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Regionalist Protest through Shared Rule? Peripherality and the Use of Cantonal Initiatives in Switzerland

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we are interested in the extent to which federalism is able to deal with peripheral protest through shared rule channels. Shared rule as a key dimension of federal states has not thus far received adequate academic attention. Empirically, we analyse the use of all cantonal initiatives in Switzerland over the past 25 years as a particular instrument of shared rule, subsequently focusing on two peripheral regions with successful regionalist parties, Ticino and Geneva. We find that regionalist parties contribute towards radicalizing peripheral demands in search of attention from the centre. This leads to the mainstreaming of peripheral demands by pulling other parties along. We conclude that shared rule properly designed gives even the most peripheral regions a voice in national decisions, but that regionalist parties may also use shared rule instruments to mobilize their electorate at home to fight their non-regionalist competitors.

KEY WORDS Shared rule; regionalist parties; centre–periphery cleavage; Switzerland

1. Introduction

Over the past few decades, an increasing academic interest has been devoted to the electoral success of West European regionalist parties, their participation in various political arenas (e.g. de Winter *et al.*, 2006; Fitjar, 2009), the evolution of party strategies and coalition dynamics (Elias and Tronconi, 2011) and their shift towards mainstream status (Hepburn, 2009). However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to how regionalist parties are able to vertically channel territorial issues in a multi-level system in order to influence the centre's policy-making. In other words, to what extent and how are regionalist parties able to frame and promote territorial issues at the centre? Understandably, in conventional representative parliamentary systems the analysis of this kind of influence of regionalist parties is focused on electoral

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results, ideological positions (Masseti, 2009) and/or the related bargaining between mainstream and niche parties (Meguid, 2008; see also Bolleyer *et al.*, 2014). But the *formalized* vertical behaviour of regionalist parties remains largely unexplored, which is why this is one of the goals of this article.

At the same time, the actual use of shared rule itself is equally unexplored. Although shared rule and self-rule are two sides of the same federal coin (Elazar, 1987; Hooghe *et al.*, 2010; McEwen and Petersohn, 2015; Mueller, 2014), existing studies—as well as the majority of real-world political demands—are biased towards self-rule. While self-rule describes the scope, nature and extent of regional autonomy, shared rule subsumes types and areas of regional influence over central decision-making. Both are necessary to guarantee the maintenance of federal-type equilibria (Swenden, 2010; Verge, 2013). Hence, a second goal of this article is to take existing categorizations of shared rule (most notably that established as part of the Regional Authority Index, or RAI; Hooghe *et al.*, 2010) a step further by looking at one particular instrument increasingly used by the Swiss cantons over the last 25 years: the cantonal initiative.

We do so following the theoretical expectations that the cantonal initiative is particularly well suited to voice territorial concerns and that its use correlates with a region's degree of peripherality and regionalist party strength. There is thus first of all a conceptual-descriptive rationale to this study: Is the cantonal initiative, which gives every one of the 26 Swiss cantons the right to petition the Swiss parliament, really an instrument to share rule territorially? Second, from an analytical point of view, how can we explain the increasing use of that instrument over the last 25 years (Vatter, 2014a: 446–7) and differences across the Swiss cantons, from those submitting one per decade to those submitting almost two per year (Vatter, 2014a: 448)?

To do so, we first present our theoretical framework which includes regionalist party strength, regional authorities and peripherality to explain the use of shared rule in federal political systems. We then contextualize the cantonal initiative and review the previous literature, so that we are able to develop hypotheses. The section on the research design includes information on data collection, operationalization and methodology. Our analysis then proceeds in two steps: a quantitative analysis of all 26 cantons for the period between 1990 and 2014 is followed by a qualitative comparison of two peripheral cantons with regionalist party success. The final section discusses our results and generalizes to other federal political systems.

2. Theoretical Framework

Federal political systems contain two avenues in which territory matters politically. The first refers to regional autonomy (self-rule), the second to the influence of regions at the central level (shared rule). In trying to understand why

and which actors make use of shared rule, we must therefore probe the territory–power nexus more deeply. The two sets of actors that lie at the heart of that enquiry are regionalist parties (parties politicizing territory to gain power) and regional authorities (power exercised territorially). We discuss these in turn.

As political actors formed along the centre–periphery cleavage, *regionalist parties* are present in almost all West European countries. In linking changing institutional and economic settings with the (postulated or observed) importance of ‘the region’ (Keating, 2003: 263), each regionalist party acts within a specific context-dependent structure of opportunities (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 150–1; cf. also Rokkan, 1999). For instance, stateless regionalism operates in a very different setting than regionalism based on one or several sub-national polities of a federation with high institutional stability and/or consolidated regional multi-party systems and even regionalized state-wide political organizations (Hopkin, 2003).

However, while the literature on regionalist parties is very advanced as regards the causes and consequences of demands for more self-rule (e.g. Elias and Tronconi, 2011; Hepburn, 2009; Massetti, 2009), a much less studied aspect concerns shared rule. One of the few exceptions is Verge (2013: 319–21), who finds that in Spain, state-wide parties were generally in favour of increasing shared rule when in opposition, but only delivered on that promise when in power if they needed regionalist support (Verge, 2013: 327). Elias *et al.* (2015), in turn, distil four different party strategies in a two-dimensional space composed of the economy (the role of the state) and territory (centre–periphery), combining spatial and salience theories. For our purposes, this may mean that mainstream parties in a given periphery choose also to compete on the territorial issue, for example through recourse to shared rule, if peripherality has become salient for reasons exogenous (e.g. economic downturn, unemployment) or endogenous (e.g. the rise of regionalist parties) to the regional political system.¹ This of course can then have effects on the salience of peripherality itself (cf. also Alonso, 2012).

The role of *regional governments* (or regional authorities, more broadly speaking) is equally under-studied in the territorial politics literature as regards shared rule. Traditional studies of federal systems (e.g. Swenden, 2010; Hooghe *et al.*, 2010) have focused more on institutions and rules-in-form than on actors and rules-in-use. One exception to the trend to focus on structural determinants of federalism is the study by Amat and Falco-Gimeno (2014). Noteworthy is their focus on decentralization as a “political outcome” (Amat and Falco-Gimeno, 2014: 824), which allows them to zoom in on the legislative arena, bargaining power and party preferences. At the same time, however, ignoring demands for and changes in shared rule (as they do) misses the other half of the territorial power sharing picture. Much like Amat and Falco-Gimeno (2014), the empirical part of this article will focus on

parliaments and parties as key actors in the territorial politics process, but regional ones and not at the national arena, in analysing the use of shared rule.

This is also in line with other research, more on the side of EU studies, that has analysed the extent and causes of regional embassies and successful influence in Brussels, i.e. at EU level (e.g. Tatham, 2008, 2015; Donas and Beyers, 2013; Callanan and Tatham, 2014; Tatham and Thau, 2014). Thus we learn, for example, that regional size (in terms of population) and actor embeddedness² positively influence success, that the EU Commission's stance evens out the scores a little bit, but that higher levels of regional authority reinforce the impact of the first two variables (Tatham, 2015: 398). The broader message from this stream of studies is to focus on *both* actor-related *and* structural characteristics in explaining the actual use of shared rule in federal political systems.

