Redrawing the Class Map
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Redrawing the Class Map
Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

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Preface

The idea for this book originated a few years ago when I carried out a short assignment for the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (SGB). I was doing a survey about collective agreements in different economic sectors and, to my surprise, found that the workers worst off in terms of both wages and working time were not the ones I had expected, namely manual workers in manufacturing. The least advantageous working conditions seemed to prevail among employees in services such as nursing, tourism or retail sale. This observation went contrary to the stereotypical image of a class structure in which the industrial proletariat lingers at the bottom, and routine service employees occupy an intermediate position. Intrigued, I decided to enquire into social stratification in more detail and compare findings from Switzerland with those of other Western European countries. Thanks to financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation, I was able to lead this research project at the University of Geneva. It finally resulted in this book, having originally constituted my doctoral thesis.

I owe particular gratitude to my thesis supervisor and mentor in academic matters, Hanspeter Kriesi. Among Swiss students of the social sciences, it is a widely acknowledged privilege to work with Hanspeter Kriesi. Being guided by him not only considerably improves the odds of finishing one’s doctoral thesis in good time, but also greatly contributes to making the process an enjoyable one. I warmly thank him for his advice, helpfulness and availability. I am also grateful to Walter Müller for accepting to assess my thesis and providing me with very stimulating comments. Further, I am highly indebted to Michael Tåhlin who gave me a striking example of disinterested helpfulness in the scientific community: besides supplying me with a tailor-made dataset of Sweden’s Level-of-Living survey (LNU) free of charge, he also helped me out whenever I ran into a problem with a variable. Not least, this book owes much to Erzsi Kukorelly who not only corrected the study’s language, but also pointed out many incongruous arguments and blurry passages in the text. Many thanks to her as well as to Roman Graf for his help with data analysis, and to Stefano Losa and Matthias Oesch for their advice and encouragement.

However helpful all these colleagues and friends have been, there is only one person to whom I wish to dedicate this book, Joanna Barczyk, who has been a splendid companion all through the time it took to bring this project to fruition.

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Daniel Oesch
Introduction

Upheaval in the employment structure

This study enquires into the employment structure of four Western European countries. It starts out from the premise that labour markets constitute a central focal point of modern societies. Hence, involuntary exclusion from the labour market such as unemployment is, by and large, experienced as a period of both economic and social hardship. Likewise, for individuals actively involved in the labour market, employment is not only a source of income, but also defines status and position in social stratification. A job thus conveys a wide range of information about the incumbent’s (probable) educational background, financial standing and social belonging. Consequently, when children ask their school-mates about their parents’ jobs, they intuitively enquire about something close to the social class of their peers’ families. For analogous reasons, in the social sciences, occupational data is considered as a useful shortcut for a series of socio-economic characteristics of individuals, characteristics commonly subsumed under class differences (Müller, 1997: 759).

In empirical research on class differences, the most widely used schema in Europe is arguably the one associated with the writings of Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe (Goldthorpe, 1980; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993). While this schema continues to be highly influential, it is uncertain whether it continues to represent contemporary labour markets. Its conceptual bases were laid during the late 1970s, with the aim of reflecting the employment structure prevailing up to the mid-1970s, typical of high industrialism (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 237). Similarly, the principal class schema in American sociology, the Wright schema (1980, 1985), was elaborated during the 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, Breen and Rottman note that ‘the major comparative findings of class analysis still rest on data ... collected during the Golden Age of Capitalism’ (1998: 16). It is not going too far to add that the major analytical tools of class research continue to mirror ‘Fordism’ and the male breadwinner model, aspects emblematic of
industrial society. Accordingly, it is one of the arguments of this study that the employment structure of Western Europe has been substantially altered over the last 30 years by a series of socio-economic trends that are not easily summarized by the dominant class schemas. More particularly, it will be argued that changes such as service sector growth, welfare state expansion, rising female participation rates and increases in educational attainment have caused considerable upheaval in European labour markets.

By way of example, a look at the joint impact of tertiarization and feminization on the British and Swiss labour force is illustrative. In 1970, men working in the industries accounted for 35 per cent of total employment in Britain and Switzerland. Thirty years later, their share has dwindled to 20 per cent in both countries. Over the same period, women working in the services have increased their share in total employment from 25 to 40 per cent in Britain and from 20 to 35 per cent in Switzerland (OECD, 1984a, b; 2002). This evolution is not only due to the spectacular expansion of service jobs, mostly taken on by women. It also derives from de-industrialization: in manufacturing, new technologies have accelerated the automation of the work of assemblers, labourers, packers and other member of the unskilled industrial workforce. In consequence, stereotypical blue-collar workers as they emerge from ‘the pages of the history of industrial capitalism’ (Myles and Turegun, 1996: 116) have declined to a small minority. In parallel, new production methods have led to a skill upgrading of the reduced industrial workforce and thus decreased the social distance between blue-collar workers and white-collar employees (Gallie, 1996a; Kern, 1998). As a result, the distinction between worker and employee status has become progressively more blurred (Müller and Noll, 1996: 11).

In terms of class analysis, these developments have made the employment structure increasingly opaque, as low-skilled occupations have not disappeared from labour markets dominated by large service sectors: sales assistants, call centre clerks or assistant nurses are all employed in jobs to which no middle class status attaches. Yet these mostly female workers do not fit easily into established class schemas. Division lines typical of industrial employment such as the blue-collar/white-collar boundary or the manual/non-manual divide are of little use when dealing with these occupational groups. Abandoning these distinctions can give surprising results, as low-skilled service workers may well experience employment relationships that are no more advantageous than those applying to manual manufacturing workers (Crouch, 1999: 165).

An analogous problem of analytical opacity emerges when shifting the focus to the salaried middle class. Educational upgrading, service expansion and welfare state development have fostered the growth of managerial and, above all, professional occupations (Crouch, 1999). The result is to tilt the employment structure towards the middle class and, at the same time, to promote increasing heterogeneity within its ranks. In consequence, it has
become quite unpromising to account for the political behaviour of the salaried middle class conceptualized as *unitary category*: variance in party support within the middle class has come to approximate variance within the entire population (Kriesi, 1998). Yet while it is apparent that the salaried middle class is made up of factions that occupy very different positions in the labour market, attempts in the literature to account for this heterogeneity have been few and, to a large extent, focused on the sole difference between professionals and managers (Savage et al., 1992; Brooks and Manza, 1997). The bulk of research into social mobility and electoral behaviour continues to rely on the manual/non-manual divide and to treat the salaried middle class as a monolithic bloc (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Shavit and Müller, 1998; Evans, 1999a).

Nonetheless, the challenge posed to class analysis by mounting employment differentiation has been taken up by a number of authors. Thus, some important inroads have been made into the ‘disordered’ structure of contemporary societies with respect to either the middle class or the ‘twilight zone’ below it. In an attempt to illuminate the black box of the middle class, several contributions have emphasized work setting differences between management, technical professions and socio-cultural professions (Kriesi, 1989; 1993; Müller, 1999; van de Werfhorst and de Graaf, 2004). With regard to political orientation, these efforts have shown promising results (Kriesi, 1998; Güveli et al., 2002). Relating to the working class, the distinction between jobs in a ‘Fordist’ division of labour and jobs in a ‘post-industrial’ service hierarchy has pointed to the possible existence of a low-skilled service proletariat, stuck in auxiliary dead-end jobs (Esping-Andersen, 1993a; Blossfeld et al., 1993). Moreover, attention has been drawn to the segregation between low-skilled women in personal services and low-skilled men in goods production, leading to a ‘bicephalously gendered occupational structure’ (Crouch, 1999: 113).

However useful, none of these contributions has tried to offer an *overall view* on social stratification in contemporary labour markets. Moreover, these theoretical developments have, with a few exceptions (Joye and Schuler, 1995; Rose and O’Reilly, 1998), not been accompanied by empirical analysis of the criteria on which new division lines are expected to rely. This is the range of problems on which this study focuses in a first step: it proposes to develop and examine a new class schema that aims at conceptualizing an employment structure marked by the phenomena of tertiarization, feminization and welfare statism.

**The challenge to embedding institutions**

Shifts in the employment structure do not only pose an analytical challenge to class theory; moreover, they also raise a political challenge as they confront labour market institutions with problems for which they were not
prepared. European welfare states, being the product of the 1930s Depres-
sion and the post-war economic ‘miracle’, were primarily designed for men
working in industrial production (Esping-Andersen, 1999a: 33). Likewise,
European trade unions had their traditional strongholds among semi-
skilled male production workers (Regini, 1992; Waddington and Hoffmann,
2000). While de-industrialization has caused severe cuts in the numerical
strength of this category, service jobs mainly filled by women have made
spectacular inroads into Western European labour markets. However, very
different characteristics apply to work careers in these expanding female
services than to those in male production jobs and management, and it is
an open question whether institutions have succeeded in adapting to the
new situation reigning in European labour markets.

This is where politics needs to be introduced. In the literature, it is widely
acknowledged that an individual’s life chances do not solely derive from
his or her labour market position. Besides the household, institutions such
as the welfare state or trade unions significantly modify the outcomes of
market relations in Western Europe. Class divisions produced by the mar-
ket may thus be softened or reinforced by the institutional setting, depend-
ing on whether institutions promote economic equality or uphold social
dualism (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Orloff, 1993). In consequence,
it appears difficult for an enquiry into social stratification to ignore the role
of institutions.

In this study, three institutions in particular are expected to have an
effect on the labour market situation of individuals, namely the welfare
state, the trade union movement and political citizenship. When looked at
from the perspective of the individual – and this study will follow a micro-
sociological level of analysis throughout – these three institutions share a
common quality: they confer rights to individuals and thus limit inequality
generated by the employment system (Marshall, 1981 [1950]). To begin
with, modern welfare states reduce the economic vulnerability of wage-
earners by guaranteeing a minimum income independent from the market
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Similarly, through collective bargaining, trade
unions enable workers to use their rights collectively and thus attempt to
overcome power asymmetry between individual worker and employer
(Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 26). Finally, political citizenship gives individuals the
right to participate in elections. Thus, it allows wage-earners, who may be
weak in terms of economic resources, to use their political resources (votes)
to influence market conditions (Korpi, 1989: 312).

It is undisputed that these three institutions potentially enable indi-
viduals to diminish their dependence on the labour market. However,
depending on country, class and gender, the degree to which different pop-
ulation groups are integrated into these institutions and benefit from these
rights varies substantially. Hence, some welfare states offer optimal cover-
age for individuals having worked full-time, without interruptions and
from an early age on. This sort of coverage does not pose problems as long as full-time employment, continuous working careers and family stability are the rule: by guaranteeing an income to the male breadwinner, the welfare state is able to reach virtually everyone (Bonoli, 2002). Yet the standard employment relationship is not the rule anymore. Alongside the rise of the service sector and women's labour market participation, non-standard career patterns have multiplied and, for the categories concerned, increased the risk of insufficient welfare coverage.

Comparable factors have affected trade unionism. In their relationship with employers, low-skilled workers depend most heavily on collective organization. As they do not possess any specific skills, they are not of strategic importance for firms and thus lack individual bargaining power. It is no surprise, then, that trade union recruitment has traditionally met with most success among semi-skilled production workers. Yet the size of this traditional union constituency is strongly declining under the influence of industrial restructuring and workforce upgrading (Kern and Sabel, 1992). The opposite situation applies to low-skilled service workers: while their number is on the increase (Goos and Manning, 2003), unions in most countries encounter difficulties when trying to organize this category, which evolves in small businesses and often works unusual hours (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000).

Consequently, low-skilled service workers, unlike the industrial proletariat, may be unable to compensate for their relatively disadvantaged labour market position by using the institutional resource of collective organization.

Finally, the right to vote is a resource that in theory may allow less advantaged groups of individuals to obtain some correction of labour market inequalities through electoral influence. However, a large body of evidence indicates that class differences remain of central importance as far as integration into the political system is concerned. This is due to two factors: first of all, Western European countries comprise sizeable numbers of foreign nationals who, while fully participating in the labour market, are excluded from political citizenship; these forced abstainers to a large extent cluster at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy (Soysal, 1994; Charles, 2000). Moreover, depending on the country, the opportunity to vote may not be seized evenly across different social groups; political apathy and electoral abstention seem to be more widespread among disadvantaged than among privileged classes (Verba et al., 1978; Lijphart, 1997). Hence, it is an entirely open question whether class differences are mitigated, or on the contrary reinforced by, democratic political participation.

In sum, this study wishes to combine the enquiry into the employment structure with the analysis of how different classes are embedded in institutions. Thereby, an institutional layer of analysis shall be added to the enquiry into the structural layer of stratification. Yet by examining the
embeddedness of individuals in the institutional setting, our main interest does not lie in the institutions per se. Rather, the primary objective is to find out more about the degree of adaptation of different institutions to different segments in the labour market. This interest is guided by an implicit hypothesis: class theory may not be alone in lagging behind shifts in the employment structure. Depending on the country, change in the labour market may have outpaced institutional inertia as well.

Plan of the book

The aim of this book is twofold. In a first step, we wish to single out changes having occurred in the employment structure over the last 30 years, and to sketch out a class map that accurately translates these shifts into analytical language. We shall then empirically explore how such a class map relates to other socially relevant dimensions such as gender, income, promotion prospects or political orientation. In a second step, our enquiry shall be extended to the institutional setting. We thereby wish to examine both theoretically and empirically the integration of different classes into the welfare state, the trade union movement and the electoral system.

There is little doubt about the fact that this set of questions is most usefully tackled from a comparative perspective. Hence, the empirical chapters of this study will cover four Western European countries that have in common political democracy, an advanced market economy and a system of social values that could perhaps be labelled as ‘occidental’: Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Our research set-up follows thus the most similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Yet while these four nations are highly comparable as regards the fundamental axis of social organization, on a lower level, they are representative of the variation found in Western Europe with respect to characteristics held to be influential for the research problematic of this study. This is notably the case concerning the welfare state (where conservative regimes contrast with liberal and social-democratic counterparts), the system of industrial relations (where an uncoordinated system stands out against coordinated systems) and the type of democracy (where bipartisan systems compare with multipartisan systems). As a consequence, this study hopes to arrive at findings that are not strictly limited to a particular country but are, to a degree, generalizable to the Western European context.

Besides theoretical concerns, our country selection is also motivated by more practical matters of data accessibility, as for these four nations, individual datasets are available that are both nationally representative and include detailed information about employment, education, income and political behaviour. The empirical chapters of this book will rely on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), the Swedish Level-of-Living Survey (LNU) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). Although these surveys are organized as panel data and are—with the exception of LNU—collected annually, the study adopts a purely cross-sectional perspective and limits analyses to data collected either in 1999 or 2000.

The two objectives of the study, outlined above, define the structure of the book which is divided into three parts. Part I starts out with a summary of the conceptual foundations of existing class schemas (Chapter 1) and a review of the shifts having occurred in Western European labour markets over the last 30 years (Chapter 2). This provides the basis for a thorough discussion of the problems female employment in general, and low-skilled service work in particular, pose to class analysis (Chapter 3). Moreover, it opens the black box of the expanded salaried middle class, rendering visible its heterogeneity (Chapter 4). Part I will be closed by the attempt to develop a new class schema that responds to the challenge of an increasingly educated, feminized and tertiarized employment structure (Chapter 5).

Part II confronts the theoretical expectations with the data. For that matter, questions of methodology will be dealt with in some detail in order to shed light on the classification process of occupational information (Chapter 6). This will enable us to map out, in some detail, the distribution of the labour force of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland across the class schema (Chapter 7). Subsequently, we wish to examine whether this new class map effectively measures what it is intended to measure. We will therefore turn our attention to the question of how the schema relates to indicators of hierarchical advantage such as work income and promotion prospects (Chapter 8). Next, focus is shifted to structural divisions within the workforce that do not necessarily follow hierarchical lines: this applies to variables such as party support, public sector employment or company size (Chapter 9). Part II closes with a look at less extended, so-called collapsed, versions of the class schema, briefly comparing their explanatory performance with results found for the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema (Chapter 10).

In Part III, we shift our attention to the relationship between individuals’ class positions and their integration into the institutional setting. It starts out with a theoretical discussion of the concept of institutional embeddedness, set on the micro-sociological level of analysis applying to individuals (Chapter 11). Based on this concept, we will examine to what extent class differences are likely to spill over from people’s working careers to their coverage with pensions in old-age (Chapter 12). The analysis of welfare state coverage will be completed by an enquiry into the determinants of trade union membership: are some classes more likely to benefit from collective organization than others? (Chapter 13). Finally, with respect to integration into political citizenship, our focus will be on class differences in electoral participation. Our interest is not limited to voluntary abstainers,
but also centres on forced abstainers, namely resident members of the population without citizenship rights: immigrant workers (Chapter 14). Part III concludes by simultaneously exploring integration into the welfare state, the union movement and the political system. Here, the aim is to examine whether disadvantage in the employment structure and disadvantage in institutional embeddedness are cumulative (Chapter 15).
Part I

Labour Market Trends and the Theory of a New Class Schema
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Class Theorists and the Debate about the End of Class

The debate about the end of class

In the early 1990s, the concept of class came under resolute criticism from political scientists and sociologists; both questioned the relevance of class for the understanding of contemporary societies. Verdicts ranged from a cautious expression of the decline of class politics (Dalton, 1996) to a blunt statement of the imminent death of class (Clark and Lipset, 1991). Initially, the debate was opened by a series of electoral studies, which reported that the salience of social divisions for voting was declining. According to these studies, class-based voting was regressing in almost all modern democracies (Dalton et al., 1984; Crewe and Denver, 1985; Rose and McAllister, 1986; Franklin, 1992). Known as the ‘dealignment’ argument, these studies concluded that traditional linkages between classes and parties were replaced by new (and volatile) associations based on voters’ issue positions or sympathy for candidates. The dealignment literature provided several explanations for the loosening of the link between class position and voting choice. A first explanation highlighted the change in values over the post-war period: growing affluence and rising education were seen to have led to a shift from an economic cleavage rooted in class differences to a conflict about value priorities, opposing holders of materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1984, 1990). A second explanation also stressed the role of rising educational levels: increasingly well educated and informed citizens were expected to evaluate political issues independent from their class position (Dalton, 1996). A third explanation linked the decline in class voting to the multiplication of lifestyles and the fragmentation of life spaces: as fewer people are integrated into traditional class networks such as trade unions, both group loyalties and class conflicts are expected to diminish (Beck, 1986; Pappi, 2002).

These accounts have in common a tendency to explain the decrease of class voting without fundamentally questioning the persistence of socio-economic inequalities: class may have ceased to be an accurate predictor of
party preference, but still gives rise to different life chances. This conclusion is not shared by a fourth explanation, which interprets eroding class voting as the consequence of an equalization of living conditions; thanks to economic growth and welfare state development, the old class conflict is seen to be resolved (Franklin, 1992). This account of voters’ dealignment more basically challenges class analysis and thus moves into the vicinity of wider-ranging claims about the breakdown of class, formulated by Lipset and Clark (1991). In an influential article entitled ‘Are Social Classes Dying?’, the two authors maintained that class had lost its influence in central fields of social organization such as politics (less class politics, more lifestyle issues), economic organization (new market individualism), family (flexibility replacing hierarchy) and social mobility (less family-determined, more ability-determined). This contention sparked a fierce debate about the significance of class in contemporary societies and resulted in several books exploring the issue of class politics (Lee and Turner, 1996; Evans, 1999a; Clark and Lipset, 2001; Brettschneider et al., 2002). Evidence accumulated, but positions did not grow closer: while results from Germany (Pappi and Mnich, 1992; Schnell and Kohler, 1995), Norway (Ringdal and Hines, 1999) and a large comparative analysis (Nieuwbeerta and Manza, 2002) point towards a decline in class voting, other findings from Germany (Müller, 1999), the U.S. (Hout et al., 1995) and Britain, France and Italy (Weakliem, 1991; Goldthorpe, 1999; Weakliem and Heath, 1999) show remarkable stability. Overall, empirical evidence remains divided between the thesis of trendless fluctuation (Evans, 1999b; Goldthorpe, 2001), the thesis of a general decline in the class basis of voting (Dalton, 1996; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf, 1999) and the thesis of realignment in class voting along new lines (Kriesi, 1998; Müller, 1999).

The controversy about the trajectory and character of class voting seems thus still unresolved. Yet overshadowed by the debate about class politics, the empirical grounds of the more fundamental ‘death of class’ argument have clearly been weakened by contributions revealing the persisting effect of class on aspects such as educational success (e.g. Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Shavit and Müller, 1998) or social mobility (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Breen, 2005). Hence, while there is little empirical evidence supporting the argument that socio-economic differences have disappeared from contemporary societies, Western Europe’s employment systems and class structures have undeniably undergone considerable changes over the last 30 years. In this respect, the debate has clearly revealed the need to move away from a binary measure of class (working class versus middle class) to more sophisticated concepts of class (Evans, 2000). Working under this assumption, it is this book’s aim to sort through these changes and draw up a class map that grasps the salient features of stratification in today’s societies. We expect such a differentiated class schema to produce better insight into social phenomena such as voting behaviour and collect-
ive organization, gender segregation and pension coverage. In so doing, a more precise measure of social stratification should reveal more clearly the relevance – or irrelevance – of class for contemporary societies. Before developing this measure, we shall first explain our use of the class concept and briefly look over the dominant class schemas.

The distinction between economic class and social class

The present study focuses on differences in class locations between distinct categories of employees and self-employed persons. Before embarking on class analysis, it must be acknowledged that the concept of class is a notoriously contested one, which can give rise to never-ending doctrinal disputes. We try to bypass this difficulty by adopting an openly pragmatic approach. Thereby we follow Erikson and Goldthorpe, who wish to primarily evaluate the concept of class on the basis of its merits for empirical research and who argue that ‘concepts – like all other ideas – should be judged by their consequences, not their antecedents’ (1993: 35). This approach goes along with a minimal work hypothesis in which class is simply referred to as a proxy for similarity in the position within the occupational system. There is wide agreement that an individual’s position within the labour market presents a significant source of the resources this individual possesses and the constraints he or she faces (Breen and Rottman, 1995: 464). Accordingly, for empirical research, class appears as a very useful shortcut for a series of socio-economic characteristics of individuals (Müller, 1997: 759).

Our use of the concept comes close to what Kocka (1980: 104) labels an economic class: individuals who, due to a common economic position, share latent interests, but not necessarily anything else. The concept stands in contrast to the more encompassing notion of social class, understood as a unit sharing a collective identity and a common organization. According to Kocka, whether an economic class becomes a social class is a strictly empirical question, ‘which finds different answers in different historical situations since economic classes are never fully transformed into social classes and classes in action’ (1980: 115). Kocka’s distinction between economic and social class is closely related to Scott’s emphasis on the difference between ‘class situation’ and ‘social class’. Advocating a Weberian programme of class research, Scott (1994: 934) separates ‘class situation’ as the present market and work situation pertaining to the individual from ‘social class’ as the larger demographic unit pertaining to the family household. According to Scott, social classes form the basis of collective action and can be identified by evidence on social mobility and intermarriages. In this study, we are concerned with individuals’ class situations (or economic class) in its Weberian meaning, leaving aside the more complex concept of social class.
Before developing our own class measure, we shall briefly discuss three influential class schemas on which much empirical research in contemporary sociology relies: the class schema developed by Erik Olin Wright, the class conception of Pierre Bourdieu and the class schema associated with the writings of John H. Goldthorpe and his colleagues. Despite a series of substantial conceptual differences between Wright and Goldthorpe, they both concur in favouring a relational approach to class theory over the concept of a gradational scale which focuses on differences in prestige, lifestyle or status (Crompton, 1998: 63). In contrast, Bourdieu rejects the imperative to demarcate classes from one another a priori. Rather than drawing boundaries between different classes, he envisions classes to be set in a continuous social space (Weininger, 2005). Hence, while Wright and Goldthorpe envisage questions of social inequality and social mobility as occurring within a categorical class structure, Bourdieu’s class concept is set in a multidimensional hierarchical space. Despite these differences, all three theorists strongly rely on occupation as a central indicator of class position. Wright uses occupational information in a neo-marxist perspective, defining social class as a structural location determined by production relationships. Goldthorpe’s class conception is said to be partly inspired by Max Weber’s work, focusing on the nature of individuals’ involvement in social relations within labour markets over time (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 31). Finally, Bourdieu’s ambition is to rethink Max Weber’s opposition between class and status or, in other words, to bridge the relation between the economic and the symbolic. In this context, occupation is treated as an indicator of both the (economic) degree of market power and (symbolic) secondary properties such as levels of education or geographical distribution. A short discussion of the three different class conceptions, beginning with Wright, provides us with the starting point for the subsequent derivation of a class schema adapted to our specific research problem.

Wright’s class schema based on economic exploitation

During the 1980s, Wright moved on from a first class schema rooted in domination (Wright, 1980), to a second class schema based on the concept of exploitation, within capitalist relations of production (Wright, 1985). Its underlying rationale is that classes are defined by social relations which are intrinsically antagonistic – an antagonism that has its basis in economic exploitation. Wright (1985) argues that in the case of capitalist societies, exploitation is based on three different assets: ownership of capital assets, control of organizational assets, and ownership of skill assets (particularly when these are legally recognized in the form of credentials). Effective control over these productive assets enables people to appropriate part of the social surplus and gives rise to three distinct (though overlapping) production relations: the capital–labour relation, the manager – worker rela-
tion, and the expert–non-expert relation (Wright and Martin, 1987: 7). Here lies one important merit of Wright’s class theory, in that it provides a criterion which allows to differentiate horizontally between hierarchically equivalent class positions: different productive assets. In its complete version, these unequal production relations result in the 12-class schema shown in Table 1.1.

It is in the collapsed version of six classes that the construction logic of Wright’s schema can be shown more easily (Wright and Martin, 1987: 9): the petty bourgeoisie and small employers are distinguished from the large group of employees because they are either self-employed or own a substantial part of the business in which they work; managers are those employees who make policy decisions about the operation of the organization in which they work, whereas supervisors oversee other workers without making policy decisions. Experts are all those incumbents of professional, technical, and managerial occupations who are not already in either the managerial, the supervisory, the petty bourgeois or the small employer class. Finally, all remaining individuals are classified as workers.

It follows from this summary that in Wright’s class schema, the working class is a purely residual aggregate – a fact that, however justified it may be on theoretical grounds, is problematic from an empirical point of view. As is documented in Table 1.2, a classification strategy based on these criteria gives rise to a class of workers (or proletarians) which embraces between 40 to 50 per cent of the population in employment of Britain, Sweden or the United States, merging together skilled and unskilled manual workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Non-management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Capitalists</td>
<td>Expert managers</td>
<td>Skilled managers</td>
<td>Non-skilled managers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Small employers</td>
<td>Expert supervisors</td>
<td>Skilled supervisors</td>
<td>Non-skilled supervisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>Non-skilled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2  The size of the working class according to the Wright class schema

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Working class in per cent of the labour force</th>
<th>Source of analysis</th>
<th>Wright schema</th>
<th>Year of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>49.6 (8 categories)</td>
<td>Marshall (1997)</td>
<td>Original (1st)</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>42.9 (12 categories)</td>
<td>Marshall (1997)</td>
<td>Revised (2nd)</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>43.5 (12 categories)</td>
<td>Wright (1985)</td>
<td>Revised (2nd)</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, men</td>
<td>43 (7 categories)</td>
<td>Ahrne and Wright (1983)</td>
<td>Original (1st)</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, women</td>
<td>61 (7 categories)</td>
<td>Ahrne and Wright (1983)</td>
<td>Original (1st)</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46.2 (6 categories)</td>
<td>Ahrne and Wright (1983)</td>
<td>Original (1st)</td>
<td>1980a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>49.5 (6 categories)</td>
<td>Wright and Martin (1987)</td>
<td>Original (1st)</td>
<td>1980b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>39.9 (12 categories)</td>
<td>Wright (1985)</td>
<td>Revised (2nd)</td>
<td>1980a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1980a: American Class Structure data; 1980b: Census public-use sample data
as well as routine clerical and low-skilled service employees. Critics aptly noted that such a large conception of the proletariat may be consistent with Wright’s conceptual criteria. However, it appears very doubtful whether in reality it reflects a meaningful grouping of relatively homogeneous class locations (Marshall, 1997: 73).

Wright’s class schema has been widely criticized on these empirical grounds (e.g. Marshall et al., 1988). Besides the central issue of debate – Wright’s conception of the salaried middle classes as ‘contradictory class locations’ –, criticism has also focused on two division lines that seem blurred by Wright’s conception of the working class: the separation between blue- and white-collar positions on the one hand and between skilled workers and low-skilled workers on the other (Mayer and Carroll, 1987: 36; Marshall, 1997: 75). Accordingly, for the range of problems that we wish to analyse, Wright’s classification strategy appears not helpful as it does not provide a criterion capable of discriminating between different groupings of skilled, semi- and unskilled workers (be they white- or blue-collar). An alternative to Wright’s class schema is given by Bourdieu’s work to which attention will be shifted in what follows.

Bourdieu’s social space composed of different sorts of capital

Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) class conception is both very large, covering the economic and cultural realms of social life, and original, in his ambition to link socio-economic position (class) and lifestyle (taste). Although this sets him apart from both the Marxist and Weberian tradition, there is remarkable convergence between Bourdieu and Wright in their insistence on the role of resources for social stratification (Savage et al., 2005). Both authors argue that class effects are produced by individual actions drawing either on ‘assets’ (Wright, 1985) or ‘forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984). Defining capital as ‘the set of actually usable resources and powers’ (1984: 114), Bourdieu distinguishes several forms of capital, the two most important ones being economic and cultural capital. While Bourdieu’s notion of economic capital is straightforward, covering market power and material resources such as income, his concept of cultural capital is more intricate. It is not only based on educational credentials, but also comprises cultural competences that are acquired through the family – ‘the intangible knowing that can secure and perpetuate access to economic capital’ (Crompton, 1998: 149). Besides these two central forms of capital, Bourdieu further introduces the notion of social capital, defined as the network of social relations that a person can effectively mobilize. These different sorts of capital are, according to Bourdieu, mutually convertible: credentials and competences, as well as social networks, can be converted into economic power, and economic power can open the way to credentials and social networks.
Depending on an individual’s endowment with different sorts of capital, he or she is located in a more or less advantageous position in the class structure. Bourdieu envisions the class structure as a social space composed of three axes. A first axis differentiates locations in the occupational system according to their total volume of capital – be it economic or cultural. Based on this vertical axis, Bourdieu (1984: 128–9) identifies occupational categories well endowed with capital – such as college professors, the liberal professions and industrialists – as the ‘dominant class’ or the ‘bourgeoisie’. In contrast, industrial workers and farm labourers possess very little capital and belong to what Bourdieu terms the ‘dominated’ or ‘working class’. In between, primary school teachers, technicians and small proprietors are located in an intermediary class labelled ‘petite bourgeoisie’. To this hierarchical dimension, Bourdieu adds a second axis separating classes according to the composition of the capital possessed by incumbents. Classes are internally divided depending on whether cultural or economic capital prevails. Hence, professors and journalists, who possess much cultural but little economic capital, are divided from industrialists and managers, who own little cultural but much economic capital. This distinction between cultural and economic capital has proved very influential on class sociology, for example by stimulating research into the relationship between professionals and managers, the ‘cultured’ and the ‘moneyed’ fraction of the salaried middle class (e.g. Savage et al., 1992; Gunn, 2005). A third and last axis of Bourdieu’s social space differentiates incumbents according to

Figure 1.1 Bourdieu’s space of social positions (simplified and adapted [1984: 128–9])
their trajectories. This dimension is intended to capture individuals’ experience over time in the volume and composition of their capital. Figure 1.1 presents a simplified version of Bourdieu’s space of social positions, illustrating axes one (volume of capital) and two (composition of capital).

An account of Bourdieu’s class theory is incomplete without a short outline of his interest for the relationship between class and status. In an attempt to bridge Max Weber’s opposition between market position (=class) and status position (=lifestyle), Bourdieu (1984) argued that differences of status – that is, of lifestyle and mentality – must be seen as manifestations of class differences. Hence, in his main examination of stratification, Bourdieu (1984) uses correspondence analysis to map lifestyle components such as culture, food, sports and clothing, onto the social space (Savage et al., 2005: 39). The linkage between class position (occupation) and status position (lifestyle components) is made by the **habitus**, which Bourdieu defines as a socially constituted system of dispositions (Weininger, 2005: 124). According to Bourdieu, experience of a particular class condition imprints a particular set of mental dispositions upon the individual (= the **habitus**), thus influencing his or her taste for music, literature or hobbies. In this manner, the **habitus** presents the missing link between ‘objective’ class position and ‘subjective’ status action.

However, Bourdieu never attempted a systematized class analysis; he developed nearly all his conceptual innovations in the context of concrete empirical studies (Weininger, 2005). Hence, even though his work has stimulated important analyses in different countries (e.g. Müller, 1992; Vester et al., 2001; Devine et al., 2004), there remains a degree of theoretical incertitude about his class schema that could be criticized as conceptual fuzziness. In this respect, Savage et al. (2005: 42) note that

> ...there is a degree of slippage and uncertainty in [Bourdieu’s] account of the class structure, and in his description of class boundaries. Terms such as cultural intermediaries, intellectuals, and the like are introduced without it ever being clear exactly which occupational groups they refer to.

This conceptual blurriness is amplified by methodological problems: notions such as the habitus cannot be directly observed, but must be apprehended *interpretively*. Other concepts, such as cultural capital, are based on such a large number of facets that their empirical operationalization becomes very difficult and often arbitrary. It has thus been argued that, by wanting to take into consideration the infinitely rich diversity of social relations, Bourdieu comes closer to an ethnographic dissection of human practices than to a rigorous theory of social stratification (Brubaker, 1985: 760). It is for this reason that we will not rely on Bourdieu’s class conception when mapping out a schema devised to reflect contemporary employ-
ment stratification. Working with large-scale individual datasets from different countries, our aim is to distil a reduced set of significant factors and to obtain a high degree of intersubjectivity as to the conceptualization and operationalization of our class map. For this objective, class analysis developed by Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe presents a more helpful starting point.

**Employment relationships and the Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema**

In devising their class schema, Erikson and Goldthorpe have a more modest scope than both Wright and Bourdieu. Unlike these authors, they reject any automatic or ‘habitual’ link between class structure and class action, limiting the theoretical ambition of their class concept to a claim about the existence of social groupings that share particular sets of employment relations over time (Crompton, 1998: 68; Sørensen, 2000). The emphasis on the time dimension and on social relationships grounded in market conditions moves them into the vicinity of Max Weber for whom ‘classes exist to the extent that groups share a common market condition as the decisive basis for their specific life chances’ (1964: 679–80; quoted by Mayer and Carroll, 1987: 16). Despite these affinities, Erikson and Goldthorpe prefer to call the schema’s inspiration ‘rather eclectic’.3 By further qualifying it an *instrument de travail* that must be judged by the value that it has in empirical enquiry, they caution against mistaken theoretical ambitions: not all classes identified in their schema need to have a common ‘demographic identity’ nor do all of them necessarily possess antagonistic interests that give rise to socio-political action (1993: 46). Consequently, Erikson and Goldthorpe answer the question about the number of classes in contemporary Britain (posed in a study by Runciman, 1990) in one sentence: ‘[A]s many as it proves empirically useful to distinguish for the analytical purposes in hand’ (1993: 46).

Notwithstanding this pragmatic stance, Erikson and Goldthorpe’s class schema is based on a clearly specified theoretical rationale. Its aim is ‘to differentiate positions within labour markets and production units or, more specifically, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations that they entail’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 37). The conceptualization of the schema rests on two distinctions. The first division line is threefold and separates different employment statuses: employers, self-employed workers without employees, employees. But as Goldthorpe (2000: 207) readily acknowledges, this distinction has become of minor importance: in modern industrial societies, the category of employees is numerically preponderant, usually accounting for some 85 to 90 per cent of the active population. It is thus to a second division line, applying
specifically to employees, that Erikson and Goldthorpe give greatest emphasis in the construction of their schema. They reiterate a distinction originally highlighted by Kocka (1981a: 64–7) and discriminate between different forms of regulation – implicit or explicit – of the employment relation, separating the labour contract from the service relationship (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 41–2). The essence of this distinction is summarized as follows:

A labour contract entails a relatively short-term and specific exchange of money for effort. Employees supply more or less discrete amounts of labour, under the supervision of the employer or the employer’s agent, in return for wages that are calculated on a ‘piece’ or ‘time’ basis. In contrast, a service relationship entails a longer-term and more diffuse exchange in which employees render service to their employing organisation in return for compensation that takes the form not only of reward for work done, through a salary and various perquisites, but also comprises important prospective elements (Goldthorpe, 1997: 42).

This quotation reveals why, according to Goldthorpe, the unequal distribution of life chances should operate through different employment relationships. Long-term provisions and side benefits are absent from the labour contract, defined by closely regulated work and payment arrangements. In contrast, in service-class occupations, loyalty is obtained through high levels of trust and the perspective of career advancement. As Evans (1996: 214) puts it, ‘service-class employees are controlled by the “carrot” of long-term benefits, and workers by the “stick” of close regulation and the labour contract’.

In a later theoretical attempt, Goldthorpe (2000: Chap. 10) has tried to put the class schema’s conceptualization on more solid ground by discussing the reasons why individuals engaged in different jobs should have their employment regulated by different contractual arrangements. Relying on transaction cost economics and rational action theory, Goldthorpe (2000: 212) argues that employment contracts have to be seen as social relationships that are implicit or incomplete in varying degrees; within the employment contract, employees will always have a considerable amount of discretion. Therefore, the employer faces the challenge of ensuring that this discretion is used in ways that are consistent with organizational values and objectives. In other words, the employer must find ways to induce employees to render their maximum effort in the work accomplished for him. For this reason, appropriate incentive structures have to be set in place whose form depends on two factors: (1) on the difficulty involved in monitoring the work performed by employees and; (2) on the specificity of the human capital involved in the work task (Goldthorpe,
The presence or absence of these two dimensions determines the form of the incentive structure fixed in the employment contract:

- Where monitoring of the work performed is easy, employees can be remunerated in direct relation to their productivity; if further, specific skills are absent, the employers do not need to ensure the long-term continuation of the contract. Under these conditions, the labour contract will prevail, involving low levels of trust and short-term exchanges of money for effort.
- However, where difficulty in monitoring work arises and where the specificity of skills is such that productive value would be lost if an employee left the organization, employers will need to gain the employee commitment through a contract relying on long-term performance appraisal, comprising a steadily increasing level of compensation throughout the employee’s working life. This form of contract grounded on prospective factors on a long-term basis defines the service relationship.

Goldthorpe (2000: 221–3) mentions two forms of mixed contracts: work presenting monitoring difficulties but no skill specificity, and work involving specific human capital but no monitoring problems. For these work settings, he argues, an intermediate form of regulation, between the service relationship and the labour contract, prevails. Table 1.3 re-produces the Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema. It shows how the theoretical distinction between different employment statuses and employment relationships is translated into practice.

The main division line runs between classes I and II on the one hand and classes VI and VII on the other, thus separating the service class from the working class. In an intermediate setting are class III, covering routine non-manual positions and class V, comprising lower-grade technical and first-line supervisory positions. Class IV groups the petite bourgeoisie and the farmers. Of particular interest for our research objective is the conceptual treatment Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 44) reserve for routine non-manual workers: when applied to women, class III is divided into a higher-grade (IIIa) and a lower-grade class (IIIb) with the purpose of isolating in class IIIb a series of very low-skill non-manual positions normally occupied by women. As we wish to show in the discussion of different categories of semi- and unskilled workers in Chapter 3, this class IIIb presents a series of conceptual and operational problems.

The class schema developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe also provided the basis for the construction of a new British socio-economic classification (NS–SEC). In the early 1990s, sociologists and government statisticians concurred that the Registrar-General’s Social Class (RGSC) had to be aban-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service relationship</th>
<th>Full 11-class version</th>
<th>Collapsed 7-class version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong></td>
<td>Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors</td>
<td><strong>I+II</strong> Service class: professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of non-manual work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II</strong></td>
<td>Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees</td>
<td><strong>III</strong> Routine non-manual workers: routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate</strong></td>
<td><strong>IIIa</strong> Higher-grade routine non-manual employees (administration and commerce)</td>
<td><strong>IVa+b</strong> Petite bourgeoisie: small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IIIb</strong> Lower-grade routine non-manual employees (sales and services)</td>
<td><strong>IVc</strong> Farmers: farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IVa</strong> Small proprietors, artisans, etc. with employees</td>
<td><strong>V+VI</strong> Skilled workers: lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IVb</strong> Small proprietors, artisans, etc. without employees</td>
<td><strong>VIIa</strong> Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IVc</strong> Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production</td>
<td><strong>VIIb</strong> Agricultural labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>V</strong> Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers</td>
<td><strong>VIIa</strong> Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>VI</strong> Skilled manual workers</td>
<td><strong>VIIb</strong> Agricultural labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>VIIa</strong> Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture)</td>
<td><strong>VIIa</strong> Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>VIIb</strong> Agricultural and other workers in primary production</td>
<td><strong>VIIb</strong> Agricultural labourers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

doned and replaced by a measure ‘whose basis derives from recent socio-
logical research on the relational aspects of class’ (Rose and Pevalin, 2002: 79). In the course of an extensive review (see Rose and Pevalin, 2003), the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema was adopted – and somewhat adapted – as the Office of National Statistic’s new classification ‘because it is widely used and accepted and is conceptually clear’ (Rose and Pevalin, 2002: 87). Analogous to the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, NS–SEC tries to bring together combinations of occupational groups that share similar employment relations. Moreover, the crucial line drawn by Erikson and Goldthorpe between a service relationship and a labour contract also serves as the central line of division between NS–SEC classes. Nonetheless, there are some minor conceptual differences between the two classifications. In NS–SEC, the manual/non-manual divide is eliminated in order to take into account changes in the nature of both industry and occupations – changes that have rendered this distinction outmoded and misleading. Likewise, the notion of skill requirements has been removed and superseded by the sole emphasis on employment relations (Rose and O’Reilly, 1998; Rose and Pevalin, 2002). Yet the main difference between the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema and NS–SEC concerns operationalization. In the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, occupational groups are allocated to different classes intuitively, based on informed professional judgement (Goldthorpe, 1980). In contrast, NS–SEC is operationalized and validated more systematically, based on explicit information on occupational groups, employment statuses and establishment size, organized into a matrix table. However, although NS–SEC slightly modifies operationalization and eliminates vestiges typical of high industrialism such as the manual/non-manual divide, NS–SEC remains a close copy of the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema.4

The Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema as point of departure

In our view, the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema appears of greater prac-
tical use than Wright’s class map or Bourdieu’s space of social positions for the specific research problematic of this study. As regards the range of problems on which we focus, three elements in particular speak in favour of the class structure developed by Goldthorpe and his colleagues:

– **Pragmatic scope:** by calling their class schema a research instrument that has to be judged on the basis of the empirical findings it generates, Erikson and Goldthorpe take an explicitly pragmatic stance. Contrary to Wright or Bourdieu, they thus successfully avoid ontologically over-
loading their concept of class: classes are simply seen as social groupings that share similar class situations, that is positions within labour markets and production units. Whether they also share common class identities and a common class habitus is an altogether different question.

- **One hierarchical criterion**: Erikson and Goldthorpe make it clear that they favour a class-structural over a prestige-scale perspective because they are interested not so much in vertical movement but in relational change (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 30). Notwithstanding this important qualification, Chapter 3 will show that their class schema is broadly structured around a hierarchical component – distinguishing between more or less advantaged positions in terms of employment relationships – and thus provides a criterion of vertical differentiation.5

- **Differentiation within the working class**: in Erikson and Goldthorpe’s schema, skilled and low-skilled workers in production, the office and personnel services are not merged into a single class. Unlike Wright, who ends up with a very large working class, comprising almost half the entire labour force, Goldthorpe’s distinction between classes IIIa, IIIb, VI, VIIa and VIIb allows a more differentiated analysis of this heterogeneous group.

It is for these reasons that the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema will serve as the theoretical starting point for the development of our own analytical framework. This means that though we will develop a different class schema adapted to the problematic of this study, we will start out from their conceptual premises and seek to defend modifications with reference to the construction logic of their schema. The structure of this Part I is highlighted in Figure 1.2. Our criticism of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s schema will begin with a reanalysis, in Chapter 2, of three trends which have a powerful effect on Western European labour forces, namely feminization, tertiarization and educational upgrading of the employment structure. As a result, we will argue that the Goldthorpe schema needs to be reviewed in order to efficiently capture different categories within the middle and the working class. The aspects in question have to do with female employment and the decreasing salience of the distinction between manual and non-manual occupations (Chapter 3) and the need for additional horizontal differentiation within the middle class (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, we will propose a new class schema that partly shifts its focus from hierarchical boundaries to horizontal divisions. We expect such a schema to better account for phenomena such as expanding services, women’s labour market participation and the growth of the welfare state.
Figure 1.2  Overview of Part I: a theoretical review of labour market stratification

**Labour market trends:**
- Service sector expansion
- Female employment growth
- Educational upgrading

(Chapter 2)

**Implication for the analysis of the working class**
(Chapter 3)

**Implication for the analysis of the middle class**
(Chapter 4)

**Construction of a modified class schema:**
- Horizontal differentiation within the middle class
- Farewell to the manual/non-manual divide

(Chapter 5)
Three Labour Market Trends and their Impact on the Employment Structure

What trends for what countries during what period?

In what follows, three labour market trends shall be examined in some detail. This analysis of shifts in the employment structure serves two explicit causes. First and foremost, it aims at singling out the transformations that have taken place in Western European labour markets over the last 30 years. Second, it simultaneously attempts to highlight the differences in the employment structure between the four countries under study. Accordingly, our focus lies both on changes over time and between countries.

Changes over time: the most influential research using the Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema is based on data that reflects the employment structure of the mid-1970s and before (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993). In parallel, the most sophisticated assessment of the schema’s validity rests on data collected in 1984 (Evans, 1992, 1996; Evans and Mills, 1998). However, since the early 1980s – and, a fortiori, since the 1970s – a series of socio-economic trends have become more pronounced and substantially altered the employment structure of economically advanced countries. Hence, in order to discriminate within the more recent data used in this study, a class schema should be capable of grasping the considerably modified shape of Western European workforces in 2000. Among the trends which, in our view, challenge the Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema, three shifts ought to be highlighted: (a) the expansion of the service sector at the expense of manufacturing (sector-shift in the economy); (b) the increased participation of women in paid employment (gender-shift in employment); (c) the rising levels of general and vocational education (education-shift within employment). These trends are by no means new and could be completed by additional vectors of change within the labour market such as the rapid adoption of new computerized and information technologies, the introduction of new forms of human resource management or the intensification of international trade (Gallie et al., 1998). Moreover, the shift towards more flexible production units has been
accompanied by the spread of non-standard types of employment (Regini, 1992; Dølvik, 2001). These trends were not ignored by the authors quoted earlier. But as Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 237) themselves make clear when discussing their analytical treatment of women’s class position, their ‘concern is with the – significantly different – circumstances that have in fact obtained – as regards this study, up to the mid-1970s – and not with predicting the future.’

Our argument in this chapter is that what looked like blurry tendencies one or two decades ago has solidified in increasingly tertiarized, feminized and skill-intensive labour markets. This chapter serves to underline the dimension of change, relying mainly on descriptive statistics. Before beginning with a theoretical account of the tertiarization process, we briefly explain the rationale behind our choice of the countries to be studied.

**Changes between countries:** In this study, the employment structure and the corresponding institutional setting will be compared for four countries: Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. These four Western European countries are held to be highly comparable on a broad range of social, economic and political variables, the research set-up thus following the *most similar systems design* (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Whereas the selection of Britain, Germany and Sweden is common practice in comparative research, Switzerland is a somewhat more unusual choice. Contrary to other small European countries with highly open economies, in particular the Netherlands and Sweden, Switzerland has actually remained largely understudied in comparative sociological literature.

Between the British and German cases, the demarcation lines are clearly drawn. At the level of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), they overlap with the division between a liberal (Britain) and a conservative regime (Germany). As regards the organization of production through markets and market-related institutions, the production regimes (Soskice, 1999), the opposition lies between a liberal market economy (Britain) and a coordinated market economy (Germany). Finally, from the point of view of the economic development trajectory (Castells, 2000), the relevant division is made between a service economy model (Britain) and an industrial production model (Germany).

Unlike Britain and Germany, the two small countries in our sample do not fit nicely into this dichotomized picture. Sweden is a prime example of the social democratic regime. Organization of welfare and the labour market is state-dominated and committed to universalism, egalitarianism and productivism – that is to full employment and to maximum participation of the citizenry in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1999a). In contrast, Switzerland’s welfare state is usually situated at midway between the liberal and the Bismarckian tradition (Ferrera et al., 2000; Armingeon, 2001a). The Swiss production regime appears to rely on a considerable degree of non-market coordination like in Germany or Sweden (Soskice, 1999). Similarly, with respect to the distribution of power between the
state, employers’ associations and the unions, Switzerland shares in several ways the neo-corporatist features of Germany and, to a lesser degree, Sweden (Crouch, 1993). On the other hand, on the basis of its low degree of labour market regulation (Esping-Andersen, 1999a: 85) and its decentralized industrial relations system (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), it has been grouped, by other scholars, with Britain. It is for these in several ways puzzling characteristics of its institutional setting and labour market (Bonoli and Mach, 2001) that the study of the Swiss case appears, in our view, to contribute to the understanding of the present problematic.

