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With or against their region? Multiple-mandate holders in the Swiss parliament, 1985–2018

Rahel Freiburghaus, Alexander Arens and Sean Mueller

Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland; Institute of Political Studies, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

ABSTRACT
Regional and local units try to influence national decision-making in various ways. This paper analyses one particular channel of subnational influence: multiple-mandate holders. These are members of the national Parliament (MPs) who at the same time hold an elected office at regional or local level. Focusing on Switzerland, we first assess the extent of this phenomenon over time and subnational space. We then test for its impact on MPs’ actual vote choices, analyzing whether an MP’s subnational loyalty outweighs party pressure on policy proposals submitted by a Swiss canton. Our analyses draw on a new, original dataset covering all ca. 1,000 Swiss MPs between 1985 and 2018. In the main, we find that it is rather territorial homophily – the congruence of constituency and submitting canton – than holding dual mandates that plays a role when it comes to an individual MP’s vote decision. However, territorial interests are indeed capable of outweighing partisan ties.

KEYWORDS Federalism; regionalism; local government; territorial politics; parliament; Switzerland

1 Introduction
Local and regional governments often face a choice: hold on to whatever autonomy they have, try to influence decisions taken at ‘higher’ levels of government – or do both at the same time (Elazar 1987; Hooghe et al. 2016; Ladner et al. 2019; Mueller 2014). Indeed, federalism scholars suppose that representation and participation in central decision-making are key to securing non-centralisation (e.g. Wechsler 1954, 543). Next to second chambers, also territorial lobbying by Governors is included among such ‘federal safeguards’ (Jensen 2016, 22; Nugent 2009). In local government studies, too, ‘access’ to the centre has long been a key focus (e.g. Ladner et al. 2019; Tarrow 1977; Page and Goldsmith 1987). Scholars distinguish various ways, notably indirect versus direct (Goldstein and You 2017; Page and Goldsmith 1987) and institutional/collective versus individual/personal access (Goldsmith and
Page 2010, 7). However, what is still missing is a comparative analysis of both local and regional participation or access at national level side by side.

Double-mandate holders, i.e. national MPs who also hold a local or regional elected mandate, are one way in which officials from below might influence central politics. While double mandates have equally been scrutinised already (e.g. Arnold 2017; Dewoghèlaëre, Berton, and Navarro 2006; François and Weill 2016; Hájek 2017; Mueller 2014; Navarro 2013; Pilotti 2017; Van de Voorde 2019; Watts 2008), the extent to which they act as territorial safeguards remains unclear. The question investigated here, therefore, is whether national MPs holding also a regional or local mandate actually defend their subnational polity’s interests at the centre.

To do so we first assess the extent of multiple-mandate holding in the Swiss parliament for both cantons and municipalities from 1985 to 2018. We then compare the parliamentary behaviour of individual MPs with and without double mandates on specifically regional matters. This not only contributes to federalism and local government research, but also parliamentary studies. Our theoretical contribution conceptualises multiple mandates as yet another channel of subnational influence – one of many for federated, but one of only a few for local units.

Section 2 first discusses the phenomenon in general, arguing that multiple-mandates potentially represent a powerful remedy to cure the twofold imperfection of existing federal safeguards. Section 3 justifies our case selection and derives hypotheses on the effects of both multiple-mandates and territorial homophily, an alternative subnational tie, on national parliamentary behaviour. Section 4 details the research design, section 5 presents our findings.

2 Multiple mandates – an effective, alternative remedy?

Three largely separate strands matter for the question tackled here. First, federal scholars have long highlighted the inefficiency of existing, constitutional mechanisms of shared rule – e.g. popularly elected second chambers – to give voice to regional interests at the national level (e.g. Smiley and Watts 1985). In short, popular elections make senators agents of their voters, or parties, but rarely territories. In turn, a national MP holding also a regional executive or legislative office would seem both abler and more effective in ensuring her region’s interests are adequately taken into account in state-wide decisions. In local government research multiple mandates are a familiar terrain (Ladner et al. 2019; Page 1991). For instance, being a mayor and regional-level MP at the same time helps deliver policy benefits to one’s constituency (Arnold 2017). Whether and to what extent that also applies to regional mandates and territorially responsive behaviour in the national legislature, however, remains largely unknown. Finally,
for parliamentary scholars an accumulation of mandates at different levels of government is but one of many ways to ‘signal’ attention to territorial constituents (e.g. Waggoner 2019; Zittel, Nyhuis, and Baumann 2019). Yet to what extent these signals trump party loyalty is another question entirely. The remainder of this section proceeds along these three strands.

2.1 The twofold imperfection of existing federal safeguards

The federalism literature highlights two main imperfections when it comes to institutional ‘safeguards’ that ought to protect subnational governments’ interests. On the one hand, such safeguards must be effective and powerful and not merely ornamental and symbolic. It is of little help to be recognised as a founding unit but remain without any specific representation at central level, as in Canada (Broschek 2012, 668). On the other hand, from the perspective of subnational governments, safeguards must ensure that it is their will getting translated into central decision-making. Thus, as put by Rossum (2001, 4), US ‘federalism has died with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment’, since subnational governments are no longer involved in the appointment of ‘their’ senators.