Common to both the activities of regional authorities and regionalist parties is the underlying centre–periphery model (Rokkan 1999; cf. also Swenden, 2006). For Lipset and Rokkan ([1967] 1990), the territorial dimension is even one of the two fundamental political cleavages (on its 'revival', cf. de Winter *et al.*, 2006). More particularly, an ideal-type periphery is characterized by *distance* and *distinctiveness* from and *dependence* on the centre (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 3). Each aspect captures a different dimension of peripherality: linguistic, religious or other cultural distinctiveness; economic dependence; and geo-topographical distance (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 15). There are two ways in which this might matter for regionalist parties, regional government and shared rule.

First, regionalist parties may campaign on, that is politicize, a peripheral situation in order to gain votes and/or office (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 121 and 141, cf. also Tarlton, 1965; Agranoff, 1999; Piattoni, 2010: 40). As stated already, context matters, of course—for example, within a more or less autonomous regional political system, regionalist parties may have a salient role in framing discourses and formulating and/or supporting policy proposals on a range of specific 'regionalist' demands or, more generally, on territorial issues aiming to enhance regional autonomy more broadly. Having experienced government participation at regional level, a regionalist party may also develop policy alliances with other regional parties (cf. also Swenden, 2006; Fitjar, 2009). However, key to every regionalist party's mobilization strategy is underlining, upholding and embedding the territoriality of politics defined in categories of 'us' (the region) versus 'them' (the centre). Recourse to shared rule, if it happens at all, is thus merely one of many instruments in this strategy.

Second, other regional parties when in government at the regional level might also rely on shared ruled instruments, particularly when in opposition at the national level (cf. Verge, 2013). For them, exercising shared rule actually offers a way in which the economic, cultural and/or political domination of the periphery by the centre can be compensated for. The competitive logic

among territories and new forms of territorial mobilization (Brenner, 2004; Bartolini, 2005: 256) point in the same direction: territory has also become more important for non-regionalist actors, with devolution processes creating more or less formal channels to communicate concerns towards the centre. Hence, the vertical dimension of state-wide party behaviour becomes increasingly salient (Hopkin, 2003; Fabre, 2008; Bardi and Mair, 2008), and exercising shared rule might be one way in which the multi-level game is played.

In sum, in a multi-level system with autonomous regions recognized by the centre, “vertical” lobbying might occur because of a peripheral malaise. But even the most objective peripheral conditions still need to be activated politically to matter for collective decision-making. In the absence of a regionalist majority (as is currently the case in Catalonia and Scotland, for example), only interparty bargaining within a region will trigger peripheral protest. We can thus presume that the better regionalist parties are at playing the coalitional game within ‘their’ regional system, the better they are able to communicate their stance towards the centre. As we shall see shortly, the success of this multi-level strategy (horizontal coalition-building, vertical protest) depends on the capacity to shape and impose a regionalist frame onto the other regional parties. We next lay out our empirical scenery.

3. Shared Rule in Switzerland

With the cantonal initiative, the Swiss federation provides a clearly institutionalized tool to exercise shared rule, that is a formal mechanism by which regional authorities (including or excluding regionalist parties) may influence central decision-making. An investigation of how this instrument has been used in actual practice is thus an ideal testing ground for our theoretical reflections. We next present that instrument and then develop testable statements, hoping to contribute also to the wider debate on why shared rule is used, by whom and for what purposes.

3.1. Context

The Swiss cantons possess various means to influence national decisions—a facet of federalism usually subsumed as ‘shared rule’ (Elazar, 1987; Hooghe *et al.*, 2010; Mueller, 2014; McEwen and Petersohn, 2015). Here we discuss the three main ones.³ Typical examples of shared rule are second chambers (Swenden, 2010), in Switzerland embodied by the *Council of States*, where each full canton is entitled to two seats and the six half-cantons to one seat each. However, unlike in Germany and rather like in the United States, members of the Council of States are directly elected by the cantonal electorate, which significantly weakens the influence of cantonal authorities at the expense of party politics (Vatter, 2014a: 461).

A second, typically Swiss way to exercise shared rule is through *direct democracy*. The so called ‘cantonal referendum’ means that at least eight cantons can challenge any Act of Parliament within 100 days of its publication. If that quorum is reached, a nationwide referendum is held and the Act adopted only if a simple majority of voting Swiss citizens consent. Although powerful at first sight, since 1848 the cantonal referendum has only been used once—but successfully so: in the popular vote of May 2004, the people rejected a proposed tax reform (Fischer, 2006; Vatter, 2014b: 130).

A third instrument of shared rule is the *cantonal initiative*. Unlike the cantonal referendum (a legislative veto to which at least eight cantons have to subscribe), cantonal initiatives can be submitted by one canton *alone* and may also *initiate* law-making. Furthermore, unlike elections to the Council of States, it is the cantonal *authorities* who are in charge of the process, and not the cantonal electorates. In fact, it is usually a cantonal parliament that initiates the submission process (Neuenschwander, 2006: 102–6), although in nine cantons the cantonal electorate is additionally competent (Vatter, 2014b: 352).⁴

However, unlike popular initiatives on constitutional change, which are submitted by at least 100 000 citizens and which lead to a binding nationwide vote regardless of parliament’s consent, cantonal initiatives depend on explicit parliamentary support: to be adopted, cantonal initiatives must be endorsed by both chambers separately (FC arts. 116–17). In this they resemble petitions, although carrying the symbolic force of having been submitted by a state-like entity and popularly elected politicians. A final particularity is related to the fact that in none of the Swiss parliaments does a single party hold a majority,⁵ so in principle cantonal initiatives would need to be endorsed by at least two cantonal parties.

Moreover, since the Council of States has lost its role as the voice of cantons and the cantonal referendum is almost never used (and even if so, then only reactively, as a veto), cantonal initiatives represent the main instrument of shared rule by which Swiss cantons currently express their demands to the national authorities. In other words, the cantonal initiative is the only *official* instrument to *territorially* lobby the Swiss parliament in a *proactive* way (Vatter, 2006: 175–81). In [Figure 1](#), we see the rise in the use of this instrument since 1978, when data collection was systematized for the first time. Its use has increased from barely 4 initiatives submitted per year between 1978 and 1987 to almost 23, in the last decade.

