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MWP 2017/02
Max Weber Programme

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EUI Working Paper **MWP** 2017/02

ISSN 1830-7728

Printed in Italy
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
www.eui.eu
cadmus.eui.eu

Abstract
In a growing number of countries, the two dominant political poles of the 20th century, the parties of the Left and the Centre-Right, are challenged by a third pole made up by the Radical Right. Between 2000 and 2015, the Radical Right has obtained more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries and in over twenty national elections. We argue that the three poles compete with each other for the allegiance of different social classes. Our analysis shows the micro-foundations of class voting in nine West European countries where the political space was tripolar for part – or all – of the period between 2000 and 2015. Based on the European Social Survey 2002-2014, we find that socio-cultural professionals still form the party preserve of the Left, and large employers and managers constitute the party preserve of the Centre-Right. However, the Radical Right competes with the Centre-Right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the Left over its traditional working-class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the coexistence of old and new patterns of class voting. The analysis of voters' attitudes shows that old patterns are structured by the economic axis of conflict: production workers' support for the Left and small business owners' endorsement of the Centre-Right. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the Radical Right and structured by the cultural axis of conflict: the support for the Radical Right by production workers and small business owners.

Keywords
Class Voting, Social Classes, Parties, Radical Right, Left, Centre-Right.

This version: 20. 1. 2016

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Introduction

The electoral rise of Radical Right-wing parties has led to the formation of three political poles of increasingly similar size in Western Europe. In a growing number of countries, the two dominant poles of the 20th century, the political parties of the Left and the Centre-Right, are challenged by a third pole made up by the Radical Right. This emergence of a tripolar political space has accompanied the electoral decline of the mainstream parties of the Left and the Right – the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats (Martin, 2013). While the political space had crystallized into a clear triangular configuration by 2000 in a few countries only, most notably in France (Grunberg & Schweisguth, 2003; Bornschier & Lachat, 2009), it quickly became the rule rather than the exception across Western Europe by 2016.

The argument of a tripolar political space is not new. It has been applied to party families' ideologies (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008) and voters' attitudes (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). We develop this argument further by uncovering the underlying structural basis for this tripolar division. We argue that, in the tripolar political space, the three poles are in competition with each other over different occupational segments of the electorate. The Left competes with the Radical Right for the support of the working class, notably production workers, whereas the Centre-Right competes with the Radical Right for the votes of the old middle class, made up of small business owners. In turn, the Left and the Centre-Right are in competition for the support of the growing salaried middle class. The rise of the Radical Right has thus not only shifted electoral competition from a bipolar to a tripolar setting, but has also triggered a process of realignment between socio-demographic groups and political parties and thereby led to a renaissance of class voting (Rydgren, 2013).

A tripolar configuration presupposes that there are at least two dimensions of political conflict. A first *economic* dimension separates the mainstream left from the mainstream right, whereas a second *cultural* dimension pits the Radical Right against both the established Left and Right (Kitschelt, 1994). Our ambition is to locate occupational classes in this two-dimensional space and thus to draw the socio-structural map of electoral competition between the three party blocs.

We focus on the political demand-side of voters and analyse the micro-foundations of electoral competition for nine West European countries where the political space was tripolar for part – or all – of the period between 2000 and 2015: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. We consider a political space to be tripolar if each of the three poles, and notably the Radical Right, obtains more than 12 per cent of the national vote. This was the case for over 20 national elections between 2000 and 2015. Our empirical analysis takes full advantage of the European Social Survey by merging the survey's seven rounds, from 2002 to 2014, into a single dataset.

Our paper first develops a model that shows how parties compete for classes in the tripolar political space. We then define the party poles, present the three poles' electoral size, and discuss our measures for class and attitudes. We then provide empirical results on class voting and show the extent to which the class effect is mediated by differences in voters' economic and cultural attitudes. The conclusion summarizes our main findings.

Parties in the tripolar political space

A political system can only accommodate three different poles if it is based on at least two dimensions. Several authors argue, theoretically and empirically, that voters' preferences are structured along two axes (Bornschier, 2010; Hooghe et al. 2002; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008). A first economic axis goes from a socialist to a capitalist end and plots supporters of income redistribution against supporters of free market solutions. A second cultural axis relates to the politics of identity and runs from a libertarian to a traditional end. While the first axis is about materialist needs and the market, the second is about belonging to a community.

We argue that three party blocs can usefully be distinguished within this political space, based on parties' ideology (Mair & Mudde, 1998): the Left, the Centre-Right and the Radical Right. Parties of the Left include Social Democrats, Communists, Greens and the New Left, which combine an economic position in favour of a strong welfare state with a culturally liberal stance on migration and multiculturalism. Parties of the Centre-Right comprise Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives, which oppose the Left over state intervention into the economy, but share – although less fervently – the Left's liberal stance on cultural issues. The Radical Right includes right-wing populist parties for whom the economic axis is of subordinate importance (Mudde, 2007), as they abandoned their initial neoliberal stance of the 1980s (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2013) and blurred their socio-economic positions in order to attract broader support (Afonso, 2015; Rovny, 2013). What sets the Radical Right apart as a third pole is its challenge of both the Left and the Centre-Right over cultural issues by strongly opposing immigration, multiculturalism and European integration.

The classification of party families into three poles may meet with three objections. A first concern is that it lumps together very different party families. We argue that the litmus test for the three poles is whether parties of a given pole share a common ideological basis which makes them natural coalition partners for government formation. This seems to be the case for Social-Democrats, Greens and Communists on the Left, as well as for Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives on the Centre-Right. In contrast, grand coalitions between the left and the right are the exception, and the participation of Radical Right parties in government even more exceptional – "a rarity in Western Europe" (Mudde, 2013: 5).

A second objection is that the Radical Right simply expands the right-wing bloc (Bale, 2003), and is thus best seen within the unidimensional Left-right opposition of parties (Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Our reading of the literature's empirical evidence disagrees with this argument. While the triangular party competition has been shown most clearly in France (Bornschier & Lachat, 2009; Gougou & Labouret, 2013; Grunberg & Schweisguth, 2003), more recent evidence for the 2000s based on media-content data (Kriesi, 2012) and expert surveys on parties (Cochrane, 2013) points to tripartition in an increasing number of West European countries. The rise of the New Left has resulted in a rapprochement on cultural issues within the left between Social Democrats and Green parties. In contrast, the rise of the Radical Right has led to a split within the right between the economically and culturally liberal Centre-Right and the culturally traditional Radical Right (Cochrane, 2013; Kriesi et al., 2015: 3).