The tertiarization of the employment structure

The rise of the service sector is a major trend which goes back at least to the pre-war years and is common to all OECD countries (OECD, 1988b: 183). Three main reasons are put forward to account for it (Esping-Andersen, 1999a: Chap. 6; Iversen and Cusack, 2000: 325; OECD, 2000: 97; Bosch and Wagner, 2003: 476): firstly, technological change leads to faster increasing productivity in goods-producing sectors which, as a consequence, continuously shed the redundant industrial workforce to the service sector. Secondly, parallel to rising general income, product markets are progressively saturated and patterns of demand shifted from goods to services. Thirdly, the expansion of the welfare state and rising female labour market participation create both offer and demand for service sector employment.

It is often unclear what precisely falls under the tertiary sector. Normally, service-sector employment is defined with reference to the employer’s main product, a service being distinguished from a good on the basis of three criteria: a service has an intangible nature, is difficult to store and requires direct interaction between the provider and the user (OECD, 2000: 81). The expansion of information technology renders this division line between the goods- and the service-producing sectors somewhat arbitrary. As a consequence, in statistical classification practice, the service sector is residually defined as those activities neither involving the extraction nor the production of material objects (Storrie, 2000: 38). This sectoral definition, however, brings about a series of limitations. The first has to do with the goods-producing firms’ practice of outsourcing services such as accounting, advertising, or legal work. A substantial part of these producer services may hence not be new in their content but only in their location. Yet outsourcing accounts only for a small part of the growth in producer services (Singelmann and Tienda, 1985: 54; Tschetter, 1989; OECD, 2000). Its expansion reflects above all the growing importance of financing and marketing. In recent years, the practice of outsourcing and subcontracting has been extended to less qualified service activities such as cleaning, catering and security work. In these activities, it is unlikely that the relocation is related to any expansion, but it most probably has an impact on working conditions. This leads us to a second limitation of the sectoral definition of
service employment: service work does not necessarily coincide with the service sector. According to Tschetter (1994), one third of workers employed in 1992 in the American manufacturing industry actually performed service type jobs, such as marketing or administration, whereas 14 per cent of the workers in the service sector performed production type activities, such as construction or mechanical jobs.

Notwithstanding these restrictions, the growth of the service sector at the expense of industrial employment is definitely not a statistical artefact. The transition from an industrial society to a society dominated by service jobs is apparent from Figure 2.1 for Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.

Figure 2.1 Employment shifts in industry and the services between 1970 and 2000

Sources: OECD (1984b); OECD (2002).
In 1970, the industrial sector still employed more workers than the service sector in Germany and Switzerland, unlike in Britain and Sweden where services had already been more important in terms of jobs than the industries since before 1960. Yet in 2000, service sector employment greatly outdid industrial employment in all four countries by a factor of 1.8 (Germany), 2.6 (Switzerland), 2.8 (Britain) and 3 (Sweden). In Germany and Switzerland, industrial decline started at the beginning of the 1970s. Whereas the Swiss employment structure underwent a rather rapid tertiarization process, Germany kept a large manufacturing sector until the end of the 1990s. In 2000, only four OECD countries had a larger employment share in the industrial sector than Germany: the lesser developed Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Portugal.

It is notable that over the past two decades, differences in the share of service jobs in total employment have considerably narrowed between the OECD countries (OECD, 2000). Storrie (2000: 39) notes a continual convergence of Western European service sectors towards the high U.S. level. Nonetheless, national differences in the tertiarization process persist. This becomes clear when examining the internal composition of service employment. As services comprise a very heterogeneous set of activities, the subdivision of the service sector into four categories as devised by Singelmann (1978) and refined by Elfring (1988) is helpful in identifying differences in service employment. When making this subdivision between distributive, producer, social, and personal services for the four countries under study, it clearly appears that everywhere social services are the largest subsector (OECD, 2000: 122). This is most clearly the case in Sweden where a close-knit network of public social services had already been developed during the 1960s and 1970s, the extensive coverage of social care services and their universal accessibility being a specific feature of the Nordic welfare state (Fargion, 2000).

Germany and Sweden lag behind Britain and Switzerland with respect to employment in two subsectors, producer services and personal services. This difference is eloquent as it concerns two subsectors with very different skill requirements: inside the OECD area, average educational attainment is highest in producer services and – within the tertiary sector – lowest in personal services (OECD, 2000: 96). This signifies that the German employment structure features less jobs than Britain and Switzerland in ‘desirable services’ (producer services) as well as in ‘less desirable services’ (personal services). Sweden is a somewhat different case as a very large share of its workforce is employed in the rather high-skill social services. In general, producer services expanded rapidly during the 1990s while personal services were stagnating. In Britain and Switzerland, there was also a marked increase in social service employment over the same time period (OECD, 2000: 122). Hence, ‘desirable services’ appear to increase faster than ‘undesirable services’ – above all if the other rapidly growing subsector, social ser-
vices, is considered, where average educational attainment is almost as high as in producer services.

Data on the occupational mix of employment confirm that the increase in the service sector implies a real reduction in the number of jobs involving the direct production of goods relative to the number of jobs involving service-type activities (OECD, 2000: 82). In fact, the shift towards services appears to be accompanied by an occupational change towards less blue-collar and more white-collar jobs, and this within the service as well as in the goods-producing sector (OECD, 1984a: 53; OECD, 2000: 82). In an analysis of the interaction between sectoral and occupational change from 1960 to 1980, Singelmann and Tienda (1985: 62) come to the same conclusion for the United States: ‘[S]o was the decline of the manufacturing industries the major reason for the decrease of crafts and manual workers, but the shift within manufacturing attributed for an equally important part of the shift (62).’

These features of service expansion bring about a series of implications for stratification. Most importantly for class theory, the rise of service jobs both within the tertiary and the secondary sector calls into question the distinction between manual and non-manual occupations. Already in the mid-1980s, the salience of the manual-/non-manual divide had been questioned in the light of the decrease of traditional industrial occupations and the expansion of service jobs. The ongoing decline of the three ‘m’s, the ‘male manual manufacturing worker’, is intimately linked to an evolution which further adds to the theoretical opacity of a hierarchical manual/non-manual distinction: the massive inflow of women into Western European labour markets.

The growth of female participation in paid employment

In the course of the last three to four decades, women’s employment has grown significantly in nearly all Western European societies. It is apparent from Figure 2.2 that between 1970 and 2000, female participation rates increased in all four countries of our sample by between 16 and 19 percentage points. Whereas Britain experienced a steady expansion of women in the labour force, Swiss female employment stagnated until the beginning of the 1980s but grew all the more rapidly during the 1990s. In the Scandinavian countries, occupational and family changes occurred at an earlier stage than in the rest of Europe, coinciding with welfare state expansion and the proliferation of social services. This is reflected by the very high female participation rates that Sweden featured already at the end of the 1970s, peaking at 81 per cent in 1990 (and slightly declining afterwards). In Germany, women’s employment has remained relatively depressed by a combination of factors such as social security rules that discourage part-time work, tax code features and a historical reliance on immigrant workers.
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, some convergence in female participation rates is observable between the four countries under study. The rise of female employment is closely linked with the diffusion of part-time work. In 2000, the share of women working less than 30 hours per week was much larger in Switzerland and Britain (45 and 41%) than in Germany and, above all, Sweden (34 and 21%) (OECD, 2002). Female part-time employment had been the most dynamic factor in Western European labour markets during the 1980s and the early 1990s, accounting for more than 40 per cent of total employment growth in the European Union (Lehndorff, 1998: 571). But since female full-time work was also responsible for a third of the increase in jobs during this period, the phenomenon of workforce feminization cannot be reduced to the expansion of part-time work.

A series of elements are invoked to explain the advance of women’s employment. On the supply side, push factors such as rising levels of education, provision of collective social services and steps towards equal rights have stimulated female commitment to labour market participation (Crompton, 1998: 85; Gallie et al., 1998: 11). Moreover, a (timid) move away from the male breadwinner model and an increase in the number of divorces has lead, among others, to a substantial shortening of the period during which married women remain out of the workplace while having children (Lewis, 1993: 6). On the demand side, the dominant pull factor appears to be service expansion. Through the integration of household activities into the market process and state expenditure in education and

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**Figure 2.2** The rise in women’s labour market participation, 1970–2000 (Women in paid employment as part of all women aged 15–64)

(Lehndorff, 1998: 571)

Sources: OECD (1984b, 2002)
public health, the rise of the service sector has provided large job opportunities for women over the last 30 years (Blossfeld, 1987: 93; Charles, 2000). Thus, demand and supply in (heavily female) service employment are mutually reinforcing. The increase in the social services subsector is particularly connected with the growth in female participation rates. Welfare state expansion has also provided large job opportunities for those women already in employment but coming from declining industries. To take an example from Norway, 45 per cent of women who worked in the textile industry in 1970 were employed in the welfare state ten years later (Kolberg and Kolstad, 1993: 60). Apart from the social services, women also occupy a large and disproportionate share of employment in less skilled personal services (OECD, 2000: 82).

How the joint action of tertiarization and feminization has transformed the workforces of the four countries under study is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which compares the share of men working in the industry with the share of women working in the service sector as parts of total employment. In 1970, the dominant category on the labour markets were men employed in industrial jobs: their share clearly exceeded women employed in the services in Britain (by 10%), in Germany (by 17%) and in Switzerland (by 14%), yet not so in Sweden (difference of only 1%). Thirty years later, the picture has been completely reversed: female service jobs account for a much larger share of total employment than male industrial jobs in Germany, Switzerland and even more so in Britain and Sweden (OECD, 1984b; 1998; 2002).

Figure 2.3 reflects the clear-cut image of industrially segregated labour markets. Crouch (1999: 113) uses the term of a ‘bicephalously gendered employment structure’, distinguishing between two dominant employment sectors, heavily male-dominated manufacturing on the one hand and female-biased social services on the other. In 2000, industry continued to
be a predominantly male sector at a ratio of at least 3.2 to 1 (Germany) and at most 3.8 to 1 (Britain). Simultaneously, women exceeded men in service employment by between 16 (Britain) and 34 per cent (Sweden) (OECD, 2002). However, even more pronounced than industrial segregation – and of greater significance for our study – is occupational segregation. In an empirical analysis of labour-market entry in Germany, Blossfeld (1987) finds the seemingly paradoxical result that occupational chances of women relative to those of men improve across cohorts as a consequence of the developing service sector and the expansion of the welfare state. But at the same time, dissimilarity is also growing between male and female occupations: over time, the first job is becoming ‘more male’ for men and ‘more female’ for women. To a lesser extent, this finding for Germany seems to apply for a wider group of countries: ‘[T]he marked increase in the proportion of women in employment has not produced any major convergence in the overall distribution of male and female employment across occupations and industries’ (OECD, 1988a: 147; see also Charles, 1992; 2000). Likewise, Johnung (1984) showed for Sweden that, when using 270 narrow occupational groups, 40 per cent of women’s total employment was channelled into only five occupations: secretaries, nursing aides, sales workers, cleaners and children’s nurses.

For class theory, the on-going feminization of the labour force has a series of implications. Firstly, it weakens the case for the conventional view of class that privileges the household over the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis. At least in work-centred research settings, the conventional approach does not seem suitable to illuminate the issues under study for the simple reason that men’s distribution over the occupational structure does not reflect women’s distribution. Expressed differently, results found for men are unlikely to be representative for the labour market experience of women. Moreover, the choice of the unit of analysis has a substantial impact on the class schema: knowing that in 2000 between 80 (Germany), 82 (Switzerland) and 87 per cent (Britain, Sweden) of employed women were working in the services (OECD, 2002), division lines typical for male manufacturing work are not of great use to discriminate between female jobs.

**Educational expansion and occupational upgrading**

Besides the shift from manufacturing to services and the simultaneous rise in women’s employment, a third trend has profoundly affected the composition of Western European workforces over the last 30 years: the massive expansion of education. According to Brauns et al. (1997a), educational reforms in Western Europe have been characterized by two elements: (1) the opening of tertiary education to significantly larger sections of the populations – increasingly diversified universities being no longer reserved for a
small social elite; (2) an expansion of the vocational qualification system in an attempt to follow technological and economic transformations.

The growth of tertiary education becomes evident when looking at the evolution of the number of university students over the last 40 years. From 1960 to 1993, Sweden’s university population increased by a ratio of 6.8, an expansion rate only slightly above that experienced in Germany (5.6), Switzerland (4.4) and Britain (4.3) (Mitchell, 1998). Although tertiary education has expanded in all four countries, the proportion of university students as part of the population differs substantially. Whereas in Sweden and Germany, university students accounted in 1993 for 2.9 and 2.2 per cent respectively of total population, the corresponding share was only 1 per cent in both Britain and Switzerland (Mitchell, 1998). However, in absolute terms, the biggest gains have not been found at the academically-oriented university level but below university in lower-level tertiary degrees, generally of shorter duration and with a vocational orientation (OECD, 1989: 57). As revealed by differences in university attendance, a high degree of diversity persists among European education and vocational training systems. In describing Germany and Switzerland’s educational systems, heavy emphasis must be laid on three factors: the dual system of vocational training, a high degree of generally accepted standards, and strong stratification of educational opportunity (selection takes place early and mobility between tracks is low). This contrasts with Britain’s relatively unstandardized and unstratified system where, as in Sweden, general education constitutes the dominant track, while vocational training is to a large degree firm-specific (Müller and Shavit, 1998). In Sweden, apprenticeships are uncommon but its school system is highly standardized and centralized. Moreover, it is characterized by a low grade of stratification (Erikson and Jonsson, 1998).

The overall increase in educational attainment in Western Europe is related both to the gender- and the sector-shift in employment. Firstly, the catch-up process of women in labour market participation has been fostered by female gains made in educational attainment relative to men (Blossfeld, 1987: 101). In every OECD country, gains in attainment levels of younger women over older women have been larger than the educational gains experienced by younger men relative to older men (OECD, 1989: 57). Secondly, educational expansion has both stimulated and been stimulated by the tertiarization of employment: as the goods-producing sector relies more heavily on low-education work than the service sector, the shift towards services has increased the demand for higher education. However, a closer look at the skill composition within the service sector reveals substantial differences. The best qualified labour force is employed in the rapidly growing producer services and social services. But at the same time, personal services have a lower skill-profile than any other subsector in the industries or services in a series of countries for which data exist: France,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States (OECD, 2000: 96). In a comparative analysis of 16 European societies, Crouch (1999: 118) also emphasizes the markedly low educational base of personal services: ‘[A]lthough it is part of the overall growth of services so widely remarked, it shares few of the characteristics stereotypically associated with that growth, being associated with neither strong knowledge bases nor high technology.’ Similarly, Dølvik (2001) points to the fact that job growth in Europe during the 1990s not only took place in skill demanding business, health and social services, but also in less skilled clerical, office and sales work. As a consequence, he expects the tertiarization process to engender a more polarized pattern of employment.

This leads us to the question whether and to what extent educational expansion and tertiarization have been accompanied by occupational upgrading, or asked differently, whether the rising levels of education have translated into more highly skilled jobs in services (or industry). Following Bravermann’s (1974) proletarianization thesis of white-collar workers, a large number of empirical studies had taken an interest in the issue of occupational up- or downgrading. Although some qualifications apply to specific work contexts (Kern and Schumann, 1984), to the question of unemployment (Goldthorpe and Payne, 1986; Gallie, 2002) and, in particular, to women (Crompton and Jones, 1984; Marshall and Rose, 1988), the findings clearly support occupational upgrading for Britain (Marshall and Rose, 1988; Gershuny, 1993; Gallie, 1991; Gallie et al., 1998), Germany (Mayer and Carroll, 1987; Kern, 1998) or the United States (Singelmann and Tienda, 1985; Wright and Martin, 1987; Wright, 1997). In a review of the debate, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 11) conclude that a wide range of countries have witnessed the shift away from manual labour towards more specialized white-collar work:

In all economically advanced nations, the tendency is for the proportion of the work-force in professional, administrative, and managerial occupations to rise, while the proportion in occupations at the lowest skill levels, both manual and non-manual, either remains stable or falls. In addition, there is little indication from survey findings of a widening experience of ‘degraded work’.

These conclusions are supported by more recent data for the four countries of our study. In Figure 2.4, we have plotted the evolution of managerial and professional jobs against the evolution of employment in the crafts and production between 1991 and 2001 (based on national statistics assembled in ILO, 2000, 2002). While absolute levels are not strictly comparable between the four countries, the evolution over time within each country certainly is. It shows that the shift away from elementary occupations in production towards jobs in the professions and management continued
during the ten years between 1991 and 2001. In comparison, the expansion of professional and managerial occupations has been most marked in Switzerland, the decrease in production and elementary jobs strongest in Britain. The general trends are comparable across the four countries under review and point towards the upgrading of the occupational structure.

However, from educational expansion, and its partial translation into an upgraded occupational structure,\(^9\) it does not necessarily follow that working conditions \textit{per se} have improved. While there is little doubt about the expansion of jobs demanding intellectual skills at the expense of tasks requiring physical ability, quality of everyday work may suffer in service economies from the spread of non-standard forms of employment. Directly consumer-oriented service businesses increasingly respond to demand fluc-
tuation by resorting to irregular working hours, short-term contracts and hired labour. These ‘just-in-time’ staffing strategies imply an increase in precarious flexibility and have possibly led to a deterioration of individual employees’ work experience (Dølvik, 2001; Gallie, 2002).

Moreover, occupational upgrading by no means implies that class inequalities are about to vanish. Research into differences in educational attainment and social mobility gives clear evidence of the intergenerational stability of class positions (Featherman et al., 1975; Müller et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993). This signifies that although within Western European countries the average level of educational attainment has considerably expanded, once all effects of expansion per se are controlled for, class differentials in educational attainment seem to have changed very little over time (Goldthorpe, 2000: Chap. 8). Therefore, a class schema, as a device capturing the distribution of advantages and disadvantages in the labour market, remains relevant. However, in our view, such a schema must be modified in order to grasp the distribution of inequalities within workforces that have gradually been upgraded and become better skilled. The processes of tertiarization, welfare state expansion and occupational upskilling have reduced the numerical strength of manual workers (frequently through early retirement) and promoted the growth of managerial, professional, semi-professional and skilled service jobs. The combined result is to tilt the stratificational order towards the middle class. Consequently, in order to capture the salient features of this somewhat changed order, the class schema must partially shift emphasis from the hierarchical to the horizontal dimension.

In Chapter 4, we will discuss in detail the need for a class schema which accounts for occupational upgrading by horizontally differentiating between hierarchically equivalent but nonetheless different labour market positions within the middle class. Before, however, the question of female employment and the most convenient unit of class analysis shall be reviewed in Chapter 3.
Women, the Manual/Non-Manual Divide and the Working Class

The unit of class analysis: the household or the individual?

The conventional view of class, advocated by Goldthorpe (1983, 1984), considers the household as the appropriate unit of stratification. This means that insofar as members of the same family live together, they are assumed to occupy a single position in the class hierarchy. The massive entrance of women into paid employment during the last decades has stimulated challenge to this approach. In particular during the 1980s, a heated debate took place over the question of how to incorporate women to class analysis. Controversy became acute over the fact that it was common practice in stratification research to derive women’s class position simply from their husband’s or father’s employment, data on female work activities being irrelevant. Consequently, feminist critique has highlighted two aspects of the conventional view considered as problematic: firstly that women’s class position is independent of their own employment status, and secondly that the social position of the family is completely unaffected by women’s work career (Sørensen, 1994: 28). The main reproach focused on the occurrence of families in which husband and wife occupy basically different class positions and where the ‘family class’ cannot simply be derived from the man’s occupation (Heath and Britten, 1984). In short, these critics have accused the conventional view of being increasingly at odds with an empirical reality of rising female employment and a gender-segmented class structure comprising a large number of ‘cross-class’ households and families headed by women (Stanworth, 1984; Leiulfsrud and Woodward, 1987).

In various replies, Erikson and Goldthorpe have insisted on the fact that the conventional view, far from being sexist, stems from a clear recognition of major sexual inequalities in regard to opportunities for labour market participation (Goldthorpe, 1983: 469, 470). In other words, they argue that the household-centred approach simply reflects a sexist reality where women continue to depend economically on men and where their class...
position is still determined by men’s employment. According to Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 235), ‘exponents of “feminist” sociology appear to have been led into underestimating the degree to which married women’s work, however more extensive it has become, still fails to transform their situation of dependency’. They put forward two arguments to explain their preference of the family over the individual as the unit of class composition: first, insofar as family members constitute a household, a broad similarity may be expected to prevail in their material conditions and in a wide range of their future life-chances; second, the economic decision-making in which family members engage in regard both to consumption and labour market participation is typically of a joint or interdependent kind (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 233). These considerations are translated into research practice by deriving the class position of the conjugal family from that of the male ‘head’ – the member of the household that typically has the greatest commitment to, and continuity in, labour market participation. In recent years, Erikson and Goldthorpe have modified their position slightly, by adopting in parallel the ‘dominance’ method originally devised by Erikson (1984). In this case, the class position of the family is determined by the employment of that partner whose work experience may be regarded as ‘dominant’ according to criteria of employment status and level of employment. Yet in terms of these criteria also, the great majority of heads of household continue to be men (Marshall et al., 1995: 13).

In this context, it must be noted that Goldthorpe (1983) uses data collected in 1974 for his demonstration of the peripheral labour market position of women. Similarly, his joint study with Erikson of female mobility patterns relies on data collected in the first half of the 1970s (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993). The two authors hence make it clear that their use of the household as unit of class composition is not influenced by value-commitments but rather by the circumstances that obtained up to the mid-1970s.10 In their view, the quite spectacular increase in female participation rates since the 1970s is by itself not sufficient to overthrow the conventional approach. As long as married women’s work forms part of a family strategy and remains characterized by discontinuity, they consider the individual approach to women’s class allocation as being misconceived (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 235). Thus, their arguments explicitly rest on empirical grounds, the terrain where controversy over the appropriate unit of class analysis has found wide expression. Several studies have examined the influence of the partner’s class on a series of topics like class identity, political association and fertility. With respect to voting behaviour, some of the cross-national findings are inconclusive (Marshall et al., 1995). For Britain, however, the evidence seems to clearly support the expectations of the conventional approach: voting intentions of women are better predicted by their partner’s class than by their own class (Marshall et al., 1988), with some qualifications applying to women in professional and
blue-collar jobs (De Graaf and Heath, 1992). At the same time, however, Heath and Britten (1984: 489) show with British data that women’s class has explanatory power for party identification and family behaviour (fertility) ‘over and above that attributable to their husbands’ class positions’.

Marshall et al. (1988) try to bring some order into the somewhat ambiguous empirical findings by introducing a differentiation based on the research objective. While work-centred aspects appear to ask for an approach based on the individual, political behaviour seems to be explained more usefully by the household-centred approach: ‘[P]artisanship runs between rather than through families’ (72). Similarly, Erikson (1984) argues on a conceptual level for the distinction of two dimensions inherent in class and thereby shows a way out of the controversy between the conventional and the individual approach. He maintains that the two basic factors of class position highlighted by Lockwood – work and market situation – do not coincide. On the one hand, the market situation relates to life chances as they stem from the individual’s occupation, having consequences for consumption level, housing standard and the ways in which children are brought up. On the other, the work situation relates to the question of how production is organized and to the location within the systems of authority and the degree of autonomy in performing work tasks. Whereas the market situation relates to the family or the household as the unit of consumption, it is clearly the individual who experiences the work situation as illustrated by health hazards or relations with work colleagues (Erikson, 1984: 501). Accordingly, Erikson suggests that the appropriate unit of class composition is either the individual or the household, depending upon whether one investigates the work or the market situation. Taking up Erikson’s distinction, Sørensen (1994: 35) concludes that ‘disagreements about the “proper” unit of analysis – the family or the individual – are really disagreements about what the research concern should be in class analysis or stratification studies’.

Hence, if the choice of the unit of analysis is supposed to reflect the substantive concern of one’s research, little doubt prevails about the necessity of an individual approach for the range of problems on which this study focuses: its explicitly work-centred setting, concentrating on institutional factors and employment conditions applying to different categories of the class system, requires the integration of women into the analysis. The need to attribute class positions to both men and women in our study is reinforced by time period and sample composition. Our data reflect the situation in labour markets in 2000, by which time women have come to account for 43 to 48 per cent of Western European workforces (OECD, 2002). In this context, following the household-centred approach, and thus excluding married women from our sample, would signify ignoring the employment relations of about a third of the labour force of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Simultaneously, we would be very unlikely to find out much about a decisive category of low-skilled workers – namely employees in routine clerical jobs, sales occupations and personal
services – for the simple reason of having omitted the majority of them, women, from our research. In sum, in this study the individual will figure as the unit of analysis, bringing about a series of repercussions for the class schema.

**Integrating women into a male class schema**

For quite some time, current class schemes have been criticized for being concerned too exclusively with the male occupational system (Murgatroyd, 1984). Hence, critics have suggested that it is primarily employment conditions of men that Erikson and Goldthorpe have in mind when constructing their classes (Crompton, 1998: 95). The main reproach focuses on the fact that their schema displays a high degree of differentiation between occupations dominated by men but is relatively insensitive to distinctions between jobs in which women are in a majority. When empirically analysing the schema’s construct validity, Evans (1996: 222) concludes that it explains less variance in job characteristics of women than men. He thereby reiterates his earlier finding that ‘women’s jobs are not likely to be as easily summarized by the Goldthorpe (or any other schema) as are men’s’ (Evans, 1992: 229).

However, Evans (1996) notes that the difference in variance explained is not dramatic and furthermore stems directly from the pronounced clustering of women in one class, class III which comprises routine non-manual workers. In fact, in the early 1980s in Britain, 39 per cent of women but only 6 per cent of men were allocated to these routine clerical, service and sales occupations of class III (Marshall et al., 1988: 74). Ten years later, women continued to cluster heavily in class III: 40 per cent of employed women are classified as ‘routine non-manual’ in Britain, whereas the same class III comprises 49 per cent of female wage-earners in France and Germany (Brauns et al., 1997b: 33, 34).11 If one adds those women found in the semi-professions (class II), more than two thirds of the female labour force of Britain, France and Germany are concentrated in only two out of seven classes (Brauns et al., 1997b). Two very different explanations are offered for this phenomenon. On the one hand, the crowding of women into such a small number of classes is seen as proving the inadequacy of the Goldthorpe class schema for female employment (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990). On the other, the clustering is, quite the opposite, considered as accurately reflecting the reality of Western European labour markets that are segregated along gender-lines (Mayer and Carroll, 1987: 31; Marshall et al., 1995: 2).12

Goldthorpe’s advocates are not wrong in emphasizing that sex-typing and patriarchal exclusion contribute towards segregated labour market outcomes as mirrored by the class schema. Still, the critiques cannot be dismissed so easily. While the full version of the Goldthorpe schema allows to differentiate very precisely between typical male occupations in manufac-
turing, distinguishing lower-grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers (V) from skilled manual (VI) and unskilled manual workers (VII), the class embracing typical female occupations in services (III) is a black box. What adds to the opacity of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s class structure for women is the highly heterogeneous character of the dominant female category, class III. Being regarded as ‘intermediate’ in the sense that the typical employment relationship takes on a very mixed form (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 43), class III is a blurred grouping that comprises a wide range of clerical, sales and personal service tasks. Assessing the validity of the Goldthorpe schema, Evans and Mills (1998) find very little evidence for routine non-manual employees sharing similar class characteristics: ‘Class IIIab are very heterogeneous, in fact a class of low “classness”’ (97).

This critique is not new. Already in the early 1980s, Goldthorpe partially remedied for the low internal consistency of class III when applied to women by subdividing it into IIIa and IIIb. The aim was to isolate in class IIIb a series of very low-skill positions in sales and service occupations which are typically held by women: ‘[T]he subdivision of class III into IIIa and IIIb was prompted by the application of the schema in studies of women’s mobility, and is used only in analysis where women are involved’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 44). While this distinction of category IIIb has improved the analytical use of the schema, it has at the same time created additional complexity as well as potential for substantial disagreement:

First of all, the schema has to be modified depending on whether it applies to men or to women. In the use that Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 241) make of class IIIb, this category is specifically devised for women and seems to imply a different employment relationship for female and male workers. In analyses that are restricted to men, class III remains undivided. As Brauns et al. (1997a: 19) aptly note, this practice is problematic insofar as it confuses aspects of occupational class with aspects of sex-segregation.

Secondly, in research, the use of the full 11-class version of the Goldthorpe schema is – due to often limited-sized data sets – the exception, not the rule. When collapsed versions of the schema are used, controversy occurs over the question where to allocate incumbents of class IIIb. Evans insists on aggregating class IIIa with IIIb, be it in a seven-class (Evans, 1992: 225), a five-class (Evans and Mills, 1999: 33) or a four-class schema (Evans and Mills, 1998: 91). Similarly, Buchmann and Sacchi (1998), Heath and Cheung (1998) as well as Müller et al. (1998) merge classes IIIa and IIIb into a single non-manual intermediate class. In contrast, Marshall and his colleagues, after allocating IIIb to class III in 1988 (Marshall et al., 1988), reviewed their practice and merged class IIIb in more recent studies with the unskilled manual workers of class VII (Marshall et al., 1995; Marshall, 1997: Chap. 10). This position is in line with that of other British work sociologists like Gallie and his colleagues (Gallie and Vogler, 1990; Gallie, 1991, 1996a; Gallie et al., 1998).
The issue of the correct location of class IIIb, when collapsed, leads to the question of the appropriate *hierarchical setting* of routine non-manual workers in a schema distinguishing between different employment relationships. Yet before discussing the difficulty involved in placing women in a vertical order, the hierarchical dimension of the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema must be addressed.

**The problem of fitting women into a hierarchical setting**

Erikson and Goldthorpe repeatedly emphasized that classes cannot be consistently ordered on any single dimension because the differences may be ones of ‘kind’ as well as ‘levels’. Even so, they recognized that ‘a threefold hierarchical division of the schema … seems well founded’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 46) and that ‘broad contrasts can still be made between what might be described as “more advantaged” and “less advantaged” classes’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 166). The empirical findings made by Evans (1992: 227) more than confirm these broad contrasts: ‘Our analysis indicates that the divisions between employee classes in the Goldthorpe schema are hierarchical.’ In the same vein, Prandy (2000: 250) explained the similarity between results produced by the continuous Cambridge scale and the relational Goldthorpe schema with the ‘major hierarchical component in the Goldthorpe class schema’. Questions about hierarchy must, at least implicitly, also be answered when constructing Erikson’s ‘dominance order’; namely when comparing the work position of both spouses in order to derive the unitary family class from that partner with the higher level of labour market involvement (Erikson, 1984; Goldthorpe, 1984: 497). In his original contribution, Erikson (1984: 504–5) specified the three dimensions on which the dominance order of occupations is built:

1. categories of higher qualifications dominate categories of lower;
2. skills being equal, non-manual categories dominate manual categories;
3. self-employed people dominate employed people;

From this listing emerges the rather clear-cut hierarchical ordering underlying the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema. What is of interest in the context of our problematic is the fact that – skills being equal – the ‘manuality’ of work appears to differentiate vertically within the class structure. It is here that a problem arises with the hierarchical ordering: while the vertical criterion of ‘manuality’ may be broadly in line with male employment of the manufacturing sector, it does not appear adequate for service employment in general and women in particular. This becomes clear when the internal composition of class IIIb is examined more closely. It reveals, as Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 241) readily admit, ‘occupations which in terms of their characteristic employment relations would seem to entail
straight-forward wage-labour’. Focusing on women, Heath and Britten (1984: 478) provided a similar description of Goldthorpe’s class III: ‘[T]here will be sizeable components of personal service workers whose work and market situation we had never supposed to be other than “proletarian”’. In a comparison of the working conditions of different categories, the authors show that in terms of coverage with sick pay or pension schemes, sales and personal service workers in Britain are in no respect better off than semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers (Heath and Britten, 1984). Moreover, in terms of level of pay, incumbents of class III fare substantially worse than manual workers of classes VI and VII (Evans and Mills, 1998: 99). It appears thus highly questionable whether routine non-manual occupations are defined by a more advantaged employment relationship than manual occupations. According to Crouch (1999: 165), there are no grounds for regarding the lower levels of the non-manual hierarchy as somehow superior to manual work.

Why then are routine non-manual employees considered in an intermediate setting which prevails over the class position of manual workers? The response seems to lie in the persisting attraction of the manual/non-manual divide as a class boundary. However, the divide’s salience as regards women’s employment has been widely criticized for over two decades and, in our view, correctly so. For instance, Britten and Heath (1983: 52) conclude their findings on differences in working conditions as follows:

The usual practice then of regarding the manual/non-manual divide as the major ‘break’ in the class structure separating the middle and the working classes is thus called into question in the case of women’s jobs.

Likewise, in the mid-1980s, Dale et al. (1985: 388) emphasized the problematic aspect of ‘building into the classification those lines of cleavage between types of occupation which are characteristic of the male occupational system, for instance the traditional divide between manual and non-manual work.’ Interestingly, Goldthorpe (1983: 480) himself relativized the importance of the manual/non-manual divide when discussing the proportion of ‘cross-class’ families. He doubted whether the wife of a manual worker employed as a clerk, typist or shop assistant was benefiting from a more advantageous employment relationship than her husband, both being engaged in an exchange of wages for labour in subordinate positions. In a short passage, he explained the *raison d’être* of the manual/non-manual divide:

From the standpoint of class analysis, the distinction between manual and non-manual work is not *in itself* of any great significance. So far as men are concerned, this distinction is of value as an *indicator* of class
position because of the fact that it is quite closely correlated with differences in market and work situations – as reflected, for example, in conditions of fringe benefits, guarantees of security and promotion prospects, work rules and relations with superiors, etc. (Goldthorpe, 1983: 480; emphasis in the text)

Thus, the manual/non-manual divide appears inadequate for female employment. Yet, according to Goldthorpe, it may still be pertinent with respect to men.

The ambiguity of the manual/non-manual divide as vertical class boundary

In industrial societies dominated by manufacturing, the manual/non-manual divide has the merit of conveniently separating the working class from the middle class. Not surprisingly, it has been general custom in non-Marxist post-war sociology to draw the principal class boundary between blue-collar workers doing manual work and white-collar employees engaged in office, sales or service activities (Myles and Turegun, 1996). However, it appears doubtful whether this dividing line remains salient for contemporary Western European labour markets. In the previous section, it was argued that it is clearly of very limited use in the case of female employment. The issue is more ambiguous with respect to male employment. In the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, the most important distinction is made between the professional and managerial positions in class I and II on the one hand, and the wage-earning manual occupations of classes VI and VII on the other. While the former positions are defined by the service relationship and comprise the core of the middle class, the latter occupations are associated with the labour contract typical of the working class (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 44). Erikson and Goldthorpe draw attention to the fact that this distinction is equally reflected in everyday language:

We find it of interest and significance that something close to this division receives widespread linguistic recognition: for example, in the distinction made in English between ‘staff’ and ‘workers’; in French between cadres or employés and ouvriers; in German, between Beamte or Angestellte and Arbeiter; or in Swedish between tjänstemän (literally, ‘service men’) and arbetare (1993: 42).

However clear the distinction between a service relationship and a labour contract may be on a theoretical level, it is in the linguistic use quoted by Erikson and Goldthorpe that the difficulties arise. Arguably, the distinction between white-collar employees (Angestellte) and manual workers (Arbeiter) is nowhere more deeply rooted than in Germany where it is closely linked
to the institutional differences introduced by Bismarck’s welfare insurance system (Kocka, 1981a). Yet Müller and Noll (1996: 11) note that for Germany ‘it has become clear over the last years that the boundaries between “worker status” and “employee status” are increasingly whittling away’ [our translation]. They argue that as a consequence, the distinction between these two categories, as it stems from the social insurance system, has lost much of its sociological salience.\textsuperscript{13} Likewise, Kern (1998: 119) stresses the homogenization process of the labour force in manufacturing. In fully automated industrial complexes, there remain very few positions that can be occupied by unskilled workers. The introduction of new technologies has upgraded the industrial workforce and led to a decrease in the social distance between white-collar employees and upskilled blue-collar workers. In other words, the hierarchical advantage of clerical employees over industrial workers has gradually eroded.

In everyday economic activity, the growing similarity between lower-grade employees and blue-collar workers is responsible for a series of practical problems.\textsuperscript{14} Within the firm, the assignment of employee or worker status to new semi-skilled recruits becomes for personnel divisions an increasingly difficult task (or even sterile, since with no practical relevance). Similarly, outside the firm, trade unions organizing ‘workers’ as opposed to ‘employees’ struggle to identify the categories to which collective bargaining applies. As Sainsbury (1987: 508) has put, the presence of various types of ‘service workers’ and ‘low level salaried employees’ have created ‘a twilight zone between the working and the middle classes’.

Erikson and Goldthorpe have not ignored the blurring between the historically separated categories of non-manual employees and manual workers. In a short passage, they specify that their use of the manual/non-manual divide must be understood in the context of the time-period of their data:

\textit{…certainly, we would not regard the ‘manuality’ or otherwise of work performed as being in itself relevant to class allocation. ... However, over the period to which our data relate, which, as will be seen, extends several decades back from the mid-1970s, the manual-non-manual division does in fact appear to have corresponded rather closely with that we have noted of ‘workers’ versus ‘staff’, etc., so far as employment relations are concerned (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 43).}

However, changes in the composition of the workforce since the 1970s have rendered the hierarchical ordering of occupations along the manual/non-manual boundary ambiguous. Intimately linked with the labour market trends discussed in Chapter 2, the first of these changes is of a \textit{quantitative kind} and relates to the decline of manual workers, both through the work-life and across cohorts in Western European societies (Gershuny,
1993; Blossfeld et al., 1993; OECD, 2002). The stereotypical blue-collar worker as he emerges from ‘the pages of the history of industrial capitalism’ (Myles and Turegun, 1996: 116) is being reduced to a small minority under the influence of technological change: ‘[I]n manual jobs, new technologies continue the long-standing automation of the work of assemblers, labourers, packers and other member of the subcraft industrial workforce’ (OECD, 1988b: 188). At the same time, even in labour markets defined by a high degree of automation and a dominant service sector, low-skilled occupations and less advantaged work positions do not disappear; on the contrary, they appear to expand (Crouch, 1999; Goos and Manning, 2003). Hence, sales assistants, waiters and cooks in fast-food outlets, routine security guards, call centre employees, assistant nurses or child care workers do not hold jobs to which a particularly favourable employment relationship attache – this although they are all employed in occupations that, commonly, are neither considered to be manual nor blue-collar and could, in the more precise use of French or German, hardly be qualified as ouvriers or Arbeiter. In short, these employees are in the awkward vertical setting of Goldthorpe’s intermediate class III.

The relative opacity of the manual/non-manual divide is, however, not only due to this category of routine service employees. Under the influence of automation, manual manufacturing work is also undergoing a qualitative change of skill upgrading. In an empirical analysis of the blue-collar/white-collar divide, Gallie (1996a) re-examines whether the spread of new technologies has undercut the differences in the employment relationship of lower non-manual and manual workers in Britain. The underlying hypothesis suggests that automation improves the working conditions of the latter as compared to the former. Gallie finds evidence ‘that the spread of new technologies has been accompanied by significant areas of convergence in the work and labour market situations of lower non-manual and manual employees’ (1996a: 471). He thereby confirms the findings made by Kern and Schumann for Germany (see Kern, 1998). At the same time, Gallie (1996a) suggests that lower non-manual and manual classes remain distinct in two quite fundamental ways. They differ in the extent to which jobs require general conceptual skills and offer perspectives of longer-term career advancement. Yet one important qualification applies to these findings: Gallie introduces a conceptual flaw in his otherwise very careful analysis by placing incumbents of class IIIb – routine sales and personal service workers – together with manual workers (1996a: 453). Thus, he contrasts the working conditions of higher-grade routine non-manual workers (IIIa) on the one hand with those of lower-grade routine non-manual (IIIb) and manual workers (VI and VII) on the other. By allocating non-manual employees to both sides of the comparison, Gallie’s research setting does, in our view, not truly reflect the manual/non-manual divide. And as the non-manual employees with the least favourable working conditions are
incorporated into the ‘manual class’, Gallie (1996a) most likely under-estimates the degree of convergence between the two categories.\footnote{15}

Before translating this critique into a new class schema that takes account of both female employment and the ambiguity of a hierarchical manual/non-manual divide (see Chapter 5), we will briefly discuss structural divisions operating within the middle class.
Growing occupational differentiation and the undivided ‘service class’

In the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, two criteria are used to single out the salaried middle class: on the one hand, the employment status separates (at least conceptually) employers and the self-employed from the much larger group of employees. On the other, the nature of the employment relationship allows to distinguish between various categories of wage-earners. Schematically, four large groupings emerge from the combination of these two distinctions: (1) the employees in professional and managerial occupations (‘the service class’), (2) the less powerful and more menial non-manual employees (‘routine white-collar’), (3) different categories of small employers, proprietors and self-employed workers (‘petite bourgeoisie’) and (4) skilled and non-skilled manual workers.

In the literature, much attention has been paid to the first category, the service class, which forms the core of the middle class and to which the most-advantaged employment relationship attaches. Erikson and Goldthorpe have taken up the somewhat unfortunate term ‘service class’ from Renner (1953) who used it with reference to the German Dienstklasse – Prussian officialdom that had been transformed from a caste to a class. What is of importance in our context is the fact that Erikson and Goldthorpe conceive of this category as a horizontally unitary class: the same defining element, the service relationship, applies to all occupations comprised within it, however different they may be in other respects. Employers resort to the service relationship in order to make sure that members of classes I (and the more junior level II) act in their best interest, binding them to the employing organizations through a long-term set of material advantages, high levels of trust, and the perspective of career advancement.

This vision of the salaried middle class as a monolithic bloc has been challenged both on the grounds of recent trends in the employment struc-
ture and by different theoretical outlooks. In a historical perspective, Kocka (1995) has argued that if one takes the concept of class seriously, the middle class has never been a class since it includes persons with very different market positions: ‘[A]t any particular time, the middle class has been heterogeneous; within it, many separate worlds could co-exist side by side’ (1995: 788). When focusing on recent changes in the labour market, a series of studies demonstrate that the massive expansion of higher education over the last decades has been accompanied by a partial upgrading of the employment structure in Western Europe. This finding emerges from a substantial body of research which in particular highlights the growth in the professions and semi-professions: for instance Crouch (1999: Chap. 5), when comparing the class structure of the mid-1990s with that of the 1960s for 16 European countries, notes a considerable swelling of the managerial and, above all, professional ranks. At the same time, he finds a decrease in the number of manual and agricultural workers. Similarly, Goos and Manning (2003) observe for Britain a large increase in the number of professional and managerial jobs between 1975 and 1999. Yet in parallel, they also find some growth in low-skilled service occupations. Finally, Brauns et al. (1997b: 33, 34) report for Britain and Germany an expansion of the service class by between four (men) and nine per cent (women) during the 1980s and early 1990s.16

This shift from little qualified manual and clerical occupations to technical, managerial and professional positions inevitably leaves its marks on the shape of the class structure. The vertically-structured pyramid typical of industrial societies, with large numbers of low-skilled manual workers at the bottom, gives way to a class distribution that resembles more closely an orange, the bulge occurring at the middle level of skills. Simultaneously, the expansion of the salaried middle class has promoted greater heterogeneity within its ranks, causing a series of sociologists to question whether the concept of the service class as a unitary grouping provides a correct reflection of reality. In particular, political sociologist have advocated a more refined operationalization of the middle class. For instance, Müller and Noll (1996: 21) note from a discussion of changes in electoral behaviour that analysis of the increasingly complex employment structure of service societies demands more horizontal differentiation. Similarly, in a reply to Schnell and Kohler (1995) who find a decrease in the salience of socio-demographic variables in explaining German partisanship since 1950, Müller (1997: 750) argues that a schema which correctly measures employment relations in the 1950s may not capture the class differences of the 1990s. He argues that the declining salience of class voting is partly the consequence of the inadequate operationalization of class: if the large salaried middle class (Angestellte and Beamte) is subdivided according to a horizontal criterion, class might re-emerge as a decisive factor in explaining partisanship.
Theoretical criticism of the unitary service class

The concept of a homogeneous service class has not exclusively been criticized on empirical grounds, but has also been challenged by a series of theoretical arguments. Critics of the unitary service class have often taken up the distinction made by Wright (1985) between the three independent axes of inequality based on property, organizational assets and skill assets, maintaining that Goldthorpe’s silence on these divisions damages his argument. In their view, the opposition within the service class between managers relying on authority and professionals depending on expertise is a class division that should be recognized as such in a schema (e.g. Savage et al., 1992). In a reply, Goldthorpe (1995) insists that deriving a class division from the command of different assets is ‘clearly at odds with my emphasis on the basic commonality in their employment relationship’ (319). However, in our view, Goldthorpe’s insistence on the employment relationship as the schema’s decisive rationale is somewhat academic. This becomes clear from his specification that service relationships tend to evolve ‘where it is required of employees that they exercise delegated authority or specialized knowledge and expertise in the interest of their employing organization’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 42). This reference to ‘delegated authority’ and ‘specialized knowledge’ suggests that the schema is more concerned with outcomes than causes, as differences in the employment relationship reflect differences in employees’ endowment with specific human capital. Hence, the more human capital an employee possesses in the form of organizational or professional skills, the more important is the incentive system that the employer must set up in order to get maximal productivity out of his employee (Goldthorpe, 2000: 213). We would thus argue that the degree of advantage attached to the employment relationship is a direct consequence of the endowment of an individual with marketable skills, either of an organizational or a professional nature. Therefore, reasoning in terms of employment relationships, however useful as an empirical indicator, seems to convey a descriptive rather than explicative level of analysis.¹⁷

Closely linked with this argument is a second critique that questions the salience of the unitary service class on grounds that ‘Goldthorpe argues exclusively from the perspective of the rational employer and underlines the common elements in the agency problems of the employers which leads them to establish service-relationship contracts’ (Müller, 1999: 143). According to this view, Goldthorpe deliberately overlooks that there may exist important differences between various categories within the service class when looked at from the employee’s perspective – in particular between the administrative-managerial and the expert-professional group (Müller, 1999). In a similar vein, Savage and Butler (1995: 349) note that the Goldthorpe schema’s concern with the sole relationship between the employer
and the employee excludes the possibility of interaction between different categories of employees. This appears to be a shortcoming insofar as two groups of employees may well be bound to their employing organization by the same service relationship; but at the same time, their place in the division of labour, the asset on which they rely and the loyalty to which they subscribe may differ in important ways. These arguments suggest that the two dimensions of employment status and employment relationship do not differentiate in a satisfactory way within the salaried middle class. However, it is then no easy task to establish a criterion that integrates the perspective of the employee and discriminates unequivocally between hierarchically equivalent service-class groupings.

**Drawing divisions within the middle class**

The most influential reference for horizontal structuring of the middle class has been, as mentioned above, Wright’s (1985) distinction between assets in the means of production, organizational assets and skill assets or credentials. For Wright, each of these assets is an independent axis of exploitation that does not depend on any other. This signifies, for instance, that those who are advantaged through their possession of organizational assets or skills may be completely disinterested in defending the rights of property. Translated into established sociological language, the possession of ‘property assets’ refers to the old middle class of employers and the self-employed, whereas the distinction between ‘organizational assets’ and ‘skills’ corresponds to the split between managers and professionals. It is on this latter division that the debate mainly focuses. Following Kriesi (1989), Müller (1999: 142, 143) draws attention to the distinction between a managerial and a professional work role which, he argues, is likely to influence the interests and political orientations of the holders of the different occupations.

*Managers* rely on the exercise of delegated authority in administrative hierarchies. They run an organization, make administrative decisions, order and oversee the work of others. They thus share in the power of the command structure of the employing organization and are directly concerned with its preservation. Furthermore, often being in positions where their personal success depends on the success of the organization, Müller (1999: 143) argues that managers are likely to display a high level of loyalty towards the organization.

In contrast, *professionals* rely more directly on the exercise of specialized knowledge and expertise. For instance, Brauns et al. (1997a: 13) note that in most countries, entering the professions is more dependent on tertiary education than is access to managerial jobs which can often be reached with lower qualifications through a successful bureaucratic career. Similarly, Savage et al. (1992) argue that the skills of managers are more
specific to, and dependent on, the particular organizational context in which they work, whereas professionals tend to be able to use their knowledge in a greater variety of settings and hence are less reliant on any one employer. As a consequence, orientation towards and identification with the employing organization seems less likely within the professional group.