Nevertheless, at first sight cantonal initiatives appear to be a rather ineffective means to influence national policy-making. Baumgartner (1980) and Neuenschwander (1999, 2006) calculate that only about 25% of all initiatives result in a parliamentary motion that forces the government to propose legislation, while a further 9% result in mere invitations to examine a question (Neuenschwander, 1999: 66–7). At the same time, almost two-thirds of all cantonal initiatives are rejected (38%) or written off (23%), which means they




Figure 1. Total number of cantonal initiatives submitted per year, 1978–2014

Note: Line indicates linear trend over time. Source: Own tabulation based on data from Curia Vista (2015).

were either not treated on time or their purpose was regarded as fulfilled already (Neuenschwander, 1999: 66–7; cf. also Baumgartner, 1980: 148–51; Wili, 1988). The share of failed initiatives even increased to 68%, by 2010 (Jenny, 2012: 16). Also, less than half of all cantonal initiatives directly address territorial questions more narrowly understood (Baumgartner, 1980: 89; Neuenschwander, 1999: 26–8 and 7), that is issues that are intrinsically territorial—like the construction of a particular road or railway line, state subsidies for a particular airport or the federal representation of a particular territorial minority such as Italian speakers (see Table A1 for further examples).

But if the cantonal initiative is neither particularly effective in sharing rule, nor used exclusively for sharing rule territorially, the question then becomes why the Swiss cantons—and some cantons more than others—continue to make use of this instrument, and even increasingly so. The existing literature provides two possible reasons. First, although between 1995 and 1999 only 1% of all important national decisions originated in the cantons (Sciarini *et al.*, 2002: 11), since then “the increased power of cantons [. . .] [has] become very important for federal policy-making” (Kriesi, 2015: 728). The cantons are both individually and collectively (e.g. through the Cantonal Conference of Finance Ministers) important players in Swiss politics (Sciarini, 2015a: 35–9, 2015b: 59–64). Moreover, the Conference of Cantonal Governments was created in 1993 precisely for the purpose of increasing subnational influence (Hänni *et al.*, 2013), and since the 1990s many cantons have started to maintain permanent ‘ambassadors’ in the federal capital (cf. della Pietra, 2008; Wüthrich, 2015a+b).

Second, despite the extremely “non-centralised” (Elazar, 1987) nature of Swiss federalism and its overall structural stability as well as prosperity, centre–periphery cleavages have recently become re-politicized both *within* and *between* the Swiss cantons (Linder *et al.*, 2008). The resurgence of territorial (or regional, in that case) politics in Switzerland can be seen,

among other developments, in the ascent of regionalist parties (see below and Mazzoleni, 2015). But regional tensions have also emerged during national referenda on various issues since the 1990s (Kriesi *et al.*, 1996), polarizing citizens' attitudes towards redistributive policies around the country (Sciarini, 2002) or even directly pitting the 'richer' against the 'poorer' cantons (cf. Mueller and Keil, 2013). In fact, in autumn 2015 an attempt by the 'rich' cantons to launch a cantonal referendum against fiscal equalization failed (Kriesi, 2015: 734; Aschwanden 2015). And also the vote on the popular initiative 'against mass immigration', in February 2014, has laid bare the urban–rural divide across Switzerland, with the most peripheral Ticino registering the highest approval rates of all 26 cantons (Mazzoleni and Pilotti, 2015). We now turn towards adjusting our theoretical expectations into case-specific hypotheses.

3.2. Hypotheses

We expected territorial issues to be related to peripherality, that is the political activation of specific (topographical) distance, (cultural) distinctiveness and (economic) dependence. In this sense, territorial protest is more or less culturally, linguistically or economically driven in connection with the type of relationship between peripheries and national centre(s). We thus expect that

H1: The more peripheral a canton, the more that canton will make use of cantonal initiatives.

Second, in line with the above-cited studies on the interests and strategies of regionalist parties to maximize the politicization of the centre–periphery cleavage, we would expect cantons with strong regionalist parties to make the most use of the cantonal initiative. Thus, our second hypothesis reads as follows:

H2: The stronger regionalist parties within a canton, the more that canton will make use of cantonal initiatives.

Strength in this sense takes into account both participation in regional governments and seat share in cantonal parliaments. However, since cantonal initiatives need to be approved in the latter, we shall rely on parliamentary strength for the empirical analysis. To control for the influence of rivalling factors, we include several other variables alongside our own. All are derived from the literature, as we explain in the next section.

4. Research Design, Data and Operationalization

Our research design consists of a two-staged comparative analysis at subnational level (Collier, 1993: 108; Snyder, 2001). Our units of analysis are the 26

Swiss cantons. Such a within-country comparison keeps the availability of protest instruments constant, because nationally defined: all cantons have the same access to the cantonal initiative. Yet it allows for variation on both the dependent and independent variables, that is the degree of peripherality and the strength of regionalist parties, on the one hand, and the frequency and nature of the use of shared rule, on the other. To detect regularity, we first rely on multivariate regression analyses; to examine causality, we then study the only two cantons with relevant regionalist parties, Ticino and Geneva, in depth (cf. Lieberman, 2005).

To measure the actual use of shared rule in Switzerland (our dependent variable), we count the number of cantonal initiatives submitted. Data are available from 1978 until 2014. However, when we turn to the analysis, we start in 1990 because it is since then that major changes have been taking place in Swiss politics, such as polarization and a revival of the centre–periphery cleavage, both in turn connected to Europeanization and globalization (e.g. Vatter, 2014a; Kriesi, 2015; Mazzoleni and Pilotti, 2015).

Turning to our two main independent variables, we measure the strength of regionalist parties through their mean vote share at cantonal parliamentary elections between their creation and the last election (source: BFS, 2015; for more details, cf. Appendix A2). Our variable for peripherality, in turn, is the *product* of spatial distance (in km) from Berne, the capital, and linguistic minority status (1 for cantons Geneva, Vaud, Fribourg, Neuchâtel, Jura, Ticino and Valais; 0 for all others). In this way, we capture two of the three essential elements of peripherality (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 3): linguistic minority status assesses cultural distinctiveness, while distance from Berne measures remoteness. Both are necessary, in our conceptualization, to speak of a periphery. Economic dependence, the third element of peripherality, is assessed using GDP figures, social benefit ratio and unemployment (BFS, 2015). Because these change over time, we again use mean values where available.

As controls we use a number of variables proposed by the existing literature. Neuenschwander (1999: 72–4, 2006: 116–17) models the use of cantonal initiatives through the strength of left-wing parties (a minority at national level) in a given canton and its degree of urbanization, while the degree of under-representation in the Council of States (where all full cantons are entitled to two seats, regardless of their population size) loses its significance when included in a multivariate regression analysis. The reason for this is that national minorities are thus enabled access to the Swiss parliament, with left-wing parties additionally interested in centralization to enable equal access to public services. Data for left-wing parties and urbanization are from the BFS (2015).

Jenny (2012), on the other hand, comes to different and partly contrary conclusions when he predicts the number of initiatives submitted by a canton to increase with the number of parties in that canton, whether the canton is inhabited by a linguistic minority (French- or Italian-speaking), and

its again under-representation in the Council of States. Moreover, while Neuenschwander is only able to explain between 28% and 29% of the variance in the number of initiatives submitted between 1998 and 2008, Jenny (2012: 20–1) can predict up to 41% (for the period between 1990 and 2010).