A third objection considers the Radical Right to be too small to constitute a pole in its own right. While we provide evidence on this issue in the results section, a brief look at electoral scores helps us to discard the argument at this stage. Between 2000 and 2015, parties of the Radical Right obtained more than 22 per cent of the popular vote in two or more national elections in Austria, Norway and Switzerland – and more than 15 per cent in two national elections in Finland, France and the Netherlands. Clearly, we do not deal here with small and short-lived protest parties. In the period since 2010, clear examples of political tripartition are found – besides in France – in small, affluent West European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

In parallel to the rise of the Radical Right, we observe the electoral decline of the mainstream parties of the left and right. Averaged over 15 West European countries, Social Democrats received the constant support of 30 per cent of voters between 1945 and 1980, before seeing their electoral share fall to 28 per cent in 1991-2000 and to 25 per cent in 2006-2010 (Martin, 2013: 544). Likewise, Christian Democrats saw their proportion of the national vote drop from 23 per cent in the 1950s to 20 per cent in the 1970s and to 14 per cent in 2006-2010 (Martin, 2013: 544). In parallel, the largest gains since 1990 were made by the Radical Right. While it is the smallest pole in the triangular political space, it is by no means insignificant. On the contrary, a look at recent elections in Germany (AfD) or the UK (UKIP) suggests that its electoral catch-up process in Europe is still under way.

Voters and classes in the tripolar political space

The rise of the Radical Right has not only been the decisive impetus for the formation of a third pole and hence of a tripolar party space. It has also contributed – together with the rise of the New Left and Green parties a decade earlier – to a process of electoral realignment where old ties between classes and parties have loosened and been replaced by new ties. Electoral competition in the tripolar space is thus not a mere conflict over values, it is also anchored in the occupational structure. The three poles compete for the votes of different classes and, given the right analytical tools, the micro-foundations of this new form of class voting should clearly emerge.

We begin by clarifying the concept of class voting, which we define as the presence of systematic links between voters' class location – their position in the labour market – and the parties they support. Which classes relate to which parties is then an empirical question, with workers voting for the Left being just one instance of class voting (e.g. Evans, 2000, Oesch 2008a). Furthermore, we argue that voters' class positions may affect both their economic *and* cultural attitudes. In their jobs, people do not only make a living, but are also exposed to experiences of autonomy and control, and to a specific set of social interactions with superiors, colleagues, clients, patients, or pupils. These work experiences likely contribute to shaping voters' values on both economic *and* cultural issues – and may result in systematic differences in class voting (Kitschelt, 2010: 666; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014: 9-10; Oesch, 2013: 32).

Of course, individuals' identities are not only forged by their class position, but also by religion, language or nationality. Party choice is then determined by the identity that is most salient – and depends on parties' efforts to articulate different identities and mobilize around particular conflicts (Bornschier, 2010: 58-59).

In order to draw the map of class voting in the tripolar political space, we distinguish three types of relationship that link classes to the party poles: (i) some classes are the *preserve* of one particular pole; (ii) some classes are the *contested stronghold* of two different poles; (iii) all three poles are in *open competition* over some classes. In a party preserve, one sole party pole receives above-average electoral support from a class, whereas the two other poles obtain below-average support from the same class. In a contested stronghold, two party poles receive above-average electoral support from a class, and the last pole receives below-average support from the same class. In open competition, none of the three poles receives above- or below-average electoral support from a class.

These three types of relationship provide a useful tool to grasp both breaks and continuities in class voting and to accommodate situations in which party dominance over one class has weakened without completely disappearing. Depending on the countries studied, research on class voting shows the resilience of traditional forms of class voting (Evans & Tilley, 2012a; Rennwald & Evans, 2014) or emphasizes the emergence of new patterns of class voting (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005; Oesch, 2013).

We argue that the two traditional party blocs of the Left and the Centre-Right each keep one class as its *preserve*: the Left is the uncontested champion of professionals in health care, education, social welfare and the media (henceforth: socio-cultural professionals), whereas the Centre-Right benefits from the strong endorsement of large employers, managers and liberal professionals. The two mainstream poles are challenged by the Radical Right over two of their *traditional strongholds*: the Left faces strong competition over the working class, while the Centre-Right struggles to keep the votes of the old middle class of small business owners. Finally, there is *open competition* between the three poles for the votes of two classes, technical professionals and technicians (henceforth: technical specialists) as well as office clerks (such as secretaries and receptionists).

Our model is shown in Figure 1 and locates the position of party poles and classes within the two-dimensional political space. This model thus depicts how we expect the electoral competition over a given class to play out. We begin with liberal professionals, large employers and managers. Their privileged location within the class structure not only leads them to adopt market-liberal economic preferences, but also leaves them undaunted by globalization, immigration and multiculturalism. Given their preferences for market solutions and cultural liberalism, the Centre-Right should be in a clear pole position for the vote of these classes.

In contrast, socio-cultural professionals mostly work as wage-earners in the public sector and likely favour a strong welfare state and income redistribution (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015). More importantly, as their work process consists mainly of social interactions – teaching, nursing, counselling – and requires tolerance for cultural diversity, they should have markedly libertarian cultural preferences (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014: 6-7; Kriesi, 1998: 169). Ever since the rise of the new social movements that mobilized around post-materialist issues in the 1970s and 1980s (Kriesi, 1989), socio-cultural professionals should be the preserve of the Left.

Figure 1 about here

While the rise of the Radical Right has by no means challenged the Left's predominance among socio-cultural professionals, it has led to a bitter contest over the traditional leftist stronghold of the working class, notably production workers. The latter were not only hit by de-industrialization, mass unemployment and trade union decline, but also often lost out in the economic reforms of Third Way social democratic governments (Arndt, 2013). Not surprisingly, they do not share in the Third Way optimism about the knowledge society (Betz & Meret, 2013). The waning conflict over the economy between the mainstream left and right has thus opened a highway for the Radical Right to attract the working-class vote over cultural issues. All the more so as the traditional left further alienated its blue-collar basis by following the New Left and adopting increasingly libertarian cultural positions. In this context, the Radical Right has made belonging to the national community an attractive identity. By upholding national sovereignty against disappearing borders and defending local traditions against multiculturalism, it has become a powerful contender for the working-class vote (Bornschier, 2010; De Lange, 2007; Oesch, 2008b)

The Radical Right does not only challenge the Left over the working-class vote, but also the Centre-Right over its traditional stronghold of small business owners. Economically, these two classes form an uneasy alliance: the working class is pro-redistribution and small business owners are pro-business (Ivarsflaten, 2005). However, they share similar preferences on cultural issues. The Radical Right's resistance to open borders and multiculturalism also strikes a chord with small business owners (Kriesi et al., 2008); while their economic preferences move them towards the Centre-Right, their cultural attitudes lead them to support the Radical Right.