According to this view, a first basic antagonism opposes managers representing organizational authority against professionals concerned with the autonomy of their discipline or profession (Kriesi, 1989; Savage et al., 1992; Müller, 1999). A somewhat different though overlapping distinction is proposed by Lamont (1987) when trying to explain variations in political liberalism (in the American left-libertarian sense) within the middle class. She draws a horizontal division line that is based, firstly, on the degree to which an employee’s knowledge is instrumental to profit maximization and, secondly, the degree to which an employee’s job is dependent on profit maximization. Schematically, this analysis allows her to distinguish, on the one hand, the professionals occupied in health, education, social and cultural services which are neither directly instrumental to nor directly dependent on profit maximization. Not surprisingly, it is among this group that support for left-libertarian politics is largest. On the other hand, Lamont (1987) groups together managers and technical professionals who are both highly instrumental to and dependent on profit maximization and, as a result, show much lower inclination towards left-liberal attitudes. The first group broadly corresponds to what has been called the ‘social and cultural specialists’, whereas the second group comprises both managers and technical experts.

In a similar vein, Kriesi (1989) and Müller (1999), having separated in a first step organization-centred managers from expertise-oriented professionals, make a further distinction within the professional group. They argue that among professionals, important differences exist in the primary orientation and loyalty between technical experts and specialists employed in the social and cultural services. Technical experts exercise occupational specialities that are of a ‘technocratic’ nature, in that the type of knowledge used is highly instrumental to the running of organizations. In contrast, social and cultural specialists evolve in the ‘helping and teaching’ occupations where they are engaged in regular contact with clients and, in turn, are likely to be more responsive to social than organizational concerns. In other words, professionals and semi-professionals in the medical services, in teaching, social work, the arts and journalism are expected to work in an interpersonal logic where organizational orientation is blurred both by reference to professional norms and by loyalty towards students, patients or petitioners. This additional distinction provides Kriesi (1989, 1998) and Müller (1999) with a three-fold horizontal division within the service class, based on differences in the relationship to organizational power and the kind of work task performed: the managers, the technical
experts and the professionals in social and cultural services. One essential question arises with respect to this three-fold division: does it correspond to class boundaries or is it better understood in terms of a distinction between occupational groups belonging to the service class? In this regard, contributions made by electoral sociology appear very useful.

Class divisions or occupational segments: a look at political behaviour

There is little disagreement about the fact that two broad occupational groupings within the service class, professionals and managers, typically hold different positions and roles within production units. Yet there is much controversy on whether this distinction is rooted in structural processes and hence constitutes a class division or, on the contrary, is better conceived in terms of occupational differentiation within the service class. Goldthorpe (1995: 319) clearly favours the latter interpretation: ‘[A]lthough not seeking to deny the fact of this division within the service class, I suggested that it might be seen as simply one of *situs*, of a kind readily identifiable within other classes.’ By *situs*, Goldthorpe (1995: 328) refers to the ‘functional context’ of an occupational group, which may exert an influence on the incumbents independently to that of the class positions. Similarly, Brint (1984) argues that the grouping of social and cultural service professionals, defined however in a more restricted sense than by Kriesi (1989), share no common situation on the labour market which would not also be common to other professionals and managers. Brint (1984) thus concludes ‘that this aggregation clearly constitutes less a class than an occupational segment of a broader class grouping’ (42).

Shifting the arguments on empirical grounds, what has traditionally been at stake in the debate over the new middle class is the political orientation of its different factions. More precisely, the debate has focused on the question whether different political attitudes within the middle-class reflect structural divisions or simply personal characteristics – if they differ at all in a systematic manner. In this latter respect, Goldthorpe (1980, 1995) has repeatedly argued that, as the service class consolidates, it will become an essentially conservative element within modern societies: occupying the more rewarding positions within the class structure, their members are unlikely to be attracted to parties that uphold egalitarian policies, but will rather seek to preserve the *status quo* which guarantees their positions of relative advantage (Goldthorpe, 1995: 322). Advocates of a horizontally differentiated middle class agree with Goldthorpe’s hypothesis as far as the managerial faction of the service class is concerned. Managers’ identification with the employing organization should lead them to form interest coalitions with employers and to lend support to pro-business parties (Müller, 1999). However, they strongly disagree with respect to the political
orientation of professionals, and in particular social and cultural service specialists, who are expected to place heavy emphasis on individual autonomy and, through their frequent exchange with patients or students, favour egalitarian values. As a result, it is assumed that they show closer affinity with environmental and pro-labour parties (Kriesi, 1998; Müller, 1999; Güveli et al., 2002). These claims, running counter to Goldthorpe’s expectation of the service class as a uniform conservative political force, have been subject to empirical analysis in various countries. For example, findings by Brooks and Manza (1997) for the United States clearly indicate dissimilar orientations:

Far from being a homogeneous constituency, the contemporary middle class is politically heterogeneous. One major segment (managers) remains a solidly Republican bloc, while another (professionals) is emerging as an important mainspring for the Democratic Party (Brooks and Manza, 1997: 204).

A split within the middle class emerges also from Müller’s (1999) analysis of German surveys, covering the period of 1974 to 1994. While managers have voting preferences most similar to those of the petite bourgeoisie, technical experts and social service professionals lean towards the Social Democratic or Green Party. The same difference in political behaviour within the middle class is evident for the Netherlands and Switzerland where social and cultural services professionals have become the group that most consistently votes for the left (de Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Kriesi, 1998; Güveli et al., 2002). On the contrary, in an analysis of voting patterns in Britain, Heath and Savage (1995) dismiss the hypothesis of structural differences in political alignment within the middle class. Yet their conclusion is closely linked to their rudimentary operationalization of different middle-class factions: the two authors try to account for Wright’s three axes of assets by merely distinguishing between three different employment statuses: the self-employed, managers, and (as a residual) other employed professionals. Not surprisingly, thus operationalized, their prior finding of massive identification with the Labour Party among ‘welfare and creative professionals’ (Heath and Savage, 1995: 281) as opposed to preponderant Conservative identification among managers is not confirmed by their regression analysis.

In general, empirical findings cast doubt on the homogeneity of political orientation in the service class. These results should, however, not be misinterpreted: the differences in political behaviour within the middle class may possibly reflect a structural division, but it cannot be ruled out that they are merely value-driven and the consequence of occupational self-selection. In other words, this counter-argument sustains that it is not the daily work experience that explains a social worker’s left-libertarian atti-
tudes, but the left-libertarian attitudes explain the social worker’s choice of occupation. Different segments of the middle class may hence not develop their political preferences on the job, but rather make their career decisions on the basis of prior value orientations acquired in the family or in higher education (Parkin, 1968; Müller, 1999: 174).
5
The Construction Logic of a New Class Schema

In search of a horizontal criterion: the limits of an asset-based approach

In the last three chapters, we have argued at length that the simultaneous growth in women’s paid work and in service-sector employment have rendered the class structure both more heterogeneous and more opaque. In this chapter, we wish to bring some system into this heterogeneity by introducing new horizontal divisions within the class structure. Our aim is thus to develop a class schema that, in trying to capture mounting employment differentiation, partly shifts its focus from differences of levels (the vertical dimension) to differences of kind (the horizontal dimension). The separation between different employment status on the one hand and different employment relationship on the other serves as starting point. While it appears very useful for research into social mobility, Erikson and Goldthorpe’s concept of employment relationship does not discriminate horizontally within the large group of middle class incumbents. Hence, we must return to the discussion led in the previous chapter and recall that, on a theoretical level, the degree of advantage attached to an employment relationship merely reflects the skill specificities (and, arguably, the difficulty involved in monitoring) of an occupation.

This leads us, in a first step, to reconsider the asset-based approach to class which distinguishes between three axes of exploitation (Wright, 1985) or, in a non-Marxist perspective, between three criteria of economic power (Runciman, 1990). The first criterion of ownership reiterates the separation of employers and the self-employed from employees. Within the large group of employees, the two criteria of authority and marketable skills divide horizontally between managers and professionals who, seen from a vertical perspective, benefit from a similarly advantageous employment relationship. The threefold distinction based on differences in economic resources is expected to correspond with three broad occupational groups:
ownership with employers and the self-employed, organizational authority with managers, skills and expertise with professionals.

While the dimension of ownership (which coincides with the category of employers and the self-employed) seems quite unproblematic, the theoretical distinction between a category based on authority and another based on expertise remains very schematic and has several shortcomings when applied empirically. A first limit of the asset-based approach concerns the fact that the criteria of authority and expertise do not discriminate in a mutually exclusive way between different categories. Within the middle class, managers are typically separated from professionals on the basis of their different resource bases (e.g. Savage et al., 1992). Yet making this distinction entails ignoring that with the proliferation of business schools, managers as business administrators become professionals themselves – as the numerous economists and corporate lawyers employed in management have always been. Moreover, on-going professionalization of management further increases the skill dependence of managers. The blurry nature of the divide between expertise and authority further emerges from the presence of a group of mostly technical professionals who follow careers that are heavily organization-centred and often lead to jobs in management. Hence, Kaufman and Spilerman (1982: 837) note in an empirical analysis that engineering occupations show an age profile that peaks between 40 and 50 years – afterwards, these professionals typically move on into managerial positions. In short, even if organizational authority seems a resource base peculiar to managers, the dependence on skills or expertise is by no means restricted to professionals. Tellingly, Wright (1985) foresees in his own conceptualization the possibility of the combination of authority with skills, creating the categories of the ‘expert-manager’ and the ‘unskilled manager’.

The salience of an asset-based division line is further undermined by its silence on the working class. In fact, economic resource bases constitute horizontal boundaries whose explicative power appears strictly limited to the middle class, as authority and expertise are of little use when differentiating within the large group of routine clerical employees, sales personnel, manual labourers and personnel service workers. Wright (1985) eludes this problem by crowding all individuals that do not possess any specific economic asset into a single category, which – as shown in Chapter 1 – provides him with a working class comprising between 40 and 50 per cent of the population in employment. Although such a strategy has the merit of being theoretically consistent, for empirical purposes it seems to obscure more than it illuminates. In conclusion, these arguments suggest that a division into three hierarchies exclusively based on the possession of different assets is both too schematic and, in the case of the working class, not encompassing enough. Accordingly, attention shall be turned to an alternative approach.
Shifting the focus from assets to the work logic

Our discussion of the skill dimension in management has cast doubt on the pertinence of an asset-based division between managers and professionals. What explains then that, as was shown in the previous chapter, something close to this division receives widespread recognition in political sociology (see Kriesi, 1989, 1998; Savage et al., 1992; Butler and Savage, 1995; Brooks and Manza, 1997; Müller, 1999; Güveli et al., 2002)? In our view, the answer lies in the fact that differences in assets play only a minor role in accounting for the structural cleavage within the salaried middle class. If we return to Kriesi (1989), we note that heavy emphasis is put instead on the differences in the *daily work experience* as determining different interests and loyalties within the middle class. According to Kriesi (1989: 1085), the main antagonism is between managers in private and public bureaucracies who try to run their organizations most efficiently and professionals in social and cultural services who seek to defend their own and their clients’ relative autonomy. In an intermediate position is the group of technical experts who, in their daily work, do not primarily refer to either the organization or the client, but the professional community and its body of knowledge. It is thus the work role and the position within the division of labour, and not primarily assets, which are put forward to explain the opposition between the three occupational groups. Depending on whether an occupation involves the administration of organizational power, the handling of technical expertise or dealing with people’s social demands, the work logic and consequently the primary orientation differ in fundamental ways.

Kitschelt (1994: 17) joins Kriesi in the emphasis of the work experience as a critical factor shaping people’s political preferences. He argues that where individuals primarily deal with human individuality in their work environment (as in education, art, communication, health care, counselling or social work), communicative involvement is strongest and authority relations diluted. He expects individuals engaged in these interactive work settings to be more likely to hold a libertarian view of community than individuals primarily occupied in object- (manufacturing, building, transportation) or document-related tasks (finance, insurance, general public administration). Gallie and his colleagues (1998) draw attention to something rather close to this distinction in their study, when introducing the notions of social skills and people-work. Their analysis of working conditions in Britain in the 1990s evolves around an empirical observation: in contrast to what debate around class suggests, the work settings of the craft worker or the assembly-line worker is representative of only a small part of the male labour force. Given the high level of segregation in the employment structure, growth of female employment in recent decades has been in very different sectors of the labour market, notably in the social and personal services. They argue that this evolution has wide-ranging consequences for
the *nature of the work experience*: ‘[T]he very nature of much work in the services is radically different, involving primarily relationships with people and requiring social rather than manual skills’ (Gallie et al., 1998: 30).

Thus, they underline that unlike managerial or clerical, technical or industrial jobs, a large part of service work implies the direct attendance to individuals’ needs through face-to-face interaction. In a similar vein, Iversen and Cusack (2000: 327) highlight the fact that most skills acquired in either manufacturing or in agriculture transfer very poorly to service occupations. Accordingly, low-skilled blue-collar workers appear to find it exceedingly difficult to adjust to similarly low-skilled service sector jobs ‘because they lack something that is vaguely referred to as social skills’ (2000: 327). Gallie and his colleagues (1998) examine the notion of social skills empirically with the help of a large set of micro-data. They find for the early 1990s that among the individuals indicating a main type of work, almost 40 per cent spent more than half their time caring for other people or dealing with clients, women being heavily over represented in this group of employees. Moreover, the authors discover a close link between what they call ‘people-work’ and the growth of the welfare state: in social work, medical services and education, the great majority of employees had ‘people-work’ as the main activity. To a somewhat smaller extent, interpersonal work was also the most important activity in retail sales and leisure services. ‘People-work’ was least common in manufacturing and construction, while banking and government were set in an intermediate position. Of particular interest in the context of our study is the finding that ‘people-work’ is not limited to qualified employees. A substantial proportion of semi- and unskilled workers were equally engaged in work involving caring for other people or directly handling clients’ demands (Gallie et al., 1998: 52).

The introduction of the notions of social skills and service-specific ‘people-work’ is relevant in several respects. First and foremost, it enables us to draw a horizontal division line within the class schema with primary reference not to assets but to the *work logic* of individuals. The presence or absence of interpersonal service work overlaps to a certain degree with the difference highlighted by Kriesi (1989) between professionals in the social and cultural services on the one hand and managers and technical experts on the other. At the same time, the distinction between an ‘interpersonal service logic’ as opposed to an ‘organizational work logic’ and a ‘technical work logic’ is, unlike assets, not limited to individuals of the middle class and thus permits extending the boundary to the working class. Schematically, this boundary distinguishes between three groups of wage-earners that are socialized by basically different work logics:

- First, individuals employed in an *organizational work logic* with a clear command structure that corresponds to a career sequence; where daily work of higher skill levels primarily involves coordination and control, and of lower skill levels mainly clerical tasks; where the main asset is authority and where basic orientation is towards the organization.
• Second, individuals employed in a technical work logic, where work routine for higher skill levels primarily consists in the development and use of technical expertise and for lower skill levels in the deployment of craft or manual skills; where job identity stems less from the employing organization than from the belonging to a scientific community or trade.

• Third, individuals employed in a face-to-face service logic, who stand outside the direct line of command and who depend primarily on social skills in their jobs when directly servicing people’s needs; where loyalty towards the organization is blurred by the direct attendance to clients’, patients’ or petitioners’ demands.

This opposition partly corresponds to, and actually draws on, the work of Esping-Andersen (1993a) who distinguishes between a ‘Fordist’ and a ‘post-industrial’ class hierarchy. Based on the criterion of how a given job is inserted in the division of labour, Esping-Andersen separates managers, administrative employees, crafts and unskilled workers from professionals, semi-professionals, skilled and unskilled service workers. While the first are expected to be embedded in hierarchical relations within the bureaucratic or industrial division of labour, the latter stand outside the lines of command and work in interpersonal service settings where the labour process is synonymous with a consumption process. Esping-Andersen (1993a) thus groups managers and clerical employees together with crafts and manual workers into a ‘Fordist’ hierarchy. In parallel, he combines technical experts and technicians with professionals and semi-professionals in the social and cultural services in order to obtain a ‘post-industrial’ hierarchy. Although Esping-Andersen’s horizontal divide draws on considerations similar to the distinction proposed by Kriesi (1989), Gallie et al. (1998) or Müller (1999), his conceptual intent is somewhat different: by distinguishing between ‘the Fordist system of standardized mass production’ and ‘the post-industrial division of labour in services’, he wishes to develop a class schema that reproduces at the occupational level the sectoral division between two logics of production.

Similar steps in a theoretically less demanding but perhaps clearer direction have been made by authors such as Blossfeld (1983, 1987) or Joye and Schuler (1995). Based on the criterion ‘of making groups as homogeneous as possible in their average general and vocational training requirements as well as in their occupational activities’, Blossfeld (1987: 98) introduces a horizontal distinction between the three occupational fields of production, services and administration. Analysing sexual segregation in labour markets, Blossfeld’s (1987) classification explicitly seeks to respond to the need of differentiating within female work careers. Slightly different sectoral divisions are made by Joye and Schuler (1995: 63) who, besides agriculture, distinguish occupations in manufacturing and construction from occupations in producer services on the one hand and occupations in social and personal services on the other. The latter distinction is motivated by the objective of separating administrative service activities from service work.
based on relationships with people. Although using different labels, this division closely reiterates the opposition between an organizational work logic and an interpersonal service logic. Based on these different contributions, the notion of work logic emerges as the key concept in the construction of a new class schema, capable of capturing the salient features of an increasingly tertiarized and feminized employment structure. For this reason, we attempt to specify more explicitly the elements underlying the distinction between different work logics.

**Formalizing the dimensions at the root of different work logics**

Within the large category of wage-earners, three basically different work logics are distinguished: *a technical work logic, an organizational work logic* and *an interpersonal work logic*. We wish to argue that these work logics systematically differ with respect to four underlying dimensions, namely (1) the setting of the work process, (2) the degree of authority relations, (3) the primary orientation, and (4) the skill requirements. Occupations are to be allocated to the different work logics on the basis of these four dimensions shown in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Technical Work Logic</th>
<th>Organizational Work Logic</th>
<th>Interpersonal Work Logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting of work process</td>
<td>Work process determined by technical parameters</td>
<td>Bureaucratic division of labour</td>
<td>Service setting based on face-to-face exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of authority</td>
<td>Working outside the lines of command for higher grades, working within a clear-cut command structure for lower grades</td>
<td>Working within a bureaucratic command structure that corresponds to a career sequence</td>
<td>Working largely outside the lines of command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary orientation</td>
<td>Orientation towards the professional community or group of trades</td>
<td>Primary orientation towards the employing organization</td>
<td>Orientation towards the client, student, patient or petitioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill requirements</td>
<td>Scientific expertise for higher grades, crafts and manual skills for lower grades</td>
<td>Coordination and control skills for higher grades, clerical skills for lower grades</td>
<td>Expertise and social skills for higher grades, social skills for lower grades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This distinction between three work logics is of a schematic nature. Yet besides substituting misleading hierarchical divisions such as the ‘blue-collar/white-collar’ or ‘manual/non-manual’ divide by a horizontal distinction, it appears to overlap rather closely with empirically observable cleavages in the employment structure. Hence at the level of the middle classes, it reflects central differences between categories such as technicians (e.g. computer assistants or safety inspectors), associate managers (e.g. junior financial managers or customs officials) and socio-cultural semi-professionals (e.g. primary school teachers or social workers) who otherwise, on the basis of the similar advantages that attach to their employment relationships, would be placed in the same class.¹⁸

Let us briefly outline the nature of these differences. Being part of the bureaucratic division of work tasks, the associate manager depends on his ability to coordinate and control others, while evolving himself in a system of authority relations that frequently corresponds to a career sequence. Through his (present or future) participation in organizational power, he is expected to show a high level of loyalty towards the employing organization. In contrast, the socio-cultural semi-professional is primarily dependent on social skills (and expertise) and evolves in an autonomous work setting that lies practically outside any lines of command. As she depends on the cooperation of her ‘clients’ (students or patients) in providing her services, she is likely to advocate their interests against organizational interference. Finally, the technician is in an intermediate position. His daily work experience makes him more likely to direct his primary orientation towards his professional community and its body of knowledge than the organization. At the same time, the technical nature of his work tasks provides more potential for the division of labour than is the case in the interpersonal service logic.

At the level of the working classes, the same criterion of work logic captures the horizontal differences between categories that in terms of hierarchy are not easily separated such as, for instance, routine operatives (e.g. assemblers or freight handlers) in the technical work logic, routine office clerks (e.g. mail sorting clerks or call centre employees) in the organizational work logic and routine service workers (e.g. nursing aides or home helpers) in the interpersonal work logic. The routine operative typically evolves in a technical logic of production where work tasks are fragmented through the industrial division of labour. He mainly depends on manual skills and works within a clear-cut command structure. Quite the opposite, a routine service worker relies heavily on social skills: her daily work experience primarily involves face-to-face relationships where the potential for the division of labour is very limited. It is in this context that the criterion of division of labour introduced by Esping-Andersen (1993a) must be understood. While both industrial production and modern bureaucracy
rely on a more or less sophisticated system of division of labour, the possibility for ‘Taylorism’ is very limited in personal and social services which are sought by clients precisely because they are personal and cater to individual demands and tastes (Esping-Andersen, 1993a: 31).

An additional indicator must be considered when separating the organizational logic defined by authority relations from the interpersonal logic defined by more autonomous work settings and greater emphasis on expertise. Authority relations presuppose not only a command structure but frequently imply the existence of an explicit career sequence along which authority is acquired and distributed. The presence of both well-defined authority relations and positioning on a career ladder is thus typical for occupations in the organizational work logic such as bank tellers, bookkeeping clerks and – on a higher level of reward – sales managers or junior civil servants (Kaufman and Spilerman, 1982). On the contrary, reliance on education and a relatively autonomous work setting coincides largely with the absence of a defined job sequence for occupations in the interpersonal service logic such as hairdressers, cooks, stewards and – on a higher skill level – physiotherapists, teachers or social workers.

This distinction between different work logics provides us with the conceptual basis for the construction of a new class schema. In what follows, these elements shall thus be integrated into a schema that consistently differentiates along both vertical and horizontal lines.

A class schema based on differences in marketable skills and the work logic

In the development of our new class schema, emphasis is given to three division lines. Little ambiguity attaches to the first, distinguishing class positions on the basis of the employment status and thus separating the small categories of employers and self-employed workers from the much larger group of employees. This distinction is widely recognized in class theory. Depending on the society under study, varying degrees of specification are used in order to differentiate between large and small employers, self-employed professionals and free lance workers, the petite bourgeoisie and farmers. However, the main interest of this study focuses on two divisions operating within the category of employees.

Firstly, we follow Erikson and Goldthorpe in highlighting the employer’s perspective. More particularly, we draw on their argument that employers bind employees to the organization through a set of compensations that are proportional to the importance attributed by the employing organization to the employees’ assets. Going a step further, we argue that the degree of advantage attaching to an employment relationship is itself a direct consequence of an individuals’ endowment with marketable skills: the more marketable skills attaches to an occupation, the more important is the
incentive system that the employer must set up to get maximal productivity out of his employee (Goldthorpe, 2000: 213). Therefore, hierarchical differentiation in our schema operates through the notion of marketable skills, a concept that is more easily operationalized than the somewhat blurry concept of employment relationship.

Secondly, this hierarchical dimension must be completed by a horizontal dimension that accounts for differences in the work logic of various occupational groups. Both the middle class and the large category comprising the ‘twilight zone’ of routine service workers and manual labourers may appear to be relatively homogeneous when seen from the employers’ perspective, as a comparable degree of advantage applies to their employment relationships. However, when looked at from the employee’s perspective, important horizontal differences persist within these two categories as regards the setting of their work process, their insertion into the division of labour, skill requirements and primary orientation. In short, we maintain that these categories have to be further subdivided horizontally to account for important differences in the work logics.

Table 5.2 exhibits the class schema that results from the combination of the horizontal axis of work logic with the vertical axis of marketable skills. Each work logic gives rise to a separate hierarchy that is dominated by a professional or managerial class and extends down to the routine classes. Besides the technical work logic, the organizational work logic and the interpersonal service logic, we further distinguish – with respect to employment status – the independent work logic of employers and the self-employed. For each class, we have listed three frequent and characteristic occupations. In the most detailed version, 17 categories are distinguished in the schema. Yet we agree with Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993: 46) that little importance is attached to the exact number of classes. Depending on the sample size and the research concern, classes can be collapsed into an 8-class version as is indicated by the bold double frames (see Chapter 10 for a discussion of collapsed versions).

A dominance order must be established to determine the decisive criterion in classifying occupations that share characteristics of several work logics, as for instance self-employed accountants, or scientists working in management. In our dominance order, we seek to give preference to that work logic that has the strongest influence on individuals’ primary orientation and daily work routine. Based on this criterion, self-employment dominates the status of employees. In our view, the work logic of architects, physiotherapists or carpenters alters quite substantially depending on whether they are employees or self-employed. Moreover, within the large category of employees, a position in management dominates the original occupation as a professional. Unlike Rose and O’Reilly (1998: 10), we consider a position in management as being more consequential for daily work experience and outlooks than the fact that the same individual possesses a
### Table 5.2  The detailed 17-class schema (and collapsed 8-class) based on four different work logics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Self-employed</strong></th>
<th><strong>Employees</strong></th>
<th><strong>Interpersonal Service Work Logic</strong></th>
<th>** Marketable Skills:**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Work Logic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Technical Work Logic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Organizational Work Logic</strong></td>
<td>Professional/managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm owners</td>
<td>Mechanical engineers</td>
<td>Business administrators</td>
<td>University teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel owners</td>
<td>Computing professionals</td>
<td>Financial managers</td>
<td>Medical doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesmen</td>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>Public administrators</td>
<td>Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>Electrical technicians</td>
<td>Managers in small firms</td>
<td>Primary school teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>Computer equipment operators</td>
<td>Tax officials</td>
<td>Physiotherapists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical doctors</td>
<td>Safety inspectors</td>
<td>Bookkeepers</td>
<td>Social workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant owners</td>
<td>Machinery mechanics</td>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>Children’s nurses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>Bank tellers</td>
<td>Cooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garage owners</td>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td>Stock clerks</td>
<td>Beauticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>Assemblers</td>
<td>Farm hands</td>
<td>Mail sorting clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressers</td>
<td>Machinists</td>
<td>Loggers</td>
<td>Call centre employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorry drivers</td>
<td>Freight handlers</td>
<td>Gardeners</td>
<td>Messengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Routine operatives</strong></td>
<td>Farm hands</td>
<td>Mail sorting clerks</td>
<td>Shop assistants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblers</td>
<td>Loggers</td>
<td>Call centre employees</td>
<td>Home helpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinists</td>
<td>Gardeners</td>
<td>Messengers</td>
<td>Waiters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Routine service</strong></td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Continuous lines indicate how classes are to be collapsed into the 8-class version</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
particular professional education. Thus, socio-cultural professionals (such as university lecturers) or technical experts (such as engineers), who take on a function in management, primarily evolve in an organizational work logic. They are likely to internalize the goals of the company and to adopt the organizational orientation necessary to run a department and to keep a balanced budget. In opposition to socio-cultural professionals or technical experts, they are less likely to primarily defend customers' or petitioners' demands or to place heavy emphasis on scientific standards.

What cleavages does the class schema capture?

The horizontal distinction between occupations rooted in a technical, organizational and interpersonal work logic draws in unequal parts on the work of Kriesi (1989, 1998), Esping-Andersen (1993a), Gallie et al. (1998) and Müller (1999). However eclectic its inspiration may seem, we believe this division line to be very useful in drawing an accurate class map. In order to avoid confusion, the following paragraphs resume what this distinction is intended to distinguish and what it is not. We start out with illuminating two possible sources of misunderstanding.

It is not a division based on industrial sectors: our concern with an interpersonal service logic situates itself on a micro-sociological level of analysis and should not be confused with a macro-sociological perspective where jobs in the service sector are distinguished from jobs in the industrial sector. In practical terms, this signifies that a childcare worker employed by a manufacturing firm may figure in national statistics as employed in the industrial sector. Yet on the basis of her daily work experience, which primarily involves the face-to-face dealing with clients' demands, she is clearly allocated to the routine service class. Likewise, although an administrator of a hospital occupies a job in the public service sector, his job clearly belongs to the organizational work logic typical of managers.

It is not a division based on the size or status of the organization: in Western Europe, the overwhelming majority of employees evolve in an organization of some kind. However, in our schema, the criterion for placing individuals in an organizational work logic is neither linked to the size nor the legal character of the employing firm. For instance, even though a watchman works for a large insurance company, he acts in an interpersonal service setting and in his job depends above all on social skills. Accordingly, he either belongs to the skilled or the routine service class. For the same reason, a book-keeping clerk employed in a small company comprising only the collaborating proprietor and a secretary still evolves in the organizational work logic typical of the skilled office class: he neither directly services people nor does he particularly require social skills for his job. On the contrary, his primary orientation is towards the company and he is employed in an administrative work setting.
There are, however, two features of Western European labour markets which are likely to be reflected in our class schema: the phenomenon of occupational gender segregation and the clustering of employment in the welfare state. Firstly, we expect the classes forming around social skills in the interpersonal service logic to be female-biased and, thus, to contrast with the technical work hierarchy, heavily dominated by men. In this respect, Beck-Gernsheim and Ostner’s (1978) explication of gender segregation appears to be still pertinent: according to these authors, women’s positions within the occupational structure are determined by both the conditions of social reproduction and the strategies of employing firms. The socialization process leads women to acquire skills that make them above all qualified for family work such as support, care, education and empathy for others. In their turn, companies seek to benefit from these characteristics by employing women in fields where specific ‘female skills’ are most usefully exploited. Women thus tend to be engaged in service occupations where the work logic is closest to the ‘female culture’. Based on this argument, it must be expected that as more household activities are integrated into the market process, more jobs are created in education, health and personal services, and more women work in occupations that are typical of the interpersonal service logic (see also Blossfeld, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1993a; Charles, 2000).

This leads us to a second feature that partially overlaps with our emphasis of the existence of an interpersonal service logic, namely employment in the welfare state. To a large extent, jobs resulting from the integration of household tasks into the market sphere are situated within the welfare state. Not surprisingly, the findings made by Gallie et al. (1998: 52) suggest that welfare state employees are among the core groups within the interpersonal service hierarchy: the occupations and sectors that depend most crucially on the ability to look after people are the helping (social assistance), the caring (health) and the teaching professions (education). While the cleavage between interpersonal welfare employees and organization-oriented managers may thus broadly echo Lamont’s (1987) opposition between professions that are little instrumental or highly instrumental to profit maximization, our distinction between different work logics does not correspond with the division between private and public employees – used by authors such as Knutsen (2001) or van Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004): government employees such as safety inspectors and town planners are situated within the technical work logic, civil servants and tax officials within the organizational work logic. At the same time, opticians, beauticians or waiters are overwhelmingly employed in the private sector but nonetheless clearly subscribe to an interpersonal service logic.

In sum, compared to other class devices such as the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, the here proposed schema may discriminate less well within industrial employment. In contrast, we believe it to be more helpful
to account for labour market trends such as expanding services, increasing female participation rates and occupational gender segregation. Furthermore, we expect it to grasp cleavages stemming from growth in welfare state employment and, more generally, to differentiate usefully within the large and heterogeneous middle classes. In Part II of this study, these expectations shall be confronted to individual data from Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.
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Part II

An Empirical Analysis of Employment Stratification
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6
Operationalization of the New Class Schema

Data, target population, classification technique

We argued in Chapter 2 that our choice of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland would provide us with a broad range of different institutional settings in the labour market, the welfare state and industrial relations. Besides theoretical concerns, this selection of countries is also motivated by more practical matters of data availability. For these four nations, individual datasets are available that are both sufficiently large and include detailed information about employment, income and education. For Britain, data is taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), year 1999, for Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), year 2000, for Sweden from the Level-of-Living Survey (LNU), year 2000, and for Switzerland from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), year 1999. If not otherwise stated, we will work with the cross-sectional weight variables included in the surveys to improve the representativeness of the British, German and Swiss samples. There has been no weighting of the Swedish LNU. For the British and German data, weighting is almost inevitable as the two data sets are not devised to be representative for the entire population but over-represent different subpopulations: Wales and Scotland in the case of the BHPS, foreign citizens in the case of the GSOEP. With respect to Switzerland, weighting is needed to adjust for the heavy under-representation of foreign nationals in the sample.

In constructing our target population, we focus on men and women aged between 20 and 65 years. Hence, we exclude from our sample very young and retired individuals whose social position is likely not to be accurately reflected by their current employment in that it may be either intermittent, consist in vocational training or serve to complete income from pensions. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to individuals who are in full-time employment or work at least 20 hours per week. Thus, we avoid deriving a class position from the employment of individuals who are only marginally involved in the labour market. As a consequence, besides the very young
...and the retired, we leave out from our sample part-time employees working less than 20 hours per week, workers on maternity leave, househusbands and housewives, the unemployed and students. As is shown in Table 6.1, these restrictions still leave us with large samples that include between 11,477 (Germany) and 3306 (Sweden) individuals.

When allocating individuals to the class schema, we rely on information from three variables:

(1) About the employment status, separating employers and the self-employed from employees (a much larger group);

(2) About the number of employees, distinguishing between large and small employers on the one hand and the self-employed without employees on the other;

(3) About the occupational title, assigning individuals to different work logics and different hierarchical levels on the basis of their occupation;

Undoubtedly, the last variable is of greatest consequence for the construction of our class schema. In order to distinguish as precisely as possible between different occupations, we have used the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) at the 4-digit level for the British, German and Swiss sample. ISCO-88 classifies jobs according, first, to the tasks and duties related to it and, second, to skills that are necessary...

### Table 6.1 Data sets and sample size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Household Panel Survey (BHSP)</th>
<th>German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)</th>
<th>Swedish Level-of-Living Survey (LNU)</th>
<th>Swiss Household Panel (SHP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of data collection</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample size (individuals)</td>
<td>15,625</td>
<td>23,341</td>
<td>5142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of target population*</td>
<td>7032</td>
<td>11,477</td>
<td>3306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>english.htm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Individuals aged between 20 and 65 years and spending at least 20 hours per week in paid employment
to carry out its requirements (Elias, 1997). As it is based on the same classification standards in the different countries, ISCO-88 has the advantage of guaranteeing a high degree of cross-national comparability. In the Swedish survey, occupational information is not classified according to ISCO-88, but to NYK-83 codes (the *Nordisk Yrkesklassificering* or Nordic Occupational Classification). The degree of specificity is similar for the four data sets: 216 occupational codes are distinguished in the Swiss sample, 267 in the Swedish, 298 in the German and 300 in the British. However, NYK categories cover a wider range of occupations than do the ISCO categories in terms of skill requirements. For a number of large occupational groups, we have resolved this lack of precision by combining NYK-codes with information from another occupational variable, the Swedish ‘socio-economic index’ (SEI).

### Adjusting occupational information for skill levels

A somewhat more controversial question is to know how the skill dimension should be dealt with when classifying occupations. In their development of a new government classification scheme for Britain, Rose and O’Reilly (1998: 5) maintain that ‘the concept of skill has no part in the conception of the SEC [socio-economic classification] and so to use category names which refer to it would be inconsistent with employment relations theory.’ This affirmation is not wrong insofar as, for classification purposes, it is clearly the characteristics and skill requirements of the job that matter, and not the formal skill level of the job holder (Elias, 1997). In other words, skills only count if they are exploited: a medical doctor working as an assembler must thus be classified as a routine operative and not as a socio-cultural professional. However, by considering skills as irrelevant for what they call the ‘employment relations theory’, Rose and O’Reilly ignore the central dimension giving rise to differences in the regulation of employment: the degree of specificity of human capital (Goldthorpe, 2000: Chap. 10). Not surprisingly, comparative empirical research shows that the link between skills on the one hand and occupational position on the other is extremely strong for Western Europe (see Shavit and Müller, 1998), education being ‘the single most important determinant of occupational success in industrialized countries’ (Müller and Shavit, 1998: 1).

Hence, the human capital dimension clearly plays an important part in the theoretical development of our schema. On an empirical level, allocation of jobs according to ISCO codes responds to this concern as ISCO is (unlike Swedish NYK-83) implicitly based on differences in skill requirements. Yet we wish to go a step further. In the case of intermediate occupations in ISCO, we have decided to complete occupational information with an additional variable for education. The aim of this procedure is to draw a more exact division between skilled occupations on the one hand...
(skilled crafts, skilled office or skilled service) and routine occupations on the other (routine operatives, routine office or routine service). By doing so, we follow both theoretical and practical considerations.

On a theoretical level, we try to account for the skill barrier that separates – within the same profession – vocationally trained workers from their unskilled colleagues. Historically, vocational training has concentrated on the preparation of skilled manual workers. In particular in educational systems like Germany and Switzerland, which are defined by a high degree of stratification (students are separated early into different tracks) and standardization (the same standards for vocational training apply nationwide), vocational training is a precondition for entering the labour force in a skilled rather than an unskilled occupation (Müller and Shavit, 1998). Simultaneously, this signifies that workers not occupationally trained are essentially excluded from skilled jobs. In the case of Germany, Blossfeld, Giannelli and Mayer (1993: 114) maintain that ‘people without completed vocational training who enter unskilled service jobs at the beginning of their job career therefore have virtually no chance of a career to skilled positions later on in life.’ There are various reasons why the skill barrier is reflected in different employment relationships. Besides employers’ preference for credentialled employees, trade unions also have an interest in securing an advantage to vocationally trained workers over their less educated colleagues. In this respect, Müller, Steimann and Ell (1998: 147) argue that, ‘as union membership is dominated by skilled workers, there is pressure to guarantee the pay-offs for the training investments made by their members by the use of exclusionary practices, and by making job allocation and pay scales dependent on educational credentials’. Translating the skill barrier into our classification, we maintain that a credentialled brick-layer is likely to benefit from a more favourable employment relationship than a brick-layer that has learnt the trade on the job, but disposes of no vocational qualification. Accordingly, they are allocated to two different classes. Similarly, a cook with a vocational certificate or a secretary with a commercial qualification most probably evolve in a different professional position than their colleagues that have learnt the same work tasks on the job but have no formal credentials.

Our use of skills when classifying individuals also responds to practical concerns. In fact, for a series of jobs, occupational information is – even on the very detailed 4-digit ISCO level – too general for allocation to classes in our schema. For Swedish NYK-83 codes, this observation applies not only to intermediate professions, but also to such categories as ‘mechanical engineers and technicians’ or ‘laboratory technicians and assistants’ which combine occupations that we wish to allocate to different classes in our schema. Similarly, without information about skill levels, we are unable to classify occupations such as ‘health, social and nursing workers’ or ‘environment and health protection workers’. Fortunately, the Swedish survey
### Table 6.2  Operationalization of the class schema

**1. Construction of target population**

**Conditions**
- full-time or at least 20 hours weekly of paid employment
- age equal or higher than 20 years
- age equal or lower than 65 years

**2. Employment status**

Employer/self-employed – employee  yes / no

*If employer/self-employed:*
- large employer: 10 or more employees  yes / no
- self-employed professionals  yes / no
- small employer: 1 to 9 employees  yes / no
- self-employed without employees  residual

*If employee* (only British, German and Swiss surveys):

#### 3a. Occupational title without adjusting for education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISCO-codes 1000 to 3000</th>
<th>technical experts / managers / socio-cultural professionals; technicians / junior-managers / socio-cultural semi-professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISCO-codes 9000</td>
<td>routine operatives / routine office / routine service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4a. Occupational title adjusted for education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISCO-codes 4000–8000, classified as <em>skilled</em> individuals with at least secondary education:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>skilled crafts / skilled office / skilled service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected to: Routine operatives / routine office / routine service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCO-codes 4000–8000, classified as <em>skilled, but</em> individuals without secondary education:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routine operatives / routine office / routine service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected to: Skilled crafts / skilled office / skilled service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCO-codes 4000–8000, classified as <em>routine</em>, individuals without tertiary education:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routine operatives / routine office / routine service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCO-codes 4000–8000, classified as <em>routine, but</em> individuals with tertiary education:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If employee* (only Swedish survey):

#### 3b. Occupational title without adjusting for education


Precise NYK-codes: Attribution to classes on the sole basis of the occupational title

#### 4b. Occupational title adjusted for socio-economic index and education

Example: NYK-codes 1–9, 12, 36, 39, 107, 109, 151, 153–154 etc.

Imprecise NYK-codes: Attribution to classes on the basis of the occupational title and information about socio-economic index (SEI) and educational level

**Note:** The dominance order is *self-employment > management > professionals* (see Chap. 5).

The allocation of ISCO- and NYK-codes into different classes is listed in the annexe, Tables A.1 and A.2.
provides a second occupational variable ‘socio-economic index’ (SEI) that serves – together with educational information – as a control variable. In the three other data sets featuring ISCO-codes, similar difficulties arise but are limited to intermediate jobs. For instance, the three large and heterogeneous occupational groups of ‘other office clerks’, ‘shop salespersons’ and ‘institution-based personal care workers’ regroup 8.5 per cent of employed individuals in the German sample. In the British sample, 4.5 per cent of employed individuals are classified as ‘other office clerks’. In the Swiss sample, 6.7 per cent of employed individuals figure under the occupational title ‘secretaries and key-board operating clerks’. Yet the tasks and duties within these often vaguely defined occupations may vary considerably. A salesperson with higher vocational education working in a shop specialized in electronic items evolves in a quite different professional setting than an unskilled salesperson sitting behind the till of a supermarket. Likewise, an office clerk disposing of A-levels who coordinates administrative tasks is likely to benefit from a more advantageous employment relationship than a colleague who has only completed compulsory schooling and who feeds data into a computer.

Hence, although we agree that skills only matter if they are exploited, we have chosen to include educational information when allocating intermediate jobs to the class schema. The exact procedure for Britain, Germany and Switzerland is as follows: from intermediate occupations that we classify as skilled (most craft and office occupations), we downgrade those individuals to the routine classes who have not completed an apprenticeship or general secondary education at least. Likewise, from intermediate occupations that we classify as routine (most operative, sales and personal service occupations), we upgrade those individuals to the skilled classes that dispose of higher education, e.g. lower or higher tertiary degrees. However, it is important to keep in mind that for managerial, professional and semi-professional occupations (ISCO codes 1000 to 3000) and elementary occupations (codes 9000), allocation is straightforward. Within these jobs, there are neither theoretical nor practical needs to adjust for skills. We summarize in Table 6.2 the procedure that we follow when applying our class schema to the data.

The three most frequent occupations in each class

There are some differences between the countries as regards the classification of the same occupations. For instance, all primary school teachers are given the ISCO-code of ‘professionals’ in the British and German samples, while the same category is classified as ‘associate professionals’ in the Swiss SHP sample. Similarly, nurses are sometimes classified as professionals and sometimes as associate professionals. It has repeatedly been pointed out that the employment relationships attaching to the same occupations vary
from country to country and that as a consequence certain occupations should be allocated to different classes in different countries (Breen and Rottman, 1995: 460). Though not denying this fact, we believe that too little is known about cross-national differences between occupations to warrant a systematically different treatment. We thus insist in assigning the same occupations consistently to the same class across the countries of our sample – hence primary school teachers and nurses are allocated in all four countries to the same class of ‘socio-cultural semi-professionals’. Finally, the allocation to the schema necessarily includes subjective judgement about the market and work situations of occupational groups, which gives plenty of potential for disagreement.25 We have tried to answer to this concern by making our choices as transparent as possible: in the annexe, Tables A.1 and A.2 show, for each class, the list of ISCO- and NYK-codes included. In order to provide a better idea of what the operationalized class schema looks like, we put it into practice with the British BHPS dataset and list in Table 6.3 the three most frequent occupations for each of the 17 classes in this sample.

On the detailed level of a 17-class version, it may be more accurate to talk about socio-professional categories than about economic classes. Yet as we argued in Chapter 1, the primary objective in using the class concept is to obtain a useful proxy for the common position of individuals in labour markets and production units. Little importance attaches to the label or the

Figure 6.1 Overview of Part II: an empirical analysis of labour market stratification

Part II:
an empirical look at
labour market stratification

Class distribution of the
labour force:
totals and gender
(Chapter 7)

Hierarchical differences
within the class structure:
income and promotion
(Chapter 8)

Horizontal differences
within the class structure:
firm size and party choice
(Chapter 9)

Looking at class differences
with a collapsed schema:
a summary
(Chapter 10)
Table 6.3  Britain 1999 (BHPS): Most frequent professions in each class (ISCO-4-digit level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent work logic</th>
<th>Technical work logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Large employers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Technical experts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers of restaurants &amp; hotels</td>
<td>1. Authors, journalists &amp; other writers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Production managers NCE</td>
<td>2. Accountants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Accountants</td>
<td>3. Teaching professionals NCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-employed professionals</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Authors, journalists &amp; other writers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Accountants</td>
<td>2. Mechanical engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Teaching professionals NCE</td>
<td>3. Architects &amp; engineers NCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</strong></td>
<td><strong>Technicians</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers in wholesale &amp; retail trade</td>
<td>1. Physical &amp; engineering science technicians NCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Managers of restaurants &amp; hotels</td>
<td>2. Computer equipment operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Farmers</td>
<td>3. Chemical &amp; physical science technicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</strong></td>
<td><strong>Skilled crafts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Taxi drivers</td>
<td>1. Industrial machinery mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shopkeepers</td>
<td>2. Skilled truck &amp; lorry drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Farmers</td>
<td>3. Motor vehicle mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routine operatives</strong></td>
<td><strong>Routine agriculture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Manufacturing labourers</td>
<td>1. Gardeners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Routine truck &amp; lorry drivers</td>
<td>2. Farm hands &amp; labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Products assemblers</td>
<td>3. Animal producers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routine agriculture</strong></td>
<td>workers NCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Valid observations (before weighting): 6851. NCE: ‘not classified elsewhere’.
Table 6.3  Britain 1999 (BHPS): Most frequent professions in each class (ISCO-4-digit level) – continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational work logic</th>
<th>Interpersonal service work logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher-grade managers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural professionals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Finance &amp; administration managers</td>
<td>1. Secondary education teaching professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Production &amp; operations department managers NCE</td>
<td>2. College, university &amp; higher education teaching professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sales &amp; marketing managers</td>
<td>3. Medical doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associate managers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers of small firms in wholesale &amp; retail trade</td>
<td>1. Nursing associate professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Legal associate professionals</td>
<td>2. Social work associate professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical &amp; commercial sales representatives</td>
<td>3. Primary education teaching professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skilled office</strong></td>
<td><strong>Skilled service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Other skilled office clerks</td>
<td>1. Police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Accounting &amp; book-keeping clerks</td>
<td>2. Skilled child-care workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stock clerks</td>
<td>3. Skilled shop salespersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routine office</strong></td>
<td><strong>Routine service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Receptionists &amp; information clerks</td>
<td>1. Routine shop salespersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tellers &amp; other counter clerks</td>
<td>2. Institution-based personal service workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mail carriers &amp; sorting clerks</td>
<td>3. Helpers &amp; cleaners in establishments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Valid observations (before weighting): 6851. NCE: ‘not classified elsewhere’.
exact number of classes. In order to gain a picture that is as differentiated as possible, we will rely on the 17-class version for most of the empirical analyses to follow. Figure 6.1 sums up the structure of Part II, designed to provide some insight into employment stratification of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. We start out with an enquiry into class distribution and gender differences in the four countries (Chapter 7), before looking at hierarchical (Chapter 8) and horizontal (Chapter 9) division lines within the class structure. In Chapter 10, we shall examine stratification in the four countries under study with a collapsed class schema in order to obtain a more parsimonious overview.
The Class Structure of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

The distribution of employment across work logics and hierarchical levels

We begin our discussion of the empirical results with a closer look at the four work logics. Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of individuals across the horizontal division lines to which we give heavy emphasis in the construction of our class schema. Although the four countries in our sample do not present fundamentally diverse employment structures, substantial differences emerge. The markedly industrial bias of the German economy is reflected in a predominant share of individuals evolving in a technical work logic: more than a third of Germany’s workforce are technical experts, technicians, crafts workers and operatives. This contrasts with data for Britain where only a quarter of the labour force is employed in these classes. Britain’s employment, however, clusters more heavily in the organizational work logic than the three other countries: 20 per cent of the British labour

Figure 7.1  Distribution of total employment across the four work logics (in %)

![Bar chart showing distribution of employment across work logics for Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland.](chart.png)
force work in managerial or associate managerial occupations and 15 per cent in clerical office jobs. In the case of Sweden, Figure 7.1 clearly reflects the importance of the country’s welfare state. A third of Sweden’s employment is set in the interpersonal service logic. The large proportion of individuals in social services is compensated by Sweden’s low share within the organizational work logic. The finding that Sweden is comparatively ‘undermanaged’ is not new and has, among others, been accounted for by the country’s large public sector (Ahrne and Wright, 1983: 223).