Moreover, a ‘robust’ federation depends on multiple federal safeguards since ‘each is imperfect and none is sufficient’ (Bednar 2009, 1) to prevent transgressions. The balance to be kept is between ‘the temptation for constituent governments to exploit the union for their own gain’ (ibid.), on the one hand, and encroachments of the central government, on the other (e.g. Gardner 2018; Dardanelli et al. 2019). Federal safeguards should thus take into account ‘states’ needs’ (Jensen 2016, 27), meaning essentially the interests of subnational governments.

For a long time, the focus of the literature was quite different, if not contrary: pluralistic conceptions of democracy highlighted the importance of non-governmental groups using resources (e.g. power, time) to exert influence over national-level policymaking (e.g. Dahl 1961). Only more recently, influenced not least by EU regional studies (e.g. Huwyler, Tatham, and Blatter 2018; Tatham 2016), have scholars regarded subnational entities as ‘territorial interest groups’ (Cammisa 1995), ‘organized interests’ (Jensen 2016, 3) or ‘lobbyists’ (Goldstein and You 2017; Mueller and Mazzoleni 2016; Payson 2020). Yet bicameralism is still considered the most important constitutionally guaranteed federal safeguard (e.g. Benz 2018; Money and Tsebelis 2016), neglecting the more informal dimensions of shared rule (e.g. Behnke 2018, 36; Mueller 2014). In sum, the long-standing tradition to equate effectiveness of subnational interest representation with the sheer existence of vertical institutions has prevented scholars from studying which (institutional) safeguards actually allow subnational governments to feed their interests into central policymaking (Gardner 2018; Jensen 2016; Nugent 2009).
Moreover, a prototypically dual conception of federalism (Riker 1964, 11) neglects the third (or even fourth) subnational layer with growing political importance: cities and metropolitan regions (e.g. Einstein and Glick 2017; Goldstein and You 2017; Jouve and Lefèvre 1999; Kübler, Schenkel, and Leresche 2003; Levine 2015; Payson 2020). Known for their enhanced commercial potential as well as ancient town privileges (‘borough rights’; Le Galès 2002), European cities were ‘squeezed into the corset of new constitutional architectures and absorbed into national urban hierarchies’ (Kübler, Schenkel, and Leresche 2003, 262). Unlike a federation’s constitutive parts, cities were not bestowed with equivalent formal access to the centre. Nor is the ‘search for a fix’ (Harding and Le Galès 1994, 200) straightforward, since metropolitan areas most often spread widely, while political borders continue to demarcate access to the – supposedly – major federal safeguard: the second chamber.

In short, the first imperfection of existing federal safeguards such as second chambers is that they do not really help regional governments transmit their preference into the national arena – with the exception of the German Bundesrat, unique in this regard (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2016). The second imperfection is that they are difficult to adapt so that they would become applicable also to non-constitutive subnational entities such as cities and conurbations.

2.2 Multiple-mandate holding as a potentially powerful remedy

Both regional and local governments might turn to multiple-mandate holding as a way to influence state-wide decisions more informally, i.e. without explicit constitutional empowerment. There are three main reasons for this. First, rather than changing them, mandate accumulation seeks to ‘exploit existing institutions’ (Gardner 2018, 570). Since multiple-mandate holders sit in the national parliament, they neither add another institution nor abolish one. Instead, dual mandates exploit the leverage of existing legal rules (e.g. eligibility, statutory provisions governing the propriety of dual-office holding) and personal resources (e.g. time, money, reputation). Speaking of Switzerland, Smiley and Watts (1985, 47) for example argued that multiple mandates add ‘an important cantonal component to the central authority’ without any amendment to the bicameral design (cf. Watts 2008, 151). In other words, rather than having to fight for constitutional reform, regional (and local) government members can simply seek election to national parliament themselves.

Second, multiple mandates emphasise individual rather than collective linkages with the central level (Goldsmith and Page 2010, 7). Because multiple mandates work through specific persons – the MP holding also a subnational mandate – they are both freer and potentially abler to make their voice heard. Freedom refers to the fact that an MP’s decision-making is most clearly
influenced by her constituency, in theory, and her party, in practice. The additional mandate provides prestige and independence to counter the latter. Effectiveness, in turn, refers to an MP’s impact within parliament: a simple party soldier would appear less able to convince her fellows than a more independent political entrepreneur.

Third, multiple mandates travel beyond the safeguards which only a federation’s constitutive units – the regions – enjoy. Not only regional, also local and county-level officials can in principle seek to dance at two weddings. If Jensen (2016, 3) has highlighted the ‘need for additional safeguards’, multiple mandates can provide yet another channel for regions. For local governments, in turn, such a channel might well be the only way to make themselves heard centrally. Research on local governments confirms that municipal representatives, especially mayors, who also sit in national or regional parliaments are political entrepreneurs par excellence – to the benefit of both their municipality and themselves (e.g. Arnold 2017; Ladner et al. 2019; Page 1991; Tarrow 1977).