Our model expects limited competition for the classes that are party preserves, and a two-way competition for the contested strongholds. In contrast, electoral competition is likely to be very open for two classes whose occupational location puts them close to the median voter: technical specialists and office clerks. The former require higher levels of education, earn above-average wages and are less vulnerable to technological change. Accordingly, they may be somewhat more market-liberal and culturally libertarian than clerks. Still, for these two classes, we do not expect any party pole to have a decisive advantage over the two others.

Hypotheses on class voting

This overview allows us to summarize our *hypotheses* about the micro-foundations of the electoral competition in the tripolar political space.

First, with respect to party preserves, we expect socio-cultural professionals to disproportionately vote for the Left, and to do so based on their cultural preferences (H1). Likewise, we expect managers to disproportionately vote for the Centre-Right, and to do so based on their economic preferences (H2).

Second, with respect to contested strongholds, we expect the working class, and notably production workers, to split their vote between the Left (based on their economic preferences), and the Radical Right (based on their cultural preferences) (H3). Likewise, we expect small business owners to split their vote between the Centre-Right (based on their economic preferences) and the Radical Right (based on their cultural preferences) (H4).

Third, in a temporal perspective, we expect the electoral rise of the Radical Right to have no influence on the two party preserves – socio-cultural professionals (and their vote for the Left) and

managers (and their vote of the Centre-Right) (H5) –, but to accompany growing support in the two contested strongholds – production workers (at the cost of the Left) and small business owners (at the cost of the Centre-Right) (H6).

Definition of party poles, data and measures

Definition of party poles

We define party poles on the basis of parties' ideology and limit our analysis to Western Europe. While the attribution of parties to the Left and, to a lesser extent, to the Centre-Right seems straightforward, the situation is more ambiguous for parties of the Radical Right. We define the Radical Right as a broad political family which shares a common ideology based on nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2013: 3). This encompassing definition leads us to include parties that display very different historical trajectories: former traditional Centre-Right parties such as the Swiss People's Party and the Austrian Freedom Party (during its liberal period in the early 1980s), former anti-tax movements such as the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, extreme-right parties such as the French National Front and Flemish *Vlaams Belang*, newcomers with a strong nationalist-populist profile such as the Dutch Freedom Party, the Finns Party and the Sweden Democrats.[1]

We consider parties to form a pole if they obtained at least 12 per cent of the votes in a national election over the period 2000-2015. Reaching between 10 to 15 per cent of the votes constitutes an important threshold for emerging parties, such as those of the Radical Right. If a Radical Right party reaches this threshold, it acquires real electoral weight and makes the government formation by a mainstream left or right party bloc much harder – we then observe a tripolar configuration. But of course, the criterion of 12 per cent is somewhat arbitrary; we choose it for pragmatic reasons because it is both restrictive and flexible enough to analyse the Radical Right – a threshold of 15 per cent would exclude too many elections, while 10 per cent would be too inclusive. Over the period under study, the 12 per cent mark is systematically surpassed by the Left and the Centre-Right in Western Europe. In contrast, the radical right pole only emerges in some countries and elections. Table A.1 in the appendix shows the parties that we consider belonging to the Radical Right and their scores in all the national elections between 2000 and 2015.

The electoral size of the three party poles

The formation of a tripolar political space largely depends on the Radical Right and its capacity to attract enough voters to constitute a third party pole. The West European countries with a sizeable Radical Right pole can be divided into two groups. In a first group, the Radical Right was solidly established over the entire period between 2000 and 2015, and includes Austria, Denmark, France, Norway, Switzerland and, with more fluctuations, Belgium and the Netherlands. In a second group, the Radical Right has made its breakthrough more recently and only emerged as a third pole after 2010. This applies to Finland and Sweden as well as to Greece and the United Kingdom, two countries not covered by our data and hence excluded from the analysis.[2] In a last group, the Radical Right is either absent, insignificant, (still) too small to be considered a third pole or it made its national break-through after 2015. This is the case of Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain as well as the more ambiguous case of Italy (not taking into account the populist Five Star Movement at the 2013

[1] Several parties are difficult to classify. We attribute the short-lived List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands to the Radical Right pole, but neither the National Alliance nor the Forza Italia/People of Freedom in Italy (see Bobba & McDonnell, 2015: 165). We do not count the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) as Radical Right, its separatist agenda making it an outlier. In order to include all parties in a given country, the radical-right pole also comprises neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties. However, with the exception of Greece, these parties do not form the basis of a sizeable radical-right pole. In the past, parties that did not take their distance with their Nazi or fascist heritage were less likely to succeed (Ignazi, 2003).

[2] For Greece, the relevant rounds of the ESS are missing. For the United Kingdom, the electoral breakthrough of UKIP took place in 2015 and thus after the last available ESS round.

general election). Table A.2 in the appendix shows the electoral strength of the Radical Right across Western Europe between 2000 and 2015.

In order to gauge the size of the Radical Right pole relative to the other poles, we attribute (almost) all parties to one of the three poles.[3] The Left includes the Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour parties, as well as Green parties, Communist parties and radical Left parties. The Centre-Right includes the Conservative, Christian Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties.[4] Figure 2 presents the electoral strength of these three poles, averaged over the most recent period from 2010 to 2015. We observe the clearest tripolar configuration of the party system in Austria and Switzerland where the Radical Right pole attracts a quarter of the electorate. In Denmark, Finland, France, and Norway, the Radical Right pole receives between 15 and 20 per cent of the vote. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden the Radical Right barely obtains 12 per cent of votes and clearly constitutes a smaller pole than the Left or the Centre-Right.