Switzerland’s employment structure stands out insofar as the independent work logic is clearly of greater importance than in Britain and Germany (but not than in Sweden). During the unusually long economic stagnation of the 1990s, self-employment grew in Switzerland by more than 20 per cent. This was the result of both companies’ practice to outsource auxiliary tasks and the government’s decision to promote self-employment as a way out of unemployment (Falter, 2002). In contrast, Germany’s substantially lower share of self-employed is linked to the corporatist organization of its labour market. The use of formal educational criteria – mostly from vocational training – extends in Germany to large parts of self-employment. In many crafts, the setting up, registration, and practice of a business on one’s own depends on having acquired the relevant crafts qualification or diploma (Müller et al., 1998: 149).

The division of employment into different work logics must be completed with information about hierarchical setting. For that reason, we show in Figure 7.2 the distribution of wage-earners across the four levels of marketable skills. Differences between the four countries are not enormous but remain noteworthy. On the highest hierarchical level, Switzer-

![Figure 7.2](image-url)

**Figure 7.2** Distribution of total employment across the four hierarchical levels* (in %)

* The four levels do not add up to 100 per cent as employers and the self-employed (for whom subdivision into hierarchical levels is more ambiguous) are not included in the figure.
land and Sweden outdo Britain and Germany in terms of employment shares. With respect to hierarchy, Switzerland has the most advantageous class distribution: Almost as many employees evolve in a higher-grade professional, managerial or associate professional function as in a lower-grade vocational or routine occupation. In contrast, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Britain keep a somewhat more proletarian class structure. While Britain features an unusually important proportion of office clerks, Germany has a large share of craft workers and routine operatives: a quarter of the German labour force is assigned to either one of these two predominantly industrial classes. As a consequence, Germany is the only country where the four hierarchical levels form a pyramid.

**Total distribution of individuals over the 17-class schema**

In Tables 7.1 to 7.4, we combine the two dimensions of work logic (the horizontal axis) and hierarchical level (the vertical axis) in order to obtain the distribution of individuals across the complete 17-class schema. The hierarchy of the technical work logic is bottom-heavy in all four countries, but most clearly so in Britain where technical experts and technicians represent two very small classes while crafts workers and operatives constitute a significant part of the employment structure. The opposite picture can be found in the organizational work logic. Everywhere, the auxiliary classes of skilled and routine office clerks remain below the numerical strength of the managerial and associate managerial classes combined. This pattern is most evident for Sweden and Switzerland, but applies also to Britain and Germany where the clerical classes are only slightly greater.

The interpersonal service logic lies in-between: the largest employment shares are found at the quite high-skill level of socio-cultural semi-professionals and at the clearly low-skill level of routine service workers, whereas socio-cultural professionals and skilled service workers form two rather small classes. Sweden presents an interesting exception in that it exhibits very large shares of both skilled and routine service workers. These classes comprise occupational groups such as children’s nurses, hospital aides and home helpers which are at the core of Sweden’s welfare state and reflect its bias towards the public provision of social services. As regards the independent work logic, it is noteworthy that the classes forming the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’, large employers and self-employed professionals, together account for only about 2.5 per cent of total employment in Britain and Germany, and less than four per cent in Sweden and Switzerland. Numerically more substantial are those self-employed that do not work as professionals and employ, if any, nine employees at most: we call them the petite bourgeoisie. Combined, their share amounts to 11 per cent in Sweden and Switzerland, to nine in Britain and to seven in Germany. This
Table 7.1  Britain 1999: Total distribution across classes in %; in parentheses: women’s share within each class in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Large employers 0.8 (35)</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals 1.6 (31)</th>
<th>Technical experts 3.8 (16)</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers 12.2 (33)</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals 4.4 (58)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>3.8 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-grade managers</td>
<td>12.2 (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>4.4 (58)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>2.7 (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>3.6 (35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>7.5 (47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-profession</td>
<td>5.9 (80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>6.4 (17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>9.9 (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled office</td>
<td>11.4 (69)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td>6.1 (54)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operative</td>
<td>8.9 (23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>1.1 (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>4.5 (60)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>9.3 (67)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BHPS data; N (valid observations) = 6851

Table 7.2  Germany 2000: Total distribution across classes in %; in parentheses: women’s share within each class in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Large employers 0.5 (14)</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals 2.2 (22)</th>
<th>Technical experts 4.5 (14)</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers 7.3 (30)</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals 4.8 (51)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>4.5 (14)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-grade managers</td>
<td>7.3 (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>4.8 (51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>3.1 (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>4.9 (27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>8.1 (58)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-profession</td>
<td>6.7 (75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>4.1 (37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>13.1 (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled office</td>
<td>9.0 (65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td>4.3 (47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operative</td>
<td>12.0 (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>1.6 (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>2.8 (68)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>11.1 (62)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GSOEP data; N = 11,979
Table 7.3  Sweden 2000: Total distribution across classes in %; in parentheses: women’s share within each class in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Large employers</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 (23)</td>
<td>2.0 (25)</td>
<td>5.9 (25)</td>
<td>7.7 (42)</td>
<td>5.1 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with</td>
<td>3.4 (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>6.0 (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>8.2 (52)</td>
<td>6.2 (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled craftsmen</td>
<td>8.6 (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine operative</td>
<td>9.0 (18)</td>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>0.6 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>10.8 (73)</td>
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</table>

Source: LNU data; N = 3304

Table 7.4  Switzerland 1999: Total distribution across classes in %; in parentheses: women’s share within each class in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Large employers</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 (26)</td>
<td>2.8 (19)</td>
<td>6.0 (8)</td>
<td>9.4 (28)</td>
<td>6.2 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with</td>
<td>4.0 (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>5.5 (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>8.2 (39)</td>
<td>6.9 (63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled craftsmen</td>
<td>9.7 (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine operative</td>
<td>8.5 (31)</td>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>1.6 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>9.3 (57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SHP data; N = 3869
highly heterogeneous group most probably does not benefit from many of the advantages typically associated with self-employment.

Of particular interest for the purpose of this study is that the two least advantaged classes of routine operatives and routine service workers account in all four countries for about the same employment share of roughly 10 per cent. The third category that is comparable to these two classes in terms of hierarchical setting, the routine office clerks, constitutes a small minority in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Even in Britain, the country with the largest proportion of clerical employees, its share lies below five per cent.

Results shown are based on a target population that only includes individuals spending at least 20 hours per week in paid work. By thus delimiting the samples, we try to avoid deriving a class position from the employment of individuals who are only marginally involved in the labour market. If the definition of the target population were enlarged to integrate individuals working at least ten hours per week, the number of included observations would rise by nine per cent in the British and Swiss samples, and by two per cent in the German and Swedish samples. The characteristics of individuals working between 10 and 20 hours per week are alike in all four countries: they are overwhelmingly female and employed in the routine services. Besides, a small share of these part-time employees are office clerks or socio-cultural semi-professionals.

The gendered logic within the class structure

As expected, our results reveal heavily gender-segregated labour markets. This is apparent from shares shown in parentheses in Tables 7.1 to 7.4, which show the female share of employment within each class. In the independent and the technical work logic, women are a small minority in all four countries. Men represent more than 70 per cent of the self-employed individuals and they make up more than 80 per cent of the employees in a technical work logic. In the organizational work logic, the share of men and women is almost even. Yet, while women constitute a large majority within the clerical occupations in all four countries, men still dominate the managerial classes. Women most clearly outnumber their male colleagues within the interpersonal service logic. This is not surprising as it is in these classes that traditionally ‘female household tasks’ such as laundry, food service or the care of preschoolers and the elderly have been incorporated into the formal economy. Being easy-entry jobs, expansion in these interpersonal service occupations appears to go hand in hand with an increase in female labour market participation (Charles, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1999a: 104).

Tables 7.1 to 7.4 do not only exhibit a substantial degree of horizontal gender-segregation. A closer look at the row totals also reveals a systematic vertical pattern of gender-segregation. While men tend to dominate both on the professional/managerial and the skilled vocational level, women clus-
ter more heavily in both associate professional/managerial jobs and routine occupations. Within the organizational and the interpersonal work logics, women are more often employed as associate managers or semi-professionals than as higher-grade managers or socio-cultural professionals. Likewise, they are better represented in the routine service and routine operative classes than in the skilled service or crafts classes. For various reasons such as the persisting educational gap, interrupted careers and, of course, discrimination, it appears that high-skilled women typically tend to evolve in assistant jobs in management or the social professions, and low-skilled women in assistant jobs in production or personal services. Men, on the other hand, either pursue tertiary education and end up in expert or decision-making occupations, or they choose vocational training and settle in the skilled crafts class.

The combined result of horizontal and vertical gender-segregation can be seen more easily when looking at the total distribution of both male and female employment across the 17 classes. The skilled crafts appear to be almost exclusively reserved for men. In effect, the number of observed individuals in this cell exceeds the number of expected individuals (as calculated from the total distribution) by 50 per cent or more for men in all four countries. Not surprisingly, the crafts class is the largest male class in all countries. In contrast, women cluster heavily in the organizational and, above all, interpersonal work logic. In Britain, Germany and Switzerland, the two largest female classes are the routine service class and the skilled office class. Combined, these two classes comprise between 27 (Switzerland) and 33 per cent (Britain and Germany) of total female employment. In Sweden, clerical work makes up a much smaller share of female employment than interpersonal service work: 32 per cent of employed women work in either the routine or the skilled service class as compared to only 11 per cent for the two office classes. In all four countries, women heavily outnumber men among socio-cultural semi-professionals: nurses, social workers, primary and pre-primary school teachers are overwhelmingly female.

With respect to gender segregation, the four countries under study present great similarities. Although there are marked differences between the British employment structure that is heavily centred on management and the office, the German configuration that clusters around crafts and production workers, and the Swedish distribution that features a larger proportion of socio-cultural specialists and service workers, overall levels and patterns of gender-segregation are comparable among the four countries. The resemblance in the gendered character of the four labour markets is emphasized by an analysis of the chances of women to be in a certain work logic as compared to the chances of men to be in the same work logic. The odds ratios for women are displayed in Figure 7.3 and reveal that women are two to three times more likely than men to work in the interpersonal
service logic (for the odds ratios of different classes, see Table A.3 in the annexe). In contrast, men are three to four times more likely than women to be employed in the technical work logic. If the focus is limited to single classes, men are close to ten times more prone to work in skilled crafts (see Table A.3). With respect to gender, the most balanced composition is found in the organizational work logic. This, however, is only due to lower-grade managers.

The use of a segregation index allows us to compare the extent of gender segregation between the four countries in our sample. The most frequently used measure of segregation, Duncan and Duncan’s (1955) index of dissimilarity, produces rather similar values for the different countries, with the exception of Switzerland. This index has a value equal to zero if there is no segregation and equal to one if segregation is complete.27 Based on our 17-class schema, this index amounts to 0.440 for Sweden, 0.433 for Germany, 0.423 for Britain and 0.336 for Switzerland.28 The value of 0.440 for Sweden signifies that 44% of women (or men) would have to move to another class in order to eliminate segregation. The seemingly surprising finding that Sweden, in spite of its egalitarian policies, has a slightly higher level of occupational segregation has repeatedly been made. It has been accounted for by the joint action of female workforce participation and service sector growth: a large and expanding service sector is responsible both for women’s participation in paid work and their concentration into clerical, sales and service jobs (Charles, 1992; 2003). Yet it should be noted that while Sweden’s class structure appears to feature a somewhat higher level of occupational segregation, it is least gender-segregated along vertical lines. Compared to the
other three countries, a larger share of women work in classes on the two highest hierarchical levels (professionals/semi-professionals or managers/associate managers) and a smaller share on the lowest level of routine positions. These aspects of hierarchy shall be explored in more detail in the next chapter, which focuses on differences in work income and promotion prospects.
How to assess the schema’s validity?

The issue of assessing a schema’s validity is regularly brought up in the literature on class. Two types of validity assessment have been distinguished: construct validation and criterion validation (Evans, 1992; 1996; Rose and O’Reilly, 1998). Construct validation is the favoured mode in the social sciences. It involves assessing whether a schema predicts other variables in theoretically stipulated ways. For example, it may be examined whether an operationalized measure of class explains variance in political behaviour, housing tenancy or health records. However, if the schema fails to account for differences in voting behaviour, it is unclear whether the schema must be blamed for faulty operationalization of social class or whether there simply is no systematic link between political partisanship and social class (see Evans, 1992; Evans and Mills, 1998). For this reason, Evans (1992) stresses the necessity to also assess the criterion-related validity of a class schema. In other words, to examine whether a class schema effectively measures what it is intended to measure. In the case of the Goldthorpe schema, this involves studying whether the measures of social class successfully reflect differences in the employment relationship such as more or less advantaged working conditions, the presence or absence of promotion prospects or the extent of control over work tasks (Evans, 1992, 1996; Evans and Mills, 1998, 2000).

With respect to our class schema, assessment should focus both on the horizontal and the vertical division lines. For the horizontal dimension we do not dispose of any control variables with which to assess whether our choices of occupational allocation correctly mirror differences in the work logic. In fact, there are no specific questions asked about people’s work logic in the datasets of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Accordingly, we must resort to occupational variables and rely on the most detailed level of ISCO (or NYK)-codes to determine whether an individual’s job belongs to a technical, an organizational or an interpersonal work setting. In contrast,
with respect to the *vertical dimension* of the schema, we are able to assess whether our proxy for a more or less advantageous employment relationship – economic power as measured by marketable skills – correlates with other measures of advantage within the labour market. There is no point in directly examining the correlation between our class schema and education – this for the simple reason that information about education is already used when constructing the schema, both as part of ISCO-codes and as a control variable for intermediate occupations. In our view, Bergman and Joye (2001) correctly criticize this kind of exercise as being tautological. Instead, in what follows we will study the relationship between our class schema and two different measures of the distribution of advantage within the labour market, namely present compensation in the job, the *work income*, and future prospects for compensation in the job, the *chances of promotion*. We start out with an analysis of class differentials in work income.

**Differences in work income across classes**

There is no agreement on the role of earnings within the concept of employment relationship. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993) and their colleagues (Evans and Mills, 1998) prefer to emphasize the importance of future prospects for compensation than actual present work income. Here the approach is somewhat different: we argue that differences in work income reflect a central dimension of advantage within the labour market. In its essence, an employment relationship boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic resources – either in the form of a monthly salary with pension rights or an hourly wage. It is not by accident that dominant actors and institutions in the labour market, trade unions and the welfare state, concentrate heavily on earnings. While trade unions have traditionally focused on bargaining for rising wage levels, social policy in Western Europe has been largely occupied with income maintenance programs. Moreover, on the individual level, earnings are closely linked to power in the labour market and social status. Hence, they may be considered as a decisive factor bearing on individuals’ life chances. Accordingly, this dimension of advantage will be examined in some detail.

We start out with a discussion of monthly earnings. For this reason, we have computed gross work income per month of both employees and the self-employed. For employees, we have adjusted figures for differences in working time: all monthly wages are standardized for full-time employment of 40 hours weekly. In contrast, for the self-employed, non-standardized monthly earnings appear to be more significant than figures adjusted for the often long hours that the self-employed report working. In addition, monthly earnings below a minimum threshold were excluded as we must assume that they are either due to coding errors or do not represent wages but rather pocket money (as in the case of family workers). While levels of
### Table 8.1  Britain 1999: Median gross work income per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£ 1660</th>
<th>£ 1420</th>
<th>£ 2140</th>
<th>£ 2170</th>
<th>£ 2100</th>
<th>£ 2140</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£ 1250</td>
<td>£ 1440</td>
<td>£ 1340</td>
<td>£ 1690</td>
<td>£ 1190</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>£ 1000</td>
<td>£ 1370</td>
<td>£ 1150</td>
<td>£ 1060</td>
<td>£ 1190</td>
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<tr>
<td>£ 1140</td>
<td>£ 930</td>
<td>£ 1100</td>
<td>£ 830</td>
<td>£ 1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total median: £1300; N = 6628.
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7
* In all four tables (Tables 8.1–8.4), row means exclude the independent work logic.

### Table 8.2  Germany 2000: Median gross work income per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DM 8000</th>
<th>DM 7000</th>
<th>DM 7260</th>
<th>DM 6450</th>
<th>DM 6610</th>
<th>DM 6670</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DM 5000</td>
<td>DM 5100</td>
<td>DM 4660</td>
<td>DM 4570</td>
<td>DM 4780</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM 4000</td>
<td>DM 4300</td>
<td>DM 4270</td>
<td>DM 3960</td>
<td>DM 4210</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM 3780</td>
<td>DM 3050</td>
<td>DM 3640</td>
<td>DM 3120</td>
<td>DM 3430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total median: 4400 DM; N = 9828.

### Table 8.3  Sweden 2000: Median gross work income per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SK 24,430</th>
<th>SK 24,400</th>
<th>SK 25,820</th>
<th>SK 25,020</th>
<th>SK 20,460</th>
<th>SK 24,140</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SK 17,680</td>
<td>SK 20,020</td>
<td>SK 19,820</td>
<td>SK 17,910</td>
<td>SK 17,160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 17,020</td>
<td>SK 18,210</td>
<td>SK 16,210</td>
<td>SK 16,310</td>
<td>SK 15,950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 17,330</td>
<td>SK 16,010</td>
<td>SK 16,260</td>
<td>SK 14,870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total median: 18,070 SK; N = 3179.
* In the Swedish data set, we dispose of information from the tax register for yearly work income (which we use for the self-employed) and of information about the self-declared hourly wage (which we use for wage-earners). Work income taken from the tax register and self-declared wages are strongly correlated

### Table 8.4  Switzerland 1999: Median gross work income per month

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Total median: 5720 SFR; N = 2864.
earnings are not directly comparable across the four countries, the *structure of earnings* certainly is. Tables 8.1 to 8.4 exhibit the median work income for different classes. As expected, work income systematically decreases along the hierarchical levels of our schema in all four countries (see row medians). In fact, there is a clear contrast between the horizontal similarity of earnings and the vertical disparity of earnings. Within the middle class, technical experts stand out as top-earners in all four countries. In Britain, they are rivalled by higher-grade managers and, to a lesser extent, by socio-cultural professionals. Britain’s class of senior managers is not only unusually large (12.2% of total employment), but also very privileged in terms of income. Median earnings thus indicate that the numerical importance of this class is neither the result of misclassification nor of euphemistic labelling; the British economy, with its large financial centre London, simply appears to be particularly management-intensive. With respect to the self-employed, attention must be paid to the low work income of the petite bourgeoisie without employees. In all four countries, this class, composed of artisans, taxi drivers, barbers, shopkeepers or farmers, earns, on average, less than skilled craft workers.

When focusing on the lower part of the wage structure, routine service workers and agricultural workers clearly stand out as two low-earnings classes. It is noteworthy that in all four countries, skilled and routine service workers earn significantly less than their counterparts working as craftsmen or operatives. Office clerks take an intermediate position: while gaining higher wages than service workers, they still do not attain the pay level of production workers. This gives us a first hint as to the inadequacy of the manual/non-manual divide. In terms of earnings, the two manual classes of crafts workers and operatives are nowhere situated at the very bottom of the hierarchy – in clear contrast to employees in low-skilled service jobs. When defending the allocation of routine service workers (Goldthorpe’s class IIIb) to the fringe of the privileged service class (as opposed to the manual classes), Evans (1992: 218) had dismissed the argument of important wage differentials by highlighting the shorter hours worked by mostly female service and sales workers. Yet in Tables 8.1 to 8.4, we control for differences in working hours and nonetheless find a large gap in earnings. Therefore, short working hours do not explain why routine service workers are a low-pay class.

However, working hours are interesting in their own right. We have therefore computed mean working hours per week for different classes in Table A.4 in the annexe. These figures show that individuals in an interpersonal service logic spend, on average, less time at work than do their colleagues in the technical or organizational work logics. In comparison, working time is shortest for routine clerks and routine service workers, followed by the two other predominantly female classes of skilled clerks and socio-cultural semi-professionals. These employees put in substantially
fewer hours per week than do managers or craftsmen. What explains most of this disparity are differences in part-time employment: although we have excluded individuals employed less than 20 hours per week from our four samples, more than a third of office clerks and service employees work part-time in Switzerland. Likewise, the highest share of part-time workers in Sweden is found among skilled service workers (37%) and routine service workers (44%). In the British sample, 30 per cent of individuals in the routine services and 22 per cent in routine office jobs are employed part-time. In contrast, the part-time share is negligible in management and technical classes.

Earnings inequality within the class structure: totals and gender

For an individual’s daily life, absolute levels of earnings are probably most consequential. However, for the internal cohesion of society, relative differences in earnings – the level of inequality – may be of considerable importance as well. In order to gain a better picture of relative income differentials, we present in Tables 8.5 to 8.8 the median earning of each class expressed as a multiple of the median earning of the least-paid class, routine service workers. These tables confirm Sweden’s status as a particularly egalitarian country as far as earnings distribution is concerned. In Sweden, the median wage of the classes at the top exceeds the wages of the classes at the bottom by no more than a factor of 1.6 to 1.7. In Switzerland, this gap is somewhat larger, the earning of the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’ (large employers and self-employed professionals) exceeding the wage of routine service workers by a factor of 1.9. The highest earnings differentials are to be found in Germany and, above all, Britain where technical experts and higher-grade managers are paid 2.6 times as much as employees in the routine services. Another measure of earnings inequality produces a similar finding: the ratio between the median work income of the entire labour force and the median work income of routine service workers indicates that Sweden and Switzerland have a relatively more equal earnings distribution than Germany and Britain. However, these results diverge from the findings of more systematic research into income inequality, which classifies Germany as a relatively egalitarian society, ranking shortly after the Scandinavian countries in terms of Gini levels, while Switzerland generally figures among the least equal countries of Western Europe, surpassed only by Britain (Atkinson et al., 1995; Burniaux et al., 1998).

By adding the dimension of gender, we obtain another significant line of inequality in earnings. There is ample evidence in economic literature about the existence of a gender wage gap in the industrial world (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1992 for an international overview). Our data confirm the existence of substantial disparity between male and female earnings: in all four
countries, women earn consistently less than men (see Tables A.5 to A.8 in the annexe). Thus, even when controlling for occupational difference as our class schema does, gender remains a highly relevant dimension of disadvantage. This signifies that in the labour markets under study, women are not only disadvantaged as far as distribution across classes is concerned, but segmentation continues within each class. In comparison, Sweden turns out to have a somewhat smaller gender wage gap than Britain, Germany and Switzerland, where levels of disparity are similarly high.

### Table 8.5  Britain 1999: Relative differences in earnings

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Total median earning divided by median earning of routine service workers: 1.56.
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

### Table 8.6  Germany 2000: Relative differences in earnings

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Total median earning divided by median earning of routine service workers: 1.4

### Table 8.7  Sweden 2000: Relative differences in earnings

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Total median earning divided by median earning of routine service workers: 1.22.

### Table 8.8  Switzerland 1999: Relative differences in earnings

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Total median earning divided by median earning of routine service workers: 1.33.
These results provide further insight into the manual/non-manual divide. Indeed, once we separate median earnings according to gender, men working in skilled services are paid roughly the same as craftsmen. Similarly, wages for women in skilled services and in the crafts are comparable. The reason why earnings are higher for craft workers than for skilled service workers is that the former class is mainly composed of (higher-earning) men whereas the latter is dominated by (lower-paid) women. However, this finding is not valid for the lowest skill level, where routine service wages remain significantly below those of routine operatives in all four countries, even if we take account of gender. A somewhat different picture applies to employment in the office. In terms of earnings, women are everywhere clearly better off as clerks than as operatives or routine service workers. This is less true for men who are paid higher wages for doing elementary tasks in production than in the office.

The inclusion of gender reveals that observed differences in pay are partly due to the channelling of (higher earning) men into production and management posts, and (lower earning) women into office and personal service jobs. Hence, what is interpreted as class differences in Tables 8.1 to 8.4 may be, to a large extent, due to the gender gap in wages. In order to examine this hypothesis, we resort to multivariate analyses and estimate a basic wage

Figure 8.1  Wage premium associated with being in a given class as compared to the routine service class in % (converted OLS-regression coefficients; sex, age and employment status being held constant)
The Distribution of Advantage over Classes

equation with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This allows us to simultaneously take account of class and sex in the explication of earnings differences. More interesting in this context is the fact that class has a large and significant influence on earnings even if sex (and age) are controlled for. Figure 8.1 displays the converted regression coefficients for selected classes at the top and the bottom of the occupational hierarchy.

The interpretation of regression coefficients is straightforward: shown percentages present the wage increase that goes along with being in a given class as compared to being in the least-paid class of routine service workers, sex, age and employment status being held constant. In concrete terms, Figure 8.1 reveals that routine operatives and skilled crafts are everywhere in financially more favourable jobs than routine service workers, even if we take gender into account. The advantage of low-skilled production workers over low-skilled service workers is substantial in Britain and Switzerland, but rather small in Germany and Sweden. In all four countries except Sweden, jobs as office clerks go along with wages that are a third above those paid to routine service workers. Finally, it is apparent from Figure 8.1 that wage premiums associated with professional and managerial work are much smaller in Sweden than in Britain, reflecting the varying degrees of equality of the countries’ wage structure. Germany and Switzerland are in an intermediate position: middle-class incumbents benefit from wage premiums that, while being considerable, are not quite as large as in Britain.

It has been shown in Tables 8.5 to 8.8 that wages are no higher in the office than they are in production. However, it seems possible that office work is linked with other advantages. In this context, Erikson and Goldthorpe give great importance to the difference between, on the one hand, the conditions of employment prevailing within organizational bureaucracies and, on the other, working conditions typical of the labour contract (1993: 41). Whereas Erikson and Goldthorpe expect the manual classes VI and VII to supply discrete amounts of labour in return for pay on a hourly or ‘piece’ rate, classes I to III of managers, professionals and non-manual employees are more likely to have a monthly salary. The difference between an hourly or ‘piece’ wage, typical for the labour contract, and the service relationship’s monthly salary has been highlighted in different assessments of the Goldthorpe class schema (Evans, 1992; Evans and Mills, 1998, 2000).

In the four data sets at our disposal, the question of how an individual is paid is only asked for Britain and Sweden. This is not surprising as in Germany and Switzerland, pay on a hourly rate has been disappearing from most work contracts other than those limited in duration, set on a part-time basis or organized as on-call duty. Hence, the distinction between ‘being salaried’ (on a monthly basis) and ‘being paid on an hourly basis’ appears above all relevant for Britain and, to a much lesser degree, to Sweden. This is confirmed by our data which clearly show that in the
British and Swedish labour markets, the modality of being paid is strongly correlated with the hierarchical dimension in our class schema. In Britain, individuals in more advantaged class positions are much more likely to be salaried than individuals in less advantaged positions. Hence, while more than 90 per cent of technical experts, higher-grade managers and socio-cultural professionals are salaried, this applies to only a small minority of craft workers (35%), operatives (21%) and routine service workers (25%). In Sweden, there are only four classes where a significant minority of more than 20 per cent is not salaried. This is the case for craft workers (only 72% of all incumbents being salaried), industrial operatives (70%), agricultural workers (57%) and routine service workers (71%). Besides these categories, hourly pay is practically non-existent for classes set on a higher hierarchical level.

In both countries, there is one exception to the general hierarchical pattern: the surprisingly high share of routine clerks that are paid on a monthly basis. This finding underlines the particular nature of the employment relationship in the office: although routine office employees are not higher paid than other low-skilled workers, they more often benefit from a monthly salary. This implies that a focus on earnings alone is too limited to account for the working conditions prevailing in the office.

**Future prospects for compensation: promotion chances**

Until now, by focusing on present compensation in the job, we have made an essentially static analysis of our class schema. Yet Goldthorpe and his colleagues have repeatedly stressed that social classes are groupings that share particular sets of employment relations over time. Accordingly, people’s mobility prospects are supposed to have at least as much influence on life chances as do their momentary earnings. Esping-Andersen’s (1999a: 157) use of Schumpeter’s omnibus analogy is illustrative in this respect: the bus of low-skilled service workers may always be full of people, but if they are never the same, the experience is unlikely to have lasting consequences for life chances. For a similar reason, Erikson and Goldthorpe emphasize the long-term dimension of the bureaucratic employment relation, which contrasts with the very short-term nature of the labour contract. Characteristic for the long-term dimension within the employment relationship is the existence of ‘important prospective elements …, above all, well-defined career opportunities’ (1993: 42). According to these contributions, promotion prospects are central to a dynamic analysis of disadvantages in the labour market. The issue of career mobility is particularly relevant with respect to routine service workers, as it provides elements of an answer to the question whether they form a grouping that may be compared, in terms of their long-term prospects, with the industrial proletariat.
Our findings on earnings and on the way of being paid (monthly salary vs. hourly pay) suggest that individuals at the bottom of the interpersonal service hierarchy do not benefit from more advantageous working conditions than do operatives – on the contrary. However, routine service jobs possibly imply a different participation in the labour market over time than do manual occupations in manufacturing: they may be secondary jobs taken on by housewives in order to make ends meet in double-earner households, or they may serve labour market entrants as stop-gap jobs. We have tried to reduce the first possibility by excluding all individuals working less than 20 hours per week from our samples. Results on working time thus indicate that those routine service workers that remained in our sample spend on average between 33 (Britain) and 38 hours (Switzerland) per week in paid employment (see Table A.4 in the annexe). Their participation in the labour market can thus hardly be called marginal.

Less clear-cut is whether low-skilled service jobs primarily serve as transitional stop-gap jobs. Empirical findings on this issue are ambiguous. It has been shown that in the U.S. (Jacobs, 1993) and, to some extent, in Denmark (Esping-Andersen et al., 1994), Norway (Kolberg and Kolstad, 1993) and Sweden (Tåhlin, 1993), routine service jobs effectively function as way-stations to other, more desirable positions. In contrast, studies for Britain (Gershuny, 1993; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999) and Germany (Blossfeld et al., 1993) indicate that low-skilled service workers remain basically immobile. In this respect, Stewart and Swaffield (1999) note that mobility of the low-paid is generally overstated, as studies tend to restrict attention to individuals remaining in employment. This gives a potentially misleading picture of mobility since low-paid workers are more likely to experience spells of unemployment than the average employee.

Our cross-sectional research setting does not allow us to give answers to all facets raised by these issues of career mobility. Yet we can have a closer look at both differences in promotion prospects and in the age structure across classes. For this reason, we show in Tables 8.9 to 8.12, the share of individuals who report having promotion chance.

Question wording differed from one country to another: for instance, the question asked in the German sample makes career improvement dependent on extra educational effort. In the case of Sweden and Switzerland, we have translated variations of the Likert scale into a dichotomous variable: ‘yes, some promotion chances’/‘no, no promotion chances at all’. Accordingly, absolute levels are not directly comparable between the countries.

Tables 8.9 to 8.12 show that promotion chances are, overall, distributed in the expected hierarchical way: professionals and managers have – despite a presumed ceiling effect – the best prospects for career advancement. In contrast, the three classes with the bleakest promotion chances are identical in the four countries under review: agricultural workers,
routine operatives and routine service workers. Not surprisingly, then, the prospects for future compensation as measured in Tables 8.9 to 8.12 strongly correlate with present compensation at work (monthly earnings), in all four countries except Switzerland. When plotting promotion opportunities against median wages for all employee classes (separated according to gender), correlation coefficients amount to \( r = 0.63 \) for Britain, \( r = 0.69 \) for Germany, \( r = 0.87 \) for Sweden, but only \( r = 0.28 \) for Switzerland. This indicates that the higher the median earning of a class, the better the pro-

Table 8.9  Britain 1999: Promotion opportunities in current job (yes in %)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>62</th>
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Total share: 51.4\% / \( N = 5842 \).
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

Table 8.10  Germany 2000: Can improve career through further education (yes in %)

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Total share: 67.2\% / \( N = 10,695 \).

Table 8.11  Sweden 2000: Has some chances of promotion (yes in %)

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Total share: 74.4\% / \( N = 2789 \).

Table 8.12  Switzerland 1999: Has some chances of promotion (yes in %)

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Total share: 40.5\% / \( N = 3178 \).
motion opportunities of individuals within this class. These findings suggest that it is somewhat academic to emphasize the separation of present compensation for work (which is quite easily measured) from prospective long-term elements that are supposed to be more consequential for life chances (but pose a series of problems for operationalization).

While in Britain and Germany office clerks and skilled service workers appear to have better career prospects than other groupings with a comparable skill profile, promotion opportunities of routine service workers are similar to those of operatives in all four countries. Moreover, when looking at men and women separately, significant differences in promotion chances within the same classes appear. Promotion prospects and gender interact everywhere in an analogous way: on the most qualified level of technical experts, senior managers and socio-cultural professionals, women are not in a less advantageous position than men with respect to promotion prospects, yet on lower skill levels, their career opportunities are consistently worse than those of men. In opposition, men employed as clerks or skilled service workers have, in particular in Britain and Switzerland, as optimistic prospects as do junior managers or technicians. This suggests that the small minority of men working in the traditionally female occupations of auxiliary office or skilled service jobs often use these posts as transitional bridges towards more attractive positions. However, for women these occupations mostly amount to dead-end jobs.

The double-peaked age structure within the class schema

In order to find out more about the career pattern of different classes, we briefly explore the age structure within our class schema. For that reason, the mean age of all classes has been computed. On average, the self-employed are oldest in all four countries. This is due to different factors such as the need for experience and capital before setting up one’s own business, as well as questions of personal choice, as the self-employed usually remain economically active longer than wage-earners (Kaufman and Spilerman, 1982). For the much larger group of employees, Figure 8.2 reveals a *double-peaked age structure*: On average, individuals are oldest either in the most desirable classes or the least desirable classes. On the one hand, this translates a ceiling effect: it is at the end of a career that people arrive at the top level of higher-grade managers or technical experts. On the other hand, it suggests that while individuals in skilled service, office or crafts positions, on average, are youngest, and therefore likely to improve their positions over time, workers on the most routine level appear to a considerable extent imprisoned in low-skilled jobs: in all four countries, workers at the lowest hierarchical level, on average, are at least two years older than their colleagues at the vocationally skilled level. Analogous to findings about promotion prospects, this dimension of disadvantage is
sharpened by the aspect of gender. In the three classes with the lowest skill profile, women are on average older than their male colleagues. Yet in highly qualified class positions, the mean age of women lies significantly below that of men. This contrasting pattern of female age structure is particularly marked for Germany and Switzerland, to a lesser extent for Sweden. It may be accounted for in terms of younger women (at the professional and managerial level) increasingly sharing in the expansion of higher education, and older women without vocational training qualification being unable to surmount the skill barrier (and thus locked in at the routine level).

There is little doubt that the two indicators that we use to measure future compensation for work, promotion prospects and age, cannot rival the findings of more sophisticated studies based on time series. However, they provide us with some insight into the extent of career opportunities of different classes. These opportunities have been shown to be closely related to work income: classes with above average earnings are also more likely to benefit from well-defined promotion prospects than classes with lower pay levels. Hence, these results suggest that our class schema successfully reflects the salient features of disadvantage within the labour market, being strongly correlated with both present compensation for work and future prospects for compensation. In the next chapter, attention shall be turned to a series of structural division within the class schema that do not separate classes along hierarchical lines, but follow horizontal differences.
9
Structural Divisions within the Class Schema: Firm Size, Public Sector Employment and Party Support

The size of the workplace

During the 1980s, labour market observers highlighted a trend towards ‘flexible specialization’ in the organization of production (e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984; Brose, 1998: 147). This implied a shift away from the production of standardized goods, manufactured under conditions of mass production, towards more flexible and smaller-scale production units. Changes in the size of businesses have equally been pointed to as a relevant side effect of the sector-shift from manufacturing towards the services (Soskice, 1990: 52). In this context, Esping-Andersen (1999b: 303) highlights the impact that tertiarization has on the size of workplaces. Whereas ‘Fordism’ was characterized by large industrial establishments, he expects the service economy to be dominated by small-scale production units ‘where Taylorist management and hierarchies are only marginally possible’ (1999b: 303).

This shift is significant insofar as it is likely to have manifold implications for the collective experience of employment, influencing on unionization, mobilization and collective bargaining. These aspects will be explored more closely when discussing labour market actors and institutions in Chapter 13. At this point, we wish to examine whether our schema exhibits any systematic differences between classes as regards establishment size. Unlike Esping-Andersen (1993a), we do not expect to find a dichotomous distinction between ‘Fordist’ classes (that work in integrated industrial complexes) and ‘post-industrial’ classes (where the relations are supposed to be predominantly between producer and client). Our class schema builds on a threefold horizontal distinction. A Taylorist command structure is thus likely to be present both in the technical and the organizational work logics. In Tables 9.1 to 9.3, we display class-specific differences in the mean size of the company for Britain, Germany and Switzerland (unfortunately, information about the ‘establishment size’ was not yet available in the Swedish dataset). The results are obtained by dividing the number of individuals working in a large company (100 or more employees) by the
number of individuals working in a small company (less than 25 employees). Hence, the number 3.4 in Table 9.1 tells us that technical experts in Britain are 3.4 times more likely to be employed in a large than in a small workplace.

A number of comments must be made on these tables. First of all, they reveal that among the three countries, the German employment structure has by far the strongest bias towards large companies. Although small businesses are defined in a more restrictive way for Germany than for Britain and Switzerland (less than 20 instead of 25 employees), this finding cannot be reduced to measurement differences. Hence, if the German threshold of less than 20 employees is applied to Switzerland, the Swiss average for all wage-earners increases only slightly from 1.39 to 1.60 and remains still largely below the German value of 2.51. This difference is also evident when comparing the total proportion of wage-earners working in an establishment with 100 or more employees: the respective shares are 52 per cent

---

**Table 9.1** Britain 1999: Individuals working in a large company (>100) as multiple of individuals working in a small company (<25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>3.4</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average for all wage-earners: 1.35. For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

**Table 9.2** Germany 2000: Individuals working in a large company (>100) as multiple of individuals working in a small company (<20)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>8.1</th>
<th>11.0</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average for all wage-earners: 2.51.

**Table 9.3** Switzerland 1999: Individuals working in a large company (>100) as multiple of individuals working in a small company (<25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>3.9</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>1.9</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average for all wage-earners: 1.39.
in Germany as compared to 42 per cent in Britain and 39 per cent in Switzerland. A look at the hierarchical dimension of the schema reveals that technical experts, higher-grade managers, and socio-cultural professionals are overrepresented in large organizations. This is quite intuitive because large establishments are, compared to small companies, both more dependent on highly educated specialists and better able to offer correspondingly advantageous employment conditions. Particularly the clustering of higher-grade managers in large companies is not surprising as establishment size is an implicit classification criterion when separating higher-grade managers from associate managers.

The relationship between establishment size and the horizontal dimension of our class schema, work logic, is displayed in Figure 9.1. It clearly shows that while the technical and the organizational work logic are dominated by large companies, the interpersonal service logic is primarily composed of small businesses. In all three countries, the share of individuals working in establishments with more than 100 employees is smallest in the interpersonal service logic, roughly amounting to a third in Britain and Switzerland, and to a little less than half in Germany. This finding corresponds with Esping-Andersen’s assumption that the industrial and bureaucratic work settings rely on larger production units than does the interpersonal service setting. At the same time, it gives some empirical plausibility to Kitschelt’s (1994: 17) hypothesis that hierarchical lines are somewhat less clear-cut in interpersonal service jobs than in the office or in production jobs. With respect to gender, it is obvious from Figure 9.1 that women are substantially less likely to be employed in large workplaces than men: both in the interpersonal and the organizational work logic, female wage-earners

Figure 9.1  Share of employees working in a large company (>100) according to work logic and gender
cluster more heavily in small entities than their male co-workers. In Britain and Germany, this situation does not apply to the technical work logic, where female craft workers and operatives are more likely to be employed in large organizations than their male colleagues. This may be due to the fact that in manufacturing, women’s work experience is more strongly determined by the Taylorist setting of large food-processing or textile industries than by the artisan craft milieu.

Interestingly, in the service hierarchy, the company size decreases with declining skill levels. Thus, unlike routine operatives or clerks, routine service workers are more often employed in a small than in a large workplace (see Tables 9.1 to 9.3). In our view, heavy emphasis must be put on this difference between routine operatives and routine service workers, two categories of labour market participants that, in other respects, share similarly disadvantaged conditions of employment. It is very probable that routine jobs in small service businesses have different implications for employment experience, basic orientations and collective action than do routine jobs in large industrial plants. We shall analyse this feature in more detail when discussing the integration of different classes into trade unions in Chapter 13. To conclude, one class within the technical work logic represents an interesting exception: crafts workers are more likely to be employed in small workplaces than technical experts, technicians or operatives. This pattern is particularly visible for Germany and Switzerland, suggesting that the skilled trades are, to some extent, still rooted in a work setting that owes more to an artisan than an industrial logic.

Public and private sector employment

The literature on political behaviour and industrial relations regularly emphasizes that public sector employees have different relationships with labour markets and production units than private-sector employees (see Iversen, 1996; Gornick and Jacobs, 1998; Knutsen, 2001). In order to have a closer look at this dimension, in Tables 9.4 to 9.7 we present the share of public sector employees within each class. As the question wording varied in the four samples, absolute values are not strictly comparable between the countries. The largest definitions of the public sector are used in the Swedish and Swiss datasets, whereas the notion of ‘civil service’ in the German sample is somewhat more restrictive and possibly understates the extent of public sector employment. The difference between the relatively low German and the somewhat higher Swiss average may thus well be the result of different definitions and not of a larger public sector in Switzerland. We respond to this difficulty by focusing our attention on differences in public sector employment across classes.

Employees of public entities are distributed in a highly uneven way across the class structure. In the technical work logic, public sector employees
### Table 9.4  Britain 1999: Share of individuals employed in a public organization (in %)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>48.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average of wage-earners employed in the public sector: 26.2%.
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

### Table 9.5  Germany 2000: Share of individuals employed in the civil service (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>...</th>
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<td>73.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>29.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average of wage-earners employed in the public sector: 27.6%.

### Table 9.6  Sweden 2000: Share of individuals employed in a public entity/administration (in %)

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<td>...</td>
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<td>56.6</td>
<td>73.3</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column totals</td>
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<td>32.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average of wage-earners employed in the public sector: 38.8%.

### Table 9.7  Switzerland 1999: Share of individuals employed in a public entity/administration (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>...</th>
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<th>22.6</th>
<th>68.1</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average of wage-earners employed in the public sector: 31.0%.
make up a small minority in all four countries. In contrast, in the interpersonal service logic they account for two thirds of total employment in Sweden and for half of total employment in the other three countries. The organizational work logic lies in-between: the public sector is an important employer in these bureaucratic classes but has nowhere such a dominant position as in interpersonal services. When examining the hierarchical dimension more closely, it becomes evident that – with the notable exception of Sweden – public employees cluster more heavily in the two highest skill levels. This is not surprising, as the nature of work in the public sector consists primarily of service delivery and regulation, implying the necessity of an educated workforce and resulting in a favourable mix of occupations (Gornick and Jacobs, 1998: 694). This is particularly true for the interpersonal work logic, where public employment prevails among professionals and semi-professionals but is less common for skilled service workers and quite rare on the level of the most routine service jobs. Moreover, like private organizations, states also rely on considerable numbers of administrators and clerks to run the bureaucracy. Particularly in Germany, a sizeable proportion of managers are employed in the public sector. When calculated as share of total public employment, officials and civil servants allocated to the two managing classes account for 23 per cent in Germany, for 16 in Britain and Switzerland, and for 13 in Sweden.

There are important differences in public employment as regards gender. Expansion of the welfare state has provided for qualified jobs in the health sector, education and social services that have largely been filled by women. In relative terms, women are more likely to work for a public employer than men in all four countries. Differences are largest in Sweden where 55 per cent of women have public jobs as compared to only 23 per cent of men. The difference is also quite large in Britain, where it amounts to 16 percentage points (35% women, 19% men), but somewhat smaller in Germany and Switzerland, where the gap stands at 10 per cent.

Breaking total public employment down for the three work logics and along gender lines, it becomes evident that in Britain and Sweden women outnumber men in the public sector also in absolute figures. This is most obvious for Sweden where 70 per cent of public sector jobs are filled by women. In all four countries, women’s public sector employment is overwhelmingly set in the interpersonal service logic. This is most clearly the case in Sweden where interpersonal service jobs held by women account for more than half of total public employment; in Britain, the corresponding share is 40 per cent. These figures suggest that female predominance in the public sector is above all due to the welfare state, offering employment in the teaching, helping and caring professions. In contrast, the organizational work logic presents a more balanced picture between male and female public sector employment. Finally, in the (mainly male) technical work logic, more men than women occupy public-sector jobs.
For women, public sector employment is significant inasmuch as it is usually accompanied by better working conditions than in the private sector. Our calculations show that women earn substantially more as public than as private employees: in Britain, the wage gap amounts to 30 per cent, in Germany to 22 and in Switzerland to 25 (difference in median earnings). For men, the advantage of the public sector over the private is smaller in terms of monthly wages (a wage gap of 20 per cent in Britain, ten in Germany and 19 in Switzerland). These wage differences are explained, to some extent, by the fact that public jobs more often demand tertiary education and are situated in better paying classes. Yet intra-class differences illustrate that public sector employees still fare better than private sector employees, even when class position is controlled for (Sweden being a notable exception, see below).

In particular for routine clerks and service workers, median wages are substantially higher in the public than in the private sector in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. These results confirm findings from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) that the wage structure in the public sector is more compressed than in the private sector and thus particularly favourable to the lower end of earnings distribution (Gornick and Jacobs, 1998).

However, Sweden does not fit into this picture. Actually, women employed in the Swedish public sector earn wages that are, on average, lower by eight per cent than in the private sector. Similarly, men are paid slightly less in the public than in the private sector (–3%). In the literature, the existence of a public sector wage penalty in the social democratic welfare state has been shown before (Gornick and Jacobs, 1998: 704). It is partly explained by the fact that Sweden’s public sector features a somewhat different occupational mix than is the case elsewhere. Besides including a substantial proportion of professional and semi-professional specialists, public employment also consists of a large share of less skilled jobs in the office and, above all, interpersonal services: the class of vocationally skilled service workers, which do not benefit from a particularly advantageous employment relationship, is unusually large in Sweden. This employment pattern reflects the central role of the Swedish welfare state as an employer. More precisely, it mirrors its bias towards the public provision of social services at the local level. The particularity of Sweden’s class structure – the predominance of the interpersonal service logic – is due to public employment at the level of local government.

In effect, our calculations show that in Sweden 48 per cent of socio-cultural semi-professionals and 46 per cent of skilled service workers are municipal employees (among socio-cultural professionals and low-skilled service workers, the respective figures are 40 and 38 per cent). In contrast, for classes in the technical work logic, municipal employment is totally insignificant. Hence not without reason, scholars have proposed, in the case of Scandinavian countries, to speak of ‘welfare municipalities instead of welfare states’ (Jorma Sipilä quoted by Fargion, 2000: 65).
Class and party support

It is common practice in research on stratification to judge a class schema’s validity by its explicative power for voting behaviour. Yet the assumption that a class schema is valid if it adequately predicts variance in voting is based on a misunderstanding. Depending on the country, the period, and above all the party structure, social class and political preferences may correlate more or less closely. Symptomatically, the debate on the very nature of the link between class and vote is vigorous (see Chapter 1). On this subject, our contribution is confined to an overview of the relationship between class position and party support. In a first step, Tables 9.8 to 9.11 show for each class the share of individuals who support a party on the left. Question wording varied according to the country. As parties on the left we have counted Labour and the Green Party in Britain and the Social-democratic and Green Party in Germany and in Switzerland. Unfortunately, the variable ‘party support’ is not available in the Swedish LNU data set. Instead, we have computed a proxy by combining into a single index the answers of four different variables inquiring into preferences about income distribution, public or private education, public or private family care, and gender equality. Thus, figures in Table 9.11 do not reflect support of a party on the left, but support of values which are traditionally upheld by parties on the left (e.g. equal income distribution, public education, public family care, more gender equality). As a consequence, results from Sweden must be interpreted with more precaution.

It is noteworthy that in Germany support for the Social-democratic and the Green Party reaches an unusually high 57 per cent. On the one hand, this is a consequence of selecting a target population aged between 20 and 65 years. Among individuals older than 65 years (that are excluded from our analyses), leftist orientation falls to 47 per cent. On the other hand, the large support for the left in 2000 is due to both the popularity of the social-democratic chancellor Schröder and his Green ally Fischer after less than two years in government and the disastrous situation of the conservative opposition shortly after CDU’s donation scandal.

The findings shown in Tables 9.8 to 9.11 add some evidence to Kriesi’s (1998: 167) and Müller’s (1999: 142) hypothesis that cleavage politics and class voting continue but remain frequently hidden by the inadequate operationalization of class. Most particularly in Switzerland, there is a striking difference in left support between higher-grade and associate managers on the one hand and socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals on the other. In effect, 63 per cent of socio-cultural professionals and even 76 of socio-cultural semi-professionals declare that they would vote for the left in case of elections. In comparison, this applies to only 35 per cent of higher-grade and to 30 of associate managers. A very similar cleavage within the ‘new middle class’ has been observed in the Netherlands, where
Table 9.8  Britain 1999: Feels closest to party on the left (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12.5</th>
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<td>57.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 4080; overall share of left orientation: 49.9%.
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.
* In all four tables (Tables 9.8–9.11), **bold** figures signify: 10% more than average; **underlined**: 10% less than average.