Hence, to measure under-representation in the Council of States (seats in the National Council are allocated to cantons according to their population), we calculate the share of a canton's population from the total population of Switzerland (data: BFS, 2015), from which we then subtract its share of seats in the Council of States. Naturally, the resulting measure strongly correlates with population size (Pearson's $r = .974$), but the theoretical reflection behind under-representation is different: cantons would resort to the cantonal initiative for lack of adequate representation, while on size alone one could argue that large cantons have many other, informal means at their disposal. Our measure also controls for the two rather large half-cantons of Basel-City (BS) and –Countryside (BL), which each have only one senator.

Two final factors to include are the composition and strength of cantonal parliaments (Vatter, 2014a: 275–6). The reason for this is that, on the one hand, previous studies have found that initiatives are mainly submitted by cantonal parliaments as opposed to cantonal governments and electorates (Neuenschwander, 1999: 49). On the other hand, while cantonal governments have other, more direct means to access the federal arena (such as participation in inter-cantonal associations and consultation processes), parliaments really only have the cantonal initiative to act vertically. Thus, for parliamentary party fragmentation we use the mean of the Rae Index values for the cantons from 1990 and 2009 (data from Vatter *et al.*, 2012), and for the strength of parliaments the index of parliamentary power calculated by the same authors (again, we use the mean of the values of 1990 and 2009). We next present our results.

5. Results

In this section, we first present some descriptive results, discuss noteworthy bivariate correlations and then move on to multivariate modelling before concentrating on two cantons.

5.1. Cross-sectional Analysis

As suspected, not all the cantons have equally often made use of the cantonal initiative, as shown in Figure 2. In fact, since 1978 six cantons have been responsible for half of all initiatives submitted, with Geneva and Berne clearly dominating. These two plus Ticino have also submitted the most initiatives over the last five years, with 16, 14 and 13, respectively.




Figure 2. Total number of cantonal initiatives submitted by canton, 1978–2014¹¹
Source: Own tabulation based on data from Jenny (2012) and Curia Vista (2015).

A look at bivariate correlations with the number of cantonal initiatives submitted reveals that seven variables yield coefficients above 0.5, all positive and significant: unemployment, the strength of parliament, the effective number of parties in parliament, population size, under-representation in the Council of States, mean strength of regionalist parties and peripherality as defined above. However, only multivariate analyses can tell which of these variables exerts the most consistent impact on the use of shared rule.

In Table 1, we start with three models that include only the strength of regionalist parties, alongside a number of institutional and political controls. The next three models test for the influence of peripherality, and the last three present alternative models. The inclusion of other economic controls (not shown) has no impact on the significance of these findings: both the influence of geo-linguistic peripherality and the strength of regionalist parties remain strong, positive and significant, as hypothesized.⁶

Judging by the amount of variation explained, the first three models explain more than either the second or third set, namely between 68 and 69%—that is between 27 and 41% *more* than either Jenny (2012) or Neuenschwander (1999). But even the peripherality models explain between 63 and 65%. The slightly higher relevance of parties over peripherality is confirmed by looking at standardized coefficients (not shown), where regionalist party strength has a consistently greater impact (between 0.397 and 0.404 across models 1 to 3) than peripherality (between 0.367 and 0.373 across models 4 to 6).⁷

Note also the consistently positive impact of the number of parties and parliamentary strength vis-à-vis cantonal governments. In particular, the effective number of parties within a cantonal parliament seems to be a highly relevant factor for predicting a canton's use of cantonal initiatives. This further underlines the importance of political factors for understanding vertical interactions in federal political systems. What is more, the strength of a cantonal

Table 1. OLS regressions for number of cantonal initiatives submitted per canton, 1990–2014

	Model								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Regionalists	1.228*** (0.382)	1.211*** (0.395)	1.231*** (0.386)						
Periphery				0.076** (0.030)	0.076** (0.030)	0.078** (0.030)			
No. of parties	2.776*** (0.759)	2.949*** (1.007)	2.350** (0.946)	2.927*** (0.815)	3.393*** (1.065)	2.457** (1.009)	2.056** (0.884)	2.829*** (0.865)	2.464*** (0.844)
Parl. strength	6.238*** (2.142)	6.457** (2.334)	5.880** (2.212)	5.126* (2.480)	5.654** (2.623)	4.692* (2.558)	5.790** (2.508)	6.211** (2.559)	5.725** (2.530)
Socialists		-0.071 (0.261)			-0.189 (0.273)				
Under-rep. in Senate			39.767 (51.818)			44.235 (55.225)			
Unemployment							3.967** (1.859)		
Latin dummy								7.319* (4.153)	
Distance from Geneva									-0.040** (0.019)
Constant	-4.559 (5.470)	-4.527 (5.590)	-1.651 (6.696)	-6.537 (6.015)	-6.521 (6.088)	-3.357 (7.249)	-6.628 (6.315)	-5.468 (6.408)	9.082 (8.085)
Observations	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
R ²	0.678	0.679	0.686	0.634	0.642	0.645	0.607	0.585	0.606
Adj. R ²	0.634	0.618	0.627	0.584	0.574	0.577	0.554	0.528	0.552
Residual SE	7.603	7.768	7.675	8.105	8.202	8.171	8.389	8.628	8.406
F Statistic	15.414***	11.092***	11.492***	12.685***	9.408***	9.519***	11.350***	10.330***	11.274***

Note: Displayed are unstandardized regression coefficients, SEs in brackets.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Variance-Inflation Factors (VIF) always < 2.04 .

parliament also matters. This confirms that cantonal activity in this area of federalism is above all undertaken by parliaments and not so much by governments, since the latter—especially from the big and urban cantons—have other, more effective means at their disposal (e.g. exerting pressure during pre-parliamentary consultation procedures; cf. Vatter, 2006: 175–7).

However, of the other variables highlighted by previous studies, neither under-representation in the Council of States nor the strength of left-wing parties remains relevant. This shows a lack of support by other parties for left-wing demands (unless they specifically benefit the specific region, see below), on the one hand, and points to the irrelevance of mere size (from which under-representation is a federal corollary), on the other. The three last models in Table 1 additionally confirm this: *distance* also matters if measured from Geneva, the south-westernmost canton of Switzerland, and linguistic *distinctiveness* is as relevant for predicting the number of cantonal initiatives launched by a canton as economic *dependence*.

Hence, our analysis clearly shows the relevance of peripheral factors—distance, minority language and regionalist parties—for predicting the use of cantonal initiatives. We now turn to a within-case analysis of Geneva and Ticino, the only two cantons with regionalist parties, to verify whether these two also *explain* the use of shared rule, and if so, how.