Figure 2 about here

Data and measures

Our analysis of class voting is set at the individual level and based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS has been collected biennially since 2002, and we merge the seven available rounds between 2002 and 2014 into a single dataset. Our sample includes only those countries and elections when all three poles – and notably the Radical Right – obtained at least 12 per cent of votes. Therefore, we include all seven rounds for Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, but one single round for Sweden (2014, when the Sweden Democrats received 12.9 per cent of the national vote). Based on this criterion, our sample includes data from nine countries, and between one to seven ESS rounds per country: Austria (4 rounds), Belgium (3), Denmark (7), Finland (2), France (5), Netherlands (2), Norway (7), Sweden (1), Switzerland (7).

Measures

In the ESS, respondents are asked what party they voted for in the last national parliamentary election. This question provides us with the dependent variable: party choice grouped into three poles, Left, Centre-Right, Radical Right.[5] We correct for the underrepresentation of Radical Right voters in the ESS by constructing individual-level weights that adjust our data for the official score that each pole received in the national election, corresponding to a given ESS round. We apply these weights as well as the ESS design weights to all our analyses.

Our key independent variable is voters' class position – their location within the labour market – which we measure with a detailed class schema based on two dimensions (Oesch 2006, 2013). A first dimension distinguishes *hierarchically* between more or less advantageous employment relationships based on people's marketable skills, whereas as a second dimension discriminates *horizontally* between different work logics.

The combination of the two dimensions leads to the 8-class schema shown in table A.3 in the appendix. This schema allows us to identify three classes belonging to the salaried middle class: (1) managers such as personnel managers, accountants and administrators; (2) technical specialists such as

[3] A few parties were not attributed to any pole, notably some regionalist parties (e.g. the SNP in Scotland), very religious parties (e.g. the SGP in the Netherlands or the EDU in Switzerland), Pirates parties, short-lived parties and smaller lists that are commonly classified under "others" in official election results. The detailed classification is available from the authors.

[4] When attributing the social-liberal parties of Northern Europe to a party pole, we considered their tendency to be natural coalition partners of either the left or the centre-right. Therefore, we allocated the Dutch *D66* and the Danish *Radikale Venstre* to the left, because those two parties were more often in governmental coalitions with the left than with the centre-right. In contrast, *Venstre* in Norway participated more often in right-wing coalitions, so we classified it in the centre-right.

[5] As presidential elections are of greater relevance than parliamentary elections in France's semi-presidential regime, we select the question about which candidate the respondent voted for in the last presidential election in France.

engineers, IT specialists and technicians; (3) socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals such as doctors, teachers and social workers. Two other classes form the working class: (4) production workers such as mechanics, assemblers and carpenters; (5) service workers such as waiters, shop assistants and nursing aides. Another class is in the twilight zone between the middle and working class: (6) clerks such as secretaries, postal clerks and receptionists. Finally, we distinguish two classes of the self-employed: (7) large employers and liberal professionals such as self-employed lawyers and dentists; (8) small business owners such as shop owners, independent artisans and farmers.

Respondents to the ESS are allocated to one of these 8 classes based on their current or, if missing, past job. We thus also attribute a class location to the unemployed, retired or economically inactive. We argue that an unemployed lawyer still faces different life chances than an unemployed assembler, as is the case of a retired medical doctor compared to a retired textile worker. Our class measure is based on three sets of information: on employment status (separating employers and the self-employed from employees), on the number of employees (separating large employers with 9 and more employees from small business owners with 0 to 8 employees) and, most importantly, on detailed occupation (based on ISCO 4-digit).[6]

Alongside the class variable, we construct two indicators to capture citizens' preferences on the economic-distributive and cultural-identitarian axes. For the economic axis, we use the only question about economic preferences that has been asked in all seven ESS rounds: "government should reduce differences in income levels".[7] This question was answered on an ordinal 5-point scale (from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree") which we standardized between 0 and 1. For the cultural axis, we use three questions regarding immigration ("cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants"), the European Union ("European unification should go further or has gone too far") and cultural liberalism ("gays are free to live as they wish").[8] Again, we standardize the answers (given on an 11-point scale or 5-point scale for the item on cultural liberalism) between 0 and 1 and calculate each voter's position on the cultural axis as his or her average value on these three questions.[9]

Class voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right

We scrutinize the class basis of the three party poles' electorate in Figure 3 by showing for each class the deviation from the party pole's mean score; horizontal bars to the left thus imply below-average electoral support, and bars to the right above-average support. Our data confirm the presence of two party preserves. The first preserve comprises socio-cultural professionals who lend disproportionate support to the Left. 54 per cent of this growing class voted for the Left – as compared to 35 per cent for the Centre-Right and only 7 per cent for the Radical Right. If it were only for socio-cultural professionals, the Radical Right would be condemned to an irrelevant minority status.

The second party preserve comprises capital owners and their agents: large employers and self-employed professionals, small business owners and managers. The Centre-Right is particularly successful among large employers and self-employed professionals among whom it obtains 56 per

[6] For more detail on the concept and measurement of the class variable, see Oesch (2006: 270-2). The script used for the construction of this class schema can be downloaded in Stata or SPSS from the webpage of one of the authors: http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts

[7] As a robustness check, we use the ESS rounds 2002 and 2008 and measure the economic axis with an additional item. In 2002, this item is: "employees need strong trade unions to protect working conditions"; in 2008: "jobs for everyone is government's responsibility". The resulting configuration of voters' attitudes by class and parties looks very similar to the pattern observed with only one item.

[8] The item on the EU is not available in rounds 1 and 5. In these two rounds, the cultural axis is based solely on the items relative to immigration and cultural liberalism.

[9] A principal component analysis of the four items confirms that the question on differences in income levels loads heavily on a first component, whereas the three other items all load on a second component. Together, these two components explain 63 per cent of variance in the four attitudinal variables (see table A.4 in the appendix).

cent of all votes – twice as much as the Left and four times as much as the Radical Right. The Centre-Right also holds greatest appeal among small business owners. The competition for this class is clearly in favour of the Centre-Right (53 per cent of all votes), although small business owners also lend disproportionate support to the Radical Right (23 per cent), thus preferring it over the Left (21 per cent).

Our hypothesis of a contested stronghold applies better to the working class – production and service workers – than to small business owners. While the Centre-Right makes its lowest score among production and service workers, the Radical Right is most successful among these same two classes with 31 and 23 per cent respectively. Were it only for production workers, the Radical Right would be much stronger, with almost a third of the electorate. It thus clearly challenges the Left for the allegiance of the working class. If we do not control for country and year, production workers are no more likely than the average voter to support the Left (38 per cent) – and service workers only slightly more likely (42 per cent).