Table 9.9  Germany 2000: Feels closest to party on the left (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>8.3</th>
<th>40.1</th>
<th>56.9</th>
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<td>70.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 4744; overall share of left orientation: 57.3% (German nationals only).

Table 9.10  Switzerland 1999: Would vote for party on the left (in %)

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>row means</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

N = 1985; overall share of left orientation: 41.5% (Swiss nationals only).

Table 9.11  Sweden 2000: Leftist political preferences (in %)*

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>24.5</th>
<th>31.8</th>
<th>28.1</th>
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<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 3146; overall share of leftist preferences: 40.2%.
* The four variables provided information about preference for: (1) more equal income distribution, (2) more private organization of education and care, (3) more family care of children and elderly, and (4) more equality between men and women in domestic work and child care.
'low-grade social and cultural specialists' have become the class that most constantly votes for parties on the left (de Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Güveli et al., 2002). In Britain and Germany, socio-cultural professionals and managers also diverge in their support for left-wing parties; likewise, in Sweden, socio-cultural specialists are more frequent than other middle-class categories to agree with political preferences traditionally attributed to the left. However, differences in these countries are much smaller than in Switzerland. Moreover, row means for Sweden suggest, as for Britain, that political orientation is predominantly structured in a hierarchical way. Leftist values in Sweden are most widely shared among operatives, low-skilled clerks and service workers. The same finding applies to Britain: the less advantageous the class position, the more likely British individuals are to favour the Labour Party.

At the other end of the political spectrum, three categories everywhere exhibit very low support for parties on the left: large employers, the petite bourgeoisie with or without employees, and higher-grade managers. This is not surprising as individuals in these class positions either run a business of their own or exercise delegated authority within a corporate business. Accordingly, it can be presumed that they favour low taxation, modest social spending and little government interference within the market sphere. It is noteworthy that within the petite bourgeoisie, having employees makes a significant difference with regard to political orientation: in all four countries, the ‘employing’ petite bourgeoisie is substantially less likely to express sympathy for the left than that who does not have employees. Moreover, in both Sweden and Switzerland technical experts are almost as unlikely as employers (and even less likely than higher-grade managers) to share political preferences defended by parties on the left.

In the case of Switzerland, we remain with the question of why support for a party on the left is uncorrelated with the hierarchical level of class position (see row means in Table 9.11). This is not due to the aggregation of the Social-democratic Party with the Green Party, which – supposedly – attracts a middle class electorate: the latter receives only five per cent of all voting intentions and covers a wide class spectrum. More promising is a look at individuals declaring the intention to vote for the neo-conservative Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC), a party historically rooted among farmers and the petite bourgeoisie, which has mutated into an anti-establishment, anti-tax party on the right wing, strongly opposed to immigration and adhesion to the European Union. Our calculations suggest that this party primarily gathers votes from two very different constituencies: on the one hand, from its traditional core constituency (the petite bourgeoisie and large employers) and, on the other, from the industrial working class (craft workers and routine operatives). While SVP-support within the entire working population amounts to 21.5 per cent, 35 per cent of large employers declare that they would vote for SVP if elections were held tomorrow. Similarly strong
support is expressed by the petite bourgeoisie with employees (30%) and without employees (34%) as well as by craft workers (33%) and routine operatives (32%). Among employed wage-earners, row means point to a clear hierarchical pattern: while classes at the bottom of the hierarchy show large support for the Swiss People’s Party (routine service workers 27%, skilled service workers 28%), higher-grade managers (16%) and technical experts (16%) are clearly less likely to vote for it. This applies even more to socio-cultural professionals (7%) and semi-professionals (5%) amongst whom support for SVP is exceptionally low. Hence, our results for Switzerland produce the paradoxical picture of a country where the relatively disadvantaged classes of craft workers and routine operatives over proportionally vote for a neo-conservative party of the right, while the rather privileged classes of socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals massively support the left. Moreover, there is a gender gap in voting patterns worth mentioning: SVP is chosen by 23 per cent of economically active men, but only by 15 per cent of economically active women. In contrast, 49 per cent of women favour the left as compared to only 38 per cent of men.

**Examining the cleavage within the salaried middle class**

Tables shown so far point towards the existence of a cleavage within the salaried middle class as regards voting behaviour. However, what must be explained in this context is why the division between the classes at the top of the interpersonal and the organizational work logic is much stronger in Switzerland than in Britain and Germany. One hypothesis is that employees in the socio-cultural professions vote not so much for traditional social-democratic politics, but for post-materialist policies that increase individual autonomy and civil liberties, and reduce market dependence and bureaucratic control; in sum, they opt for what has been called ‘new politics issues’ (Müller, 1999: 145). In countries where social-democratic parties compete for government (and are not a minority governmental partner as in Switzerland), such policies are typically advocated by smaller, left or centre-left parties such as the Green Party in Germany or the Liberal Democrats in Britain. Accordingly, we examine in Tables 9.12 and 9.13 whether support for these two parties in Britain and Germany follows the class pattern observed for Switzerland’s left.

Results shown confirm that by far the strongest supporters of Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Green Party in Germany are socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals. In both countries, they are twice as likely to back the party of ‘new politics’ than higher-grade and associate managers. It is noteworthy that the Liberal Democrats and even more so the Green Party primarily cater to middle-class voters: row means of Tables 9.12 and 9.13 indicate that these two parties have much less support on the lowest hierarchical level of routine workers than among professionals and
experts. This is particularly striking with respect to Germany’s Green Party. If we disentangle support for the traditional coalition partners of the left in Germany – the SPD and the Green Party –, and look only at figures for the Social-democratic Party, the same hierarchical class pattern emerges as suggested by Tables 9.8 for Britain and 9.11 for Sweden: support for the SPD is strongest among agricultural workers, routine operatives and technicians, and weakest among the self-employed, technical experts and higher-grade managers (see Table A.9 in the annexe). It thus appears that in Germany, the Social-democratic Party still rallies the traditional stronghold of the left, the industrial working class, while its junior partner, the Green Party, succeeds in mobilizing an over-proportionate part of the salaried middle class, notably socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals. With respect to gender, the disparity resembles that found in Switzerland: women are more likely than men to support the Liberal Democrats in Britain (14% as compared to 10%) and the Green Party in Germany (11% as compared to 8%).

These findings point to a significant cleavage within the employed middle class between, on the one hand, socio-cultural professionals who lean towards parties on the left or centre-left and, on the other, managers and administrators who, like employers, favour parties on the right. This division between the classes at the top of the interpersonal and the organizational work logic is visible in all four countries, but stands out most clearly in the case of Switzerland. Thus, so far we do not find any evidence for Goldthorpe’s expectation that the service class will become, once it consol-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.12</th>
<th>Britain 1999: Feels closest to Liberal Democrats (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total share of liberal democrat support: 11.3%.
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.13</th>
<th>Germany 2000: Feels closest to Green Party (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total share of Green party support: 9.1%.
idates, ‘an essentially conservative element within modern societies’ (1980: 181). On the contrary, it seems quite heterogeneous, including important factions that consistently favour parties on, and preferences of, the left.

Yet conclusions should not be drawn to hastily. In fact, Goldthorpe stresses the importance of the consolidation process within the middle class (1995: 322). Hence, the service class may still be quite heterogeneous politically – but as it is consolidating, each new cohort is expected to move more towards a homogeneous conservative position. This assumption collides with currents in research on political behaviour that call the division within the middle class new cleavage, thus implying that it prevails among cohorts that were politically socialized after 1968 (Kriesi, 1989; Güveli et al., 2002). We will have a closer look at these two contrasting hypotheses by differentiating left-wing support of different classes for three different age groups: (a) individuals aged 20 to 35 years, (b) individuals aged 36 to 50 years, and (c) individuals aged 51 to 65. The result is displayed in Figure 9.2 for higher-grade and associate managers on the one hand (which we merged into managers), and socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals on the other (which we merged into socio-cultural specialists). It produces the unambiguous finding that the cleavage within the salaried middle class is widening for younger generations. Among the oldest cohort of managers and socio-cultural professionals, there is no significant difference in left-wing support in Britain and Germany. However, there is an evident division between the same two classes as far as the youngest cohort is concerned. In Switzerland, the cleavage is already very marked for the oldest cohort. Still, it further deepens among the youngest cohort.

These results run counter to Goldthorpe’s expectation of an increasingly more homogeneous and conservative service class. In fact, the opposite seems true: over time, managers and socio-cultural professionals appear to

![Figure 9.2](140398591X_11_ch09.pdf) 14/2/07 2:50 PM Page 119
become more and more dissimilar political blocs. In the literature, attempts have been made to explain left-wing support of ‘welfare and creative’ individuals by the fact that their jobs are predominantly set in the public sector (e.g. Heath and Savage, 1995: 281–2). A similar cleavage between employees in the public sector and the private sector is highlighted by Kitschelt (1994) or Knutsen (2001), who put emphasis on the difference in economic interests: public employees are expected to favour large government budgets, a well-developed welfare state, and market restrictions. In contrast, private employees depend on the performance of their employing organizations and are thus expected to prefer lower taxes and less market interference. Although not denying the relevance of sector employment, we do not expect our results in party support to be driven by this dimension.

As mentioned in detail before (see Chapter 5), our explanation rests on the difference in the *work logic* between managers and socio-cultural professionals. Accordingly, we expect left-wing support of the latter to be closely linked to their daily work role, which implies advocating patients’ or petitioners’ demands against organizational constraints or market dominance.

As a first test of this hypothesis, we compute cross-tabulations of class, party support and public/private sector employment. In Britain, 50 per cent of private sector employees support the left as compared to 56 per cent of public sector employees, in Germany the respective figures are 55 and 63 per cent, in Switzerland 38 and 57 per cent. When looking at distinct classes, results clearly suggest that the high levels of leftist support by socio-cultural specialists is not due to public sector employment. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals employed in the private sector are as likely to support the left as their colleagues in the public sector in both Britain and Germany. In Switzerland, left support is higher among socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals working in the public sector (left support of 68 and 78% respectively). Still, 51 per cent of socio-cultural professionals and even 73 per cent of semi-professionals employed in the private sector support the left. In comparison, only 42 per cent of higher-grade managers and 28 per cent of associate managers employed in the public sector give their preference to the left. Thus, party support of socio-cultural specialists does not appear to be due to public sector employment. However, in order to further substantiate this hypothesis, we resort to multivariate analysis and run binary logistic regressions for the determinants of party support. Regression results are exhibited in Table 9.14 and show the odds ratios for different classes to support a given party. For reasons of parsimony, we have merged the 17 classes into 8 classes.42

**Voting for the traditional left in Britain and Germany (regressions 1 and 3):**
In Britain, only one class is less likely to vote for the traditional left than managers: the petite bourgeoisie. Besides this category, left support in Germany is very rare among the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’ (large-employers and self-employed professionals) as well. In opposition, the chance to vote
Table 9.14  Estimates for the odds of supporting a given party [exp(B) of binary logistic regressions]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Labour support</th>
<th>Liberal Democrat support</th>
<th>Social-democratic support</th>
<th>Green support</th>
<th>Left support (SPS/ (SVP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(man = 0 / woman = 1)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.19*</td>
<td>1.35**</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional bourgeoisie</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>2.41***</td>
<td>1.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(reference Petite bourgeoisie)</td>
<td>0.66**</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
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<td>category: Technical specialists</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.31*</td>
<td>1.79**</td>
<td>1.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managers) Production workers</td>
<td>1.79***</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>1.49***</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>1.38**</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural specialists</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>2.68***</td>
<td>3.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>1.65***</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(private = 0/public = 1)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-member = 0 / member = 1)</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>4072</td>
<td>4072</td>
<td>4733</td>
<td>4733</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to support a given party as compared to the chance of not supporting the same party. *** Significant at the 0.001 level; ** at the 0.01 level; * at the 0.05 level.
for either the Labour Party in Britain or the SPD in Germany is largest among production workers. In Britain, they are further joined by service workers and office clerks, who are all significantly more likely than managers to choose Labour. Hence not surprisingly, in Britain and to a lesser degree in Germany, support for the traditional working class party is strongest at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Besides, regression results indicate for both countries that public sector employment is not a significant factor. In contrast, union membership significantly increases the likelihood of Labour support in Britain.

**Voting for the new left / centre-left in Britain and Germany (regressions 2 and 4):** Although the political distance between Labour and the Liberal Democrats in Britain and, above all, between SPD and the Green Party in Germany appears rather small, the profile of their voters differs strongly. In both countries, the strongest supporters of the ‘traditional left’, production workers, are least likely to vote for the ‘new left’. In contrast, the cleavage within the salaried middle class becomes apparent with respect to the ‘new left’: socio-cultural specialists are almost twice as likely to support the Liberal Democrats than managers in Britain and even 2.7 times more likely to prefer the Green Party in Germany. Interestingly, in both countries, the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’ appears rather favourable to the parties of ‘new politics’ as well. This effect is mostly due to self-employed professionals. With respect to the other variables, regression results show that age and gender do not significantly contribute to explaining Liberal Democrat support in Britain. Yet they suggest, for Germany, that the Green Party’s typical supporter is young and female. Again, public sector employment fails to have a significant impact on party support in either of the two countries.

**Voting for the left or the neo-conservative right in Switzerland (regressions 5 and 6):**

In Switzerland, there is not a large class difference between supporters of the Green Party and those of the Social-Democratic Party. Hence, a regression is run for the class basis of the two parties combined. There are three classes that are significantly more likely to support the left than managers: technical specialists, the traditional bourgeoisie and, above all, socio-cultural specialists. Unlike the two other countries, public sector employment in Switzerland significantly increases the likelihood of left support. It does so to a similar extent as does union membership. Moreover, women are substantially more likely to favour a party of the left than men. Yet even if we take account of gender, public sector employment and union membership, socio-cultural specialists remain 3.7 times more likely than managers to favour the left. Hence, as in the two other countries, public sector employment fails to explain the cleavage in middle class voting.

Finally, the focus is put on the determinants of right-wing voting and, more precisely, on support for the neo-conservative Swiss People’s Party
Regression results reveal that, unlike parties on the left, the SVP gets less support from women than men. Moreover, it is very unsuccessful among socio-cultural specialists. In contrast, it receives large support from its traditional clientele, the petite bourgeoisie, as well as from the two relatively underprivileged classes of service workers and, above all, production workers. This may appear surprising as SVP does not advocate values traditionally upheld by working class parties such as equal income distribution and government correction of market distortions – accordingly, members of trade unions are significantly less likely to support the SVP than non-members. Yet individuals in relatively less advantaged class positions are nonetheless more likely than managers to support the party’s anti-establishment and anti-immigration programme – a fact that has received large attention in the literature (e.g. Kriesi, 1998; Mazzoleni, 2003; McGann and Kitschelt, 2005).

In sum, these explorative inquiries into political behaviour suggest that the schema effectively accounts for differences in party support. While these differences follow vertical lines with respect to support of the ‘traditional left’, they run horizontally through the middle class with respect to the parties of ‘new politics’. For more authoritative conclusions, more in-depth analyses are needed. These, however, fall outside the scope of the present study.
10
Collapsed Versions of the Detailed Class Schema

Working with a collapsed 8-class schema

There are both theoretical and practical reasons speaking in favour of a tighter version of our class schema. From a theoretical standpoint, it may be argued that not all the divisions made in the 17-class schema have a class character. In fact, there is most probably no class difference between the position in labour markets and production units held by skilled clerks on the one hand and routine clerks on the other. Likewise, farmers with a couple of employees do not work in a very different setting than farmers without employees (both belonging to what we call the petite bourgeoisie). In our view, the distinctions made in the 17-class schema based on four work logics and four levels of marketable skills are interesting in their own right as they permit an in-depth analysis of the workings of the employment structure. Yet depending on the object of the study, a class schema with fewer categories is more accurate and has furthermore the merit of greater parsimony. In empirical research, however, it is normally not so much for theoretical considerations but for practical constraints that collapsed versions are preferred to the original – detailed – class schema. Thus, in samples that are not quite as big as the German Socio-Economic Panel or the British Household Panel, the reduction of the number of classes responds to the statistical necessity of having sufficiently large cell counts. Moreover, imprecise occupational information may render a series of subdivisions impossible. Accordingly, collapsed versions of class schemas are often used in order to maintain high standards of cross-national comparability in data (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 35).

When collapsing the 17 categories in our schema into less classes, different procedures are possible. Classes could be merged depending on the specificities of each country. Thus, in Germany, skilled office clerks and lower-grade managers should be combined as they share similar employment relationships with respect to both earnings and promotion prospects; moreover, their political orientation differs only slightly. However, these
two classes are very distinct in Britain and, above all, in Sweden and Switzerland. When applying the criterion of income, career opportunities and political orientation to Britain’s class structure, two other categories emerge as similar which, again, are separated by quite some distance in Germany: technicians and craft workers. In what follows, we will not give too much importance to these cross-national differences, which, in any case, may be partially due to national particularities in the labelling of occupations. Instead, we will collapse the employee categories along the same hierarchical division line for all four countries. Therein, we give strong emphasis to the boundary that separates occupations held by educated professional and semi-professional personnel from occupations filled by vocationally trained or unskilled workers. As we do not mix categories from different work logics, in our collapsed version we obtain the six different employee classes exhibited in Table 10.1: in the technical work logic, technical experts are merged with technicians, and craft workers with routine operatives; in the organizational work logic, higher-grade and associate managers are collapsed, as are skilled and routine office clerks; finally, in the interpersonal service logic, we combine socio-cultural professionals with socio-cultural semi-professionals and skilled service with routine service workers. The final 8-class version as shown in Table 10.1 results from two additional adjustments within the categories of the self-employed and employers. The first is straightforward and consists in the fusion of the petite bourgeoisie without employees with its counterpart that has employees. The second concerns the categories of large employers and self-employed professionals which, when merged, approximates to what may be called the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’.

In what follows, we use this collapsed version to review the salient features of employment stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.

**Distribution of individuals and material advantage across the 8-class schema**

Distribution of the workforce over the 8-class schema is shown in Table 10.2. It illustrates that, in terms of numbers, the employment structure of Britain, Germany and Switzerland is dominated by the two male classes of *production workers* and *managers*. In contrast, due to its generous welfare state and high

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Technical specialists</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural specialists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Production workers</td>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>Service workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.1 The collapsed 8-class schema
women’s participation rates, Sweden’s labour force clusters heavily in the female class of service workers. The smallest class is identical in all four countries, being everywhere made up of the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’. Historically, this class comprised the capitalist elites of Western European countries. However, as large companies have become incorporated, many entrepreneurial activities have been shifted from proprietors to the salaried managerial class. Consequently, the traditional bourgeoisie consists, to a large extent, of self-employed professionals such as medical doctors, lawyers and accountants, as well as a small number of employers, mainly active in the wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants and garage business. Hence, this category only vaguely resembles the stereotypical capitalist class of entrepreneurs. With respect to the working class, it is noteworthy that production workers still outnumber service workers everywhere apart from Sweden. In comparison, there are substantially less office clerks than both routine staff in production or interpersonal services in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. However, this does not apply to Britain, where the share of individuals occupied in bureaucratic jobs – both clerks and managers – is conspicuously large.

With respect to gender, the collapsed schema shows even more clearly that women cluster in the interpersonal services and in clerical office jobs, whereas men provide a large majority of technical specialists and production workers. In all four countries, half of all economically active men are either employed as managers or production workers. For women, on the other hand, the two largest classes are service workers and socio-cultural specialists in Sweden, or service workers and office clerks in the other three countries. Hence, women typically evolve in assistant jobs in the office or in subordinate jobs in interpersonal services. The salient features of gender segregation in the labour market remain visible when using the collapsed 8-class schema.

### Table 10.2 Total distribution across the 8-class schema (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Technical specialists</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural specialists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GB 2.3</td>
<td>GB 7.4</td>
<td>GB 19.7</td>
<td>GB 10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 2.6</td>
<td>DE 9.4</td>
<td>DE 15.4</td>
<td>DE 11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW 3.2</td>
<td>SW 11.9</td>
<td>SW 15.9</td>
<td>SW 13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH 3.9</td>
<td>CH 11.5</td>
<td>CH 17.6</td>
<td>CH 13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petite bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Production workers</th>
<th>Office clerks</th>
<th>Service workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GB 9.2</td>
<td>GB 19.8</td>
<td>GB 15.9</td>
<td>GB 15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 7.2</td>
<td>DE 26.6</td>
<td>DE 11.8</td>
<td>DE 15.5</td>
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<td>SW 11.7</td>
<td>SW 18.3</td>
<td>SW 5.9</td>
<td>SW 20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH 11.3</td>
<td>CH 19.8</td>
<td>CH 9.8</td>
<td>CH 13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a further step, we shift our attention to the distribution of material advantage across the 8-class schema. For this purpose, Table 10.3 exhibits the median monthly work income of each class. As noticed before, these results confirm that earnings are comparable horizontally, while revealing marked vertical differences. Within a same work logic, the gaps between classes at the top and classes at the bottom of the hierarchy lie around 20 to 30 per cent in Sweden, around 40 to 50 per cent in Germany and Switzerland, and around 50 to 100 per cent in Britain. It is noteworthy that members of the petite bourgeoisie have monthly incomes that clearly lie below middle class levels. Yet while self-employment does not go along with particularly advantageous working conditions in many cases, it may still be the case that farmers and shop-owners have access to other resources besides work income.

In a further step, we shift our attention to the distribution of material advantage across the 8-class schema. For this purpose, Table 10.3 exhibits the median monthly work income of each class. As noticed before, these results confirm that earnings are comparable horizontally, while revealing marked vertical differences. Within a same work logic, the gaps between classes at the top and classes at the bottom of the hierarchy lie around 20 to 30 per cent in Sweden, around 40 to 50 per cent in Germany and Switzerland, and around 50 to 100 per cent in Britain. It is noteworthy that members of the petite bourgeoisie have monthly incomes that clearly lie below middle class levels. Yet while self-employment does not go along with particularly advantageous working conditions in many cases, it may still be the case that farmers and shop-owners have access to other resources besides work income.

It is interesting in the context of our study that within the less qualified labour force, service workers clearly come last in terms of pay. Everywhere except Sweden, these mostly female employees earn at least 15 per cent less than individuals occupied in production work or in clerical jobs (in Sweden, differences are somewhat smaller). Thus with regard to earnings, the 8-class version adds no evidence in favour of a manual/non-manual divide. On the contrary, at a comparable skill level, non-manual service jobs appear to be linked with less favourable market conditions than artisan or industrial jobs.

**Reflection of class cleavages in party support and public sector employment**

With respect to political orientation, the 8-class schema appears more useful than the detailed class version. Being more parsimonious, the presentation in Table 10.4 reveals more clearly than the extended schema the cleavage in left support within the salaried middle class. Besides the two
categories of self-employed, the traditional and petite bourgeoisie, managers are the only employee class where support for the left lies below average in the countries under review. In contrast, socio-cultural specialists are the only class in Germany and Switzerland whose preference for either social-democratic or green parties is at least 10 per cent higher than on average. In Britain, they are further joined by production workers and service workers. The cleavage within the middle class is particularly marked in Switzerland where a look at production workers’ party orientation suggests that, contrary to Britain, it eclipses the capital-labour antagonism. In Britain and Germany, socio-cultural specialists also constitute an important clientele of the left. Yet differences between managers and socio-cultural professionals were not very marked in 1999/2000: in both countries, this might be due to the explicitly business-friendly stance that ‘New’ Labour’s leader Tony Blair and the Social Democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder (a former VW board member) tried to give to their government in their first years of office.

Up to this point we have only looked at aggregate figures for left voting. As has been shown in Chapter 9, this may be misleading: in Germany, socio-cultural specialists over proportionally favour the Green Party, while they are not more likely than managers to support the Social Democrats. In Britain, socio-cultural specialists do not only differ from managers in their marked support for the traditional left, Labour, but also through their stronger preference for the centre-left, the Liberal Democrats (see Table 9.12 in Chap. 9). Hence, in order to present a more differentiated picture, we specify in Figures 10.1 to 10.3 class support for all major political parties. The main interest lies on the parties situated at the centre-right or right, neglected so far by our analysis.

It is noteworthy that in both Britain and Germany, support for a conservative party (the Conservatives or CDU/CSU) is strongest among the same three classes in the same decreasing order, namely among the petite bourgeoisie, the traditional bourgeoisie and managers. In Switzerland, there are three parties situated to the right of the political centre: Christian Demo-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GB 36.4</th>
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<tr>
<td>CH 38.8</td>
<td>CH 41.3</td>
<td>CH 32.7</td>
<td>CH 69.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GB 34.8 GB 58.5 GB 50.7 GB 56.7
DE 34.8 DE 60.4 DE 61.6 DE 55.3
CH 24.0 CH 38.1 CH 42.8 CH 40.5

Total share of leftist support: GB: 49.9; DE: 57.3; CH: 41.5.
For class labels, see Table 10.2 in this chapter.
crats (CVP/PDC), Radical Democrats (FDP/PRD) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC). While the party traditionally closest to business, the Swiss Radical Democrats, receives largest support from the traditional bourgeoisie and managers, the neo-conservative Swiss People’s party is most successful in mobilizing the petite bourgeoisie – interestingly, alongside production workers. In contrast, support for a party to the right is lowest in all three countries among socio-cultural specialists. This is most clearly the case in Britain where only 17 per cent of this class supports the Conservative Party. Likewise, in Switzerland, socio-cultural specialists are least likely among all classes to favour the Christian Democrats, the Swiss Radical Democrats and, above all, the Swiss People’s Party.

Hence, these figures largely confirm findings from Chapter 9 that there are two class cleavages with respect to party support: in Germany and, above all, Britain, there is a **vertical cleavage** that separates production and service workers (who support Labour and the SPD respectively) from the employer classes, the traditional and petite bourgeoisie (who vote for the Conservative Party in Britain and the Christian Democrats in Germany). In Britain, Switzerland and, to a lesser degree, Germany, there is a **horizontal cleavage** that runs across the salaried middle class, separating socio-cultural specialists (who vote for parties to the left and centre-left) from managers (who are more likely to support a party to the right). It thus appears that class voting in Western Europe is no longer patterned in an exclusively hierarchical way between members of the manual working class and the middle class. Besides, the split within the salaried middle class between individuals in different work logics emerges as another relevant cleavage.

**Figure 10.1**  Party support among economically active individuals, Britain 1999
When shifting our attention to public sector employment, another cleavage comes to view. There is a substantial gap between socio-cultural specialists who mainly work in the public sector (69% in GB, 71% in CH, 74% in DE, 78% in SW) and production workers who are predominantly employed...
in the private sector (5% in GB, 8% in SW, 10% in DE, 18% in CH). For several reasons, the contrast between these two classes could not be stronger. On the one hand, the public-sector class of socio-cultural specialists is highly skilled, mostly female and marked by an interpersonal service logic. On the other, the private sector class of production workers displays a much lower skill profile, is overwhelmingly male, and set apart by crafts or Taylorist mass production work processes. Yet at the same time, these contrasting classes both support the left.

Collapsing the 17-class schema into a version inspired by Erikson and Goldthorpe

In a last exercise, we combine the categories of our 17-class version in such a way as to reproduce, at least partially, the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema. For this purpose, we merge classes of different work logics while keeping hierarchical levels apart. The construction logic of such a collapsed 6-class schema is apparent from Table 10.5. By combining the three classes at the top of the technical, organizational and interpersonal service logic with large employers and self-employed professionals, we obtain a category that corresponds quite well to Erikson and Goldthorpe’s higher-grade service class. Likewise, technicians, junior managers and socio-cultural semi-professionals are collapsed into the lower-grade service class. The remaining four classes are identical to the ones of the collapsed 8-class schema discussed in the preceding section. For better comparability with tables shown earlier in this chapter, we change Erikson and Goldthorpe’s presentation of the class schema (to the left) into a form that reflects horizontal boundaries (to the right).

This exercise highlights some of the differences in the construction logic of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s class schema and our 17-class version. For instance, Goldthorpe distinguishes in his original 11-class version four different classes of manual workers: lower-grade technicians, skilled manual workers, unskilled manual workers and agricultural workers. Therefore, collapsing these four classes into a single category as done in the 6-class schema in Table 10.5 signifies an important loss of information. On the other hand, as regards non-manual employees in both administration (IIIa) or sales and services (IIIb), the collapsed 6-class version is as detailed as the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema ever gets. The most important difference concerns, however, the middle classes. Whereas Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993) lay the accent on a hierarchical boundary between the higher-grade and the lower-grade service class, our operationalization follows Kriesi (1998) and Müller (1999) and builds on horizontal divisions between middle class categories involved in different work logics. This difference will be examined in Tables 10.6 which displays empirical results for the higher-grade and the lower-grade service class of the collapsed 6-class schema.43
Table 10.6 shows the size and the pay of the two classes at the top of the class hierarchy. The most elite class – the higher-grade service class – comprises less than 20 per cent of all economically active individuals in Germany and more than 25 per cent in Switzerland. Britain’s higher-grade service class lies in-between, but its lower-grade service class is smaller than in the other three countries under study. In terms of compensation for work, the income of the higher-grade service class exceeds the mean earning within the economy by 60 per cent in Britain, by 50 per cent in Germany, and by 30 per cent in Sweden and Switzerland. It is from these data that the specific advantage of an operationalization inspired by the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema is apparent: the division between a higher-grade and lower-grade service class makes it possible to isolate the most advantaged category within the class structure. This is of particular interest for studies into social mobility that seek to distinguish upward changes. Thus, unlike the collapsed 8-class schema shown earlier, a class structure based on Erikson and Goldthorpe’s conceptualization would allow us to capture important upward steps from the lower-grade service class to the higher-grade service class such as, for example, the advancement from a position as primary school teacher or technician to a position as senior official, university lecturer or engineer.
However, the shortcomings of such an operationalization are evident from the last two columns in Table 10.6. A look at political orientation shows that the cleavage between administrators and socio-professional specialists is blurred by the fusion of different categories within the middle class. In particular for Switzerland, the significant left-right division found earlier disappears. This suggests that Goldthorpe’s refusal to acknowledge the political heterogeneity of the middle class is closely linked to questions of conceptualization and operationalization of the class schema. While the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema seems very useful for the study of social mobility (and in particular of upward and downward mobility), it remains mute about horizontal divisions that are consequential for political behaviour. Moreover, systematic differences in public sector employment between different classes are masked in Table 10.6 as are important aspects of gender segregation between (male) technical experts and (female) sociocultural professionals and semi-professionals. In sum, schemas inspired by Goldthorpe’s concept of the unitary service class present, in our view, an important limitation, since they ignore a dimension which we regard as decisive for the analysis of different positions within labour markets and production units: the work logic.

Table 10.6  Total distribution across classes, monthly median work income, left party support and public employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total distribution in %</th>
<th>Monthly median work income</th>
<th>Left party support in %</th>
<th>Public sector employment in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER GRADE SERVICE CLASS (I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB 22.7</td>
<td>2100£</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 19.3</td>
<td>6730DM</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW 21.9</td>
<td>24270SK</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH 25.6</td>
<td>7400SFR</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER GRADE SERVICE CLASS (II)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB 17.0</td>
<td>1530£</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 19.7</td>
<td>4780DM</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW 22.1</td>
<td>19020SK</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH 20.6</td>
<td>6460SFR</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Part III

Class and the Concept of Institutional Embeddedness
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Introducing Institutions: the Concept of Institutional Embeddedness

Adding an institutional layer to the analysis of labour market inequality

In the preceding Part II, we have analysed dimensions of inequality in the employment as captured by the concept of occupational class. In doing so, our exclusive focus has been on stratification resulting from the market. However, an individual’s life chances do not solely derive from his or her labour market position. Besides the household, institutions such as the welfare state or trade unions significantly modify the outcomes of market relations in Western Europe. Thus, it has been widely argued that welfare provisions have stratifying effects. Some policies may promote equality and minimize economic differences, while others may uphold social dualism and strengthen occupational differentiation. In this context, Orloff (1993: 305) maintains that ‘the programs of the modern welfare state differentially advantage various social groups, and there is important variation ... in the extent to which the interests of dominant and subordinate groups are enhanced’. In other words, class divisions produced by the market may be lessened or reinforced by the institutional setting (e.g. Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the degree to which an individual benefits from social provisions or collective bargaining influences on his or her life chances. And as our aim is to obtain an accurate picture of social stratification, politics and the role of institutions cannot be left aside. Thus, we add in Part III an institutional layer to the structural layer analyzed in Part II.

In analyzing the interaction between class and institutions, we will rely on the notion of institutional embeddedness. Our use of this concept is somewhat different from the original meaning given by Polanyi (1944) and Granovetter (1985) that behaviour in general, and economic action in particular, are closely embedded in networks of social relations. Although situating our analysis on a micro-sociological level, we focus neither on interpersonal relations nor on the role of trust, but on the extent to which
individuals are embedded in the institutions shaping the labour market. Thereby, we concentrate on three institutions:

1. on individuals’ integration into the welfare state through pension coverage;
2. on individuals’ integration into the trade union movement through membership;
3. on individuals’ integration into the political system through the entitlement to, and actual use of, the right to vote.

Hence, our concept of embeddedness is about both individuals’ coverage with, and mobilization of, institutional resources likely to alter their position in the stratificational order. These resources may be provided through social benefits: the welfare state. Alternatively, the mobilization may imply a direct intervention in the market through organizational resources: trade unions. Finally, corrective action may come through political influence as expressed through votes: political citizenship. The concept of institutional embeddedness thus defined becomes primarily meaningful with respect to low-skilled workers. Being the most vulnerable group on the labour market, low-skilled workers depend most heavily on collective risk coverage. As they lack the resources necessary for individual strategy, social policy and collective action are of particular importance for them. Accordingly, we expect important variation in the extent to which different classes are embedded in different institutions across the countries in our sample. Hence, the analysis of individuals’ institutional embeddedness simultaneously implies close examination of the architecture of the institutions themselves.

Before presenting a model that tries to formalize the relation between labour market institutions and the class structure, we wish to discuss in more detail the three dimensions of institutional embeddedness upon which we focus.

Institutional embeddedness as different facets of citizenship

Our concept of institutional embeddedness draws on the reflections T. H. Marshall made on citizenship and social class. Marshall argued that citizenship consists of civil, political and social rights that emerged in successive phases of the history of capitalist democracies (1981 [1950]). Eighteenth-century civil rights established individual freedom, nineteenth-century political rights inaugurated political freedom, and twentieth-century social rights provided the basis of social welfare – freedom from want. With respect to stratification, he maintained that ‘the equality implicit in the concept of citizenship undermined the inequality of the class system’ (Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 19). In the same vein, Esping-Andersen argued that
‘one’s status as a citizen will compete with, or even replace, one’s class posi-
tion’ (1990: 21). It is these statements that we wish to examine more closely
with the help of the notion of institutional embeddedness: does equality
inherent to individuals’ institutional embeddedness partially make up for
unequal positions in the labour market – or, on the contrary, is labour
market stratification reinforced by variation in institutional embeddedness?
To shed light on this question, we must first explore the theoretical setting
of the three dimensions on which rests our concept of institutional embed-
dedness. They correspond, to some extent, to three facets of citizenship
highlighted by T. H. Marshall:

- the welfare state or social citizenship;
- the trade union movement or industrial citizenship;
- the right to vote or political citizenship.

**Social citizenship**

Marshall (1981 [1950]: 8) defines social citizenship as ‘the whole range
from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right
to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized
being according to the standards prevailing in the society’. His concept of
social citizenship is developed in opposition to the old poor laws and
closely linked with the notion of social rights. Unlike the ‘relief of the poor
within a framework of repression’ (Flora and Alber, 1981: 48), social cit-
zizenship refers to rights that individuals are entitled to claim as citizens.
Thus, for instance old-age benefits are underpinned in most Western
European states by social rights attached to the status of citizenship. Conse-
quently, Flora (1986: XV) has argued that the welfare state completes the
nation state, to the extent that the provision of social rights has become an
essential element of political legitimacy. However, Flora specifies that only
few social rights are citizen rights in a stricter sense: depending on the
country, they are more closely related to employment status or economic need
than to political status.

Relevant in our context is the fact that social rights may limit the eco-
nomic vulnerability of wage-earners. This happens through the social guar-
antee of consumption capacities and thus reduces individuals’ dependence
on the labour market. According to Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984: 183),
by weakening workers’ reliance on market forces, social policy implies an
effort to ‘de-commodify’ wage-earners. However, if it is widely accepted
that social citizenship partly supplants market distribution, the degree of
coverage with social rights (or the extent of ‘de-commodification’) is likely
to vary considerably across countries. Depending on whether claims for
social benefits are based on citizen-rights, on individuals’ employment
record or on means tests, integration into the welfare state will differ
strongly. For the same reason, we also expect different groups of wage-
earners to benefit unequally from entitlement to social citizenship rights. It is these differences that we hope to capture in our concept of institutional embeddedness.

Industrial citizenship
For T. H. Marshall, the principle of citizenship had its effect also on the workplace. By generating a concept of equal social worth, citizenship challenged the legitimacy of economic inequalities and forms of organization based on traditional hierarchical principles. This affected work life principally through the extension of the role of trade unions. According to Marshall (1981 [1950]), it was one of the main achievements of political power in the nineteenth century to clear the way for trade unionism by enabling workers to use their civil rights collectively. Thus, collective bargaining has become ‘an instrument for raising workers’ social and economic status, that is to say, for establishing the claim that they, as citizens, were entitled to social rights’ (Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 26). By helping to overcome the structural weakness of individual workers vis-à-vis employers in the labour market, unions have come to play a significant role in shaping market relations. In Marshall’s terms, ‘trade unionism has created a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel with and supplementary to the system of political citizenship’ (Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 26).

Hence, industrial citizenship presents another dimension alongside social citizenship that is likely to matter for institutional embeddedness of wage-earners. It is reasonable to suppose that most workers adhere to unions for instrumental reasons, as the most effective means of realizing individual needs and aspirations (Hyman, 1992: 160). Thus, in our context, we consider union membership and collective bargaining as resources that may allow workers to enhance their position in the labour market. However, industrial citizenship does not benefit all wage-earners to the same extent. In fact, Gallie (1996b) shows that the decisive determinant for union membership in Britain lies in the structural context in which individuals are employed. In many workplaces, unions are either absent or ineffective in defending employee interests. In these cases, union adhesion does not present an asset for individual workers, and levels of membership are likely to be very low. Accordingly, we may reasonably expect variation in the extent to which individuals in different classes and different countries are members of unions and hence able to profit from industrial citizenship.

Political citizenship
According to Rokkan (1975), there are two paths along which citizenship rights can be extended: the ‘collective bargaining way’ or the ‘electoral channel’. Hence, our last dimension of citizenship is straightforward in its scope, concerning political participation through voting. The idea of individuals expressing their public policy choices through participation in elec-
tions is at the core of the notion of pluralist democracy (Topf, 1995: 29). Marshall thus argues that the normal method of establishing social rights is by the exercise of political power (1981 [1950]: 26). Likewise, Korpi maintains that in the welfare state, politics is deliberately used to modify the play of market forces. More precisely, he expects large groups of individuals that are weak in terms of market resources to use their more favourable positions in terms of political resources in order to affect market conditions (1989: 312).

Accordingly, we consider the right to vote as a resource that allows groups of individuals to correct for labour market inequality through influence in the political system. Yet not all adult citizens have the right to vote. First and foremost, foreigners are not entitled to participate in national elections. Thereby, shares of between four (Britain) and 20 per cent (Switzerland) of the population are denied full political citizenship in the four countries in our sample (OECD: 2001: 184). Moreover, the exclusion from suffrage may also be voluntary: individuals who have the right to vote, but do not make use of it. Therefore, it is not only foreigners that concern us here, but also those citizens who abstain from voting and thus give up their potential influence on public policies – and, at the same time, cease to be attractive for political parties. In this context, Verba and Nie (1972: 125) argued that ‘citizens of higher social and economic status participate more in politics’, expecting participation to be a function of education, income, and occupation. Accordingly, there may be considerable variation in the extent to which different classes are embedded in the political system. Since we limit ourselves to one dimension of political participation – voting –, differences may be modest. Yet as voting is the sole act of participation in politics for most citizens in Western Europe, this dimension of citizenship appears nonetheless crucial for our analysis of stratification.

Combining the three dimensions

At a theoretical level, our concept of institutional embeddedness seeks to subsume the three facets of citizenship exposed before. Translated into the more concrete terms that will guide our empirical analysis, the focus lies on the extent to which individuals of different class backgrounds are integrated into the pension system, the union movement and the political system. As is shown by the ad-hoc model in Figure 11.1, the aim is to link the micro-sociological level of individuals’ labour market position with the macro- (or meso-)sociological level of embedding institutions. It becomes clear from Figure 11.1 that our concept of institutional embeddedness combines two different perspectives: as regards coverage with pensions and collective bargaining, the top-down perspective of the institution prevails. In contrast, as far as union membership and political participation are concerned, the bottom-up perspective of the individual is of greater importance.
Figure 11.1  The relationship between employment stratification and the concept of institutional embeddedness

CUMULATIVE DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS (Chapter 15)

INSTITUTIONS:

integration into:
WELFARE STATE
‘social citizenship’
(Chapter 12)

integration into:
TRADE UNIONS
‘industrial citizenship’
(Chapter 13)

integration into:
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
‘political citizenship’
(Chapter 14)

DIMENSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS:

coverage
(with social benefits)

coverage
(with collective agreements)

participation
(membership)

participation
(voting)

LABOUR MARKET STRUCTURE:

INDIVIDUALS in different class positions
(Chapters 6 to 10)
Our concept may thus appear to crowd together rather different things, mingling elements of passive coverage (such as social and industrial rights) with active integration (as union members and voters). However, these elements share a common quality of constituting *institutional resources* that are prone to enhance or weaken an individual’s position in the stratification system as it results from the labour market.

Moreover, the three dimensions of the concept are closely related. The scope of trade union action, and more particularly of collective bargaining, overlaps to a large degree with the objectives of the welfare state, in that both institutions focus on the notion of the ‘social wage’, comprising aspects such as maternity benefits, occupational pensions or rules about dismissal. Furthermore, while today the welfare state and trade unions appear as complementary organizations, at the end of the nineteenth century they seemed more functionally equivalent, when unions acted as friendly societies, providing a range of (modest) insurance benefits. The link between political citizenship and both the welfare state and trade unions is even more straightforward. The extent to which different classes participate in the political system through voting is crucial for the distribution of social rights and the shaping of the industrial relations system. Expressed differently, the higher the share of individuals in a class that are unable or unwilling to vote, the lower is the class’ influence on social and industrial policy.

To sum up, it must be remembered that our focus clearly lies on the individual. Thus, union membership could be looked at with the aim to analyse its implications for the union as an organization. Similarly, levels of participation could be examined in terms of the consequences for the stability and legitimacy of the political system. However, this is not what we are primarily interested in. Rather, we wish to know the characteristics of individuals who are union members or voters, and whether endowment with this facet of citizenship affects their situation in the labour market. At the same time, it is obvious that by studying individuals’ embeddedness in the institutional setting, we hope to find out more about the degree of adaptation of different institutions to different segments in the labour market. Here, cross-country comparisons appear useful.

This Part III is structured as follows: in Chapter 12, we will have a closer look at the welfare state and try to examine empirically who is covered by pension rights. In Chapter 13, the question of trade union membership will be examined, while in Chapter 14 we will explore to what extent different classes mobilize in voting. Finally, in Chapter 15 we will look at the three dimensions concurrently, and analyse whether disadvantage with respect to institutional embeddedness is cumulative.
Class Differences in Pension System Integration

Welfare states between social citizenship and social differentiation

Social rights, understood as the right to some economic security independent of the market, are not a twentieth century invention. Historically, they were rooted in membership of the village community, the town and the guild. (Proto-)industrialization dissolved these social rights until nothing remained but the old poor laws, which treated the claims of the poor not as a part of their citizenship rights, but as an alternative to them (Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 9). At the end of the nineteenth century, the poor houses were slowly substituted by state-led welfare programs which re-established the notion of social rights. By providing basic income schemes, these welfare states permit people to make their living standard, to some extent, independent from pure market forces (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 3). Moreover, through their impact on market outcomes, they are likely to alter stratification as it ensues from differences in employment relationships (Korpi and Palme, 2003: 428). In the context of our study, the focus lies on this feature of welfare statism: the (de-)stratifying impact of social programmes that may weaken (but possibly also strengthen) the hierarchy resulting from the labour market. Hence, we wish to find out to what degree class differences in the occupational system are reflected in differences in the integration into the pension system.

Although the driving forces for the development of welfare states have been very similar throughout Western Europe – expansion of industrial capitalism, the emergence of mass democracies and the threat of a growing industrial working class (Flora and Alber, 1981) –, national responses have varied greatly. This variation in system design is likely to be reflected in the extent to which different classes are covered with social rights in different countries. It is for this reason that we must have a brief look at institutional differences between countries. The most influential typology of welfare states is the one developed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999a), distinguishing between a liberal, a conservative and a social-democratic welfare regime:
• The liberal welfare regime clusters around the Anglo-Saxon nations and is most clearly associated with the poor-relief tradition. Its architecture is dominated by means-tested assistance, which is completed by modest universal transfers or modest social insurance schemes. Entitlement to targeted programs is typically restricted to the most needy and often stigmatized. As state benefits are modest, there is an important market for private welfare plans.

• The conservative welfare regime is characteristic of continental European countries and builds on large social insurance systems. Entitlements are based on a mix of labour market records and financial contributions, translating the systems’ concern with status preservation. The Catholic Church and the principle of subsidiarity have left important marks on the regime: the state only intervenes if the family is incapable to respond to its members’ needs.

• The social-democratic welfare regime applies most clearly to the Scandinavian countries. Pursuing high levels of equality, it includes all social strata in universal transfer systems. Entitlement rules are based on citizenship or long-time residency. By granting generous benefits and providing a wide range of social services, this regime also caters to the demands of the middle class. Thereby, it crowds out the market from the welfare sector.

This threefold classification corresponds, to a degree, to the distinction made by Ware and Goodin (1990) between a residual, an insurance-based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12.1 Characteristic dimensions of the three welfare regimes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal/Anglo-Saxon</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility criterion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle of allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of earnings compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant provider of welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on social structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and a rights-based welfare state. Table 12.1 resumes schematically the principal characteristics of the three welfare regimes and tries to fit in the four countries of our sample. The most relevant dimension in our context is shown in the last column, the effect on social structure.

The two easiest countries to place into Esping-Andersen’s typology are Sweden and Germany. The encompassing social-democratic model closely fits Sweden’s welfare state where all citizens are endowed with similar rights irrespective of class or market position. Flat-rate universalism and comprehensive risk coverage minimize differences in individuals’ integration into the welfare state. Esping-Andersen and Korpi maintain that:

[O]ne might say that the social citizenship concept has been taken more literally here [in Scandinavia] than elsewhere; not only because coverage is universal, but also because there is a deliberate attempt to ensure that all citizens are treated on equal terms (1987: 70).

Unlike Sweden, welfare states in continental Europe – and in Germany in particular – were never primarily motivated by egalitarian objectives. With the introduction of a social insurance system, Bismarck aimed to fragment and divide what appeared as the emerging collectivist threat of the industrial working class (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981: 17). In effect, Kocka (1981a) shows how insurance schemes in Germany succeeded in creating and consolidating new divisions among wage-earners, notably between blue-collar workers and white-collar employees. The nature of an individual’s occupation determined to what extent and under what conditions life course risks were covered. Hence, the corporatist models created ‘socio-political communities’ within the labour force and segmented citizens according to the colour of their collars (Korpi and Palme, 1998: 668; Korpi, 2001). Status differentiation is thus one of the distinguishing features of the continental welfare state: social rights are linked to class and earnings, and the capacity to reduce income inequality is small (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1994: 12).

Classification of the two remaining welfare states, Great Britain and Switzerland, is more ambiguous. In contrast to the corporatist fragmentation of Continental Europe, Beveridge envisioned for Britain a welfare state that would uniformly encompass the entire workforce: a combination of wide coverage with low flat-rate levels (as in the National Health Service or in the state retirement pension). Yet over the post-war decades, Britain’s social policy has known a steady shift from universal to means-tested benefits (Rhodes, 2000: 172). During the conservative governments of Thatcher and Major, market solutions were strongly promoted while the basic pension was kept low through the decoupling of benefit indexation from wages. As a consequence, Britain’s welfare state moved towards the residual liberal model, where the middle class typically relies on occupa-
tional or personal pension plans, while bad risks depend on means-tested assistance (Lewis, 1993: 13; Esping-Andersen, 1999a). According to this image of dualist segmentation, we expect to find considerable disparity in the degree to which different social categories benefit from welfare coverage.