5.2. Within-case Analysis

The goal of this section is to understand the mechanism behind the launching of a cantonal initiative and to verify the influence of peripherality and regionalism. Studying Geneva and Ticino is suitable because both are peripheral cantons on the topographical as well as the linguistic dimension. Both French (spoken in Geneva) and Italian (Ticino) are minority languages in Switzerland overall; and the respective capitals, Geneva city and Lugano, are quite far away from Berne. Moreover, linguistic and geomorphologic distance overlaps with economic dependency. On the one hand, even the impressive economic growth of the post-war period was unable to reduce Ticino's dependence on Swiss-German economic centres (Toppi, 2003). Geneva, on the other hand, is the canton with the highest unemployment rate (5.5% in 2014 against a Swiss average of 3.2%), and claims against dominance by the Swiss-German majority regularly emerge (Baettig, 1986; BFS, 2015). At the same time—and possibly because of this—we see that both cantons have made an active and increasing use of the cantonal initiative in the last two decades (Figure 3).

Let us next focus on 'territorial' initiatives more narrowly. This definition refers to defending or advocating a cause that is *peculiar* to a *specific* territory and applies to 19 initiatives submitted between 1990 and 2014: 5 from Geneva and 14 from Ticino (see Table A1). Of these, 79% regard economy, transport and matters of state organization. Less important areas of cantonal initiatives




Figure 3. Number of cantonal initiatives submitted in GE and TI, 1990–2014

Note: Dashed lines indicate linear trends over time.

in the strictly territorial sense are housing, health care and asylum policy. Moreover, while in Geneva territorial initiatives thus defined only make for about 11% of all initiatives submitted since 1990, territoriality is much more important in Ticino, where 44% have an explicit link to territory. Note that because Ticino is the only fully Italian-speaking canton, demands for a more extensive linguistic policy (2005), more Federal Councillors (2010) and a better linguistic representation in the federal government (2012) are also territorial. This shows the policy malleability of territory for political purposes.

In both cantons, peripherality is characterized not only by geo-linguistic *distance* and economic *dependence*, but also by regional *distinctiveness*. Of course, both cantons have been part of modern Switzerland for over 200 years. And particularly since World War II, Swiss identity building was embedded in increasing welfare (Kreis, 1993). In fact, linking national identity to economic integration can be regarded as a specific translation of national ‘insularity’ and Swiss ‘exceptionalism’ (Froidevaux, 1997), thus providing for a partial neutralization of peripherality (Ceschi, 1992; Ghiringhelli, 2003). But particularly concerning Ticino, no other Swiss canton possesses a similar overlap between linguistic and political borders: with the exception of small and fragmented Italian-speaking territories in the canton of Grisons, Swiss-Italian territorially coincides with the canton of Ticino, providing for a dense network of media (print, radio, TV, online) focalized on cantonal politics. So nowhere else in Switzerland are linguistic, regional and cantonal borders so fixed.⁸ Geneva, too, is part of a wider, but different cultural space. On the one hand, the existence of a “romande” identity (i.e. (Swiss-)French-speaking) vis-à-vis the Swiss-German majority is emphasized (e.g. Charpillot and Grimm-Gobat, 1982). On the other hand, cantonal belonging persists, as seen for instance in the refusal to merge with canton Vaud, in 2002. Moreover, over the last decades Geneva may have experienced more difficulties in adapting to globalization and liberalization than the German-speaking cantons (Sciarini, 2002; Mazzoleni and Pilotti, 2015).

All this is not least expressed in the rise and consolidation of two regionalist parties, the *Lega dei Ticinesi* (LT) and the *Mouvement Citoyens Genevois* (MCG). Both parties have come to significantly reconfigure the political landscape of their canton (Figure 4). In Ticino, the LT was founded in 1991 (Knüsel and Hottiger, 1994; Mazzoleni, 1999, 2005) and is currently the biggest party in the cantonal government, with two out of five seats, and the second-largest party in the cantonal parliament. In Geneva, the MCG was established in 2005 and currently holds one out of seven government seats (BFS, 2015).

Both parties have placed territory at the very heart of their name and programme. Of course, these regionalist parties are *cantonalist* regionalist organizations (cf. also Thorlakson, 2009), where the regional polity remains part of a multi-level federal structure. Moreover, unlike regionalists elsewhere, the LT and the MCG do not demand less, but rather *more* involvement from the centre. In other words, both provide examples of *integrative* regionalism (Keating, 1998). They want a stronger and more tightly integrated federation by strengthening Switzerland's external boundaries against globalization's threats. Hence, if "in other contemporary multinational democracies, (sub-) nationalist politics is as much about seeking greater territorial autonomy and the recognition of nationhood than it is about achieving independence" (Beland and Lecours, 2008: 4), for both Swiss regionalist parties the key territorial claim is to strengthen the ties between their region's autonomy and national independence.

Because of their parliamentary strength and government participation, we could expect a growing influence of the LT and the MCG on policy-making, including the use of shared rule. However, the role of regionalists




Figure 4. Vote and seat share of LT and MCG, 1991–2015

Note: GS = share of seats in government; G% = vote share in governmental elections (only Ticino, where proportionality is used); P% = vote share in parliamentary elections. Sources: <http://www.ge.ch/elections/> and <http://www3.ti.ch/DFE/DR/USTAT/> [25/10/2015].

is not as expected: none of the territorial initiatives was actually initiated by either of the two parties (Table A1). One reason for this might be that to submit a cantonal initiative, a majority (or at least a plurality, if others abstain) within the cantonal parliament is needed, and that as anti-establishment parties (at least rhetorically), regionalists prefer to go for it alone. Thus, both parties have preferred other strategies, such as relying on the media (tribune strategy) and the launching of popular initiatives or legislative referenda (with an anti-establishment claim), as well as politicizing primarily *within* the cantonal level. Nevertheless, the LT did co-sponsor five initiatives and the MCG did support the initiation of one, in 2005. What is more, other parties, from the left to the right, have made use of the cantonal initiative for territorial purposes. This shows the use of shared rule to be the outcome of coalitional success.

Thus our cross-sectional results need to be nuanced. *Prima facie*, there is no direct evidence that contradicts the finding whereby peripherality and regionalist parties are positively correlated to territorial lobbying. Clearly Ticino, which is culturally (Italian-speaking minority), topographically (cut off by the Alps) and economically the most peripheral canton, has made the greatest use of this instrument in recent years. All of Ticino's 2014 initiatives have had a direct connection with the presence of Italian border workers (*frontalieri*), that is people living in Italy but commuting into Ticino for work on a daily basis. That is a core issue of the LT. Knowing about the strength of the LT further helps to understand the number and type of territorial initiatives coming from this canton: the 2014 initiative demanding that Ticino be converted into a 'special region' for economic and immigration purposes is certainly the most radical demand voiced in this context. Yet this initiative was not submitted by the LT, but by the Green Party of Ticino, which over the last years also mobilized along the territorial dimension.

The point about regional, issue-specific coalitions is verified by calculating support ratios (Table A1), defined as the number of supporting cantonal MPs per total regional MPs.⁹ For our 19 'territorial' initiatives, that support is never below 44%, stands at 71% on average and even attains unanimity on four occasions (all having to do with infrastructure). At the same time, at the federal level the success rate of this subset is much lower than that observed for other cantonal initiatives (Neuenschwander, 1999, 2006; Jenny, 2012), namely 16%.¹⁰ Yet even the 'failed' initiatives can be interpreted as success in the sense that they (a) allowed these cantons to place specific issues on the federal agenda and (b) maintained the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage.