Figure 3 about here

The different class profiles of our three party poles emerge more clearly when we adopt a compositional perspective and disaggregate each pole's electorate according to class (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The Radical Right depends strongly on the working-class vote. Half of its voters are either production or service workers – as compared to a third of the Left's electorate and a quarter of the Centre-Right's electorate. The Left compensates its waning stronghold among working-class voters with success among socio-cultural professionals, who make up 21 per cent of its electorate – as compared to only 6 per cent among Radical Right voters. The Centre-Right in turn relies less on the working class and socio-cultural professionals, but draws its strength from large employers and liberal professionals, managers and small business owners. Together, these entrepreneurial classes constitute almost 40 per cent of its electorate – as compared to 24 per cent of the Left and 26 per cent of the Radical Right. Contrary to our expectation, small business owners do not weigh heavily within the Radical Right's electorate. They make up only 12 per cent – and therefore less than in the electorate of the Centre-Right (14 per cent), but more than in that of the Left (6 per cent).

Our argument about class voting in the tripolar political space has a temporal dimension: We expect the realignment between classes and party poles to be triggered by the rise of the Radical Right. Finland and Sweden allow us to test this argument as our data cover both an election without a tripolar configuration (when the Radical Right was still irrelevant) and with a tripolar configuration (when the Radical Right made its breakthrough). In Finland, the Radical Right increased its voting share fourfold from 4 to 19 per cent between the elections of 2007 and 2011. In Sweden, it doubled its share from 6 to 13 per cent between the elections of 2010 and 2014.

Figure 4 shows the difference in party support by class before and after the emergence of a tripolar political space. In both countries, the Radical Right made its largest gains among production workers (+26 percentage points in Finland, +18 in Sweden), followed by small employers (+18 points in Finland, +11 in Sweden). For the Left, the rise of the Radical Right meant heavy electoral losses among production workers (-19 points in Finland, -8 in Sweden) and moderate losses among service workers and clerks. While the Radical Right strongly challenged the Left over the working-class vote, it had no impact on support for the Left among socio-cultural professionals. This support remained (almost) stable in Finland and increased strongly in Sweden (by 15 points). With the emergence of a tripolar configuration, the Centre-Right lost out most clearly among small business owners in Finland (-15 points) and large employers and self-employed professionals in Sweden (-23 points).

Figure 4 about here

The economic and cultural attitudes linking classes with party poles

We expect different class positions to go along with different sets of attitudes – and these attitudes should pick up the class effect and translate it into party choice. Based on the issues discussed above,

we plot voters' preferences on the economic and cultural axes into the two-dimensional political space shown in Figure 5. Although we aggregate voters' preferences at the level of both classes and party poles, our analysis relates only to the electoral *demand-side*: The location of a given party poles reflects the mean positions of their voters on economic and cultural issues.

At the level of *party poles*, we observe the triangular configuration found by other scholars (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Voters of the Centre-Right are close to the median voter in terms of cultural preferences, but hold distinctly market-liberal economic attitudes. Voters of the Radical Right are economically more centrist than those of the Centre-Right, but take a more right-wing stance over cultural issues and cluster at the bottom end of the cultural-preference axis. Voters of the Left stand out in terms both of their socialist attitudes on the economic axis and their libertarian attitudes on the cultural axis. Economically, they are at greatest variance from the voters of the Centre-Right. Culturally, they differ most from the voters of the Radical Right.

At the level of *classes*, socio-cultural professionals are particularly libertarian. Although they also take a more leftist stance over economic issues, what clearly sets them apart is their cultural libertarianism. The opposite – traditional – end of the cultural axis is occupied by small business owners and, above all, production workers. While these two classes share similar cultural attitudes, they diverge on economic preferences. Small business owners are more market-liberal – and in this respect more similar to the electorate of the Centre-Right –, whereas production workers hold more leftist economic attitudes.

These results on attitudes suggest that the three party poles compete most fiercely over three class segments. First, the Left and the Radical Right compete for the working class; depending on whether economic or cultural issues are more salient, production and service workers either choose the Left or the Radical Right. Second, the Left and the Centre-Right compete for the salaried middle class – managers and technical specialists –, and this conflict mainly concerns the economic dimension. Third, the Centre-Right and the Radical Right compete for small business owners, and this conflict relates to the cultural dimension.

Figure 5 about here

To what extent do economic and cultural preferences account for the class differences in party choice? We examine this question by estimating multinomial regressions on the determinants of voting for one of the three party poles (see Table 1). Resorting to a multivariate model also allows us to test whether the link between classes and party poles holds once we account for other determinants of voting such as gender, age, education, the place of residence (city, town, suburb, village) as well as for country and year (ESS round). We present the results as marginal effects and choose clerks as the reference category because they are close to the median voter (see Figure 5).

The first model M1 simply presents the class effect on party choice, net of the influence of all the control variables. The results lead us to the same conclusions as did the descriptive evidence shown above. The Radical Right draws largest support from production workers and small business owners, but is least successful among socio-cultural professionals and managers. Compared to the reference category of clerks, the Left is more successful among production workers, service workers and, above all, socio-cultural professionals, but holds less appeal among managers, large employers and small business owners. The Centre-Right presents the mirror image of the Left, losing out among working-class voters and socio-cultural professionals, but receiving strong support from small business owners, large employers and managers. For both the Left and the Centre-Right, marginal effects are not only statistically significant, but for three classes exceed 10 percentage points and are thus substantial.

If we run a separate regression for each country, the same configuration between classes and parties emerges (see Figure A.2). In seven out of nine countries, the Radical Right is most successful among production workers (joined by service workers in several countries) and small business owners (joined by large employers in Austria, Norway and Sweden). Only Belgium and, to a smaller extent, the Netherlands differ from this pattern – as the Radical Right has a stronger cross-class profile (but then we have low numbers of observations for Radical Right voters in these two countries). In eight

out of nine countries, the socio-cultural professionals are particularly unlikely to vote for the Radical Right, but lend disproportionate support to the Left in six out of nine countries. In Denmark, Finland, France and Norway, they are joined by production workers who also strongly support the Left. In contrast, large employers, self-employed professionals and small business owners are the weakest supporters of the Left in all nine countries, but form everywhere (except in Switzerland) the electoral backbone of the Centre-Right.