Finally, Switzerland is a hybrid case. The importance of its earnings-related insurance schemes, such as the old-age pension AHV, moves it into the proximity of the corporatist continental regime. Yet simultaneously, important elements plead for a classification alongside the liberal welfare states. The administration of several schemes is left to competing private organizations (health insurance, second-tier occupational pensions). Moreover, in social assistance, means-testing is still very widespread. Hence, most scholars agree to qualify Switzerland as a mixed conservative-liberal welfare state (Obinger, 1999; Merrien and Bonoli, 2000; Manow, 2002) or in Armingeon’s (2001a: 150) words, ‘a continental model with a liberal face’. It is, then, an open question whether (corporatist) status differentiation or (market) dualism is of greater importance for Switzerland in explaining differences in classes’ embeddedness in the welfare state.

The labour market basis of the welfare state

In contrast to earlier poor relief where the main beneficiaries were women and children, modern welfare states do not focus on these categories but on the male labourer. In Flora’s (1986: XXVII) words, ‘the welfare state was originally built around the male provider of the family’. In most countries coverage with welfare provisions do not constitute citizen rights, but are attached to the employment status of individuals. This is most clearly shown in Germany, where Bismarck’s insurance system was, initially, centred entirely around the industrial blue-collar worker. Over the decades, new occupational categories were gradually added and accorded separate insurance programs (Kocka, 1981a; Korpi and Palme, 1998). Similarly in Switzerland, social insurances have historically developed from labour law and hence make most benefits conditional on the existence and the nature of employment (Murer, 1996). More specifically, the European post-war welfares state being the product of the 1930s Depression and the ‘workers question’, they were designed for men working in industrial production (Esping-Andersen, 1999a: 33). As a consequence, they offer optimal welfare coverage for individuals having worked full-time, without interruptions and from an early age. This sort of coverage is unproblematic as long as full-time employment, continuous working careers and family stability are the rule: by guaranteeing an income to the male breadwinner, the welfare state is able to reach virtually everyone (Bonoli, 2002). However, the standard employment relationship is not the rule anymore; changes in labour market behaviour and family structure have led to a much wider variety of
career profiles. The rise of the service sector and massive female labour market participation have led to an expansion of non-standard career patterns that expose individuals to the risk of insufficient social security coverage. Bonoli (2002: 4) resumes the relationship as follows:

Part-time work usually results in reduced pension entitlements, as do career interruptions due to childbearing. The result of the presence of these new career profiles in the labour market may be, if pension systems are not adapted, the translation of the labour market and working poor problems of today into a poverty problem for older people in thirty or forty years’ time.

Insufficient welfare coverage has an obvious gender dimension. Non-standard forms of employment such as part-time work and interrupted careers concern above all women. In Britain and Switzerland, one out of four individuals worked less than 30 hours per week in 2000; in Germany and Sweden, this was the case for one out of six labour market participants (OECD, 2002). Women make up a large majority of these part-time employees, 84 per cent in Germany, 80 per cent in Britain and Switzerland, 73 per cent in Sweden (OECD, 2002). In general, female career profiles generate pension entitlements below the standard level, regardless of the institutional structure of the welfare system. Most noticeably, women are disadvantaged with respect to male bread-winners in employment- or career-based entitlement systems such as social insurance schemes or occupational benefit plans (Orloff, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999a; Leitner, 2001). Firstly, this is due to the income factor: in all four countries of our sample, low income concentrates in routine service occupations dominated by women (see Chapter 8). Thus, where minimum revenue is a qualifying condition for inclusion into an (earnings-related) insurance program, it is above all women who are left out. Secondly, women’s disadvantage stems from the time factor: access to social insurance rights is conditional on time requirements such as minimum working hours, contribution periods, duration and continuity of employment (Scheiwe, 1994: 134). Although most countries introduced new legislation in the 1990s to make up for some of the insufficiencies in coverage (contribution credits for care work in Germany and Switzerland, extension of minimum working hours taken in account for German pensions), national responses continue to vary strongly. In order to capture this variation on a more detailed level, we will have a closer look at the pension systems in the four countries of our sample.

National differences in the coverage with pensions

Pension systems are arguably the most important programmes of Western European welfare states, both in terms of public costs and the risk they
cover: unlike unemployment or work accident insurance, pension schemes cover a risk – old-age – that is inevitable for all socio-economic categories.\textsuperscript{44} As regards pension systems, our focus lies on the qualifying conditions for coverage as the most relevant indicator for embeddedness. Alternatively, we could also concentrate on the money transferred between different income groups in order to examine the impact on stratification (Korpi and Palme, 1998). However, as we are primarily interested in the individual and not the different systems, aspects of coverage appear here more significant than distributional questions.

The most comprehensive pension coverage is offered by the \textit{Swedish welfare state} where entitlement to the basic old-age pension is extended to all citizens and long-term residents, including economically inactive groups. With the abolition of means-testing in the universal ‘People’s pension’ (\textit{folkpension}) in 1946, eligibility has largely become divorced from work performance, marital status or sex (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1987). Since 1960, a second tier complements the basic pension scheme, the mandatory earnings-related public scheme ATP. The ATP requires relatively few years of contribution. Yet its earnings-graduated design nevertheless signifies that individuals with low income, discontinuous employment careers or reduced work schedules receive lower or no ATP-benefits.\textsuperscript{45} At the end of the 1990s, the Swedish pension system was thoroughly remodelled and the relationship between the two tiers modified. In terms of priority, the earnings-related tier substitutes the basic flat rate pension. Thus, the lion’s share of earnings goes into two (defined-contribution) income pensions that replace the (defined-benefit) ATP scheme.\textsuperscript{46} The qualifying threshold remains very low for both earnings-related schemes (a yearly minimum income of about 1000 Euro).\textsuperscript{47} Accordingly, coverage extends to almost the entire working population. In addition, the former backbone of the pension system, the basic flat-rate scheme is converted into a complementary ‘guarantee pension’. It is only destined to complete for insufficient coverage by the earnings-related tier (Palme, 2003; Palmer, 2003). This reform has been interpreted as a shift from an egalitarian-redistributive pension system towards a regime where the objective of income maintenance predominates (Bertozzi, 2003: 8). However, the Swedish pension system retains strong elements of the social-democratic welfare model: benefits from the basic pension remain high and entitlement continues to be based on residence. Moreover, coverage from the earnings-related scheme is extensive and there is a quasi-absence of means-testing.

In \textit{Germany}, coverage with public pensions is limited to the economically active population, extending to about 85 per cent of the workforce. The self-employed, and until 1999, workers with earnings below a minimum threshold are not subject to mandatory coverage (Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003: 5). Due to its earnings-related system, public pensions in Germany are roughly proportional to labour income averaged over the
entire life course and have thus very small redistributive properties. Yet benefit levels are very generous: for an average worker with 45 years of contributions, the replacement rate amounts to 70 per cent of pre-retirement earnings in 2000. Not surprisingly, this crowds out private pension plans; employer schemes and personal plans play only a very subordinate role in the German pension system. While pensions from the public insurance scheme account for 80 per cent of total pension income, only 15 per cent stem from savings and five per cent from occupational pensions.48 This is slowly changing with the Riester reform introduced in 2001, and will lead to a gradual reduction in the maximum replacement rate of public pension benefits from 70 to 64 per cent and to mandatory contributions into company or personal schemes. At the same time, the reform introduces a basic pension guarantee for all residents in need (conditional on means-testing). Being financed through taxes, it provides benefits at a level slightly above social assistance.

The Swiss welfare state is often ranged alongside the corporatist-continental regime. However, with regard to pensions, the Swiss system is quite different from the German design, as it rests on three tiers. The first tier consists of a basic pension that combines both Bismarckian and Beveridgean features. Being mainly financed through employment-related contributions, it has a universal coverage and includes all residents who have contributed to the scheme during at least one year. It is only weakly income-related: benefits vary between a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 40 per cent of the average wage. Since there is no ceiling on earnings-related contributions, the basic pension is strongly redistributive. People depending on this pension as sole source of income are entitled to a (means-tested) pension supplement (Obinger, 1999). In the mid-1990s, 12 per cent of pensioners received such supplementary benefits. The basic first tier pension is completed by a second tier, funded occupational pensions, which became mandatory in 1982 and strongly reinforced the income-maintenance goal in the Swiss pension system. Finally, the third tier consists of tax-deductible savings that primarily benefit high-income groups and the self-employed.

With respect to coverage, the inclusive character of the basic pension collides with the exclusive nature of the funded occupational schemes. In effect, employees with earnings below 40 per cent of the average wage (about 1360 Euro in 2003)49 cannot contribute to an occupational pension fund. Whereas this minimum earnings limit is generally exceeded by full-time workers, it proves too high for many part-time employees, most of whom are women. Moreover, employees combining several part-time jobs are also left out if none of their wages exceeds the threshold. Thus, besides the self-employed, about ten per cent of employees are excluded from funded pension schemes (Bonoli, 2003: 409). Even for those employees with wages slightly higher than the minimum earning limit, these schemes
yield very small benefits as only the income share above the threshold is taken into account for savings. Conscious of this problem, the Swiss parliament finally decided in 2003 to lower the minimum earnings threshold to 30 per cent of the median wage for 2004. Nonetheless, the Swiss pension system shows discreet signs of a dualist system: while the basic pension and the (means-tested) pension supplements determine the earnings capacity of low-income pensioners, funded pensions are gradually substituting the basic pension as the main source of income for the middle class (Bonoli and Gay-des-Combes, 2003: 62).

In Britain, reforms of the succeeding Conservative governments have shifted priority from the flat-rate basic pension to occupational and personal pensions. By decoupling benefit indexation from wage increases in 1979, the Thatcher government caused far-reaching benefit cuts in the basic pension: between 1978 and 1998, it declined from 25 per cent of the average wage to only 16 per cent (Liu, 1999: 25). Parallel to the weakening of the first tier (the basic pension), in 1986 the Thatcher cabinet introduced the possibility to opt out of the second tier (the state earnings-related pension SERPS). As a result, Britain’s earnings-related tier has been split into three parallel pension programs: state pensions, occupational pensions and tax-deferred personal pensions. By the end of the 1990s, 10.5 million of the British workforce had access to an employer-provided occupational scheme, ten million had bought personal pensions and seven million remained with the SERPS (Department for Work and Pensions, 1998).

According to Liu (1999: 38) and Emmerson (2002: 18), partial privatization has led to a ‘creaming off’ of the country’s top earners from the SERPS to occupational pensions, and of medium earners to personal pensions. In contrast, individuals in low-pay positions continue to depend on the SERPS for two reasons. Firstly, low-earners are often excluded from employers’ occupational plans. Secondly, they are poor candidates for personal pensions as the small benefits generated by their savings would be eaten up by the administrative costs of the funds (Department for Work and Pensions, 1998).

In parallel to the process of partial privatization, the pension prospects of individuals incapable of opting out from the SERPS have deteriorated significantly between 1979 and 1995. As public pensions have become gradually less important for the retirement income of the middle class (who have access to occupational and personal schemes), the different Conservative governments seized the opportunity to trim the benefits of both the basic pension and the SERPS. Due to a series of steep cuts, in 1999 the maximum benefit from first- and second-tier public pensions amounted to only 36 per cent of the average earning. (Liu, 1999: 38). The situation of increasing pension dualism was evident when Blair’s Labour government took office. As a response, it substituted the SERPS with a second-tier pension (the state second pension), which will gradually become flat-rate
and is explicitly designed to cover workers excluded from occupational and personal pensions (Bonoli, 2003: 410). Yet the logic of the British pension system is unchanged and continues to rely heavily on means-testing, as the combined value of the basic pension and the state second pension remains very low: individuals with less than 37 years of contributions still remain dependent on means-tested supplemental benefits (Pensions Week, August 1999).\(^{51}\) The logic of means-testing was further underpinned by the Blair government through a substantial increase in money spent in means-tested benefits, the Pension Credit.

Sole coverage with public pension schemes may leave a sizeable proportion of pensioners dependent on means-tested benefits to maintain acceptable living standards. Moreover, it must be noted that coverage with the public schemes is far from being universal. Entitlement to both the basic pension and the state second pension (the former SERPS) is conditional on contributions paid from an income lying above the ‘lower earnings limit’: £3900 per year in 2002/03. A sizeable share of the British labour force has earnings which lie below this threshold. In the mid-1990s, 16 per cent were not covered by either first- or second-tier pensions (Liu, 1999: 29).

### Evidence for class differences in pension coverage: Britain’s private pensions

Having reviewed the basic features of pension coverage in the four countries of our sample, we wish to examine empirically to what extent coverage follows class lines in the different countries. For this reason, we resort to a slightly simplified version of our class schema. Firstly, we leave aside the self-employed who are only partially integrated into the public pension system in countries like Germany and Switzerland. Secondly, in order to reduce the cell counts and augment parsimony, we decrease the number of wage-earner classes from 13 to 11 by excluding the very small class of agricultural workers and by merging routine office clerks with their more skilled clerical colleagues. The routine office class is smallish, comprising less than 3.5 per cent of the economically active population in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Moreover, analyses in Chapters 8 and 9 have revealed that employment conditions of the two clerical classes are very similar with respect to different dimensions. As a result, we obtain the reduced class schema displayed in Table 12.2.

Based on this schema, we wish to explore integration into the pension system for different classes. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional setting of our study and the lack of variables allow only a partial examination of this issue. However, for the country where segmentation in the pension system is strongest – Britain –, we dispose of extensive information about the pension situation of individuals. Hence, we start out our analysis with a look at coverage with second tier pensions in Britain.
In Britain, affiliation to an employer’s occupational pension scheme is considered a privilege that guarantees significantly better income security in old-age than the state second-tier pension. But in various employer schemes, access is restricted to the core staff. Hence, among the 10.7 million employees covered by an employer scheme in 1991, two million were in schemes excluding blue-collar workers and five million in schemes restricting access for part-time workers. Moreover, 1.1 million employees were in schemes that impose a waiting period of one year on new workers or exclude them altogether (Davis, 1997: 16). Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that Table 12.3 reveals large class differences in the coverage with employer schemes. Among the most privileged middle-class employees (socio-cultural professionals, higher-grade managers and technical experts), at least 70 per cent are covered by an occupational pension. This stands out against the situation among craft workers and routine operatives, where only a minority of between 40 and 46 per cent has access to an employer scheme. However, the situation is least enviable for routine service workers where almost two thirds of employees are excluded from employer schemes.

The alternative to coverage with an employer’s occupational fund is setting-up a personal pension. Hence, those employees who are excluded from their employer’s scheme and who can afford it, are expected to opt for personal pension plans. Otherwise, they depend on the low benefits of

Table 12.2  The reduced 15-class schema

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large employers</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Britain, affiliation to an employer’s occupational pension scheme is considered a privilege that guarantees significantly better income security in old-age than the state second-tier pension. But in various employer schemes, access is restricted to the core staff. Hence, among the 10.7 million employees covered by an employer scheme in 1991, two million were in schemes excluding blue-collar workers and five million in schemes restricting access for part-time workers. Moreover, 1.1 million employees were in schemes that impose a waiting period of one year on new workers or exclude them altogether (Davis, 1997: 16). Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that Table 12.3 reveals large class differences in the coverage with employer schemes. Among the most privileged middle-class employees (socio-cultural professionals, higher-grade managers and technical experts), at least 70 per cent are covered by an occupational pension. This stands out against the situation among craft workers and routine operatives, where only a minority of between 40 and 46 per cent has access to an employer scheme. However, the situation is least enviable for routine service workers where almost two thirds of employees are excluded from employer schemes.

The alternative to coverage with an employer’s occupational fund is setting-up a personal pension. Hence, those employees who are excluded from their employer’s scheme and who can afford it, are expected to opt for personal pension plans. Otherwise, they depend on the low benefits of

Table 12.3  Britain 1999: Coverage with an occupational scheme (in %; coverage of women in parenthesis)

| – | – | 69.5 (67.5) | 73.4 (75.7) | 80.7 (80.7) |
| – | 66.5 (62.4) | 53.3 (50.8) | 76.7 (78.1) |
| – | 46.0 (45.8) | 59.9 (57.9) | 50.6 (41.2) |
| 39.9 (24.3) | 36.8 (33.7) |

N = 6017. Average: 57.4% (men: 58.4%; women: 56.1%).
For class labels, see Table 12.2 in this chapter.
the public second-tier pension, which provide at best a wage replacement rate of 20 per cent, to which the basic pension contributes another 16 per cent of the average wage (data for 1999). Calculation based on the British Household Panel Survey show that 21 per cent of the employee workforce pays into a personal pension. Almost half of these employees also have access to an employer scheme, thus saving into two different pension funds. It is above all craft workers and routine operatives who make up for fragmentary coverage with an employer scheme by exclusively saving into a personal pension; 28 per cent of craft workers and 23 per cent of routine operatives rely for their savings on a personal pension plan. In contrast, only a minority of office clerks (17%), skilled (15%) and routine service workers (14%) succeed in setting up personal pensions. Among technical experts and both higher-grade and associate managers, 24 per cent declare paying into a personal pension plan. There is an obvious gender dimension in the propensity to save in personal pension plans: men not only receive higher wages and spend more time in paid work, they also succeed in making better provisions for retirement than women. While 24 per cent of gainfully employed men pay into a personal pension, only 17 per cent of gainfully employed women have access to a personal pension plan.

Coverage with either occupational or personal second-tier pensions in Britain is summed up in Figure 12.1. The class character is conspicuous: among higher-grade managers, technical experts and professionals, less than 20 per cent do not possess an occupational or a personal pension. Associate managers, office clerks and craft workers take an intermediate stance, with roughly 30 to 35 per cent left out from private pensions. The situation is less enviable for routine operatives and skilled service workers, among whom

Figure 12.1 Coverage with occupational and/or personal pensions, Britain 1999
40 per cent lack private pension coverage. Finally, occupational and personal pension funds remain largely beyond the reach of routine service workers, with less than 50 per cent covered by either one of the two schemes. These results effectively suggest that in Britain, public second-tier pensions’ function has been reduced to a basic backup for those excluded from employer schemes and unable to save in personal pensions.52

However, before jumping to conclusions, we should control for the influence of other determinants of pension coverage besides class such as age, gender or employment status. For this reason, we resort to multivariate analysis. As our dependent variable ‘coverage with an occupational or a personal pension’ is dichotomous (not covered = 0/covered = 1), binary logistic regressions appears to be the appropriate technique. Results of these regressions are displayed in Table 12.4 and clearly confirm the relevance of

Table 12.4  Britain 1999: Estimates for the odds of coverage with an occupational or a personal pension (binary logistic regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) men</th>
<th>(2) women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft workers</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-grade managers</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-grade managers</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>4.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled service workers</td>
<td>1.93**</td>
<td>1.75**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine service workers</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 and more</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.273 0.319
N observations 3113 2821

Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to be covered by either an occupational or a personal pension as compared to the chance of not being covered by either an occupational or a personal pension.
All coefficients significant at 0.001 or more, except: **: significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05; ( ) not significant; r = reference category.
class for the explanation of differences in pension coverage. For men, evolving in the routine services massively reduces the probability of pension coverage in comparison to all other classes. Among women, craft workers and routine operatives have equally bad prospects as low-skilled service workers. Interestingly, office clerks have comparatively good pension prospects, in spite of relatively low wages (see Chap. 8). Hence, even at the lowest hierarchical level, the administrative work setting seems to go along with fringe benefits that are unknown in low-skilled production or service jobs. Besides class, characteristics of the workplace such as the public-sector setting or company size significantly increase the probability of coverage with an occupational or a personal pension. This translates the fact that large companies and public establishments are much more likely to offer employer schemes than small firms in the private sector. Finally, age and full-time employment both have a strongly positive influence on coverage. Albeit present, their effect is somewhat weaker for women than for men.

We had noted that besides being excluded from occupational and personal pensions, there is a small share of British wage-earners that do not meet the conditions for integration into the state basic pension and second-tier pension, because their earnings do not reach the minimum threshold. The same condition for access to the (second-tier) pension system exists in Sweden and Switzerland. Therefore, in the next section, this aspect of pension coverage shall be simultaneously examined for Britain, Sweden and Switzerland.

**Falling below the minimum earnings limit**

In multi-tier pension systems, access to second-tier pensions is often barred to low-earners. This lies, to some degree, in the logic of the system: while the first-tier pension normally provides a flat-rate minimum benefit that is sufficient to cover basic needs, the second tier is supposed to replace income at a level that allows the maintenance of accustomed consumption capacities. In Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in Switzerland, the basic pension provides a relatively high replacement rate for low earnings. As a consequence, the exclusion of individuals with low (or very low) incomes from the earnings-related tier may not appear very unsettling. However, two trends make it increasingly problematic: firstly, gradual shifts in priority and benefit levels from the flat-rate basic pension to earnings-related schemes; secondly, the expansion of non-standard types of work typical of much female service employment. Thus, the increase in the share of low-earners (due to part-time and limited-duration contracts) and the simultaneous decrease in basic pension benefits may sharpen the poverty risk for the elderly in Western European welfare states. At the same time, it must be specified that the minimum thresholds vary strongly as to their exclusive
character. While the minimum earnings limit in Sweden, the base amount, is very low at roughly 1000 Euro per year, Switzerland features a much higher threshold of about 16,250 Euro (year 2003). Britain’s minimum earnings limit lies in-between at 5560 Euro per year in 2003, but has the specificity that it restricts access not only to the second-tier but also the first-tier pension.

We have calculated the share of employees falling below the minimum earnings limit in force in the year of the respective datasets. Our results show that the Swedish threshold is of very little importance and excludes only very few individuals from coverage with the earnings-related pension tier. In effect, less than 0.1 per cent of employees working 20 hours or more per week do not qualify for second-tier pensions in Sweden. Likewise in Britain, the lower earnings limit has a very limited impact, excluding less than one per cent of the employed labour force from contributions to the basic pension and the state second pension. Among routine service workers, this share increases to four per cent. If we extend our analysis to the population spending at least 10 hours per week (instead of 20 hours per week) in paid employment, figures become more preoccupying. Among employees working 10 hours or more per week, four per cent receive earnings below the minimum limit in Britain. This is mostly due to the high share of routine workers not reaching the minimum earnings limit (19.3%). Not surprisingly, there is a strong gender dimension: while more than seven per cent of women remain below the minimum earnings limit, this applies to only 0.7 per cent of men.

The earnings threshold is of greatest consequence for the Swiss pension system. Table 12.5 shows that in Switzerland, six per cent of all employees earn wages that are too low for inclusion in occupational pension funds. Again, gender differences are striking: 71 per cent of employees falling below the minimum earnings limit are women. Besides, it is noteworthy that for more than ten per cent of the individuals not covered, the earnings threshold is missed by a derisory amount. This suggests that in some cases, employers deliberately avoid the extra-costs of occupational pensions (consisting of employer contributions and administrative charges) by setting

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<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.0 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4.3 (12.9)</td>
<td>3.2 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.1 (5.9)</td>
<td>7.2 (10.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.1 (17.8)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

N = 2558. Average: 6.0% (men: 2.7%; women: 12.0%).
For class labels, see Table 12.2 in this chapter.
the wage, or the corresponding working hours, just below the mandatory contribution limit. With respect to class differences, Switzerland presents a picture similar to the one revealed for coverage in Britain with occupational and personal pensions: routine operatives and low-skilled service workers are significantly more likely to be excluded from occupational pensions than the average employee. Again, the situation grows more worrying if we enlarge the population taken in account for Switzerland to employees working at least 10 hours per week. For this target population, the share of individuals not reaching the minimum earnings limit rises to almost 11 per cent, to 22 per cent for women, and to even 32 per cent for routine service workers.

Perception of financial security when in old-age: Germany

In Germany, employees working less than 15 hours weekly were traditionally excluded from the state pension. Yet since 1999, employers have to pay a contribution amounting to 12 per cent of wages for low-earners; employees remain free whether they want to contribute or not. Thus, the first-tier state pension has become quite inclusive with respect to the employed workforce, while second-tier private pensions are still at an embryonic stage. Therefore, in the German case, we shall look at a different dimension of integration into the pension system. In the German Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1997, individuals were asked to rate their financial security for old-age on a scale from very good to very bad. The results of these subjective assessments are shown in Table 12.6. Over half of all wage-earners perceive financial prospects for their old-age as bad or very bad. It is unclear to what extent individuals integrated into their subjective assessment the financial stability of the German pension system per se or whether they focused exclusively on their individual financial perspectives for their old age. In any case, with respect to class, the shares in Table 12.6 show little variance and are inconclusive. There are only four classes where less than 50 per cent of incumbents consider their financial security as bad or very bad. These are the three privileged categories of socio-cultural

| – | – | 56.3 (54.8) | 45.0 (72.8) | 39.4 (43.2) |
| – | – | 55.7 (56.8) | 47.9 (56.5) | 59.8 (57.9) |
| – | 54.5 (60.8) | 50.1 (53.4) | 50.8 (76.3) | 53.6 (52.9) |

Average: 51.4% (men: 48.6%; women: 55.2%). N = 5357.
For class labels, see Table 12.2 in this chapter.
professionals, higher-grade and lower-grade managers plus, surprisingly, routine operatives.

Results from binary logistic regression not shown here reveal that variables such as age, employment status, class, public-sector employment and firm size explain only very little variance in perceived financial security when elderly. Class does not seem to have a significant impact either for men or women. For men, full-time work, employment in the public sector or in a large establishment all enhance the subjective assessment of financial security. In contrast, women’s assessment is only influenced by age: as the age of retirement comes closer, financial prospects appear somewhat less gloomy. Interpretation of these results is risky. They may imply that Germany’s earnings-related basic pension gives rise, if not to similar earnings, then at least to relatively similar subjective security across the class schema – its status-preserving capacity being equally good or bad for different classes. However, empirical evidence for Germany remains on much weaker grounds than for Britain’s (and perhaps Switzerland’s) second-tier pensions where coverage unmistakably follows class lines. Our findings for these two countries suggest that being a woman working part-time in a routine service job strongly increases the likelihood of insufficient coverage with second-tier pensions. Thus, although social rights have largely penetrated Western European societies, evidence from old-age pensions in Britain and Switzerland suggests that they are nonetheless clearly correlated with socio-economic advantage.

After this first – and, admittedly, partial – look at integration into the pension system, we turn our attention in the following chapter to another dimension of institutional embeddedness, namely to integration of individuals into trade unions.
Class Differences in Trade Union Membership

Trade union membership as proxy for industrial citizenship

The step from social to industrial citizenship implies a shift in the level of analysis from the state level to the level of intermediary organizations. There is a wide variety of intermediary organizations such as political parties, religious associations or voluntary welfare societies. However, in this study we focus exclusively on the one organization most closely associated with the labour market, namely trade unions. In this respect, the definition given by Beatrice and Sydney Webb in 1894 provides a useful starting point: ‘[A] trade union is a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of improving the conditions of their employment’ (quoted by Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000: 11). In Western Europe, trade unions generally perform three different functions: self-help, collective bargaining and national lobbying. On the micro level of the individual, unions act as self-help associations and cater to individual demands, supplying services such as legal advice, administrative help or mediation in the case of problems at work (grievance handling). Historically, the most important individual service has consisted in the provision of insurance benefits as many unions functioned at their beginning as friendly societies, covering contingencies such as death, sickness or unemployment (Hyman, 1992: 160). Today, unions still take charge of the management of unemployment insurance in three Scandinavian countries and Belgium. On the meso level of the economic sector or the company, unions serve as collective bargaining agents and thus attempt to overcome the asymmetry of power between the single wage-earner and the employer (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980: 70). Besides wage bargaining, unions usually (co) organize workplace participation and consultation. It is through this function that union action provides the rudiments of what has been called ‘industrial democracy’ (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000: 37). Finally, on the macro-level, unions act as lobbyists. In the neo-corporatist arrangements of most Western European countries, unions have been recognized as interlocutors that legitimately influence on the making of public policy.
In the context of our study, we are interested in industrial citizenship, a concept most clearly linked with the second function of trade union action, collective bargaining and workplace representation. Thus ideally, our measure of institutional embeddedness should focus on whether an individual is covered by a collective agreement and employed in an establishment with a works council. However, this information is usually not available in individual level data. Therefore, we will focus on the more general attribute of trade union membership. According to the literature, wage-earners may join unions for three different sets of reasons. Firstly, union membership may be due to a normative motivation of solidarity. Through their socialization process, wage-earners may identify with union values and take with them to the workplace a belief that joining a union is a natural thing to do. Secondly, motivation for membership may be purely instrumental. Workers may adhere to unions to more effectively fulfil individual ambitions at work such as higher wages, better job security or more involvement. Finally, membership may be the result of an external obligation such as formal or informal peer pressure at the workplace to join a union (closed shop). In an analysis based on individual data, Guest and Dewe (1988) find very little support for the solidarity hypothesis, whereas instrumental rational choice variables are highly significant for membership. While compulsory membership (the closed shop) was of considerable importance for union adherence in Britain up to the 1980s, it has since lost most of its relevance. Windolf and Haas (1989) suggest that bureaucratic pressure exercised by the works council system may still have some influence on union membership in Germany. However, instrumental motives such as expected economic benefits of membership appear as much more decisive. In this respect, Gallie (1996b: 144) shows for Britain that by far the most frequently cited reasons for union membership are ‘protection in the labour market’ and ‘higher pay and better working conditions’. In their overview of national studies, Waddington and Hoffmann (2000: 62) come to the same conclusion: most individuals join unions in order to gain support in the case of problems at work. This pre-eminence of the instrumental explanation is further substantiated by a comparative analysis set on the macro-level: Ebbinghaus and Visser (1999) find that the key factor explaining union growth or decline at the country level is union access to the workplace.

Instrumental purposes thus seem by far the most influential rationale for trade union adherence. This signifies that individuals only become members if unions appear capable of enhancing their position at work – through the organization of collective bargaining, protection from dismissal and participation rights. However, in most countries union strength and implantation vary heavily depending on the economic sectors and the company. Hence, membership only confers a significant advantage in some establishments but not in others. Accordingly, where unions are incapable
of successfully representing employees’ interests, membership is likely to be very low. This corresponds to the finding made by Gallie (1996b: 171) that the most frequent reason given by people for no longer being members was that they had either moved to jobs where there were no unions present in the workplace, or they felt unions had become ineffective in defending employee interests in their establishments. Hence, union membership appears largely a function of the structural context of the workplace, and can thus reasonably be taken as a proxy for industrial citizenship.

Two problems remain when using union membership as a measure of industrial citizenship. Firstly, the asymmetry of the relationship between the employer and wage-earners diminishes with employees’ increasing skill levels: the benefit of joining a union is thus lower for highly skilled individuals. Workers without specific skills are easily substitutable and consequently depend on collective action for better employment conditions and protection against dismissal. In contrast, for highly skilled employees it may be more rational to prefer individual strategies. However, this high-skill bias in membership is likely to be mitigated if adherence to professional associations is also included in our measure of union membership, since higher-grade employees are likely to rely on union action in order to emphasize the specificity of their skills and to thus secure their professional status.

A second and more serious difficulty arises with the free-rider problem: unions’ political lobbying and, to some degree, collective bargaining resemble collective goods which benefit to wage-earners even if they do not pay membership fees. Therefore, it may be argued that being a union member or not does not make any real difference for institutional embeddedness. This free-rider phenomenon cannot be ruled out, but its importance is diminished because of the existence of selective rewards (Olson, 1965). Unions increasingly supply individual services such as legal counselling and legal insurances, coaching in administrative questions (such as tax declarations and foreign worker permits) and further education in order to attract and keep members. Crucially, unions are exclusive suppliers of unemployment insurance in Sweden. Moreover, unions have traditionally dealt with individual problems of members at work. Although these selective rewards are only indirectly related to the workplace and industrial democracy, they translate a relevant dimension of institutional embeddedness as they provide individuals with additional assets to cope with uncertainty in the labour market.

Characteristics of national trade union structures

With respect to trade unions, our focus is micro-sociological and centres on differences in membership between classes. Accordingly, we wish to know the characteristics of individuals who are union members. However, before
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant organizational principle</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>craft/general</td>
<td>industry</td>
<td>industry</td>
<td>industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of union confederations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleavages separating confederations</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>white/blue collar</td>
<td>white/blue collar academics/ non-academics</td>
<td>socialist/Christian white/blue collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration in union structure</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>concentrated</td>
<td>concentrated</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant level of collective bargaining</td>
<td>company level</td>
<td>sectoral level</td>
<td>sectoral level</td>
<td>sectoral/company level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage rate with collective agreements 2000 (a)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage private sector (a)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>70%*/55%**</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage public sector (a)</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * West Germany; ** East Germany; *** Before 2000, working conditions of Swiss civil servants were determined by a special legal status. Consequently, there was no collective bargaining in the public sector.

Sources: (a) Eiro 2003 (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions)
examining differences in individuals’ membership, we must have a brief look at the macro-picture of the union movements in the four countries under review. For this matter, some of the distinctive features are summed up in Table 13.1.

Today, unions still bear the ‘social imprint’ of the employment structure and organizational model of the time of their foundation (Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, Britain’s highly fragmented union structure is a heritage of successive waves of unionization that first followed craft lines and then took the shape of general (multi-sectoral) unions. Late but rapid industrialization in Germany and Sweden has led to a substitution of craft unions by industrial unions, which have adopted the sector as organizing principle and reached a comparatively high degree of concentration (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000). Switzerland’s unionism is also organized along sectoral lines. It is, however, further crosscut by the politico-religious cleavage between socialist and Christian movements. Unlike in Germany, where the Christian current united with the dominant socialist movement after 1945, the two strands still remain separate in Switzerland. Reproduction of the status division between white-and blue-collar workers in the union structure is common to all four countries. Only in Britain’s craft-based organization are white-collar unions integrated into the main confederation. In the three other countries, white-collar employees organize separately (Ebbinghaus, 1993).

With regard to collective bargaining, substantial differences persist between the four countries in our sample. These become evident when looking at coverage rates: while almost all wage-earners benefit from a collective agreement in Sweden, this is only the case for a third of the workforce in Britain. Germany and Switzerland are set in an intermediary position with 67 and 45 per cent respectively. The disparity in coverage rates overlaps with the difference in the dominant level of bargaining. Over the 1980s and 1990s, all countries in our sample have witnessed a trend towards decentralization (Traxler, 1994). The consequences, however, have been very different. In Sweden, centralized negotiations at the national level have been substituted by sectoral agreements. In Germany and, above all, Switzerland, it is sectoral bargaining that had come under pressure from employers’ associations. While the economic sector still remains the dominant level in Germany, in Swiss industrial relations bargaining over key issues such as wages and working time has to some extent been transferred to the company level (Mach and Oesch, 2003). The most dramatic changes have taken place in Britain where multi-employer bargaining has almost completely disappeared. In 1998, only five per cent of private-sector employees were covered by a sectoral agreement as compared to 30 per cent in 1980. In comparison, the decrease in coverage with single-employer agreements was more moderate (Zagelmeyer, 2003: 122). The dominance of single-employer bargaining in Britain signifies that only those wage-earners benefit from collective agreements who are employed in unionized workplaces.
Negative trends in coverage rates have been paralleled by similar declines in union membership. As Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000: 59) argue, ‘membership is a prime measure of the power base of interest organizations and an indicator of the capacity for collective action of workers’. Hence, before turning to the individual determinants of union membership, the evolution of union density and membership is examined in more detail in Table 13.2. Between 1970 and 1980, unions expanded in all four countries, no matter whether the starting point was a low density rate of around 30 per cent as in Germany and Switzerland, a medium rate of 50 per cent as in Britain or a high rate of 67 per cent as in Sweden. In contrast, the 1980s and 90s brought slow but continuous losses for German and Swiss unions. A sharper fall in membership was experienced in Britain where unions lost five million members between 1980 and 1996. At the end of the 1990s, less than one third of the dependent workforce was unionized in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. In contrast, Sweden’s unions stand out as a special case where membership continued to grow during the 1980s and remained almost stable during the 1990s (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000). The unusually high

Table 13.2  The evolution of membership in trade unions (and professional associations)

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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Britain (U.K.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>density (gross)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total (gross)</td>
<td>11,187</td>
<td>12,947</td>
<td>9947</td>
<td>**7987</td>
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<td>largest union</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;G</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>*881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unison</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>density (net)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total (net)</td>
<td>6966</td>
<td>8154</td>
<td>8014</td>
<td>*8327</td>
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<tr>
<td>largest union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG Metall</td>
<td>2223</td>
<td>2622</td>
<td>2727</td>
<td>2773</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ver.di</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>density (net)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total (net)</td>
<td>2325</td>
<td>3114</td>
<td>3388</td>
<td>*3293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>largest union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Metall</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommunal</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Switzerland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>density (net)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total (net)</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>*770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>largest union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMUV</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>*95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBI (GBH)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>*98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** density = union density rate; total = total membership; largest union = largest single union.

Gross density rates and gross totals include retired members, net values do not. In the case of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, totals do not include retired members, but data for single unions do. All data for the UK are gross. German data for 1999 include East and West Germany. ** 1996; * 1997, ° 1998, ^ 2001.

**Source:** Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); except (a) Eurostat; (b) for Switzerland: National Office for Statistics.
levels of unionization in Sweden cannot be understood without making reference to the particular institutionalization of its unemployment insurance, the Ghent system.\textsuperscript{53} Functioning as a voluntary but publicly supported scheme that is administered by unions, the Swedish unemployment insurance provides a powerful selective incentive for joining a union (Rothstein, 1992).

In the context of our study, the changes in the national ranking of the largest single union are interesting to note: in 1970 in all four countries, the organizations with most members were unions active in manufacturing, and more particularly, in the metal and engineering industries.\textsuperscript{54} After 1980, membership of these metal unions declined everywhere (except in Germany where reunification briefly spurred membership). Today, they have mostly ceded their status as largest worker organizations to service-sector unions primarily organizing public employees.\textsuperscript{55} In Sweden, the female dominated municipality workers unions \textit{Kommunal} already surpassed the mainly male metalworkers union in 1978. In Britain and Germany today, the largest organizations are the result of mergers between white-collar service unions and public sector unions (\textit{Unison} 1993, \textit{ver.di} 2001). In stark contrast to the manufacturing unions, their membership consists of 50 (\textit{ver.di}) and 70 (\textit{Unison}) per cent women (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000).

### Class differences in union membership

It has been widely argued that the shift in employment from manufacturing to services and the parallel change in the class structure have challenged the organization methods of trade unions (Visser, 1992; Waddington and Hoffmann, 2000). The restructuring of industrial sectors, automation and the up-grading of the workforce have reduced the number of semi-skilled production workers and thus weakened the traditional strongholds of union recruitment (Kern and Sabel, 1992). According to Hyman (1992: 152), ‘the changing structure of employment seems biased against union membership’. This assumption shall be examined more closely by looking at class differences in unionization. What we are particularly interested in is to know whether less advantaged classes make up for their relatively weak labour market position by adhering to collective organization. Information about union membership is available in all four datasets. In the German GSOEP dataset, however, the question about membership is not asked every year. Therefore, analyses were made with the smaller sample of data wave 1998 (instead of wave 2000). As in Chapter 12, we use the same simplified class version shown in Table 13.3 and leave aside the self-employed classes (for whom union membership is the exception).

With the exception of the German dataset, the differences between trade union membership and professional association membership is made
nowhere. Accordingly, we treat professional associations as unions in all our analyses. The results are exhibited in Figure 13.1, displaying the share of unionized individuals in each employee class. National differences in aggregate union density are very closely replicated by our micro data – the characteristics of our samples seem thus to correspond surprisingly well to those of the respective populations. Although actual levels vary, relative differences between classes are surprisingly similar across the four countries: everywhere, the same categories show lowest levels of unionization. Besides the small class of highly skilled technical experts, unionization is particularly low among individuals working in the office: managers and clerks in all four countries have below-average adherence rates. More problematic in terms of institutional embeddedness are the low membership rates of routine service workers. In both Germany and Switzerland, this is the class where least individuals organize collectively. As was shown in Chapter 8, this category’s working conditions are characterized by particularly low mean earnings and very poor promotion prospects. Moreover, it is obvious from Figure 13.1 that routine service workers are not able to compensate for their relatively disadvantaged employment conditions by using institutional resources such as collective bargaining or workplace participation.

When turning our attention to classes with high union density, two categories stand out. As expected, membership is above average among classes mainly containing production workers in manufacturing: technicians, craft workers and routine operatives. However, even higher unionization rates are found among highly skilled employees evolving in an interpersonal service logic. In no other class is collective organization so widespread as among socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals. In Germany and Switzerland, their unionization rate lies 50 per cent above average, in Britain up to 100 per cent.

Hence, with respect to trade unionism, there is no clear-cut division between manufacturing and the services. High membership rates can be found both among production workers and professionals in interpersonal services. In contrast, unions are badly implanted in the office, in the un-

### Table 13.3 11-class schema (including wage-earner classes only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>Skilled service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Routine service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
Figure 13.1  Trade union density of different classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Union density by class (N=)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3214</td>
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</table>
skilled services and at the top of the technical work hierarchy. Our findings contradict Gallie (1996b: 147) who maintains, based on the Goldthorpe schema, that ‘the level of membership in the service class is fully comparable with that among technicians and supervisors’. In fact, analyses with our class schema show that union membership within the privileged service class varies heavily: whereas managers and technical experts are clearly less likely to unionize than technicians and crafts workers, socio-cultural specialists feature higher unionization rates than production workers in all four countries. Based on a different labour market survey, this finding has been made before for Switzerland (Armingeon, 2001b: 72–3). These results suggest that by merging the different factions of the middle class into a unitary service class, the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema obscures more than its illuminates about union membership – as it does about political orientation (cf. Chapter 9).

**Individual determinants of membership: sex and age**

The high unionization rates of socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals may seem surprising, since these occupations are mainly held by women. Women are traditionally expected to be less prone to unionize because of their discontinuous labour force participation, which is owing to marriage and family commitments. Tables 13.4 to 13.7 effectively show that, with the notable exception of Sweden, women’s union adherence is generally lower than that of men. Yet in Sweden, women have presented an absolute majority of union members since 1988 (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000: 645). In contrast, gender differences in unionization are considerable in Germany and Switzerland. But again, the socio-cultural professions and associate professions stand out as a special case: in all four countries, women working in these jobs are far more likely to be union members than in all the other classes. This is most clearly the case in Britain and Switzerland where female unionization rates are twice as high in this category than on average.

Empirical studies using logistic regressions suggest for Britain (Booth, 1986) and Germany (Windolf and Haas, 1989) that male-female differentials in unionization are, above all, due to differences in the characteristics of the jobs held by men and by women. Similarly, Gallie (1996b: 159) finds that ‘the major break in patterns of membership would appear to be less between men and women as such, than between people in full-time work and people in part-time work’. Hence, it would not be feminization of the labour force *per se*, but the growth of part-time, temporary and other ‘non-standard’ forms of employment which undermine the union movement. In effect, our calculations show that membership is systematically lower among part-time than full-time employees. However, whereas differ-
Tables 13.4 to 13.7  Union membership by sex (in %)

Table 13.4  Britain 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>m:</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>52</th>
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<td>21</td>
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Average: men 29.2%; women 26.6%.
For class labels, see Table 13.3 above.

Table 13.5  Germany 1998

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Average: men 35.5%; women 21.3%

Table 13.6  Sweden 2000

<table>
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<td>w:</td>
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<td>w:</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
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</table>

Average: men 81.0%; women 84.2%

Table 13.7  Switzerland 1999

<table>
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<th>17</th>
<th>23</th>
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<table>
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<table>
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<th>m:</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>15</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: men 27.4%; women 18.1%
ences in unionization are considerable in Britain and Germany, Swedish and Swiss part-time workers show only slightly lower inclinations to join unions than their full-time employed colleagues.

Another individual determinant that is expected to influence union membership is age. Age is heavily correlated with work experience and translates what has been termed an ‘exposure effect’: the longer workers have been in the labour force, the more opportunities they will have had to join unions, and the more opportunities unions will have had to recruit them (Bain and Elias, 1985: 81). At the same time, age may also reflect an industry effect (declining industries have few new entrants), or mirror changes in union strength: factors that have induced an individual to join a union in the past may no longer operate if unions have become absent from the workplace. While older workers remain union members from force of habit, their younger colleagues may never get unionized (Booth, 1986: 47). When computing membership rates for the two age categories of 20 to 42 and 43 to 65 years, we find clear evidence of a recruitment problem in the British, Swiss and, to a lesser extent, German union movements (see Tables A.10 to A.13 in the annexe). In Britain, union density decreases from 34 per cent among the 43 to 65 years old to 24 per cent among the 20 to 42 years old. In the two other countries, the contrast is somewhat smaller (from 34 to 27% in Germany, from 29 to 21% in Switzerland): Low membership among the younger age category is all the more worrying for unions as there is some indication that union adherence usually takes place during the first ten years of the working life (Elias, 1996: 181).

In comparison, Swedish unions are in a very comfortable situation as membership rates in the younger age category still exceed 75 per cent. In the case of Britain, the only classes where strong union renewal seems to happen are those of socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals. In contrast, unionization rates among young production workers have fallen to 25 per cent. A similar picture can be found in Switzerland where membership rates for the younger category lies below 25 per cent in all classes except among socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals.

**Workplace characteristics and unionization**

Empirical research into the determinants of union membership regularly shows workplace characteristics to be the most decisive factor (Bain and Elias, 1985; Booth, 1986; Guest and Dewe, 1988; Windolf and Haas, 1989; Elias, 1996; Gallie, 1996b). Over the last 20 years, workplace characteristics have undergone profound changes – changes that appear to account for a large part of union decline. At the beginning of the 1980s, increased competition in, and volatility of, the product markets led firms in Western Europe to accelerate the introduction of new technology and to seek more
flexibility in the use of labour. Firms’ efforts to render their structure more flexible included adjustments in working time (such as part-time and limited duration contracts), the decentralization of activities (into autonomous profit centres) and the externalization of services (outsourcing) (Gallie et al., 1996: 13; Brose, 1998: 147). The reorganization of firms, in particular of large firms, has an impact on the mobilization potential of unions as outsourcing, chains of suppliers, and production in networks all reduce the organizational unity of the workplace (Kern and Sabel, 1992). A high incidence of small and fluid firms, decentralized business units, and non-standard employment impedes the development of social bonds among workers and between workers and their representatives (Dølvik, 2001). There is a close relationship between flexible production methods, establishment size and collective organization: ‘[S]ome researchers claim flexible work organization hampered union organizations as workers no longer gathered in large groups under a single factory roof, sharing similar working conditions and interests around which industrial unions could mobilize’ (Western, 1995: 182).

Hence, the size of the workplace in which people are employed is one of the most commonly cited factors affecting union membership. For this reason, we have computed union density of different classes for small, medium and large establishments (see Tables A.14 to A.16). The findings confirm the importance of plant size for the explanation of union membership. In Britain and Germany, individuals working in establishments with more than 100 employees are twice as likely to be unionized than their colleagues engaged in plants with less than 25 (or, in the German case, 20) employees. Disparities are most striking for craft workers and operatives in Britain and Germany: when employed in a large plant, one out of two production workers are trade union members; when employed in a small plant, this applies to less than one in five. The influence of establishment size, albeit present, is somewhat smaller on Swiss unionization. It is noteworthy that establishment size seems to be of greater consequence for union membership of lower skilled workers than for collective organization of managerial and professional staff.

What explains the greater likelihood of unionization in large workplaces than in small ones? A first explanation suggests that employers in larger firms have a more favourable attitude towards trade unions as a way of ensuring more effective communication with the workforce (Gallie, 1996b: 151). A second explanation, applying particularly to Germany, relies on workers’ participation rights and the system of co-determination. Workers are likely to benefit from more extensive and more formal participation rights in larger firms (which have works councils) and may thus have more incentives, and be under stronger peer pressure, to join a union (Windolf
and Haas, 1989). The third line of reasoning links plant size with the organization costs of unions (Booth, 1986: 48): for trade unions, costs of recruitment are largest in small, dispersed plants with the stereotypical patriarchal employer. On the contrary, in large anonymous establishments, unions face significantly lower per-capita costs of recruitment and mobilization. Whatever the decisive cause, phenomena such as outsourcing and the decentralization of activities, which go along with tertiarization, do not work in the unions’ favour. In this context, it is useful to recall the findings made in Chapter 9 about the average firm size of different classes. It clearly emerged that the technical and organizational work logics are dominated by large companies, whereas routine interpersonal service jobs are primarily set in small businesses. This may partly explain why low-skilled service workers show weak union integration – despite the fact that, in theory, they appear most dependent on collective action to enhance their precarious working conditions.

Besides plant size, there is another workplace characteristic that heavily influences on union membership, namely the ownership sector. Depending on whether an establishment is set in the private or the public sector, unionization rates vary heavily. In the public sector, railway and post office workers have traditionally been strong advocates of trade unions. Over the last 30 years, they have been joined in public unions by employees working in educational, health and social services. Visser notes in this respect that ‘in Europe, union growth in the past two decades has depended heavily upon the expansion of government employment and communal services’ (1992: 28). The results displayed in Figure 13.2 confirm the importance of public employment for union membership. In Britain, unionization rates in the public sector are three times higher than in the private sector, in Switzerland twice as high. Differences are not quite as large in Germany and Sweden; still, public employees are 20 to 30 per cent more likely to be union members than their colleagues in the private sector.