In sum, it is through *issue-specific coalitions* (primarily on the economy, transport/infrastructure and matters of state organization/representation, in our two cases) and because of the *indirect pressure* arising from regionalist (electoral and office) success that territorial lobbying occurs, contributing in turn to further radicalizing peripheral claims. Regionalist parties thus

contribute to the mainstreaming of peripheral demands. The case of Geneva even shows that a regionalist party can almost completely abstain from voicing peripheral demands, at least as regards the official channel of shared rule. Hence, although not that many cantonal initiatives were actually submitted by regionalist parties, we regard these parties' increasing strength as a sign of an underlying peripheral malaise that also pushes mainstream parties to make use of the cantonal initiative to voice territorial concerns. So while peripherality is an important condition for regional lobbying, political actors still need to be able and willing to use those channels. Regionalist party strength in this sense is an important cause that is endogenous to the regional political system. More broadly, it helps to understand the mechanism behind the launching of shared rule instruments.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

In this contribution, the general question we were interested in was how a region's peripheral status and the strength of regionalist parties relate to the use of shared rule mechanisms. The case we chose to investigate this phenomenon empirically was the Swiss federation, where through the cantonal initiative every canton is able to individually, proactively and formally petition the Swiss parliament. While previous analyses (Neuenschwander, 1999; 2006; Jenny, 2012) have found the cantonal initiative to be primarily a remedy for under-representation in the Council of States, peripherality and regionalist party strength also matter. These cross-sectional findings are robust to the inclusion of various socio-economic (GDP per capita, urbanization, social benefit ratio, unemployment) and political (strength of left-wing parties, strength of parliament, number of parties in parliament) variables.

To investigate the role of peripherality and regionalist parties more closely, we then undertook a comparison of Ticino, the only fully Italian-speaking canton located in the extreme south of Switzerland, and Geneva, French-speaking and located in the extreme south-west. We further focused on cantonal initiatives with a particularly territorial focus, i.e. those that put their own canton at the heart of a demand. We thus saw that the presence of a regionalist party—the LT and the MCG, respectively—alone did not suffice to explain the launching of cantonal initiatives, since state-wide regional parties, from the left to the right, also shape and promote territorial issues, independently and not only in linking with regionalist parties. In fact, cantonal initiatives are instruments of peripheral protest primarily for other political actors in that region.

However, usually the only ones to profit from a politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage in the long run are regionalist parties (Alonso, 2012), an insight proven by the rise of both the MCG and the LT in the last decade.

Both are now the second-largest parties in their cantonal parliaments, just behind the Liberals. In this regard, an important factor that sets Ticino apart from Geneva is its specific configuration of distance (topographically cut off from the rest of Switzerland by the Alps), distinctiveness (the only Italian-speaking canton) and dependence (economically weak and vulnerable to the Italian market and European political developments). In Geneva, only two of these factors are present: linguistic difference, with French-speakers in a minority position nationally (but in majority positions in five other cantons), and far away from but still closer to Berne than Ticino. Economically speaking, Geneva is clearly a centre on its own. Hence the differences in the share of territorial initiatives from all cantonal initiatives (lower in Geneva) and the strength of regionalist parties (higher in Ticino).

In sum, while it may be too early to speak of a widespread resurgence of the centre–periphery cleavage for Switzerland, the use of cantonal initiatives shows there is more potential for it than 20 years ago. As indicators of peripheral protest, the rise in cantonal initiatives *in general* at least seems to indicate that federal policy has become more controversial. At the same time, using cantonal initiatives for strictly *territorial* protest against federal (non)decisions may be seen as yet another strategy to mobilize internally (that is, within the region) along the centre–periphery cleavage in order to gain votes, seats and office. One effect of this is that regionalist claims have become acceptable to a parliamentary majority, maybe also because the demand is then sent off ‘to Berne’, which allows for similar blame-shifting as is observable in the EU multi-level polity. To what extent this strategy of (ab)using shared rule for political mobilization is crowned by institutional success, e.g. by creating favourable opportunities for vertical bargaining between centre and periphery, is however a matter of future investigation.

The inference for scholars interested in more general matters of federalism and territorial politics is twofold. First, investigating the actual *use* of different instruments of shared rule helps us understand trends at both ends, that is both in the region as well as at the centre. If such instruments are used by certain regions not only more often, but also for purposes of mobilizing along centre–periphery lines, we might expect this dimension to become more salient to the benefit of regionalist parties. The landslide victory of the SNP in the 2015 UK elections testifies to that. If, on the other hand, the centre is reluctant to listen or offer concessions, that dimension might become salient also at the national level and/or spill over into other regions. Here, the example that springs to mind is Spain, where the absence of any formal channels of regional voice (Swenden, 2006) has certainly not helped diffuse tensions between Barcelona and Madrid.

The second inference has to do with the political activation of periphery. Parties compete and mobilize along primary and/or secondary dimensions (cf. Elias *et al.*, 2015), and the success of regionalist parties is due in no

small part to the rediscovery of territoriality. Our findings suggest that regionalist parties contribute to both radicalizing and mainstreaming peripheral demands, in the process dragging other parties along. The Belgian example is perhaps the most wide-reaching case in that regard—national parties were quite literally pulled apart. So although shared rule properly designed gives even the most peripheral regions a voice in national decisions, regionalist parties may use national shared rule instruments to fight their non-regionalist competitors at home.

Of course, the expression of regionalist success need not be confined to the shared rule dimension, but can also have effects on the exercise of self-rule. Hence, further questions to be investigated are the degree to which territorial issues are salient within regional policy-making, whether these issues are related to a regionalist party's agenda and mobilization strategies, and to what extent and why territorial issues have been accepted by other parties—in the region or, ultimately, even at the national level.

Notes

1. Note that we are not interested in *which* of the four strategies identified by Elias et al. (2015)—“ignoring”, “blurring”, “subsuming” or two-dimensionality—is adopted, but merely in the *effects* this might have on the politicization of periphery and the use of shared rule.
2. Embeddedness is defined as “interchange and access frequencies to different players or networks within a given set up” (Tatham, 2015: 390).
3. Other ways include the autonomous setting of potentially nationwide standards though inter-cantonal treaties (Bochsler, 2009; Buser, 2011; Vatter, 2014b: 136); influence during the pre-parliamentary consultation phase and territorial lobbying (Wälti, 1996; NZZ, 2014); the double majority requirement for constitutional amendments, in practice a veto for the electorates of the small, rural, conservative cantons (Vatter, 2014b: 127); and inter-governmental councils (Hänni et al., 2013; Ch Stiftung, 2014).
4. At the federal level, the legal basis of the cantonal initiative is given by art. 160 FC; the specifying legislation, in turn, is found in articles 115–117 of the *Federal Act on the Federal Assembly* of 13 December 2002 (status as of 25 November 2013), accessible here: <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20010664/index.html> [29.4.2015].
5. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) is the largest party in 9 cantonal parliaments, with between 28% and 35% of the seats; the Christian Democrats (CVP) hold a plurality in 7 (28–47%), the liberal FDP dominates in 6 (24–37%), and the Socialists are first in 2 cantons (with 27% and 33%, respectively). In Nidwalden, SVP and CVP control 18% of the seats each, while no seat shares can be calculated for Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (BFS, 2015).
6. Moreover, our results hold even if we substitute mean regionalist party strength with regionalist performance at the last cantonal election; rely on a simple linguistic-topographical dummy of peripherality; replace our measure of under-representation with Jenny's (2012); or control for disproportionality and consociationalism (for details, see Table A2).