Table 1 about here

The introduction of economic attitudes into the second model M2 partly explains why large employers and managers dislike the Left and endorse the Centre-Right – the effects become smaller for these classes once we account for differences in their economic attitudes. Economic attitudes also explain, albeit marginally, why production and service workers disproportionately support the Left and avoid the Centre-Right. However, they contribute nothing to the explanation of why production and service workers vote for the Radical Right. If we hold economic attitudes constant, the class effect becomes even larger for service workers. The Radical Right gains the support of the working class not *thanks* to its free-market programme, but *despite* it (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Oesch, 2008b).

Introducing cultural attitudes in a third model M3 changes nothing in the case of voters of the Centre-Right. Clearly, it is voters' economic preferences – and not their cultural attitudes – that explain the differential support among classes for the Centre-Right. In contrast, conflict on cultural attitudes is decisive for the Radical Right. The class effect of production and service workers is almost halved if we hold cultural preferences constant – and becomes insignificant in the case of small business owners. For the Left, cultural attitudes mediate the class effect to a smaller effect than economic attitudes. If we keep cultural attitudes constant, production and service workers become more likely – and managers less likely – to vote for the Left. In other words, the working class supports the Left despite its culturally libertarian programme (see also Lefkofridi et al. 2013).

When introducing both economic and cultural preferences in a last model M4, we find that attitudes pick up the class effect only to a small extent. However, preferences go in the expected direction. While both dimensions – economic and cultural – matter for voters of the Left, voters of the Centre-Right primarily vary from other voters by holding more liberal attitudes on the economy, whereas voters of the Radical Right primarily vary by holding more culturally traditional attitudes.

In a last analysis, we illustrate how attitudes affect party choice by plotting the predicted probabilities of a mid-aged male production worker voting for either one of the three poles, depending on his economic and cultural attitudes. If we set cultural attitudes at the average value and only vary economic attitudes (Figure 6, Left-hand panel), we find that the Left dominates among production workers strongly favouring redistribution, whereas the Centre-Right makes important inroads among production workers strongly opposing redistribution. Voting for the Radical Right varies little and remains at a comparatively low level. However, if economic attitudes are held constant at the average value and only cultural attitudes vary, we find that the Radical Right receives massive support among production workers with traditional attitudes, whereas the Left dominates among production workers with libertarian attitudes (Figure 6, right-hand panel). It is now voting for the Centre-Right that varies little and remains at a low level.

These analyses show clearly that the Radical Right successfully competes for the working-class vote (as for that of small business owners) thanks to cultural conflict, whereas the Centre-Right and, to a lesser extent, the Left mobilize along economic conflict lines. This further suggests that the *old* working-class vote for the mainstream Centre-Right parties is different from the *new* working-class vote for the Radical Right. Anti-redistributive attitudes drive the former, whereas traditional cultural attitudes explain the latter.

Figure 6 about here

Conclusion

The rise of the Radical Right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western Europe as we knew it over much of the post-war period. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as the two traditional party poles of the Left and the Centre-Right are challenged by a third pole – the Radical Right – in a growing number of countries. The expectation that right-wing populist parties would constitute ephemeral protest movements did not materialize. Between 2000 and 2015, the Radical Right secured more than 12 per cent of the electorate in over ten Western European countries and in over twenty national elections. Moreover, the Radical Right still seems to be in a process of expansion in several European countries. This applies in particular to new contenders in Germany (AfD) and the United Kingdom (UKIP).

Our objective was to examine how electoral competition between the three party poles plays out at the micro-level of different social classes. For this reason, we presented a model of class voting that distinguishes three types of relationship between classes and parties: some classes are one party pole's *preserve*, other classes are the *contested stronghold* of two party poles, and over still other classes there is an *open competition* between three party poles.

Our analysis confirms the hypotheses about the party poles' preserves. While the Left receives disproportionate support among socio-cultural professionals, the Centre-Right dominates among large employers, self-employed professionals and managers. Socio-cultural professionals' attachment to the Left owes as much to cultural as to economic preferences. In contrast, the endorsement of the Centre-Right by employers and their agents is primarily motivated by economic attitudes. With electoral shares of 50 per cent, we rightly talk about party preserves in the case of socio-cultural professionals on the Left, large employers and managers on the Right.

If the electoral domination of the old and new middle classes seems largely out of reach for the Radical Right, the one notable exception is small business owners – a class that Marxists named, somewhat derogatorily, the *petite bourgeoisie.* While the Radical Right made larger inroads into the electorate of small business owners than into any of the other middle-class segments, the electoral relevance of small business owners for the Radical Right should not be overestimated. The Centre-Right still obtains significantly larger voting shares in this class. Moreover, as small business owners are not a large socio-demographic group, they do not account for more than 12 per cent of the Radical Right's electorate.

Our hypothesis of a contested stronghold applies better to the working class: to service workers and, most clearly, production workers. The Radical Right receives its highest score in these two classes. Were it only for production workers, the Radical Right would come close to a third of the national electorate. The Radical Right provides a serious challenge to the Left over its traditional working-class stronghold. In terms of economic attitudes, production and service workers are close to the Left. Our multivariate analysis confirms that they still lend significantly stronger support to the Left than do clerks, technical specialists or managers. However, their cultural preferences are in closer accordance with the Radical Right, explaining why the electorate of the Radical Right has the strongest working-class bias of the three party poles. Half of its voters are either production or service workers – as compared to less than 40 per cent for the Left and less than 30 per cent for the Centre-Right.

These contested strongholds attest to the coexistence of old and new patterns of class voting. Old patterns, in which party dominance over one class has weakened without disappearing, tend to be structured along the economic axis of conflict. Examples are production workers' support for the Left and small business owners' endorsement of the Centre-Right. In contrast, the emergence of new patterns is due to the rise of the Radical Right and mostly structured along the cultural axis of conflict. Examples are the affinity of production workers and small business owners for the Radical Right.

The results from two countries where the Radical Right made its breakthrough during our period of observation – Finland and Sweden – suggest that the Radical Right disproportionately owes its success to the votes of the two contested strongholds, small business owners and, above all, the working class. In contrast, it leaves largely unaffected the preserves of the Left (socio-cultural professionals) and Centre-Right (employers and their agents) because these classes do not share the Radical Right's cultural preferences.