One of the reasons explaining massive unionization in the public sector appears to be a more favourable employer attitude. Thus, Gallie (1996b: 157) finds for Britain that employees in the public sector were twice as likely as those in the private to report that their employers encouraged trade union membership. It is noteworthy that, when controlling for ownership, socio-cultural professionals no longer stand out as particularly union friendly in Sweden and Switzerland. The high union density of these two classes appears, to a large extent, to be due to their predominantly public sector setting. This suggests that class differences in union membership may vanish once other factors such as establishment size or public sector employment are taken in account. Therefore, we shall resort to multivariate analysis in the next section, in order to simultaneously control for the impact of different individual attributes and workplace characteristics.
Figure 13.2 Union density by class and by ownership sector
A multivariate analysis of the determinants of union membership

By using multivariate analysis, it is possible to control for different determinants of union membership concurrently, and thus to summarize the relative importance of each single factor. Table 13.8 displays the results of binary logistic regressions that have been run separately for unionization of men and women. For each variable, the odds of being a union member associated with a given characteristic are shown in relation to the reference category. The influence of class on membership varies considerably between the four countries. In Britain and Germany, crafts workers and operatives are significantly more likely to join a trade union than the reference category of office clerks, even if we take account of disparities in factors such as plant size, sex or part-time employment. In contrast, once we hold other variables constant in the Swedish and Swiss sample, class differences in male unionization become quite small. With respect to gender differences, the analyses produce the interesting finding that higher membership of socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals is due above all to women’s higher propensity to unionize. In all four countries, women in these two classes are twice as likely as office clerks to join a union. For male employees, differences are smaller and only significant in Britain and Germany. Among men, three classes show lower union adherence than office clerks: these are the high-skill classes of technical experts and managers on the one hand, and the low-skill class of routine service workers on the other. Hence, lowest unionization patterns appear to be concentrated among the categories at the top and the bottom of the class hierarchy. This finding confirms Hyman’s observation that whereas employees with scarce professional or technical qualifications may perceive little need for trade union support, workers in the weakest labour market position may lack the resources and internal cohesion for collective organization (Hyman, 1992: 162).

In addition to class, the effects of all the other variables prove significant. With the exception of Germany, public employment is everywhere the most important predictor of union membership. Civil servants are more likely to be in a union than private sector employees by a factor ranging from 2.5 (Switzerland) to five (Britain) and six (Sweden). Hence, it is not tertiarization per se that undercuts trade unionism, for growth in public services clearly appears to be favourable to unions. Rather, it is the expansion of private services that challenges union recruitment.

Alongside public employment, plant size is another powerful determinant of union membership, strongly influencing men’s unionization in Britain and Germany, while being less important for women’s membership in general and for Swiss unions in particular. Like plant size, age is posi-
Table 13.8  Estimates for the odds of union membership (results of binary logistic regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain 1999</th>
<th>Germany 1998</th>
<th>Sweden 2000</th>
<th>Switzerland 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) men</td>
<td>(2) women</td>
<td>(3) men</td>
<td>(4) women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42 years</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65 years</td>
<td>1.86**</td>
<td>1.42**</td>
<td>1.47**</td>
<td>1.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>0.60*</td>
<td>2.25**</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>3.65**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.53****</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled crafts workers</td>
<td>1.64**</td>
<td>2.24*</td>
<td>1.89**</td>
<td>2.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>1.72**</td>
<td>2.15**</td>
<td>2.07**</td>
<td>1.85**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-grade managers</td>
<td>0.60**</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-grade managers</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>2.15**</td>
<td>2.48**</td>
<td>3.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td>1.88*</td>
<td>2.53**</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled service workers</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine service workers</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<td>Status</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>4.05**</td>
<td>1.69**</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
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<td>Firm Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99</td>
<td>1.90**</td>
<td>1.46**</td>
<td>1.96**</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 and more</td>
<td>3.28**</td>
<td>1.65**</td>
<td>3.67**</td>
<td>2.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>4.98**</td>
<td>5.18**</td>
<td>1.84**</td>
<td>1.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
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<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>3072</td>
<td>2801</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>2393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to be a union member as compared to the chance of not being a union member. r = reference category; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level.
tively correlated with trade union membership: women and even more so men in the older age category are significantly more likely to be unionized than their colleagues in the younger age category. Finally, results for part-time work are ambiguous: only in Britain (and among Swedish women) does part-time work significantly reduce the odds of trade union membership. However, it must be recalled that our samples include only those individuals spending at least 20 hours per week in paid employment. Those part-time workers with a more marginal implication in the labour market – and probably also in the union movement – have been excluded. Nonetheless, contrary to Gallie’s (1996b: 159) finding of the predominance of the part-time/full-time divide for the explanation of sex differences in unionization, our analyses produce significant gender differences even when controlling for part-time employment. This is obvious from the results of a regression run jointly for men and women not shown here. In a further regression, we have included a variable for party preference in order to test the influence of personal value orientation. In the literature, people voting for a party on the left are expected to be more likely to favour solidarity principles and join a union than the rest of the population. This assumption is confirmed by our results: in effect, in all four countries, the inclusion of left voting both increases the explanatory power of the estimations and the likelihood of being a union membership. Yet this individual determinant is far less influential than workplace characteristics such as class, public sector employment or establishment size. Moreover, the difficulty of determining cause and effect remains, since union membership itself is expected to influence people’s party preferences.

We summarize the differences in collective organization by showing the membership probabilities of four wage-earner profiles. In Table 13.9, the probabilities of union membership are calculated for a male routine operative, a female routine service worker, a male associate manager and a female socio-cultural semi-professional. It is shown that middle-aged men working as routine operatives in large plants have a probability of being a union member of 50 per cent in Britain and Germany, 90 per cent in Sweden and 33 per cent in Switzerland. In contrast, membership probabilities of younger women employed as routine service workers in small private businesses are consistently lower in all four countries. They lie at only ten per cent in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. This signifies that there is only one chance out of ten that women working in the low-skilled private services belong to a trade union in these three countries (unlike in Sweden, where chances are much better). Thus, if we compare routine operative and routine service workers, we find two classes that are similarly disadvantaged with respect to working conditions (cf. Chapter 8), but which significantly diverge with respect to their embeddedness in collective organization. While the male industrial class of routine operatives is solidly embedded in trade unions in all four countries, the female class of routine
service workers basically lacks industrial citizenship everywhere except Sweden. This finding reflects the fact that outside Scandinavia, unions still struggle to come to terms with the expanding private services and women’s growing involvement in paid employment.

To conclude, the probabilities shown in the two last columns of Table 13.9 recall the heterogeneity of the salaried middle class. The female class of socio-cultural semi-professionals, which mainly works in the public sector, is everywhere (except Germany) much better organized in unions and professional associations than male junior managers working in large private companies. Although comparable advantages attach to the working conditions of these two classes, their political outlook (cf. Chapter 9) and their potential for collective action appear to differ considerably. Hence, as far as integration into trade unions is concerned, we find no indication for a unitary service class as modelled by Goldthorpe and his colleagues.
Class Differences in Political Citizenship and Electoral Participation

Citizenship and political rights as power resources

The particular interest of political citizenship lies in the fact that political rights are at the basis of both social and industrial citizenship. Through the right to participate in the exercise of political power as an elector, individuals have their say on both the welfare state and industrial relations. The normal channel of expanding social rights is thus the use of political power (Marshall, 1981 [1950]: 26). Likewise, in collective bargaining, workers depend on a legislative framework that is obtained in the political arena. Accordingly, Marshall very optimistically maintained that ‘the equality implicit in the concept of citizenship undermined the inequality of the class system’ (1981 [1950]: 19). This argument has been taken up by theorists of the power resources school such as Gøsta Esping-Andersen or Walter Korpi. Central to their preoccupation is the question ‘whether, and under what conditions, the class divisions and social inequalities produced by capitalism can be undone by parliamentary democracy’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 11). Their hypothesis states that groups relatively disadvantaged in terms of economic resources may compensate for it by combining in the sphere of politics and thus influence market outcomes (Korpi and Palme, 2003: 427). Expressed differently, democracy is supposed to enable less privileged groups to use their major political resource – numbers – in order to improve their position in the stratification system through redistributive policies.

However, it is an open question whether the spread of political rights down the social hierarchy has effectively led to equal integration of all social groups into the political system. Two elements throw doubt on such an interpretation. Firstly, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that opportunities to take part in democratic political life are used more effectively by some groups than by others (e.g. Lijphart, 1997). Hence, Verba et al. (1978: 2) argue that ‘those citizens who are wealthier, better educated, or who come from more prestigious ethnic or racial or linguistic backgrounds will hold a disproportionate share of political influence’. Secondly, Western
European populations comprise sizeable shares of foreign nationals who are excluded from political citizenship. Having settled down permanently, these guest workers form large ‘foreign’ communities within their host societies; they fully participate in the labour market and the welfare state, but have no share in political rights (Soysal, 1994). As a consequence, they cannot enhance their position within the economic system through the use of democratic influence.

Based on these observations, we shall analyse embeddedness in the political system as follows. In a first step, we will look at distribution over the class structure of those labour market participants who do not possess full political citizenship, i.e. foreign nationals. In a second step, we will concentrate on individuals enjoying full citizenship rights and find out whether there are class differences in the effective use of political rights. There, we focus on the most elementary dimension of political participation, which is voting. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent the electorates of the four countries of our sample reflect the class structure.

**Exclusion from voting due to foreign citizenship**

All over Western Europe, the post-war boom triggered large waves of immigration of guest workers, especially from Southern Europe and Turkey.\(^{57}\) Initially, governments regarded the employment of guest workers as a temporary response to labour shortages, expecting foreign individuals to leave again upon the end of the boom and the rise of unemployment. Accordingly, it was considered natural that guest workers were to remain outside the national citizenry (Soysal, 1994: 2). But contrary to these expectations, the host states have not (or only very partially)\(^{58}\) succeeded in sending their guest workers away. Their stay proved, to a large extent, permanent: migrant workers have become a structural part of Western European labour markets (Castles, 1986). Associated with employment in subordinate positions and exclusion from political citizenship, foreign nationality continues to be an essential line of disadvantage in most of Western Europe (e.g. Charles, 2000; OECD, 2001). There are, however, considerable differences as to the numerical importance of foreign citizens within the four countries of our sample. Their share in the population is far higher in Switzerland where they account for 20.1 per cent than in Britain (3.8%), Germany (8.9%) or Sweden (5.6%) (OECD, 2001: 184). Not surprisingly, in Switzerland, channelling of immigrants towards the bottom half of the occupational system has come to be known as the *Unterschichtung* (‘substratification’) of Swiss society by foreign workers (Buchmann and Sacchi, 1998: 417).

In order to compute the distribution of foreign nationals across the class structure, we resort to the same version of the class schema as in Chapters 12 and 13, but additionally include the self-employed (see Table 14.1).
Again, we have restricted our analysis to wage-earners and those self-employed spending at least 20 hours per week in paid employment. With the datasets at our disposition, the relationship between class and nationality can only be explored for Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.59 Findings are given in Tables 14.2 to 14.4.60 In all three countries, results clearly confirm that foreign workers cluster at the bottom of the class hierarchy. This is also apparent from a look at the sole distribution of foreign nationals across the class schema. In all three countries, foreigners are heavily overrepresented among routine operatives and routine service workers. This is most obvious in Germany where the distribution of immigrant workers takes a pyramid shape with more than half of all foreigners employed at the lowest skill level. Initially needed to respond to labour shortages in manufacturing, guest workers in Germany still concentrate in the crafts (17\%) and, above all, routine operative jobs (34\%). In contrast, Sweden’s foreign workforce is clearly service-centred, but remains nonetheless underprivileged in hierarchical terms: 23 per cent of all guest workers evolve in the routine services as compared to 14 per cent in routine operative jobs. In Switzerland, foreigners also cluster in less advantaged class positions: 16 per cent working as routine operatives, 14 per cent as routine service workers. At the same time, a sizeable share of foreigners are employed as technical experts (8\%) or socio-cultural professionals (5\%). These highly qualified foreign employees appear to have little in common with the bulk of immigrants that are relegated to subordinate positions.

Besides reflecting the countries’ employment structure, Tables 14.2 to 14.4 reveal large class differences with respect to the right to vote. The asymmetrical distribution of foreigners across the class structure signifies a parallel class bias in the population entitled to vote. This bias is most unsettling in Switzerland, where over half of the large foreign community has lived for more than 15 years in the country or was already born in the country – but still remains excluded from full political citizenship (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2003).61 This has consequences for the class com-

### Table 14.1  The 15-class schema used in this section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large employers</th>
<th>Self-employed professionals</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, we have restricted our analysis to wage-earners and those self-employed spending at least 20 hours per week in paid employment.

With the datasets at our disposition, the relationship between class and nationality can only be explored for Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.59 Findings are given in Tables 14.2 to 14.4.60 In all three countries, results clearly confirm that foreign workers cluster at the bottom of the class hierarchy. This is also apparent from a look at the sole distribution of foreign nationals across the class schema. In all three countries, foreigners are heavily overrepresented among routine operatives and routine service workers. This is most obvious in Germany where the distribution of immigrant workers takes a pyramid shape with more than half of all foreigners employed at the lowest skill level. Initially needed to respond to labour shortages in manufacturing, guest workers in Germany still concentrate in the crafts (17\%) and, above all, routine operative jobs (34\%). In contrast, Sweden’s foreign workforce is clearly service-centred, but remains nonetheless underprivileged in hierarchical terms: 23 per cent of all guest workers evolve in the routine services as compared to 14 per cent in routine operative jobs. In Switzerland, foreigners also cluster in less advantaged class positions: 16 per cent working as routine operatives, 14 per cent as routine service workers. At the same time, a sizeable share of foreigners are employed as technical experts (8\%) or socio-cultural professionals (5\%). These highly qualified foreign employees appear to have little in common with the bulk of immigrants that are relegated to subordinate positions.

Besides reflecting the countries’ employment structure, Tables 14.2 to 14.4 reveal large class differences with respect to the right to vote. The asymmetrical distribution of foreigners across the class structure signifies a parallel class bias in the population entitled to vote. This bias is most unsettling in Switzerland, where over half of the large foreign community has lived for more than 15 years in the country or was already born in the country – but still remains excluded from full political citizenship (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2003).61 This has consequences for the class com-
position of the Swiss electorate: 41 per cent of routine operatives are foreigners and do not possess the right to vote at the national level. This contrasts with large employers or self-employed professionals where the share of immigrants is below 15 per cent. In relative terms, this bias is even stronger in Germany: among routine operatives, one out of five individuals do not have the right to vote, whereas among managers or socio-cultural professionals, the proportion is one in 40. Although small in absolute terms, the disparity also exists in Sweden where eight per cent of routine service workers are foreigners and thus lack full political citizenship, as opposed to only two per cent of immigrants working as either associate or higher-grade managers.

The unequal distribution of foreign workers across the class schema introduces a bias in the composition of the electorate. Before exploring the

---

**Table 14.2** Germany 2000: Share of non-German nationals (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2.7</th>
<th>4.6</th>
<th>2.7</th>
<th>2.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 11,170; average: 7.7%.

For class labels, see Table 14.1 above.

* Row means only include employee classes (leaving aside the self-employed).

**Table 14.3** Sweden 2000: Share of non-Swedish nationals (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6.1</th>
<th>4.6</th>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>3.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3282; average: 3.8%.

**Table 14.4** Switzerland 1999: Share of non-Swiss nationals (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14.7</th>
<th>28.4</th>
<th>18.1</th>
<th>19.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3807; average: 22.5%.
implications of this bias, we wish to examine another potential source of asymmetrical political representation: the difference between classes in the effective use of the right to vote.

Class differences in electoral participation

Besides foreign workers who are formally excluded from the right to vote, we are interested in a second category of politically isolated individuals: individuals who possess full political citizenship rights but abstain from using them. In the literature, the question whether there are class differences in voting is highly controversial. While there is a large consensus on the class character in time-consuming forms of political actions such as campaigning or contacting government officials, evidence concerning the less demanding activity of voting is more equivocal. Class bias in electoral participation is found in a series of individual-level studies for Britain (Swaddle and Heath, 1989), France (Boy and Mayer, 1997), the Netherlands (Van Egmond et al., 1998), Switzerland (Mottier, 1993; Bühlmann et al., 2003) or the U.S. (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). However, these analyses contrast with a body of research that does not report a significant relationship between class and voter turnout in Britain (Crewe et al., 1977; Pattie and Johnston, 1998; Heath and Taylor, 1999), Sweden (Ersson, 2002) or Switzerland (Farago, 1998; Wernli, 2001).

In a first step, we limit our focus to the relationship between class position and electoral participation. We start out by looking at the particularities of the dependent variable ‘voting/non-voting’. In the different socio-economic datasets at our disposal, the question about participation in the last election is only asked in the Swedish sample (LNU, 2000). While there is no possibility to examine electoral participation in the German and British samples, the Swiss sample provides an alternative variable that serves as substitute. People were asked what party they would vote for if elections were held tomorrow. As a possible response, the Swiss sample offers ‘would not vote’. There are advantages and disadvantages to this substitute. As Swaddle and Heath (1989: 345) show for Britain, abstention is to a large extent a temporary phenomenon, related to circumstantial rises in the cost of voting such as sickness, holidays or stays away from home for work. In contrast, persistent non-voters account for a relatively small proportion of all abstainers. Asked what party they would vote for in the case of elections, the large group of temporary non-voters seem, in the Swiss dataset, more likely to indicate a party choice (or, alternatively, that they don’t know) than to answer that they would not vote. Accordingly, in the Swiss sample, we expect to deal only with persistent abstainers. This is interesting as it allows us to isolate a hard core of the politically apathetic population. The disadvantage of this variable is that we massively underestimate the extent of electoral abstention: while declared abstention in
our sample amounts to only eight per cent, official figures reveal an abstention rate of almost 47 per cent for the Swiss parliamentary elections in 1999. Nonetheless, the comparison of our regression results (to be presented later on in Table 14.7) with findings of earlier research on voter turnout in Switzerland (Mottier, 1993; Kriesi, 2005) shows that coefficients for socio-demographic variables and explained variance are very similar. This strongly suggests that we are dealing here with a valid proxy for persistent abstention.

In the case of the Swedish dataset, reported abstention at the 1998 Riksdag elections falls short of official abstention by seven per cent (official turnout was 81% as opposed to 88% in our LNU-sample). This gap is a common feature of electoral surveys. In the literature, it is widely acknowledged that reported participation rates lie systematically above effective participation rates (among others: Swaddle and Heath, 1989; Pattie and Johnston, 1998; Anduiza Perea, 2002). Interestingly, the comparison of another Swedish survey and the 1991 elections shows exactly the same gap of seven per cent between reported turnout and official turnout as is case for our sample and the 1998 elections (Anduiza Perea, 2002: 668). To a degree, this gap may be due to misremembering and conformist behaviour: since voting is socially desirable behaviour, respondents may not admit to the interviewers that they did not vote. Yet more important is the fact that non-voters are generally less likely to take part in surveys than voters. For our study, this signifies that, if anything, we probably underestimate the effect of socio-demographic variables on voting, as our datasets are biased in favour of socially integrated individuals.

Some exploratory evidence on the link between voting and electoral participation is presented in Tables 14.5 and 14.6. For each class, we have computed the share of non-voters. Findings for Sweden clearly suggest a class pattern to voter turnout, in line with descriptive statistics from a comparative Scandinavian study on electoral participation (Goul Andersen and Hoff, 2001: Chap. 3). Individuals at the top of the class hierarchy such as higher-grade managers, self-employed and socio-cultural professionals are three to four times less likely to abstain from voting than routine operatives or low-skilled service workers. In exact figures, abstention rates among socio-cultural and self-employed professionals amount to less than five per cent, whereas 17.5 per cent of routine service workers report not having voted in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The hierarchical dimension of turnout is emphasized by the row means: individuals in less advantaged classes appear considerably less likely to vote than individuals in more privileged class positions. Interestingly, there are almost no differences within the organizational work logic, clerks being as conscientious voters as are managers.

The figures for Switzerland closely replicate the results found for Sweden. Consistent abstention is very rare among socio-cultural professionals, semi-
professionals and higher-grade managers, for whom it falls below five per cent. In contrast, a sizeable share of 14 to 15 per cent of routine operatives and service workers seem to rule out electoral participation from the outset. Hence, differences in electoral participation in both Sweden and Switzerland appear to follow vertical class lines. Yet however clear the bivariate link between class and turnout may be, there is wide agreement among political scientists that electoral participation is not driven by a single determinant. Therefore, the central question to be answered is whether there is a class bias in voting once other factors are controlled for. This question shall be examined in a multivariate setting.

A multivariate model explaining differences in voter turnout

In the literature on electoral participation, the different reasons for which people do not vote are subsumed in one sentence: ‘because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked’ (Franklin, 1996: 219; Brady et al., 1995: 271; Norris, 2001: Chap. 5). The sentence makes reference to three different elements influencing voting: individual resources, motivation and mobilization opportunity.

Table 14.5  Sweden 2000: Share of individuals who did not vote in 1998 parliamentary elections (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10.5</th>
<th>4.8</th>
<th>6.5</th>
<th>5.7</th>
<th>3.8</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>row means*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3119; average: 10.2%.
For class labels, see Table 14.1 on p. 181.
* Row means only include employee classes (leaving aside the self-employed).

Table 14.6  Switzerland 1999: Share of individuals who would not vote in case of elections held tomorrow (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6.1</th>
<th>4.3</th>
<th>5.0</th>
<th>4.9</th>
<th>2.2</th>
<th>4.1</th>
<th>row means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2978; average: 8.4%.
‘They can’t’ refers to individual resources: voters having fewer resources to acquire and decrypt political information are expected to be more likely to abstain (Pattie and Johnston, 1998: 265). Accordingly, participation appears to be contingent on basic resources such as education, income and occupation – or, in short, social class (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978).

‘They don’t want to’ introduces a second element of motivation: voters lacking political interest and civic motivation are less prone to take advantage of participatory opportunities than individuals concerned with public issues (Kriesi, 2005). Yet political interest and civic values may themselves be dependent on resources, notably on education and cognitive skills (Brady et al., 1995: 284).

Finally, ‘nobody asked’ refers to mobilization opportunity: individuals excluded from intermediary organizations may lack awareness of the stakes of elections and thus remain at home. Political parties and trade unions try to increase turnout among their members by recruiting them into the political process (Radcliffe and Davis, 2000; Norris, 2001) and by providing cues (such as slogans and electoral recommendations) that lower the cost of participation (Teorell, 2003).

According to these theoretical contributions, voter turnout depends on individual resources, motivation and the mobilization context. These assumptions shall be examined empirically for Sweden and Switzerland. Since electoral participation is a dichotomous variable with a skewed distribution, we use binary logistic regressions for our analyses. In order to make out the contribution of the different determinants, we proceed step-wise and gradually add variables. Results are displayed in Table 14.7 and will be commented in what follows. We start out with a look at the socio-demographic component of electoral participation.

**Age and gender**

There is a large consensus in the literature about the positive link between age and voting (e.g. Brady et al., 1995; Brunner, 1998; Blais et al., 2004; Rubenson et al., 2004). Our results confirm this link by revealing a powerful impact of age on participation for both Switzerland and Sweden: turnout substantially increases with age. Although our sample is limited to the economically active (under 65 years), age is one of the most significant predictors of electoral participation in all the models tested. Less univocal are the findings for gender. While gender is strongly related to voter turnout in both Switzerland and Sweden, results go in opposite directions. In Sweden, women are significantly more likely to vote than men even when occupational position and education are controlled for. In Switzerland, the contrary is true: men show clearly higher levels of participation. This has been explained by the fact that Swiss women acquired the right to vote (on the federal level) as late as 1971. Accordingly, primary political socialization of
older women has taken place in a period when only men enjoyed full citizenship rights (Mottier, 1993).

**Individual resources**

For reasons of parsimony, we have entered the class variable into the model in a collapsed 7-class version, stressing the hierarchical dimension.\(^{63}\) Regressions (1a) and (1b) show that if we control for age and gender, class differences in voting remain large and significant in Sweden and Switzerland. In both countries, the traditional bourgeoisie and managers are 2.5 times more likely to vote than routine workers. The odds ratios indicate that socio-cultural specialists are particularly conscientious voters: compared to the least-advantaged class, routine workers, their chance of staying away from the polls are three times smaller in Sweden and even six times smaller in Switzerland. To a large extent, this effect is due to education. Making informed decision whether to vote and who to vote for requires cognitive skills, which are usually obtained through education (Brady et al., 1995; van Egmond et al., 1998: 288). Hence, if we add a five-scale measure of education (and work income) to the variables age, gender and class, the explanatory power of the model increases in both countries (regressions 2a and 2b). In Sweden, the entire effect of class on voting is picked up by education and work income; in Switzerland, the class effect is reduced as well. This is not surprising insofar as class is strongly correlated with both differences in educational attainment and work income. In fact, class is expected, to some extent, to sum up information about education and income. Moreover, education enters the construction of our class variable both directly (to separate vocationally trained workers from their unskilled colleagues) and indirectly (through skill levels in ISCO-codes). However, while class becomes non-significant in Sweden once education and work income are introduced into the model, there is a persistent class effect in Switzerland. Socio-cultural specialists and managers remain at least twice as likely to participate in elections than their low-skilled workers, even if education and income are controlled for.

There are two possible reasons why class should matter more strongly for voter turnout in Switzerland than in Sweden. Firstly, as mentioned before, our analysis for Switzerland focuses exclusively on the hard core of abstainers. It is probable that class is of greater consequence for persistent abstainers than for the larger and fluctuating group of temporary non-voters, on which we focus in the Swedish sample. Secondly, the socio-political context has probably been more conducive to class abatement in Sweden than in Switzerland. Decades of social-democratic government and successful trade union mobilization may have reduced class cleavages in Sweden (e.g. Erikson, 1990; yet not so according to Svallfors, 1999). At the same time, class differences in electoral participation appear to have been quite modest in Sweden already in the 1920s and 1930s (Goul Andersen and Hoff, 2001).
### Table 14.7  Estimates for the odds of electoral participation (abstain = 0/vote = 1; binary logistic regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1a)</td>
<td>(2a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.03***</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>Male = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>2.52*</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ref. category: routine workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional bourgeoisie</td>
<td>2.41***</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical specialists</td>
<td>2.76***</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>3.24***</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural specialists</td>
<td>1.50*</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>1.84**</td>
<td>1.65**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vocational secondary</strong></td>
<td>2.68***</td>
<td>2.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ref. category: General secondary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary, not tertiary</td>
<td>4.79***</td>
<td>4.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly work income</td>
<td>6.05***</td>
<td>5.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party member°</strong></td>
<td>Member = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union member</td>
<td>Member = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times a year</td>
<td>1.68*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice a month</td>
<td>5.36*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week or more</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political interest</strong></td>
<td>On a scale from 0 to 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>3119</td>
<td>2983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance of voting as compared to the chance of abstaining.

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** at the 0.01 level; * at the 0.05 level.; + There is perfect correspondence between party members and voters in Switzerland: no party member declares abstaining; ° for Sweden, we do not have information about party membership; instead, we have used a variable distinguishing between individuals being/not being active members of an association other than a trade union.
Our results are less controversial as far as education is concerned. Yet they strongly question Topf’s (1995: 48) observation that there is no generalized educational effect on voting in Western Europe. Quite obviously, completion of a general secondary, a post-secondary or a tertiary school degree increases the likelihood of electoral participation in both countries. With respect to work income, we find a significant impact only for Sweden. In Switzerland, the influence of income is funnelled entirely through class position and education; if we enter income alone alongside age and gender (leaving aside class and education), its effect becomes highly significant for Switzerland as well.

Mobilization opportunity

It is commonly argued that social networks such as political parties, trade unions and community associations provide collective resources and thus foster electoral participation (e.g. Radcliffe and Davis, 2000; Norris, 2001). The effect of these recruitment networks is examined in regressions (3a) and (3b) where we control for party membership, union membership and church attendance. These variables make a substantial contribution to the explanatory power of the model for Switzerland, but less so for Sweden. In Switzerland, there is perfect correspondence between party membership and voting, signifying that all party members declare voting. In the Swedish dataset, where information about party membership is not available, we have used active membership in an association other than a union as a proxy. This measure is positively correlated with voting, but has a rather modest impact. In both countries, trade union membership has the expected positive sign but fails to become significant at the 5%-threshold. Finally, the frequency of church attendance makes a surprising contribution to elucidating electoral participation. While individuals who attend church service every once in a while are twice as likely to participate in elections than non-church goers, turnout of persons attending church once or more a week does not significantly differ from that of non-church goers in both Sweden and Switzerland. This somewhat puzzling result can be partly explained by looking at a more detailed variable for church attendance, available in the Swiss dataset. It reveals that low turnout among frequent churchgoers is exclusively due to those individuals who declare attending church several times a week. Unusually high abstention among this group must probably be explained by both the lack of time and interest. In contrast, individuals going to church once a week are as likely to participate in elections as are those individuals attending church once or twice a month.

Motivation

Besides individual resources and recruitment networks, motivational factors such as political interest are expected to be crucial for determining voter turnout. Information about political interest is only available in the Swiss
sample. This is unfortunate as regression (4b) reveals that adding a 11-point scale measuring political interest massively increases the explanatory power of our model, the pseudo $r^2$ almost doubling. Controlling for political interest also has an influence on the other determinants: while the impact of class, albeit remaining significant for socio-cultural specialists, grows substantively weaker, the observed gender differences in turnout vanish altogether. This suggests that women are less likely to participate in elections because they are less interested in politics. Moreover, educational attainment becomes insignificant. In other words, this means that once we control for political interest, cognitive skills as measured by education no longer seem to matter for electoral participation. How should this result be interpreted?

The role of political interest in explaining voter turnout

The finding that political interest is the most important predictor for voting has been made repeatedly. Among others, Brady et al. (1995) had shown it for the U.S. and Kriesi (2005) for direct democratic votes in Switzerland. It is on the basis of models integrating political interest that the existence of a link between class and voting (Wernli, 2001) or education and voting (Brady et al., 1995) had been rejected. However, two qualifications throw doubt on such a conclusion. Firstly, our results suggest that when carefully operationalized, class affects participation even if political interest is controlled for. Secondly, as an explanation of voter turnout, political interest is scarcely satisfying from a theoretical point of view: while it is commonsense that people interested in politics are more likely to participate in ballots, we remain with the enigma why some people are interested in politics and some not. What, then, must be explained are differences in political interest (Anduiza Perea, 2002: 647).

We suppose that socio-economic inequalities are essential for electoral participation as they lead to differentials in civic assets such as cognitive skills, political awareness and political interest. In other words, class position and education may determine electoral participation through two alternative channels, either directly through resources or indirectly through motivation. In order to illustrate this second link, we resort to two measures of political interest provided in the Swiss dataset (SHP, 1999). In the first variable, people indicate the degree to which they are interested in politics on a scale from 0 (not interested at all) to 10 (very much interested). In the second variable, people are asked how often they discuss matters of politics from 0 (never) to 10 (several times a week). In Figure 14.1, we have computed for each class the mean score of these two strongly correlated measures. Results suggest a close link between class position, political interest and electoral participation. For the two classes with particularly high levels of abstention (see values in parenthesis in Figure 14.1), skilled and routine workers, means on the political interest scales are consistently
lower than for middle-class employees such as technical specialists, managers or socio-cultural specialists.

The petite bourgeoisie takes an intermediate stance in political interest and voter turnout, while the traditional bourgeoisie (self-employed professionals and large employers) scores particularly high on both political inter-

Figure 14.1 Class position and political interest, Switzerland 1999

Figure 14.2 Educational attainment and different measures of political attitude, Switzerland 1999
est measures and electoral participation. A similar correlation is revealed in Figure 14.2 between different measures of political interest and educational attainment: individuals with post-secondary or tertiary schooling talk more often about politics, rate their own political influence higher and are in general more interested in politics than individuals with only a vocational secondary degree or with no secondary education at all. Hence, education appears conducive to political interest, and political interest conducive to electoral participation.

The link between class and political interest is also apparent for Germany: while the GSOEP dataset provides no information about electoral participation, it contains a question about whether people are interested in politics. Analyses of this variable show that on average, 11 per cent of gainfully employed Germans declare not having any interest in politics at all. Among routine service workers, this figure increases to 20 per cent, among routine operatives even to 22 per cent. In contrast, only four per cent of higher-grade managers and less than one per cent of socio-cultural professionals assert not being interested at all in politics. In order to substantiate the hypothesis that the key-predictor of participation, political interest, is in its turn driven by resources, we run a regression for the determinants of political interest. Since our dependent variable – political interest – is a continuous 11-point scale (0 to 10), ordinary least squares (OLS) regression appears as the appropriate statistical technique. Results reveal that class position and education have a highly significant effect on political interest (Table A.17 in the annexe). Members of the salaried middle class are substantially more likely to be interested in politics than routine workers, even if we account for differences in education. Similarly, political interest increases with age and the educational level reached. In Switzerland, men are considerably more interested in politics than women. Moreover, union membership and, above all, party adhesion significantly increase political interest. In sum, the same factors that we identified in regressions (1b) to (3b) of Table 14.7 as having an impact on electoral participation also affect political interest. This strongly suggests that the effect of socio-demographic characteristics on turnout is channelled through motivation: the more resources an individual possesses in the form of economic power (as measured by class) and cognitive skills (as measured by education), the more likely he or she is to be interested in politics and, consequently, to make use of the right to vote.

Unequal distribution of political rights and the implications for the electorates

We have argued that two factors are likely to introduce a class bias into the composition of the electorate of Western European countries. The first factor is related to the presence of foreign nationals who cluster to a large extent in subordinate jobs and are deprived of political citizenship rights.
This bias is further amplified by the fact that electoral abstention is more frequent among individuals at the bottom than at the top of the class hierarchy. Figures 14.3 and 14.4 reveal the effect that these two biases combined have on the representativity of the electorate. They show for Sweden

* Figure 14.3 Share of foreigners and abstainers in the total of each class, Sweden 2000*

* The shares of abstainers in Figures 14.3 and 14.4 are not identical with the shares exhibited before, as the target populations are not identical: In Figures 14.3 and 14.4, the relevant population refers to both national and foreign citizens, whereas in the analyses presented before, we only focused on national citizens.

* Figure 14.4 Share of foreigners and abstainers in the total of each class, Switzerland 1999
and Switzerland the share of individuals that do not participate in elections, because they either do not have the right to vote (foreigners) or do not use the right to vote (abstainers). It must be kept in mind that abstainers are heavily underrepresented in the Swiss SHP sample and, to a smaller extent, in the Swedish LNU, where, moreover, foreign citizens are substantially underrepresented. Accordingly, we are less interested in absolute levels of political exclusion (which seriously underestimate reality), as in comparing the share of the politically excluded and inactive between different classes. Not surprisingly, in Sweden and Switzerland routine workers are the class with by far the largest proportion of non-voters. In comparison, the combined share of foreigners and abstainers is two to three times smaller among managers and socio-cultural professionals in both countries. In sum, these figures confirm that categories at the top of the class hierarchy are much better represented in the electorate than the less advantaged classes of skilled and routine workers. The bias in political citizenship is further underlined by a comparison of the distribution of voters and abstainers across hierarchical levels. In both Sweden and Switzerland, professionals and managers are considerably overrepresented among active voters, whereas individuals in routine jobs make up an overproportional share among the subpopulation that does not have or does not use the right to vote.

It can reasonably be expected that these differences in the distribution of political rights have implications for both political parties’ orientation and policy design – for if more than half the incumbents in an occupational class do not vote (as is the case of operatives and routine service workers in Switzerland), these classes lose much of the interest they may present as electoral target groups. Accordingly, policies that correspond to the preferences of the electorate may not comply with the wishes of the numerically important but politically uninfluential classes at the bottom of the hierarchy. With respect to this issue, the only evidence at our disposal is exploratory and stems from a variable in the Swiss dataset about individuals’ self-placement on a left-right scale (ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right). It shows that economically active individuals who vote, situate themselves more to the right (mean score = 4.82) than the politically excluded or inactive part of the workforce (mean score = 4.50). In agreement with Pacek and Radcliff (1995), this suggests that electoral abstention is primarily to the detriment of parties to the left. Although more in-depth analysis is needed to illuminate the political implications of unequal participation, there are some elements speaking in favour of this hypothesis. Thus, our data point to large differences in earnings between the politically integrated and the politically inactive. In Switzerland, the median pay of the workforce that has and uses the right to vote exceeds the median pay of the entire workforce by 8.5 per cent. In stark opposition, the median pay of the politically uninfluential subpopulation lies 13 per cent below that of the entire work-
force. In Sweden’s more compressed wage structure, the respective figures are plus two per cent (median income of the politically active workforce compared to the entire workforce) and minus ten per cent (median income of the politically uninfluential workforce compared to the entire workforce).  

If we focus on the margins instead of looking at means, differences in income become more significant. This is evident from Table 14.8 where we have computed both the share of high-earners and low-earners in the different population groups. In the Swiss labour force, there are about as many individuals with a very low work income (less than two thirds of the median earning) as there are individuals with a high work income (more than 1.5 times the median earning). If we look at the same categories within the electorate, the share of high-earners increases by four percentage points while the share of low-earners falls by 3.5 per cent. In relative terms, there are 25 per cent more high-earners in the Swiss electorate than could be expected from observing the distribution within the entire labour force. The opposite picture can be found when looking at those who do not vote: while there are almost twice as many low-earners as in the electorate, the share of high-earners is split by half.

Income differences between the entire workforce and the electorate are much smaller in Sweden, where the share of guest workers is lower and the wage structure more compressed. Still, high-earners are twice as frequent among those voting as among those economically active individuals who cannot or do not want to participate in elections.

In sum, there is strong evidence that the distribution and use of political rights follows class lines. The exclusion of foreign citizens from voting and the abstention of workers in routine jobs result in electorates where groups at the top of the class hierarchy are systematically better represented than groups at the bottom. Higher-earning and better-educated individuals are substantially more likely to possess and use political rights than low-skilled workers in auxiliary occupations. In the light of these findings, Esping-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total working population</th>
<th>Working population using the right to vote</th>
<th>Working population not voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.66 median</td>
<td>&gt;1.5 median</td>
<td>&lt;0.66 median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: For all wage-earners, work income is standardized for employment of 40 hours weekly.*
Andersen’s expectation that economically less advantaged groups use political influence to compensate for unfavourable market outcomes appears rather too optimistic – certainly so for Switzerland where the spread of democratic rights has not led to an egalitarian integration of different social groups into the political system. In effect, our results imply that socio-economic inequalities are, to a large extent, translated into the sphere of politics.
Cumulative Differences in Institutional Embeddedness

Alternative channels of political influence

So far, we have examined three dimensions of institutional embeddedness separately: in Chapter 12 integration into the welfare state (pension coverage), in Chapter 13 integration into intermediary institutions (union membership) and in Chapter 14 integration into political citizenship (nationality and electoral participation). However, following T. H. Marshall we have argued that these different dimensions all reflect aspects of a common concept – namely citizenship, understood as a means of assuring a degree of economic security independent of market forces. Whether the welfare state, the union movement or parliamentary democracy, the common denominator of these institutions is to confer rights to individuals and, thus, to limit the degree of inequality generated by the labour market (Crouch, 1999: 423). Yet it has been shown in Chapters 12 to 14 that the degree to which different classes are embedded in these institutions varies substantially. Moreover, disadvantage with respect to institutional embeddedness may be cumulative: individuals not covered by the pension system may also be excluded from political citizenship and lack an efficient union at the workplace. In contrast, it appears possible that missing integration with respect to one dimension of citizenship may be compensated by coverage with another dimension of citizenship. Thus, individuals not having the right to vote may possibly make up for the lack of direct political influence by using industrial and social rights. Accordingly, the task of this chapter is to simultaneously explore coverage with political, industrial and social rights.

We will start out by examining the link between political and industrial citizenship. These two dimensions are more intertwined than may appear at first glance. Through the institutionalization of interest coordination between employers’ associations, organized labour and the state, unions have come to play an important role in public policy making in most Western European countries. There is ample evidence that in Germany, Switzerland
and, most clearly so, in Sweden, the neo-corporatist administrative arena has become an alternative channel of political power alongside the traditional parliamentary arena (Crouch, 1993, 1999; Blom-Hansen, 2000). Hence, in Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in Germany and Switzerland, trade unions share directly in the administration of public affairs. On the micro-sociological level, this signifies that foreign workers may possibly compensate for the lack of formal political citizenship through union adherence and industrial codetermination. Accordingly, it has been argued that the distinction between industrial and political rights is problematic as trade unions and work councils have come to constitute important vehicles for participation in politics (Soysal, 1994). The link between industrial participation and political influence is most clearly acknowledged in Austria, where foreign citizens may take part in elections for work councils, but are ineligible for the position of shop steward (Soysal, 1994: 128). Against this background, we wish to examine whether foreign workers succeed in compensating for the lack of formal political citizenship through union adherence.

Labour organizations’ stands towards immigrant workers have undergone various changes during the post-war period. Initially, unions were sceptical towards immigration for fear that an ever increasing labour supply would prevent wages from rising. Yet once the transition from a temporary labour migration system to permanent immigration had become manifest in the 1970s, unions began to adapt to the new situation and try to organize as many foreign workers as possible (Castles, 1986; Penninx and Roosblad, 2000). Among strategies developed were the forced enrolment of immigrant workers at arrival as in Sweden (Knocke, 2000) or the creation of parallel structures for immigrants within the union organization as in Switzerland.

In Figure 15.1, we compare membership rates between national and foreign workers for the three countries for which information about nationality is available. Results show that unionization of foreign workers has met with varying success. Most successful by far has been the Swedish labour movement. Although immigrants are somewhat less likely to be organized than Swedes, differences are small. Almost four out of five foreign workers are union members in Sweden. There is a larger gap in Germany and, above all, Switzerland where foreign workers’ membership rates lie clearly below those of nationals. In these two countries, only 26 (Germany) and 18 per cent (Switzerland) of foreign wage-earners adhere to a trade union or a professional association as compared to 30 and 26 per cent of national wage-earners. Interestingly, gender intervenes as a further substantive factor: while both German and Swiss men are better integrated in unions than their male immigrant colleagues, union density among foreign men is higher than among native women. The lowest share of union members are found in the weakest category on the labour market, female immigrant workers. Hence, in Germany and Switzerland, we find little evidence of industrial citizenship compensating for formal political rights. The discrep-
ancy in unionization rates is particularly perturbing in the case of Switzerland where almost a quarter of the workforce does not possess Swiss citizenship and, despite frequently long years of residence, remains basically excluded from political participation, be it direct (voting) or indirect (industrial relations).

There are class differences worth noting. Within the group of crafts workers in Switzerland, unionization rates are higher among immigrants (34%) than among Swiss workers (28%), whereas in all the other classes foreigners are clearly less likely to be union members. Similarly, among immigrant workers in Germany, union density is particularly high among technicians (34%), crafts workers (30%) and routine operatives (38%), while it lies below ten per cent in the skilled and routine services. This indicates that the organizational capacity of the industrial working class is still quite high, allowing successful integration of a high proportion of (male) foreigners into the union movement. Hence, Crouch’s observation on the blue-collar proletariat still seems valid: ‘[T]he originally pejorative definition of manual workers as an inferior class category enabled these class incumbents to organize themselves for citizenship’ (1999: 424).

**Union adherence and the use of political rights**

Union membership in Western Europe arguably presents a means for individuals lacking formal citizenship rights to obtain (indirect) political...
representation and influence. This idea is based on the observation that ‘integration does not come about from a direct relationship between the immigrant and the host country, but rather through the mediation of intermediary organizations which, having attracted the immigrants into their midst, introduce them in turn to wider issues of full citizenship’ (Cachón and Valles, 2003: 471). However, intermediary organizations such as unions may not only offer indirect political rights to individuals without formal citizenship. They may provide incentives to effectively use these political rights to individuals having formal citizenship rights. In other words, industrial citizenship may operate as a catalyst for political citizenship. Radcliffe and Davis (2000: 132) thus argue that the capacity of the working class to participate in politics is a function of the extent to which it is organized. Accordingly, these two authors expect membership of organizations in general, and unions in particular, to increase political interest and political efficacy. Intermediary organizations are supposed to foster electoral participation among their members through two mechanisms (Teorell, 2003): firstly by recruiting individuals into the political process, and secondly by channelling information and thus providing cues that lower the cost of participation for the single individual.

We have seen in Chapter 14 (Table 14.7) that once we control for resources and other mobilization networks, the impact of union membership on voting becomes marginal. Although having the expected positive sign, union membership is only significant at the 10\%-threshold. In Figure 15.2, the link between union membership and electoral abstention is displayed in detail for Sweden and Switzerland, the two countries for which reliable information on voter turnout is available. The link between union adherence and turnout is stronger in Switzerland than in Sweden: union membership reduces electoral abstention in Switzerland by half, in Sweden by a quarter. Moreover, in both

Figure 15.2 Electoral abstention of union members and non-union members, wage-earners only
countries, union membership has a much stronger effect on women’s than men’s electoral participation: unionized women are substantially less likely to abstain from voting than their non-unionized colleagues. Results not shown here indicate that collective organization does not foster voter turnout evenly across classes: again, union membership seems of greatest consequence for members of the industrial working class, promoting electoral participation most strongly among technicians, craft workers and routine operatives in Switzerland, and among craft workers and office clerks in Sweden.

What is the class composition of the politically excluded population, that is, individuals who are neither union members nor voters? In both Sweden and Switzerland, the most heavily overrepresented class among the non-voters and non-union members is constituted by routine service workers. While they make up a small share among wage-earners organized in unions and using the right to vote (11% in Sweden; 6% in Switzerland), they account for a much larger proportion of the politically uninfluential population (24% in Sweden; 16% in Switzerland). In contrast, the politically most active category consists in both countries of socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals. Their share is three to four times larger within the group of union members and voters than among non-members and abstainers.

Adding the dimension of social citizenship

Foreign workers may possibly obtain some (indirect) political influence through trade union membership. Yet the absence of formal political citizenship rights may also be compensated, at least to a degree, through access to social rights. This is the argument put forward by Soysal (1994) who maintains that foreign citizens lack political citizenship rights but are nonetheless integrated into their host societies through the welfare state. This line of reasoning challenges T. H. Marshall’s theory of a sequential evolution from civil rights to political rights and, finally, to social rights (Soysal, 1994: 131). In Marshall’s model, political rights come first, and are instrumental to acquiring social rights. Yet the extension of rights to migrant workers appears to have evolved differently. In the guest workers system applied all over Western Europe in the post-war decades, migrants’ civil and political rights remained severely restricted: guest workers were denied basic civil rights such as family reunion, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of movement (Castles, 1986: 768; Soysal, 1994: 122). Moreover, the right to vote on the (decisive) national level is still reserved to nationals in all Western European countries. At the same time, social and economic rights have increasingly been granted to migrant workers. In most countries, formal citizenship does not appear to be a significant factor determining eligibility to social programs; the array of
social rights accorded to nationals are equally extended to foreign residents. Soysal (1994: 132) thus concludes that host states find it much harder to deny social rights to new groups of people than the right to vote, which still carries a symbolic meaning in terms of national sovereignty.

However, as we highlighted in Chapter 12, the substance of welfare rights differs considerably from country to country, reflecting variations in national social systems. The more extensive the welfare state, the more open it is to non-citizens. With respect to the dimension which we emphasize, old-age pensions, this signifies that an encompassing system based on residence as in Sweden is likely to offer more comprehensive coverage than a social insurance system requiring a certain number of contribution years as in Germany. Given the limited information available about welfare items in our datasets, our analysis of differences in pension coverage between nationals and foreigners is restricted to Germany and Switzerland. In Sweden, foreign workers employed more than 20 hours per week and residing in the country by and large fulfil claiming criteria for both the basic guarantee pension and the second-tier earnings-related pension. In the British dataset, information about nationality is missing. Consequently, in Figures 15.3 and 15.4 we compare pension coverage between nationals and foreigners in Germany and Switzerland.

Figure 15.3  Perceiving financial security in old-age as being very bad, and nationality, Germany 1997
Figure 15.3 exhibits very little difference in perceived financial security in old-age between Germans and immigrant workers. Among both categories, roughly one fifth considers pensions prospects to be bleak. Similarly, Figure 15.4 reveals that among wage-earners working at least 20 hours per week in Switzerland, coverage with the earnings-related second-tier pension is almost identical for nationals and foreigners. There are, however, noteworthy gender differences: while foreign men are slightly better covered than national men, pension security seems lowest in both countries for foreign women. This finding is particularly surprising in the case of Switzerland where Swiss women are substantially more likely to work part-time (49%) than foreign women (36%) – and part-time employment is one of the decisive factors for not reaching the minimum earnings threshold that entitles integration into the second-tier pension system.