7. Unfortunately, because of the strong correlation between the mean strength of regionalist parties and peripherality (Pearson $r = 0.767$), it is not possible to test for both at the same time.
8. For instance, a survey conducted in the 1990s showed that citizens' feelings of belonging to Ticino were significantly more intense than in French- or German-speaking cantons (Kriesi et al., 1996: 56).
9. Calculations based on the protocols of the cantonal parliamentary debates, at http://www3.ti.ch/POTERI/sw/legislativo/attivita/archivio_sedute.php and <http://www.ge.ch/grandconseil/memorial/versionHtml.asp> [accessed 30 April 2015].
10. This includes the three initiatives of Ticino submitted in 2014 and so far only rejected in the Council of States but rejected by the National Council committee (cf. "Iniziativa cantonale bocciate", in *Ticino Online* of 13 October 2015, <http://www.tio.ch/News/Ticino/Politica/1053045/Iniziativa-ticinesi-bocciate>); while the two partial successes of 2000 (submission of the basic idea in the form of a Council of States motion) and 2008 (accepted in the National Council, then written off because officially embraced by the Swiss government) are counted half.
11. GE = Geneva, BE = Berne, JU = Jura, TI = Ticino, AG = Aargau, BS = Basel-City, BL = Basel-Countryside, LU = Lucerne, SG = St. Gall, ZH = Zurich, VS = Valais, SO = Solothurn, VD = Vaud, NE = Neuchâtel, FR = Fribourg, TG = Thurgau, ZG = Zug, GR = Grisons, SZ = Schwyz, SH = Schaffhausen, UR = Uri, NW = Nidwalden, GL = Glarus, OW = Obwalden, AI = Appenzell Inner-Rhodes, and AR = Appenzell Outer-Rhodes.

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Appendix

Table A1. Territorial cantonal initiatives from Geneva and Ticino, 1980–2014

Year	Canton	Initiator	Support	Topic/Demand	Result
1993	GE	S, G & other left	100%	Infrastructure (rail)	Accepted in both plenaries
1996	TI	S	63%	Federal subsidies for house constructions	Accepted in both plenaries
2000	TI	S	100%	National cohesion fund (for peripheries)	Rejected in both plenaries
2000	GE	S, G & other left	100%	Infrastructure (rail)	Rejected but demand submitted as motion
2002	TI	S	100%	Maintain postal services in TI	Rejected in both plenaries
2005	TI	S, C, L + LT	64%	Invest in Swiss pluri-linguism	Rejected in both plenaries
2008	TI	S, C, L, G + LT	64%	Alpine Transport (road to rail)	Accepted in Council of States, then written off in both Chambers
2008	GE	L	83%	Lower health care payments for GE residents	Rejected in both plenaries
2009	TI	S, C, L, V + LT	52%	Infrastructure (road)	Rejected in Council of States, pending in National Council
2010	TI	S, C, L, G + LT	73%	State restructuring (9 Federal Councillors)	Rejected in both plenaries
2011	GE	L, C, V + MCG	55%	Infrastructure (road)	Rejected in both plenaries
2011	TI	C	69%	Border workers in TI & fiscal payback to Italy	Twice rejected in Council of States, once accepted in National Council (=rejected)
2012	TI	L	70%	Asylum seekers centre in Chiasso (TI)	Rejected in both plenaries
2012	TI	S, V, G + LT	56%	State restructuring (linguistic representation in federal government)	Rejected in both plenaries
2012	TI	C	74%	Second homes in TI	Twice rejected in Council of States, once accepted in National Council (=rejected)
2014	TI	L	59%	Fiscal relations with Italy	Rejected in Council of States*
2014	TI	G	44%	Special status for TI	Rejected in Council of States*
2014	TI	C	70%	Autonomous regulation of alien workers	Rejected in Council of States*
2014	GE	S	59%	Easier visa access so as not to damage 'international Geneva'	Rejected in both plenaries

Note: L = Liberals, C = Christian-Democrats, V = Swiss People's Party, S = Socialists, G = Green Party, LT = Lega dei Ticinesi, MCG = Mouvement Citoyens Genevois. *Also rejected by the National Council committee, but not yet by the National Council plenary at time of writing.

Table A2. Codebook for variables used in cross-sectional analysis

Variable	Description	Source
<i>Cls</i>	total number of cantonal initiatives submitted, 1990–2014	Curia Vista (2015)
<i>reglast</i>	vote share of regionalist party at last cantonal election (GE: 2013; TI: 2015)	BFS (2015)
<i>regmean</i>	mean cantonal parliamentary vote share of regionalist party (GE: 2005, 2009 and 2013; TI: 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015)	
<i>BEdist</i>	distance from Berne city, in km	googlemaps
<i>GEdist</i>	distance from Geneva city, in km	
<i>latin</i>	French- or Italian-speaking cantonal majority (GE, VD, NE, JU, FR, VS and TI)	BFS (2015)
<i>SPmean</i>	Strength of Socialist Party, cantonal parliamentary seat share, mean of 1990 and 2015. 0% for AI, AR only since 2000	
<i>periph1</i>	product of <i>BEdist</i> and <i>latin</i>	own calculation
<i>periph2</i>	dummy: 1 if the canton is peripheral from Berne, 0 otherwise	
<i>periph3</i>	dummy, interaction of <i>periph2</i> and <i>latin</i> : 1 for GE, JU, TI and VS, 0 for all others (alternative measure of peripherality)	
<i>pop2013</i>	number of inhabitants, year 2013, in 1000	BFS (2015)
<i>SRunder1</i>	under-representation in the Council of States (% cantonal population of total Swiss population minus % seats in Council of States)	BFS (2015) & Curia Vista (2015)
<i>SRunder2</i>	under-representation in the Council of States (alternative measure)	Jenny (2012)
<i>urban</i>	degree of urbanization, 2013	BFS (2015)
<i>GDP</i>	per capita GDP, 2012, in Swiss Francs	
<i>unemp</i>	mean unemployment rate, 2000–14	
<i>socben</i>	social benefit ratio, 2013	
<i>rae</i>	Rae Index (party fragmentation), mean 1990–2009	Vatter <i>et al.</i> (2012)
<i>parl</i>	mean strength of parliament, 1990–2009	
<i>gallagher</i>	Gallagher Index (disproportionality), mean 1990–2009	
<i>konk</i>	Konkordanz Index (=total parliamentary vote share of cantonal government parties), mean 1990–2009	
<i>Npart</i>	Number of parties in cantonal parliament, mean 1990–2009	