In the last decades, it has become common in political science to study party competition independently from the social divisions that underlie European societies. The process of dealignment between social classes and political parties has been interpreted as closing the historical chapter of class voting. Our findings suggest that party competition continues to be firmly rooted in the social structure – and that we observe the realignment between classes and parties. Each party pole has a distinctive social basis, which is the joint outcome of persisting old divisions and the development of new contrasts between classes. Moreover, a clearly defined social basis is not the prerogative of the smaller pole of the Radical Right, but also applies to the two larger poles of the Left and the Centre-Right.

At the same time, political parties cannot rely solely on the mobilization of their party preserves to reach electoral majorities. Given the small size of the different classes, parties only obtain stable majorities if they succeed in creating new coalitions of voters (e.g. Beramendi et al., 2015). With the shrinking of the two traditional party poles and the rise of the Radical Right, the forging of stable coalitions will become increasingly difficult in the new tripolar political space.

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Figures

Figure 1: A model of party poles and class-party links in a two-dimensional political space



Figure 2: Electoral strength of the three poles 2010-2015 in Western Europe (in %)



Notes: Only countries with a Radical Right pole in at least one election over the entire period 2000-2015, see Table A.1 in the appendix. If there was more than one national election over the period 2010-2015, we calculated the average scores. The detailed classification of parties is available from the authors.

Figure 3: Electoral support for the three poles by social class (in %)



Data: ESS, N=43,742. Data weighted.

The y-axis cuts the x-axis at the mean electoral score over all the classes (39.3% for the Left, 39.0% for the Centre-Right, 18.8% for the Radical Right).

Legend for classes: Serv work=service workers, Prod work=production workers, Clerks=clerks, Socio prof=socio-cultural professionals, Tech prof=technical professionals, Manag=managers, Lar/self-emp=large employers and self-employed professionals, Small bus=small business owners. The percentages in parentheses show the size of each class in the electorate.

Figure 4: Difference in party support before and after the emergence of a tripolar configuration (in percentage points)

Finland: 2007, 2011 elections



Sweden: 2010, 2014 elections



N Finland: 2007=2527, 2011=2817; N Sweden: 2010=2628, 2014=1412.
Source: ESS 4-5 and ESS 6-7 in Finland; ESS 5-6 and ESS 7 in Sweden. Data weighted.
Legend for classes: see under Figure 3.

Figure 5: Location of voters in a two-dimensional space – by class and party pole



Data: ESS 2002-2014. N= N=43,833 - 63,028. Data weighted.
Legend for classes: see under Figure 3.

Figure 6: Voting for one of the three party poles (in %) – predicted probabilities for a mid-aged male production worker, depending on his economic and cultural attitudes



Note: Predicted probabilities based on model 4 in Table 1. Vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals. Probabilities are calculated for a production worker, male, 35-44 years, upper secondary education, small city, with cultural attitudes held at their mean value (Left-hand panel) or economic values held at their mean value (right-hand panel).

Table 1: Voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right – marginal effects (with S.E.) based on multinomial logistic regressions

	M1 Dem.	M2 +eco	M3 +cult	M4+eco +cult	M1 Dem.	M2 +eco	M3 +cult	M4+eco +cult	M1 Dem.	M2 +eco	M3 +cult	M4+eco +cult
	LEFT				**CENTRE-RIGHT**				**RADICAL RIGHT**			
Social class (ref. clerks)												
Service workers	0.04**	0.03**	0.06**	0.05**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.07**	0.03**	0.04**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod workers	0.05**	0.04**	0.09**	0.07**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.13**	-0.12**	0.07**	0.07**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.13**	0.12**	0.12**	0.11**	-0.05*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical specialists	0.00	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.02	0.07**	0.05**	0.07**	0.05**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Large empl./Self-em.	-0.10**	-0.07*	-0.12**	-0.09**	0.12**	0.10*	0.14**	0.11*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	-0.18**	-0.17**	-0.17**	-0.15**	0.14**	0.13**	0.14**	0.13**	0.04*	0.04*	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pro redistribution		0.49**		0.46**		-0.40**		-0.41**		-0.09**		-0.06**
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Pro libertarian			0.81**	0.76**			-0.24**	-0.19**			-0.54**	-0.55**
			(0.06)	(0.07)			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Socio-demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country and ESS round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden's R2	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289
N	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047

Note: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$. Table reports marginal effects using Stata command dmlogit2 based on multinomial regressions with clustered standard errors and dummies for country and ESS round. All models include controls for gender, age, education and residence unit (large city, suburb, town, village). Only class and attitudes shown, for the full model see Table A.5 in the appendix.

Appendix – Figures

Figure A.1: Class composition of the three poles' electorate

Data: ESS, N=43,742. Data weighted.

Figure A.2: Party choice in national elections with a tripolar political space – marginal effects for social class by country





Note: Figures report the marginal effect of social class relative to the reference category of the clerks on voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right. The calculation is based on multinomial regressions with socio-demographic controls (gender, age, education and residence unit) and year dummies (as in M1 in Table 1), performed separately for each country. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix – Tables

Table A.1: Detailed score of parties included in the Radical Right pole in elections 2000-2015

