kriesi. Hanspeter, Koopmans. R, Duyvendak. J. W et Giugni. M, 1995, *The Politics of New Social Movements in Western Europe*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel, *Le carnaval de Romans, De la Chandeleur au mercredi des Cendres 1579-1580*, Paris, Gallimard, 1979.

Les Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure, 1997, « Le maintien de l'ordre », n°27.

Marx, Gary. T, 1979, "External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes and Complications", in McCarthy. J. et Zald. M (dir.), *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Cambridge Mass, Winthrop Pub, p. 94-125.

Marx, G. T, 1974, "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant : the Agent Provocateur and the Informant", *American Journal of Sociology*, 80, p. 402-429.

Marx, Gary, 1998, « Some Reflections on the Democratic Policing of Demonstrations », in Della Porta, Donatella and Reiter, Herbert, (eds), *Policing Protest. The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 253-270.

McCammon, H. J, 1990, "Legal Limits on Labor Militancy: Labor Law and the Right to Strike since the New Deal", *Social Problems*, vol 37, n°2, p. 206-229.

McCarthy, John, D and McPhail, Clark, 1998, « The Institutionnalization of Protest in the United States », in Meyer, David, S and Tarrow, Sidney (eds*), The Social Movement Society. Contentious Politics for a New Century*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc, p.83-111.

Molotch, Harvey and Lester, M, 1975, « Accidental News : The Great oil Spill as Local Occurrence and National Event », *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, p. 235-260.

Molotch, Harvey, 1979; « Media and Movements », in McCarthy, John. D and Zald. Mayer. N, *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Cambridge, Winthrop, , p. 71-93.

Murdock, Graham, 1984, « Reporting the Riots : Images and Impact », in Benyon, John (ed*), Scarman and After* ,Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 73-95.

Neveu, Eric, 1994, *Une société de communication ?,* Paris, Montchrestien, collection clefs.

Piven, Frances and Cloward, Richard, 1991, "Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* (4), p. 435-458.

Rootes, Chris, 1981, "On the Future of Protest Politics in Western Democracies -A Critique of Barnes, Kaase et al., *Political Action*", *European Journal of Political Research* 9, p. 421-432.

Rucht, Koopmans. R and Neidhart. F (eds), 1998, *Protest Events Analysis*, *******

Schlesinger, P, 1990; « Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism : Source Strategies and the Limits of MediaCentrism », in Ferguson. M (ed), *Public Communication : The New Imperatives*, London, Sage, p. 61-83.

Sommier, Isabelle, 1990, *Analyse des services d'ordre CGT et CFDT*, mémoire de DEA, Paris, EHESS, unpublished M. A . Dissertation,

Tarrow. Sidney, 1994, *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Tchakhotine, Serge, 1952, *Le viol des foules par la propagande politique*, Paris, Gallimard.

Verret, Michel, *La culture ouvrière*, Paris, L'Harmattan.

Von Zoonen, Elisabeth, 1990, « The Women's Movement and the Media : Constructing a Public Identity », *European Journal of Communication,* vol 7, n°4, p. 453-476.

Waddington, Peter, A ; J, 1994 ; *Liberty and Order, Public Order in a Capital City*, Londres, UCL Press.

Waddington, Denis, 1992, *Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder: A Comparative and Historical Approach*, London, NY, Routledge.

Wisler, Dominique and Marco Tackenberg, (1998), "Quand dire c'est réprimer. Espace public et stratégies de rue", in Les *Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure*, no 32 (forthcoming)

Wisler, Dominique and Marco Tackenberg, 1999. « The role of the police in public disorders : image or reality ? », In : *Patterns of provocation*, ed. by Richard Bessel and Clive Emsley, Berghahn Publishers, New York (forthcoming).s