Table A3. Descriptive statistics (cross-sectional analysis)

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Cls</i>	26	15.8	12.6	2	46
<i>reglast</i>	26	1.7	5.9	0.0	24.2
<i>regmean</i>	26	1.2	4.1	0.0	16.3
<i>BEdist</i>	26	127.6	62.8	0	241
<i>GEdist</i>	26	253.2	100.5	0	397
<i>latin</i>	26	0.3	0.5	0	1
<i>SPmean</i>	26	17.0	8.5	0.0	33.9
<i>periph1</i>	26	30.6	60.5	0	214
<i>periph2</i>	26	0.4	0.5	0	1
<i>periph3</i>	26	0.2	0.4	0	1
<i>pop2013</i>	26	313.1	332.2	16	1,426
<i>SRunder1</i>	26	−0.000	0.04	−0.04	0.1
<i>SRunder2</i>	26	0.02	0.02	0.002	0.1
<i>urban</i>	26	60.8	31.9	0.0	100.0
<i>GDP</i>	26	75,138.9	25,508.2	51,985	151,095
<i>unemp</i>	26	2.1	1.1	0.7	4.8
<i>socben</i>	26	2.7	1.6	0.9	7.3
<i>rae</i>	26	72.2	11.7	30.3	85.6
<i>parl</i>	26	−0.02	0.8	−1.6	1.3
<i>gallagher</i>	26	−3.6	2.1	−8.0	−1.3
<i>konk</i>	26	80.5	7.8	65.7	92.5
<i>Npart</i>	26	6.9	2.1	4.0	12.5

Table A4. Raw data, all 26 cantons

	Cls	reglast	regmean	BEdist	latin	SPmean	periph1	periph2	periph3	pop2013
ZH	18	0	0	123	0	24.44	0	0	0	1426
BE	46	0	0	0	0	26.04	0	0	0	1001
LU	19	0	0	99	0	12.02	0	0	0	390
UR	5	0	0	147	0	12.5	0	0	0	36
SZ	6	0	0	147	0	11.33	0	0	0	151
OW	2	0	0	91	0	8.49	0	0	0	37
NW	5	0	0	111	0	2.78	0	0	0	42
GL	4	0	0	193	0	15.14	0	0	0	40
ZG	9	0	0	123	0	11.67	0	0	0	118
FR	11	0	0	35	1	22.89	35	0	0	298
SO	18	0	0	37	0	22.54	0	0	0	261
BS	24	0	0	96	0	27.92	0	1	0	189
BL	13	0	0	79	0	25.37	0	0	0	279
SH	4	0	0	169	0	27.36	0	1	0	79
AR	2	0	0	201	0	5.64	0	1	0	54
AI	2	0	0	216	0	0	0	1	0	16
SG	20	0	0	202	0	15	0	1	0	492
GR	7	0	0	241	0	10	0	1	0	195
AG	28	0	0	83	0	17.4	0	0	0	636
TG	10	0	0	164	0	15.64	0	1	0	260
TI	31	24.2	16.33	214	1	14.07	214	1	1	347
VD	16	0	0	104	1	26.3	104	0	0	749
VS	20	0	0	155	1	11.8	155	1	1	327
NE	12	0	0	52	1	33.91	52	0	0	176
GE	45	19.2	13.87	159	1	18.33	159	1	1	469
JU	33	0	0	77	1	22.78	77	1	1	72

Table A4. Raw data, all 26 cantons (cont.)

	SRunder1	SRunder2	urban	GDP	unemp	socben	rae	parl	gallagher	konk	Npart
ZH	0.13	0.09	95.16	96950	2.5	3.18	82.62	0.06	-2.325	72.175	9.5
BE	0.08	0.06	62.97	75867	1.9	4.24	79.57	0.56	-3.395	77.35	12.5
LU	0.00	0.02	50.76	64806	1.6	2.14	68.395	-0.10	-1.305	79.385	5
UR	-0.04	0.00	0	51985	0.8	1.12	62.33	0.08	-6.88	83.595	4.5
SZ	-0.02	0.01	80.33	58874	1.2	1.50	67.27	0.43	-3.62	90.545	4.5
OW	-0.02	0.00	0	64422	0.7	1.13	63.255	-0.92	-3.15	80.355	4.5
NW	-0.02	0.01	87.44	64853	0.7	0.91	65.945	-0.08	-4.14	87.385	4.5
GL	-0.04	0.00	0	66440	1.6	2.00	78.795	-1.53	-2.235	78.54	6.5
ZG	-0.03	0.01	96.34	151095	1.7	1.67	72.945	-0.62	-3.975	87.91	5.5
FR	-0.01	0.02	55.83	56706	2.2	2.51	75.93	-0.05	-2.075	81.035	7
SO	-0.01	0.02	77.61	66631	2	3.46	74.235	0.67	-1.695	80.975	5.5
BS	0.00	0.02	100	149426	2.8	6.07	85.57	-0.24	-4.845	65.8	11.5
BL	0.01	0.03	91.77	66391	2	2.60	80.81	0.72	-2.68	75.5	7.5
SH	-0.03	0.00	76.08	89720	2.3	2.41	78.765	-0.27	-1.98	73.3	8.5
AR	-0.02	0.01	53.25	55358	1.3	1.99	53.27	-1.42	-8	77.775	6
AI	-0.02	0.00	0	59805	0.7	1.11	30.29	-1.55	-8	92.5	4
SG	0.02	0.03	65.63	72373	1.8	2.21	72.43	0.29	-2.665	85.79	7.5
GR	-0.02	0.01	50.22	69576	1.3	1.20	74.49	0.16	-8	90.83	7.5
AG	0.03	0.04	66.04	61852	2.1	2.03	80.48	0.97	-2.77	69.43	8
TG	-0.01	0.02	50.1	60896	1.8	1.64	79.665	-0.97	-2.875	76.58	7.5
TI	0.00	0.02	88.42	80234	3.7	2.41	76.45	0.89	-1.285	88.42	7
VD	0.05	0.05	74.27	66928	3.9	5.03	78.45	0.09	-2.875	88.925	8
VS	0.00	0.02	57.46	54293	3.2	1.68	58.87	1.28	-2.94	83.965	6
NE	-0.02	0.01	73.44	82317	3.8	7.25	74.235	0.25	-2.485	71.195	6.5
GE	0.01	0.03	99.2	103558	4.8	5.41	84.565	0.31	-5.815	65.685	7
JU	-0.03	0.00	28.65	62255	2.8	2.56	77.25	0.34	-1.87	87.855	6.5