On the basis of the limited evidence at our disposal, we find little indication for a cumulative relationship between political citizenship on the one hand and social citizenship on the other. Consistent with Soysal (1994), social rights appear both more expandable, in size and scope, and less exclusive than political rights. Yet while nationality is not a decisive division line with respect to pension coverage, it is possible that industrial citizenship and pensions are more strongly linked.
Industrial citizenship and pension coverage: a reinforcing effect?

The relationship between the union movement and the welfare state has undergone various changes over time. Originally, the nineteenth century craft unions functioned to a large extent as mutual benefit associations, offering modest coverage for contingencies such as unemployment, sickness or the loss of tools (Hyman, 1992: 160). In particular, unemployment insurance was an essential factor in early union organization, serving both as an incentive for workers to join and as an indirect minimum wage against downward competition from the ‘industrial reserve army’ (Alber, 1981: 152). Hence, it is not surprising that in the first decades of the twentieth century, union attitudes were generally hostile towards compulsory state-run unemployment schemes (Toft, 1995: 567–8). After World War II however, the rivals turned into accomplices, unions being today among the strongest supporters of the welfare state in Western Europe. In the context of our study, the focus lies on whether collective organization at the workplace affects the likelihood of individuals to be covered by social rights. More precisely, we wish to examine whether pension coverage varies between union members and non-members.

Unions’ influence on pension coverage is most tangible with respect to occupational pension plans. In all four countries of our sample, there exist occupational pension schemes which are, to some extent, linked with industrial relations. Notably in the two multi-tier countries Britain and Switzerland, occupational schemes account for a substantial part of pension incomes. In contrast, their importance is minor in the two social insurance countries Germany and Sweden: although their coverage extends to 70 per cent of employees in the industrial sector in Germany and even to 90 per cent of wage-earners in Sweden, benefits of these schemes are marginal compared to those paid out by state insurance. In Sweden, all occupational schemes are based on collective agreements between employers and labour organizations; in Germany this applies only to some schemes, mostly set in the public sector. Due to the lack of information in our datasets about occupational pensions and to their small magnitude in Germany and Sweden, we shall leave aside these two countries from subsequent analyses. In contrast, we will investigate the effect of union membership on pension coverage for Britain and Switzerland.

In Britain, there is no legal obligation for the provision of occupational pensions, employer schemes yielding strictly private benefits (see Chapter 12). Accordingly, we expect union presence at the workplace to have an effect on the scope of coverage of these schemes. Through the use of industrial rights such as collective bargaining, unions may succeed in expanding coverage of occupational pensions to groups of workers who, if not organized collectively, lack strategic importance for the firm and thus have little
individual bargaining power to obtain inclusion in the employer scheme. Our calculations show that this hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. Non-union members are significantly less likely to be covered by an occupational pension than their unionized colleagues: among non-members, the share of wage-earners without an occupational pension amounts to 53 per cent as compared to only 16 per cent among union members. In Figure 15.5, this relationship between pension coverage and union membership is further broken down for gender and hierarchical position in the labour market. Results clearly indicate that collective organization increases the chances of being covered by an employer scheme for both sexes, although benefits of union membership appear somewhat greater for men. As regards hierarchy, it is noteworthy that union membership not only affects coverage of workers in subordinate positions, but also of managers and professionals. While benefits accruing from union membership are somewhat greater for the less privileged classes, the use of collective rights enhances coverage with an occupational pension for those classes at the top of the hierarchy as well.

However, is there a causal relationship between union membership and coverage with an occupational pension? In Britain, unions are most successful in recruiting full-time employees who work in large companies in the public sector (see Chapter 13). At the same time, full-time employment, company size and public-sector setting are decisive determinants of the existence of an employer scheme. Hence, the link between collective organization at the workplace and coverage with an occupational pension may be spurious: the same factors that promote union membership may also
explain the presence of an employer scheme. In order to control for this possibility, we resort to multivariate analysis and run two logistic regressions for the determinants of pension coverage. In the first regression, we leave union membership aside. In the second regression, we integrate it as an independent variable. Results are shown in Table 15.1 and reveal that adding union membership substantially increases the explanatory power of the model. In addition, the odds ratio tells us that union members are over three times more likely to benefit from an occupational pension than non-members, even if we control for factors such as public sector employment, firm size and hierarchical position within the labour market. Hence, this finding adds evidence to the hypothesis that in Britain, industrial citizenship and social citizenship have strong cumulative effects. In Britain’s decentralized industrial relations system, the presence of an effective union

<table>
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<th>Britain 1999 (2)</th>
<th>Switzerland 1999 (3)</th>
<th>Switzerland 1999 (4)</th>
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<td>1.03***</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
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<td>2.09***</td>
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<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
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<td>0.257</td>
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<td>5873</td>
<td>2454</td>
<td>2449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to be covered by an occupational pension as compared to the chance of not being covered. *** significant at the 0.001 level; ** at the 0.01 level; r = reference category.
at the workplace appears to have a strong influence on the welfare benefits offered by management.

In Switzerland, the other country in our sample where occupational funds account for a large share of retirement income, we do not expect a direct link between union membership and pension coverage as in Britain. In fact, inclusion into the Swiss second-tier occupational pension system is compulsory for all employees earning more than 40 per cent of the median wage. Hence, exclusion from occupational pensions is due to low earnings, and thus largely a consequence of atypical employment such as part-time or fixed-term contracts. However, exclusion from pension coverage and lack of collective organization at the workplace may nevertheless coincide. For this reason, we have calculated the share of wage-earners falling below the minimum earnings threshold for both union members and non-members. By further controlling for gender and nationality, we obtain the results exhibited in Figure 15.6. They reveal that union members are significantly less prone to fall out of the occupational pension system than non-members. This outcome is mainly due to the large differences found for women: female union members, both Swiss and foreign, are substantially better integrated into the second-tier pension system than non-unionized women. To a lesser degree, this also holds true for Swiss men, but not for foreign men.

The results of multivariate analysis (binary logistic regressions) shown in Table 15.1 confirm the correlation between second-tier pension coverage and union membership for Switzerland. Even if we take into account other determinants of coverage such as gender, part-time employment or hierarchical position in the labour market, union members are twice as likely to

Figure 15.6  Not covered by second-tier pension, by nationality and union membership, Switzerland 1999
obtain earnings that qualify them for access to a pension fund than non-union members. However, integrating union membership into the model adds very little explanatory power, suggesting that it is of secondary importance compared to the other predictors. But why should union members be better integrated into Switzerland’s system of occupational pensions than non-members? The answer most probably resides in the fact that the elements determining exclusion from occupational pensions – atypical employment and low earnings –, also constitute a hindrance for union recruitment. We had observed in Chapter 13 that unions in Switzerland (as in Britain and Germany) struggle to organize part-time employees working in small establishments, in the private, low-skilled services. Hence, employees remaining outside organized labour are also likely to receive wages below the minimum earnings threshold that entitles to an occupational pension. As in Britain, exclusion from the pension system goes hand in hand with exclusion from collective organization in Switzerland, too – although the relationship, while being cumulative, is probably not directly causal. In sum, it appears that unlike formal political citizenship, which is no precondition for the access to social rights, industrial citizenship seems to affect pension coverage.
Concluding Summary

Recalling the central divisions within the employment structure

An empirical enquiry into the employment structure of four different countries unavoidably produces a large quantity of information. The countless tables and figures in the text (and the annexe) are witnesses to the abundance of data on which this study rests. In this concluding chapter, we wish to take an opposite stance and strive for more parsimony, trying to sum up the principal findings in an economical way. As a result, we will limit our summary to four employment segments, namely, higher-grade managers, socio-cultural professionals, routine operatives and routine service workers. This selection is motivated by reasons of both economy and theoretical clarity: the first two categories are emblematic of the growing heterogeneity within the salaried middle class, while the latter two illustrate the impact of tertiarization and feminization on the working class.

The choice of these categories permits us to recall the two criteria to which we give heavy emphasis in the construction of our class schema. With respect to the vertical axis, we argue that differences in the employment relationship are due to differences in marketable skills: depending on the importance of an employee’s skill assets, employers will set up a more or less generous incentive system to obtain maximal productivity from their personnel (Goldthorpe, 2000: Chap. 10). Hence, higher-grade managers and socio-cultural professionals, due to their endowment with organizational skills or expertise, are situated at the top of the class system. In contrast, routine operatives and service workers have little to offer in terms of marketable skills, and find themselves relegated to the bottom.

The vertical criterion of marketable skills needs completion with a horizontal axis, which separates classes according to differences in the work logic. Depending on whether an occupation involves the administration of organizational power, the deployment of technical expertise and craft, or face-to-face attendance to people’s personal demands, the work logic and primary orientation differ in fundamental ways. Based on this horizontal
criterion, we separate managers employed in an organizational work logic from technical experts evolving in a technical work logic and socio-cultural professionals working in an interpersonal service logic. On the lowest hierarchical level, we distinguish between routine operatives, who belong to a technical work logic, and routine service workers, whose work experience is shaped by the interpersonal service logic. The combination of the vertical and horizontal axes produces a class schema that is devised to account for labour market trends such as increasing female employment, expanding services, the rise in educational attainment, and the growth of the welfare state.

When confronting the schema to data of the four countries of our sample, we obtain class distributions that closely reflect national differences in the economic trajectory. The markedly industrial bias of the German economy is translated by an unusually large proportion of individuals employed as craft workers or routine operatives. In contrast, Britain’s employment clusters heavily in managerial jobs, reflecting the expansion of business services in general and finance in particular. In Sweden, interpersonal service jobs account for a much larger share than in the other three countries and mirror the Scandinavian welfare state’s role as provider of social services. Finally, Switzerland’s employment structure borrows features from both Germany and Britain, combining a relatively large share of technicians and craft workers with a sizeable proportion of managers and small employers.

The introduction of a horizontal division line into the schema has the merit of highlighting the extent of gender segregation in Western European labour markets. In this respect, Figure C.1 shows that on the high-skill level, men cluster in management, whereas women are slightly overrepresented among socio-cultural professionals. Polarization is more striking on the low-skill level, where routine operative jobs are overwhelmingly male and routine service jobs female. While being most visible in Britain, this pattern of segregation clearly stands out in all four countries of our sample.

What emerges then from Figure C.1 is a dually gendered occupational structure, in which highly educated men take on positions in management and low skilled men in the crafts, whereas women, depending on their skill level, either choose the socio-cultural (associate) professions, or end up in routine service jobs. To a degree, this cleavage overlaps with the division between employment in the private and the public sector. Whereas male jobs in management and production are mostly set in the private sector, female jobs in the interpersonal services depend to a considerable extent from the state’s ability to offer employment in the teaching, helping and caring professions.

In terms of their size, the four occupational groups, selected above, together account for roughly a third of total employment: the share of higher-grade managers lies between eight (Sweden) and 12 (Britain) per
cent, that of socio-cultural professionals between four (Britain) and six (Switzerland) per cent. The two low-skilled classes of operatives and service workers are largest in Germany (each making up 12% of total employment) and smallest in Switzerland (each accounting for 9%); however, differences between countries are not enormous. Studies into employment changes over the last 30 years suggest very different growth trajectories for these four occupational groups (Crouch, 1999; Goos and Manning, 2003; OECD, 2000a): those comprising managers and socio-cultural professionals have expanded massively and this trend is expected to continue. At a somewhat slower rhythm, the category of routine service workers grew as well and will probably keep on growing. Finally, the number of routine operatives has declined heavily and nothing indicates an end to this decline.

Distribution of material advantage across classes

In the literature, there is apparent controversy over the question whether class consciousness and class action have declined over the last decades (see for example Lee and Turner, 1996; Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Clark and Lipset, 2001; Chauvel, 2002). As this study has mainly focused on a struc-
tural analysis of different employment segments, we do not know why and when collectively shared employment conditions give rise to common class interests and class mobilization or, in Kocka’s terms, why and when ‘economic classes’ become ‘social classes’ (1980: 115). Yet while our study remains silent about the subjective aspect of class consciousness, it clearly shows that the objective basis for class formation, namely inequality within the employment structure, remains striking: in all four countries of our sample, employment as a routine operative or routine service worker brings about consistently worse perspectives in terms of earnings, promotion prospects and pension coverage than employment in managerial or professional positions.

In our analysis, we have put heavy emphasis on the role of work income by arguing that an employment relationship essentially boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic resources. Figure C.2 recalls that in this relationship, higher-grade managers and socio-cultural professionals benefit from ‘terms of trade’ (wages) that are considerably more favourable than those applying to routine operatives and routine service workers. On average, the wages of the former exceed earnings of the latter by a factor that lies between 1.7 (Sweden) and 2.6 (Britain). What is of particular interest is the finding that in all four countries, routine service workers are paid

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**Figure C.2** Monthly gross work income (standardized for 40 hours per week)

- **Britain 1999**, in £
  - Higher-grade managers: £2,170
  - Socio-cultural professionals: £2,100
  - Routine operatives: £1,140
  - Routine service: £830
  - Mean: £1,300

- **Germany 2000**, in DM
  - Higher-grade managers: 6,450 DM
  - Socio-cultural professionals: 6,610 DM
  - Routine operatives: 3,780 DM
  - Routine service: 3,120 DM
  - Mean: 4,400 DM

- **Sweden 2000**, in SKR
  - Higher-grade managers: 26,020 SKR
  - Socio-cultural professionals: 20,240 SKR
  - Routine operatives: 17,330 SKR
  - Routine service: 14,870 SKR
  - Mean: 18,570 SKR

- **Switzerland 1999**, in SFR
  - Higher-grade managers: 7,180 SFR
  - Socio-cultural professionals: 7,170 SFR
  - Routine operatives: 5,040 SFR
  - Routine service: 4,300 SFR
  - Mean: 5,220 SFR
less than routine operatives. This finding holds true even if, with the help of multivariate analysis, sex and age are controlled for. With respect to earnings, British sociologists have shown that inequality is not limited to the level of pay but spills over to the kind of pay (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Evans and Mills, 1998). Our results for Britain confirm that the great majority of both routine operatives and service workers do not benefit from a monthly salary, but are paid on an hourly or piece-work basis. In contrast, more than 90 per cent of higher-grade managers and socio-cultural professionals are salaried on a monthly basis.

Hence, as far as work income is concerned, there is no evidence for a manual/non-manual divide – quite the contrary: compensation for work is not lowest in routine production jobs, but in low-skilled interpersonal service occupations such as shop assistant, home helper, waiter, or nursing aide. In this context, Goldthorpe and his colleagues insist that social classes are groupings that share particular employment relations over time. Accordingly, people’s prospects for mobility appear to have as much effect on life chances as do momentary earnings. If a routine service occupation is only a transitional stop-gap job, it is not necessary to brood over the very low wage (Esping-Andersen, 1993b). However, our results suggest that this is not the case. In all four countries, promotion prospects are distributed in a hierarchical way: professionals and managers benefit from much better promotion opportunities than routine operatives or service workers. It fits into this picture that, on average, routine service workers are everywhere older than vocationally educated employees in skilled service or craft jobs. Moreover, earnings and promotion opportunities are strongly correlated: the higher the median income of a class, the better the promotion chances of individuals within this class.

In sum, our findings for present compensation in the job (earnings) and future prospects of compensation for work (career opportunities) point to a phenomenon of cumulative disadvantage in the employment structure. This ‘chain’ of cumulative disadvantage begins in school and often extends over the life course: children brought up in relatively disadvantaged families are at a higher risk of attaining low educational qualifications. As education is the most important determinant of occupational success, the lack of educational credentials restricts labour market opportunities to the less skilled and less secure job sector (Shavit and Müller, 1998). Once people have entered these routine jobs, they find less opportunities for skill upgrading through on-going education and thus are likely to accumulate a skill deficit. As a result, they remain trapped to a significant degree between the low-paid job sector and unemployment (Gallie, 2002: 115).

Moreover, depending on the welfare regime, disadvantage in the labour market may spill over to the retirement situation: all Western European countries, to some extent, make pension income conditional on previous earnings. As a result, interrupted work careers, part-time employment and
low pay increase the risk of insufficient pension income. This risk has more or less effect depending on whether pension entitlements are exclusively based on prior contributions or whether long-term residence is used as a further eligibility criterion. Accordingly, the encompassing Swedish welfare state provides better institutional embeddedness to low-skilled workers than the liberal British system. For Britain, our findings suggest that inequality in the employment structure is amply echoed in inequality in pension coverage. Figure C.3 recalls that a majority of British routine service workers do not have a private second-tier pension, while among managers and socio-cultural professionals this proportion represents 15 per cent or less. To a lesser extent, the same pattern of inequality is found for coverage with second-tier pensions in Switzerland. For Germany, results based on subjective assessments, while less evident, show a similar though much weaker hierarchical pattern.

With respect to clerks, our findings show that even at the lowest hierarchical level, employment in the office goes along with fringe benefits such as a monthly salary and an occupational pension, advantages that are rarer in low-skilled production or service jobs. Therefore, it is uncertain
whether routine clerks belong to the working class in the same way as operatives or low-skilled service workers. In contrast, Figure C.3 reiterates the findings shown for earnings that the employment relationship of routine service workers – a category that cannot be defined with reference to manual work or a blue collar status – is no more advantageous than that of routine operatives. On the contrary, this category of mostly female employees appears to be the most exposed grouping in the labour market. On a theoretical level, this suggests that traditional sociological divisions such as the manual/non-manual divide or the blue-collar/white-collar distinction have lost much of their explanatory power. On a practical level, this points to one of the lines along which pension system reform should be undertaken in order to guarantee a modicum of economic welfare to the entire population. In our view, the focus would need to be shifted from the traditional male clientele in routine production jobs to the growing female personnel in low-skilled services jobs, associated with part-time employment, fixed-term contracts and interrupted work careers.

The mobilization context of different classes

As mentioned before, our study primarily strives to provide a structural account of contemporary employment stratification. In so doing, we ignore the conditions necessary for the passage from class structure to class action, from the objective situation to subjective consciousness. However, while this analysis remains silent on class mobilization per se, it nonetheless explores the context of mobilization. The difference between the two tasks is straightforward: a thorough study of class mobilization should also integrate the supply side of politics and focus on the actors of class politics, namely political parties and trade unions (Sartori, 1968; Mair, 2001). This track of research has not been followed here. Yet our study enquires into the demand side of politics by examining party preferences and collective organization of different classes. This allows us to sketch out the structural context of mobilization in which parties and unions are engaged.

Our results for party orientation confirm earlier findings, pointing to a political cleavage within the salaried middle class (among others: Kriesi, 1989, 1998; Müller, 1999; Güveli et al., 2002). In this respect, Figure C.4 recalls that left support is consistently higher among socio-cultural professionals than among managers. This difference is particularly salient in the case of Switzerland, where socio-cultural professionals have become the class that most constantly votes for the left – a situation also reported for the Netherlands (de Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Kriesi, 1998; Güveli et al., 2002; van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004). Finally, when observing the political outlook of other classes, it is noteworthy that left support among low-skilled members of the traditional industrial proletariat – routine operatives – exceeds the average by more than five per cent only in Britain.
The finding of a political divide within the salaried middle class runs counter to Goldthorpe’s (1980; 1995) expectation that the privileged ‘service class’, having a substantial stake in the status quo, will develop an essentially conservative orientation. In this line of reasoning, Goldthorpe (1995) has criticized ‘new class’ theories for not providing an adequate account of the structural location of middle-class leftism. Accordingly, we have attempted to single out the structural differences from which the observed cleavage in political outlook ensues. Our focus is on differences in the nature of the work process, the work logic, a criterion according to which socio-cultural professionals and managers clearly diverge.

On the one hand, socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals stand outside the direct lines of command and benefit from high levels of autonomy in the interpersonal exchange with their reference groups of students, patients, or petitioners. Through their focus on the non-profit sector, they are likely to be supportive of egalitarian policies that reduce market dependence (through the strengthening of the welfare state) and increase individual autonomy (through the expansion of civil liberties). Accordingly, they are expected to show affinity to environmental and pro-labour parties.
On the other hand, the work setting of higher-grade managers is defined by the bureaucratic division of labour. Managers exercise delegated authority within a corporate business and need to adopt the organizational orientation necessary to run a department and to keep a balanced budget. As a result, they are expected to favour low taxation, modest social spending and little government interference within the market sphere – in other words, their role at work tends to make them supportive of policies traditionally advocated by conservative parties.

It thus appears that class voting in Western Europe does not follow an exclusively hierarchical division between members of the manual working class and those of the salaried middle class. Yet while electoral support may not be solely structured in a vertical manner, electoral participation certainly is: not all classes are of equal importance as an electoral clientele. In consequence, looking at party support translates only a partial picture of the mobilization context. This is due to two factors: firstly, Western European countries comprise sizeable numbers of foreign nationals who, while fully participating in the labour market and the welfare state, are excluded from political citizenship (Soysal, 1994). This introduces a bias into the composition of the electorate as these ‘forced abstainers’ cluster, to a large extent, at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Hence, we have shown for Switzerland that foreigners only account for 18 per cent of higher-grade managers, but for more than 40 per cent among routine operatives. The discrepancy is even stronger in Germany where 21 per cent of routine operatives do not have German citizenship, while this is true for only two per cent of socio-cultural professionals.

Secondly, the citizenship bias is further amplified by the fact that voter turnout is significantly higher in privileged than in disadvantaged classes. Figure C.5 recalls that in Sweden and Switzerland (where data is available), routine service workers and operatives are three to six times more likely to abstain from voting than higher-grade managers and, above all, socio-cultural professionals. Once we control for other factors such as age, gender

![Figure C.5](140398591X_18_Cons.pdf)
and education, class remains a significant predictor of electoral participation in Switzerland but not in Sweden, where education is of much greater importance in explaining voter turnout. Nonetheless, for the two low-skilled classes of operatives and service workers, the combination of a high share of abstainers and foreigners results in lower attractiveness as an electoral target group and thus in less political influence. Hence, inequality in the employment structure appears, to a considerable extent, to be mirrored by inequality in political citizenship.

Through neo-corporatist arrangements, industrial relations in most European countries have gained an important role in the shaping of public policies. Thus, trade unions provide an alternative channel of political influence alongside the parliamentary channel dominated by political parties (Crouch, 1993). However, the principal raison d’être of trade unions is their role at the workplace, where they try to overcome the power asymmetry between the individual wage-earner and the employer. Not surprisingly then, the primary motivation for joining a union is instrumental and resides in the objective of obtaining better representation at the workplace and higher pay (Guest and Dewe, 1988; Windolf and Haas, 1989; Gallie, 1996b). Hence, it can reasonably be expected that differences in union

**Figure C.6  Trade union membership**
membership owe as much to the structural context of the workplace – being either union-free or having an effective union – as to individual choice.

In this context, Figure C.6 recalls the disparity in membership rates. While the great majority of the Swedish labour force is organized in a trade union or a professional association, membership rates in the three other countries lie between 24 and 30 per cent. In spite of this disparity, the class pattern of unionization is highly comparable across the different countries: socio-cultural professionals are everywhere the category that succeeds best in organizing its members in unions. Albeit somewhat lower, membership rates are also above average among routine operatives, the class – together with skilled craft workers – forming the backbone of industrial trade unionism. In contrast, collective organization is less widespread among managers and, above all, routine service workers. Membership figures for the latter suggest that changes in labour markets have outpaced the adaptability of German and Swiss unions: even though low-skilled service workers often have poor working conditions and could thus potentially benefit from collective organization, less than 20 per cent are union members in these two countries.

Outpaced institutions and the potential for cross-class alliances

Our analysis has repeatedly highlighted the internal differences between the categories that make up the middle class. While salaried managers have, in the era of corporate business, come to replace the figure of the employer and represent organizational authority, socio-cultural professionals jealously guard their autonomy and primarily direct their loyalty to their students or patients rather than the organization. Moreover, professionals in the social and cultural services stand out as a class that presents an unusually high potential for political mobilization: in no other class is electoral participation so widespread and rates of union membership so high. The capacity for collective organization is particularly interesting in the context of the category’s political orientation towards the left: although socio-cultural professionals benefit from an employment relationship that is comparable to that of managers, they do not follow the latter’s conservative outlook.

On a lower level of material advantage, a bicephalous working class emerges from our analysis: it consists of mainly male routine operatives employed in production and mostly female workers in low-skilled sales and service activities. Routine operatives can look back to decades of industrial trade unionism and, on average, earn wages that permit some modest affluence. Nevertheless, their long-term prospects remain poor in terms of both promotion opportunities and future pension rights. In comparison, routine service workers share the long-term adversities of operatives, but addition-
ally have employment conditions characterized by often severe disadvantages such as low pay, atypical employment patterns and precarious job security. Moreover, the analysis of institutional embeddedness suggests that routine service workers are the class closest to social anomy: unlike routine operatives, they do not benefit from the organizational support of powerful trade unions, are badly integrated into the welfare state, and have the highest share of electoral abstainers. In short, it appears that none of the three categories of institutions have succeeded in integrating the particularly exposed group of routine service workers.

This situation is all the more preoccupying if looked at in a dynamic perspective. Goos and Manning (2003) show for Britain that over the last 30 years, there has not only been a spectacular increase in the number of advantageous jobs in management and the professions, but also much growth in low-skilled service occupations. They note that both ‘lovely’ and ‘lousy’ jobs are on the rise. Hence, we do not need a crystal ball to see that the social problem of precarious service employment will remain acute for the near future. According to Gallie (2002: 98), different policies exist to address this problem. At the extremes are the ‘neo-liberal’ solution applied in Britain and the ‘Scandinavian’ solution followed by Sweden, the ‘conservative’ solution chosen by Germany (and, to a degree, Switzerland) being in an intermediate position. While the British way tries to favour employment by increasing wage differentials and reducing collective bargaining controls on employers, the Swedish method involves an effort to improve the quality of work of the low-skilled and to provide more effective opportunities for skill enhancement through continuous education. Our analysis suggests that in terms of earnings and promotion prospects, the ‘Scandinavian’ solution has more positive implications for the quality of life of those affected. Yet in order to provide authoritative evidence on this question, our analysis would have to control: (1) for the level of employment (by focusing on the unemployed), (2) adopt a dynamic perspective (with the help of time series), and (3) integrate the potentially crucial welfare role of the household – three lines of further investigation which fall outside the scope of this study.

In our view, the central findings of this study remain unaffected by these acknowledged limitations of our research design. What emerges then from the preceding chapters is the formation of a category within the salaried middle class (socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals), which – while benefiting from an advantageous employment relationship – shows an unusually high potential for political mobilization and a political orientation towards parties on the left. Having come to play a leading role in both trade unions and left-wing parties, socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals thus join (and partly substitute) the traditional clientele of the left, semi-skilled production workers. However dissimilar the expanding group of socio-cultural professionals and the declining group of
production workers may appear, they stand on common ground with regard to political outlook and collective organization. In fields such as distributional politics and welfare state reform, this may open the door to new cross-class alliances: both categories are expected to favour democratic control of the market economy, relatively egalitarian income distribution and a generous welfare state.

This potential for cross-class action is significant with respect to our findings revealing the need for institutions to adapt to the new situation in labour markets, which have become increasingly feminized and service-intensive. Today, citizenship institutions still largely reflect, to some extent even reinforce, inequalities found in the employment structure. More advantaged classes benefit from better integration into the welfare state, are better organized in collective interest groups such as unions, and make better use of their democratic rights than classes at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. In sum, although intended to provide a counterpart to the ‘raw market nexus’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990), citizenship rights basically remain distributed in a hierarchical way. With the possible exception of Sweden, institutions in the four countries under review have not been able to avoid that individuals at the margin of the employment structure also are at the margin of the pension system, the union movement and the electoral system.
Table A.1  ISCO-1988 codes of each class (identical for British, German and Swiss samples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Technical experts</th>
<th>Higher-grade managers</th>
<th>Socio-cultural professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF and 10 or more employees</td>
<td>SELF and 2000–2470 employees (and less than 10 employees)</td>
<td>2100–2213</td>
<td>1000–1251, 2410–2419, 2441, 2470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF and less than 10 employees (and not 2000–2470)</td>
<td>3100–3213, 3471</td>
<td>1252–1319, 3410–3449, 3452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>Skilled office</td>
<td>Skilled service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>Routine service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>Routine agriculture</td>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>Routine service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SELF**: self-employed or employer  
**SEI**: socio-economic classification of current job according to Statistics Sweden  
**EDUC**: educational level (from 0, incomplete compulsory school, to 7, doctoral studies)
### Table A.3  Female odds ratios: the probability of women being in a given class as compared to the probability of men being in the same class (equal probability = 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Description</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent work logic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large employers</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie with employees</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie without employees</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical work logic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine agricultural</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Organizational work logic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher grade managers</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled office</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>23.19</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.06</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal service logic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>3.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.4  Mean weekly working hours (including only individuals employed at least 20 hours per week)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent work logic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large employers</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie with</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie without</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical work logic</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical experts</td>
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<td>39.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>41.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilled crafts</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine operatives</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine agricultural</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>(37.7)</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational work logic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-grade managers</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate managers</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled office</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine office</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal service logic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled service</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine service</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GB: Hours normally worked per week.  
DE: Contracted working hours; where missing: Actual working hours.  
SW: Normal hours worked per week  
CH: Weekly working hours.  

Mean weekly hours: 38.6.  
Mean weekly hours: 39.0.  
Mean weekly hours: 38.6.  
Mean weekly hours: 41.3.
Table A.5  Britain 1999: Median monthly gross work income for men and women (in £)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>m: (850)</th>
<th>1670</th>
<th>2220</th>
<th>2300</th>
<th>2180</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2740)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1690</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>(720)</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>(620)</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>790</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male median: 1430 £
Female median: 1140 £
In all four tables, parentheses indicate that median figures are based on less than 30 observations. For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.

Table A.6  Germany 2000: Median monthly gross work income for men and women (in DM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>m: (8500)</th>
<th>7500</th>
<th>7810</th>
<th>6870</th>
<th>7010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>5340</td>
<td>5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4370</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3130</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>3440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male median: 4820 DM
Female median: 3870 DM
Median male income / median female income: 1.25.

Table A.7  Sweden 2000: Median monthly gross work income for men and women (in SEK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>m: 28,260</th>
<th>27,480</th>
<th>25,870</th>
<th>30,020</th>
<th>22,480</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13,450)</td>
<td>(15,910)</td>
<td>(13,450)</td>
<td>(15,910)</td>
<td>(13,450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>20,350</td>
<td>22,020</td>
<td>18,110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>18,520</td>
<td>18,520</td>
<td>17,630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>18,980</td>
<td>18,510</td>
<td>(16,380)</td>
<td>17,410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>12,580</td>
<td>(16,510)</td>
<td>(16,380)</td>
<td>16,010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>18,010</td>
<td>(16,510)</td>
<td>(16,510)</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>15,510</td>
<td>(12,830)</td>
<td>(16,510)</td>
<td>14,720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male median: 19,590 SEK
Female median: 16,940 SEK
Median male income / median female income: 1.16.
Table A.8  Switzerland 1999: Median monthly gross work income for men and women (in SFR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>m:</th>
<th>w:</th>
<th>m:</th>
<th>w:</th>
<th>m:</th>
<th>w:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9310)</td>
<td>8660</td>
<td>7940</td>
<td>7620</td>
<td>7740</td>
<td>5440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4940)</td>
<td>(7020)</td>
<td>(6500)</td>
<td>5440</td>
<td>6340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>7050</td>
<td>6380</td>
<td>7720</td>
<td>7110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>(3240)</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>5380</td>
<td>5930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5160</td>
<td>5330</td>
<td>6120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td>3490</td>
<td>(4120)</td>
<td>4880</td>
<td>3620</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m:</td>
<td></td>
<td>5280</td>
<td>(4290)</td>
<td>5280</td>
<td>4840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w:</td>
<td></td>
<td>4220</td>
<td>(4730)</td>
<td>4910</td>
<td>3740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male median: 6280 SFR  
Female median: 4910 SFR  
Median male income / median female income: 1.28.

Table A.9  Germany 2000: Feels closest to Social-democratic Party (SPD) (in % )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>row means</th>
<th>8.3</th>
<th>23.1</th>
<th>41.3</th>
<th>42.6</th>
<th>45.9</th>
<th>43.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total share of SPD-supporters: 48.2%  
For class labels, see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7.
### Tables A.10 to A.13  Union membership by age category (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.10</th>
<th>Britain 1999</th>
<th>Table A.11</th>
<th>Germany 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: 20–42 years old: 24% ; 43–65: 34% .  
For class labels, see Table 13.3 in Chapter 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.12</th>
<th>Sweden 2000</th>
<th>Table A.13</th>
<th>Switzerland 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43–65</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: 20–42 years old: 78% ; 43–65: 88% .  
Average: 20–42 years old: 21% ; 43–65: 29% .
### Tables A.14 to A.16  Union membership by company size (in %)

**Table A.14  Britain 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less 25</th>
<th>25–99</th>
<th>more 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less 25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more 100</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A.15  Germany 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less 25</th>
<th>25–99</th>
<th>more 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less 25</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more 100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A.16  Switzerland 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less 25</th>
<th>25–99</th>
<th>more 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–99</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more 100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For class labels, see Table 13.3 in Chapter 13.

Average: less 25: 17%; 25–99: 28%; more 100: 36%.

Note: for Germany, small companies are defined as having less than 20 (and not 25) employees.

Aver.: less 20: 16%; 25–99: 27%; more 100: 38%.

Average: less 25: 20%; 25–99: 23%; more 100: 28%.
## Table A.17  OLS-regression for political interest, Switzerland 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beta coefficients</th>
<th>t-statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable:</strong> political interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>9.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man = 1</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>10.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional bourgeoisie</td>
<td>0.57*</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite bourgeoisie</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical specialists</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural specialists</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational secondary</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General secondary</td>
<td>1.14***</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary degree</td>
<td>1.39***</td>
<td>7.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member = 1</td>
<td>1.96***</td>
<td>13.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member = 1</td>
<td>0.43***</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**R² adjusted** 0.226

**N observations** 3279

SHP 1999 data; ***significant at the 0.001 level; **at the 0.01 level; *at the 0.05 level.
Notes

Introduction

1 See in this respect van de Werfhorst and de Graaf (2004: 219): ‘The Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema has evolved to the standard indicator of class positions in international research.’

Chapter 1 Class Theorists and the Debate about the End of Class


3 ‘We have drawn on ideas, whatever their source, that appeared to us helpful in forming class categories capable of displaying the salient features of mobility among the populations of modern industrial societies’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 35).

4 In a comparison of the Erikson/Goldthorpe schema and NS-SEC, Goldthorpe and McKnight (2002: 28) report that at the five class level, the class allocation of individuals shows almost 90 per cent continuity between the two classification systems.

5 However, in the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema, not all classes are vertically differentiated: in particular, different employment statuses may not usefully be compared from a hierarchical point of view. The extent to which their classes can be said to be vertically classified will be discussed further in Chapter 3 in the context of the manual/non-manual divide.

Chapter 2 Three Labour Market Trends and their Impact on the Employment Structure

6 However, more recently, these two authors have redone their analysis with British data collected in 1996 and come to rather similar conclusions (Evans and Mills, 2000).

7 On this, see Marshall et al. (1985: 269):

   The occupational structure has become progressively more complex as the numbers in traditional proletarian occupations are decreased and those in service increased. This generates both theoretical and subjective opacity. In effect the conventional distinction between manual and non-manual labour becomes less salient sociologically and socially.

8 Professional and managerial occupations are identified based on ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988) major groups 1 (legislators, senior officials and managers) and 2 (professionals), while craft and production occupations are based on major groups 7 (craft and related trades workers), 8 (plant and machine operators and assemblers) and 9 (elementary
occupations). Major groups 3 (technicians and associate professionals), 4 (clerks), 5 (service and sales workers) and 6 (skilled agricultural workers) have been left aside. For Germany, occupational data based on ISCO-88 are not available before 1993, for Sweden not before 1997.

9 As educational expansion is more accentuated than the process of occupational upgrading, the rising levels of education have only partially and not fully been translated into rising levels of skills at work. This means that returns to educational investments in Europe have decreased over the last 10 to 15 years (Brauns et al., 1997a).

Chapter 3   Women, the Manual/Non-Manual Divide and the Working Class

10 ‘We would like to emphasize that we do not wish to take up any strong position on what future developments in regard to family class are to be expected’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1988: 550). ‘It is evident that, in resting on empirical grounds of the kind indicated, our position here is entirely open to revision should certain changes occur’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 237).

11 Data are only for women aged between 25 and 44 years.

12 Marshall et al. (1995: 2) note in this respect: ‘[C]ritics of the conventional view seem to want to argue both that sex discrimination in employment constrains women into lower-level jobs and grades, and that any classificatory device that reflects this oppression is somehow inadequate and sexist.’


14 However, the historical distinctness of workers and employees must not be exaggerated. Kocka (1981b) shows for Germany that social differentiation between blue- and white-collar employees really took shape in public consciousness only between the end of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century; after which, this division line began to weaken again.

15 In order to avoid misunderstanding: we do agree that classes IIIb and VII have similarly disadvantaged employment relationships and may usefully be collapsed if similarity of working conditions is the key argument (as, for example, in Gallie, 1991). However, in a study that wishes to analyse the salience of the manual/non-manual divide (as does Gallie, 1996a), it does not seem useful to aggregate the lower grade routine non-manual class IIIb with non-skilled manual workers of VII.

Chapter 4   Horizontal Divisions within the Middle Class

16 However, the authors insist on the finding that neither country has experienced an upgrading of the class structure over time that is of similar strength to the upgrading of educational distribution.

17 Our critique may seem simplistic in that it focuses on only one of the two dimensions identified by Goldthorpe (2000: Chap. 10) as being decisive for the shaping of the employment contract; the skill-dimension. Unlike in Chapter 1 where it is discussed in more detail, we do not go further into the second dimen-
sion – the difficulty involved in monitoring the work performance – because it seems to us heavily correlated with the first dimension of ‘skill specificity’ (e.g. Breen and Rottman, 1995: 459). In this respect, see also Goldthorpe (2000: 219):

[W]here difficulty in monitoring work arises, as is the case with professionals or managers, it then becomes especially important for the employer to gain the commitment of employees through a form of contract relying on performance appraisal of only a broad and long-term kind,... (our emphasis).

Chapter 5  The Construction Logic of a New Class Schema

18 In the Erikson and Goldthorpe class schema, these occupations are all allocated into ‘service class II’ of lower grade professionals, administrators, and officials.

Chapter 6  Operationalization of the New Class Schema

19 In Chapter 7, we also discuss results for a sample that includes all individuals spending at least ten hours per week in paid employment and thus integrates a larger share of part-time employees.

20 Goldthorpe (2000: Chap. 10) also emphasizes a second factor: The difficulty involved in monitoring the work.

21 Intermediate occupations are those occupations that are situated on the third skill level of codes 4000 to 8000, regrouping clerks (4000), service and sales workers (5000), agricultural workers (6000), crafts workers (7000) and machine operators (8000).

22 See also Erikson and Godthorpe (1993: 149): ‘[T]he possession or non-possession of an apprenticeship has been shown to be especially consequential for German workers as regards both their occupational life-chances and their standards and style of living.’

23 For Britain, T. H. Marshall’s (1981 [1950]: 42) highlights a significant trade union position. In 1948, the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) approved the principles of a White Paper on Personal Incomes to the extent that ‘they recognized the need to safeguard those wage differentials which are essential elements in the wages structure of many important industries and are required to sustain those standards of craftsmanship, training and experience that contribute directly to industrial efficiency and higher productivity.’

24 We use the definition of the CASMIN-schema to distinguish between educational levels (Müller and Shavit, 1998: 17). In the German and Swiss surveys, levels 1abc (which correspond to compulsory education and basic vocational training) are used to ‘downgrade’ individuals from skilled intermediate occupations to the routine classes. Levels 3ab (that correspond to lower-level and higher-level tertiary degrees) are used to ‘upgrade’ individuals in routine intermediate occupations to the skilled classes. Individuals disposing of levels 2abc (that correspond to vocational education, general secondary education or A-levels/Abitur) are classified in conformity with the primary allocation of their occupation (without correction for skill levels).

'The classification of occupations exhibits more disarray than almost any other issue in professional sociology and provides endless ground for argument and confusion. How a sociologist decides to categorize occupations will reflect his own beliefs about the nature of the social world, his theoretical preference and objectives, and his own moral or political attitudes and values (and all these will themselves be interrelated).'</p> <p><strong>Chapter 7  The Class Structure of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland</strong></p> <p>26 Implicit to this presentation is the assumption that within each of the four levels, the degree of advantage attaching to the employment relationship is comparable. Whether this assumption is correct shall be examined below.</p> <p>27 The index of Dissimilarity is defined as \[ D = \frac{1}{2} \sum |A_k/A - B_k/B| \] It expresses the proportion of women (or men) that would have to move to another class to achieve an equal distribution of men and women over the whole class schema. By definition, D always lies in the interval \([0,1]\).</p> <p>28 The finding of a somewhat lesser gender segregated employment structure in Switzerland contrasts with earlier findings based on 541 detailed occupational categories (Charles and Buchmann, 1994).</p> <p><strong>Chapter 8 The Distribution of Advantage within the Class Schema: Work Income and Promotion Prospects</strong></p> <p>29 Monthly earnings were excluded if falling below the following thresholds: 100 £, 300 DM, 250 SFR, 1400 SK.</p> <p>30 As a measure of average earnings, the median is preferable to the mean, as it is less influenced by extreme values.</p> <p>31 A restrictive definition of part-time is used in the British sample: ‘working less than 30 hours per week’.</p> <p>32 The dependent variable is the logarithm of the monthly wage (standardized for working hours). Independent variables controlled for are: age, age squared, sex, class, employment status. The technique used is unweighted OLS-regressions in SPSS. All classes are significant at the 0.1 level or better. For reasons of parsimony, we have merged routine office clerks and skilled office clerks, whose earnings are everywhere very similar except in Germany. The adjusted \(r^2\) indicate that independent variables together account for 30 (Switzerland), 37 (Britain), 42 (Germany) or 44 per cent (Sweden) of the variance in earnings.</p> <p>33 In the Swedish sample, as having promotion opportunities are counted all those individuals answering with values 2 to 4 (‘fairly small’, ‘fairly large’, ‘very large’), thus only excluding value 1 (‘very small’). In the Swiss sample, we have counted all those individuals as having some chances of promotion that answered – on a scale of ten values – differently that ‘no chances of opportunity’.</p> <p>34 A chief executive of a large firm, a physics professor or a medical superintendent have only very little possibility to further improve their career.</p> <p>35 Age means of the different categories of self-employed vary between 43 and 45 years in Britain and Sweden, between 42 and 46 years in Germany, and between 43 and 48 years in Switzerland. In all four countries, the oldest age structure is found either among self-employed professionals or large employers.
Chapter 9  Structural Divisions within the Class Schema: Firms Size, Public Sector Employment and Party Support

36 For Germany, the respective category for small companies is ‘less than 20 employees’. Unfortunately, the GSOEP sample does not allow the subdivision for ‘less than 25 employees’.

37 In the British BHPS and German GSOEP samples, information is based on the question: ‘which party do you feel closest to?’. In the Swiss SHP dataset, the ‘Sunday question’ was asked: ‘what party would you vote for if elections were to be held tomorrow?’.

38 For Switzerland, we have further included two very small left-wing parties such as Labour and Solidarity.

39 In the 1999 and 2003 Swiss parliamentary elections, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei / UDC Union démocratique du centre) received the most votes of the four Swiss governmental parties.

40 As we are not able to directly measure party support in the Swedish sample, Sweden will be left out of the following discussion.

41 For Britain, Labour has been included as sole party on the left. If figures for the Liberal Democrats were added, the cleavage shown in Figure 10.2 would further deepen. For Germany, we counted the Social Democratic (SPD) and the Green Party as parties on the left.

42 We merge classes into the following categories: Traditional bourgeoisie (large employers and self-employed professionals); petite bourgeoisie (petite bourgeoisie with/without employees); technical specialists (technical experts and technicians); managers (higher-grade and associate managers); socio-cultural specialists (socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals); production workers (crafts workers, routine operatives and agricultural workers); office clerks (skilled and routine clerks); service workers (skilled and routine service workers). The characteristics of this merged version of the class schema will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

Chapter 10  Collapsed Versions of the Detailed Class Schema

43 We show results for the higher-grade and lower-grade service classes only, as the other categories of the collapsed 6-class version are identical to the ones in the 8-class schema.

Chapter 12  Class Differences in Pension System Integration

44 However, while it concerns the entire population, the risk of mortality differs according to social class. It has repeatedly been shown that individuals in less advantaged class settings have a lower life expectancy than individuals in more privileged positions (see Klein, 1993).

45 In order to avoid large inequalities, supplementary pension benefits were introduced for those with no or very low ATP benefits (without any other income testing than the amount of ATP pension received).

46 Within the earnings-related tier, 16.5 per cent of earnings go into a first scheme based on (individual) notional accounts, organized on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis. A smaller share of earnings (2.5%) goes into fully funded individual accounts that are administered by private fund managers within a public framework.
Earnings must be in excess of 24 per cent of the base amount (the minimum level at which income must be declared for tax purposes) which was 36,900 SKR in 2001 (Palme, 2003).


25,320 SFR per year, corresponding to 2110 SFR per month.

18,990 SFR per year, corresponding to 1580 SFR per month.

The importance of targeting is illustrated by another figure: in 2003, over half of Britain’s pensioners received benefits conditional on means-testing (Hansard [official report of the proceedings of the British Parliament] 25. June 2001, Col. 376).

Blair’s reform of gradually transforming the earnings-related state pension (SERPS) into a flat-rate State Second Pension must be understood in this context: the middle class having abandoned the SERPS, what remains of the second-tier pension primarily caters to low earners. Accordingly, fighting poverty becomes the top priority and a flat-rate pension the obvious answer. At the same time, by providing low flat-rate benefits, the reform leads to even greater incentives for middle- and high-earners to join a private scheme and thus cements the pension system’s dualist structure (Emmerson, 2002).

Chapter 13  Class Differences in Trade Union Membership

Called after the Belgian town in which it was established in 1901.

The British Transport & General Workers Union (T&G, before: T.G.W.U.) organizes members irrespective of industry or occupation, but its largest recruitment base is neither transports nor services but manufacturing.

Switzerland, where no large service sector union exists, is an exception. The two largest unions are the metal workers union SMUV and the construction workers union GBI which merged into UNIA in 2004.

Unfortunately, information about establishment size was not available in the Swedish dataset at the time of writing.

Chapter 14  Class Differences in Political Citizenship and Electoral Participation

This applies to a lesser extent to Great Britain and Sweden. In the former case, labour migration came to a large extent from the ex-colonies, primarily from the Caribbean, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. In the latter case, migrant workers were mainly from Finland.

During the recession of the 1970s, migrant workers returned home from all over Western Europe. In Switzerland alone, more than 200,000 foreign workers left the country as their temporary residence permits were not renewed (Flückiger, 1998).

It was not possible to construct the same table for Britain as the question about citizenship remained unanswered by more than 65 per cent of the individuals in the BHPS sample. In any case, the impact of post-war immigration on the labour market is less usefully analysed in terms of nationality in Britain than in Germany, Sweden or Switzerland as arriving workers from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent were usually holders of British citizenship. Relying instead on information about ethnic membership proved equally ineffective as this question was only answered by a third of the sample.
60 It must be noted that foreign citizens are strongly underrepresented in all three samples. Thanks to a specifically devised weight variable, we can correct for under-representation of foreigners in the Swiss dataset. However, with respect to Germany and Sweden, it must be kept in mind that our population samples lead us to underestimate the extent of exclusion from political citizenship.

61 In our target population, the average duration of foreigners’ residence in Switzerland is 20 years. The period of time spent as a foreigner in Switzerland varies strongly, however, according to class position: among foreigners working as socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals, average duration of residence amounts to only 10.3 and 11.8 years. In contrast, time of residence of crafts workers and the petite bourgeoisie lies at 25.4 or 24.1 years respectively (own calculations, SHP 1999).


63 The 15-class schema shown in Table 14.7 has been collapsed into the following 7 classes: (1) traditional bourgeoisie (large employers and self-employed professionals); (2) petite bourgeoisie (petite bourgeoisie with and without employees); (3) technical specialists (technical experts and technicians); (4) managers (higher-grade managers and associate managers); (5) socio-professional specialists (socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals); (6) skilled workers (craft workers, office clerks, skilled service workers); (7) routine workers (routine operatives and routine service workers).

64 It is, however, significant at the 10%-threshold.


Chapter 15 Cumulative Differences in Institutional Embeddedness

66 In Britain, the timid post-war attempts towards economic interest coordination collapsed during the successive Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s (Crouch, 1999: 351; Rhodes, 2000). However, albeit outside the formal coordination apparatus, unions remain a political force in contemporary Britain.

67 As noted in Chapter 14, information about nationality is absent from the British sample. In any case, the link between immigration, union membership and political influence in Britain is probably more usefully analysed in terms of ethnic origin and integration, as arriving migrants from the (ex-)colonies often possessed British citizenship (Wrench, 2000).

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