	Election year	Party	Party name	Elections E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8
AT	02/06/	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	10	11	17.5	20.5				
	08/13	BZÖ	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich	-	4.1	10.7	3.5				
		Total		10	15.1	28.2	24				
BE	03/07/	VB	Vlaams Belang	11,7	12	7,8	3,7				
	10/14	FN	Front National	2	2	0,5					
		Total		13,7	14	8,3	3,7				
DK	01/05/	DF	Dansk Folkeparti	12	13.3	13.9	12.3	21.1			
	07/11/15	FrP	Fremskridtspartiet	0.6							
		Total		12.6	13.3	13.9	12.3	21.1			
FI	03/07/	PS	Perussuomalaiset	1.6	4.1	19.1	17.6				
	11/15										
FR	02/07/12	FN	Front National	16.9	10.4	17.9					
		MNR	Mouvement national républicain	2.3	-	-					
		Total		19.2	10.4	17.9					
DE	02/05/	REP	Die Republikaner	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.2				
	09/13	NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland	0.4	1.6	1.5	1.3				
		AfD	Alternative für Deutschland	-	-	-	4.7				
		Total		1	2.2	1.9	6.2				
GR	00/04/	LAOS	Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós	-	2.2	3.8	5.6	2.9	1.6	1	-
	07/09/	ANEL	Anexartitoi Ellines	-	-	-	-	10.6	7.5	4.8	3.7
	12a+b/	GD	Chrysi Avgi	-	-	-	0.3	7	6.9	6.3	7
	15a+b	*Total*		0	2.2	3.8	5.9	20.5	16	12.1	10.7
IT	01/06/	LN	Lega Nord	3.9	4.6	8.3	4.1				
	08/13										
LU	03/09/13	ADR	Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei	10	8.1	6.8					
NL	02/03/	PVV	Partij Voor de Vrijheid	-	-	5.9	15.4	10.1			
	06/10/12	LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	17	5.7	0.2	-	-			
		Total		17	5.7	6.1	15.4	10.1			
NO	01/05/	FrP	Fremskrittspartiet	14.6	22.1	22.9	16.3				
	09/13										
PT	02/05/	PNR	Partido Nacional Renovador	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5			
	09/11/15										
ES	00/02/	E-2000	España 2000	-	-	-	0	0	-		
	04/08/	DN	Democracia Nacional	0	-	0.1	0	0	0		
	11/15	*Total*		0	0	0.1	0	0	0		
SE	02/06/	SD	Sverigedemokraterna	1.4	2.9	5.7	12.9				
	10/14										
CH	03/07/	SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei	26.7	28.9	26.6	29.4				
	11/15	Lega	Lega dei Ticinesi	0.3	0.6	0.8	1				
		MCG	Mouvement citoyen genevois	-	0.1	0.4	0.3				
		SD	Schweizer Demokraten	1	0.5	0.2	0.1				
		FPS	Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz	0.2	0.1	-	-				
		Total		28.2	30.2	28	30.8				
UK	01/05/	UKIP	UK Independance Party	1.5	2.2	3.1	12.6				
	10/15	BNP	British National Party	0.2	0.7	1.9	0				
		NF	National Front	0	0	0	0				
		DUP	Democratic Unionist Party	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6				
		Total		2.4	3.8	5.6	13.2				

Note: The score is 0 when a party reaches less than 0.1% of the vote.

Table A.2: Strength of the Radical Right pole in legislative elections 2000-2015



Notes: Table A.1 provides detailed information on the parties included in the Radical Right pole. In France, the scores are based on the first round of the presidential election. In Greece, the second election of 2012 (June, after the first election in May) is indicated under 2013. For 2015, the second election (September, after the first election in January) is indicated in the last column. Source for the electoral results: Election Resources on the Internet: Western Europe, Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, http://electionresources.org/western.europe.html, supplemented by Wikipedia.

Table A.3: The 8-class schema – with three typical occupations in each class

Interpersonal service logic	*Technical work logic*	*Organizational work logic*	*Independent work logic*
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	Technical (semi-) professionals	(Associate) managers	Liberal professionals and large employers
Medical doctors	Engineers	Administrators	Entrepreneurs
Teachers	Architects	Consultants	Lawyers
Social workers	IT-specialists	Accountants	Dentists
Service workers	Production workers	Office clerks	Small business owners and farmers
Waiters	Mechanics	Secretaries	Shop owners
Nursing aides	Carpenters	Receptionists	Independent artisans
Shop assistants	Assemblers	Mail clerks	Farmers

Table A.4: Parameter estimates of exploratory principal component analysis (PCA)

	Component 1	Component 2
Redistribution	**0.92**	0.03
Immigration	-0.02	**0.65**
Europe	0.23	**0.60**
Cultural liberalism	-0.33	**0.47**
Eigenvalue	1.03	1.48
R2	25.8%	36.9%

Data: European Social Survey, 38 country-rounds
Results of PCA with Varimax rotation. Factor loadings above 0.40 are printed in bold.

Table A.5: Voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right – marginal effects (with S.E.) based on multinomial logistic regressions (full model)

	M1 Dem.	M2a +eco	M2b +cult	M3+eco +cult	M1 Dem.	M2a +eco	M2b +cult	M3+eco +cult	M1 Dem.	M2a +eco	M2b +cult	M3+eco +cult
	LEFT				**CENTRE-RIGHT**				**RADICAL RIGHT**			
Female	0.05**	0.03**	0.03**	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age (ref. 35-44)												
15-24	-0.00	0.01	-0.03**	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25-34	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**	0.02	0.02	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
45-54	0.06**	0.05**	0.06**	0.06**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
55-64	0.04**	0.03**	0.06**	0.04**	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
65-74	-0.03	-0.05**	0.01	-0.01	0.06*	0.08**	0.05	0.07**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
75+	-0.03	-0.04*	0.02	0.01	0.07**	0.08**	0.06*	0.07**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (ref. upper secondary)												
Lower secondary or less	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02	0.03**	0.03**	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Post secondary	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary	0.05**	0.07**	0.01	0.03*	0.07**	0.05**	0.08**	0.06**	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.08**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social class (ref. clerks)												
Service workers	0.04**	0.03**	0.06**	0.05**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.07**	0.03**	0.04**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Prod workers	0.05**	0.04**	0.09**	0.07**	-0.12**	-0.11**	-0.13**	-0.12**	0.07**	0.07**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Socio-cultural prof.	0.13**	0.12**	0.12**	0.11**	-0.05*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Technical specialists	0.00	0.02*	0.01	0.02*	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Managers	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.05*	-0.02	0.07**	0.05**	0.07**	0.05**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Large empl./Self-em.	-0.10**	-0.07*	-0.12**	-0.09**	0.12**	0.10*	0.14**	0.11*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Small business own.	-0.18**	-0.17**	-0.17**	-0.15**	0.14**	0.13**	0.14**	0.13**	0.04*	0.04*	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Residence (ref. small city)												
Big city	0.07**	0.07**	0.05*	0.05**	-0.05*	-0.05**	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suburbs/outskirts	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.01*	0.01*	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Village/Countryside	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pro redistribution		0.49**		0.46**		-0.40**		-0.41**		-0.09**		-0.06**
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Pro libertarian			0.81**	0.76**			-0.24**	-0.19**			-0.54**	-0.55**
			(0.06)	(0.07)			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Country and ESS round dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
McFadden's R2	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289	0.0654	0.0915	0.1062	0.1289
N	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047	42,047

Note: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$. Table reports marginal effects using Stata command dmlogit2 based on multinomial regressions with clustered standard errors and dummies for country and ESS round (not shown).