While these three reasons explain why members of regional and especially local governments might seek a national mandate, multiple-mandate holders must also behave differently from single-mandate holders for the territorial safeguard argument to hold. What leads us to expect that they will? From a rationalist power-based approach, remaining in office is the driver of any MP’s behaviour (e.g. Strøm 1997). To achieve their goal, MPs cater to the interests of those who decide on their re-election, i.e. the voters within their constituency. Accordingly, (opportunistic) territorial representational responsibilities will come to the fore for every MP’s office-seeking strategies, underlying ‘most legislative behavior’ (Waggoner 2019, 709; cf. Mueller and Bernauer 2018; Zittel, Nyhuis, and Baumann 2019). Yet we still theorise multiple-mandate holders to be more strongly incentivised to act upon the principles of territorial responsiveness, for two reasons.

First, national MPs who simultaneously belong to regional or local authorities are able to leverage informational asymmetries. By actively doing politics ‘on the ground’, they become familiar with the needs and necessities of their constituencies. They can then turn this information into national legislative work that brings home ‘pork’ – or they can at least try and thus ‘signal’ territorial responsiveness (e.g. Waggoner 2019; Zittel, Nyhuis, and Baumann 2019). ‘Simple’ MPs, in turn, are regularly reproached for being a bit aloof, i.e. oriented towards ‘the capital’ while ‘[evading] direct contact with citizens’ (Hendriks, Loughlin, and Lidström 2010, 741).

Second, multiple-mandate holders are more electorally vulnerable than their counterparts since the practice also assumes a given career orientation, prioritising ‘accumulation’ over ‘succession’ (cf. Borchert 2011, 134). Rather than following the predominant ‘springboard’ and, once the ladder towards the national offices is climbed up, saying ‘farewell for good’ (ibid.), multiple-
mandate holders remain true to their lower level. Such ‘accumulation’ also asks for sacrifices (e.g. time) as legislatures at different orders of government have experienced marked professionalisation (Squire 2007). Professionalisation, in turn, breeds careerism (Borchert 2011) since a multiple-mandate holder’s multiple full-time, long-term, and fully paid political jobs reduce the possibilities to make a living outside politics. This is why they are, in relation to single-mandate holders, even more dependent upon re-election – and, hence, more willing to please subnational constituencies.

2.3 Whose effects remain contested

Multiple mandates can be encountered in 16 out of the 29 European countries scrutinised by Navarro (2013). This prevalence is of course no guarantee for effective protection of subnational interests in central policymaking. Essentially, multiple-mandate holders need to actively bring their local and/or regional orientation into the national legislature and convert it into substantive parliamentary behaviour to serve as subnational ambassadors (Goldsmith and Page 2010, 7).

Yet parliamentary studies on the phenomenon’s consequences are scarce, albeit developing. For example, François and Weill (2016) analyse parliamentary activities of French multiple-mandate holders and find that, while increasing the number of questions asked, the production of legislative notes by deputies is diminished. Put differently, parliamentary control mechanisms (e.g. notes) are traded for enhanced constituency service. In his study of the Czech Republic, Hájek (2017) equally suggests that multiple-office holding influences parliamentary performance both positively, with regard to plenary attendance and legislative proposals, and negatively, with regard to committee attendance and speaking activity. Arnold (2017), in turn, shows that Swiss municipalities with a double-mandate presence in ‘their’ regional parliaments succeed in avoiding financial burdens. Especially mayors who also sit in cantonal parliaments play this ‘vertical power game’ effectively. To what extent this also works for regional-national office holders remains to be explored, however.

3. Case selection and hypotheses

3.1 Switzerland

Investigating the case of Switzerland more closely seems a promising avenue to arrive at general insights for two reasons. First, both of the above-mentioned federal imperfections are glaringly present. Indeed, Swiss bicameralism is a paradigmatic example for how institutions originally designed to safeguard federalism can be found wanting from the perspective of
subnational governments: although cantons are provided with an equal number of seats in the Council of States (senate), just like in the USA the appointment of senators by regional parliaments has been gradually replaced by popular election (Vatter 2018). Both the cantons themselves (ch Stiftung 2017) as well as scholars (Vatter, Freiburghaus, and Triaca 2017) highlight the diminished potential of the second chamber to transmit cantonal governments’ interests into central decision-making.

At the same time, next to the 26 cantons, also the roughly 2,000 municipalities are politically, legally, financially, and socially relevant entities (e.g. Ladner et al. 2019). Indeed, a third of all public revenue and expenditure is situated locally (e.g. Vatter 2018). Yet the vast majority of constitutional safeguards are reserved to the cantons, leaving local governments powerless. Hence, if double mandates indeed offer a suitable and more direct way to be heard at the central level, we should encounter its widespread use not only by regional but also – and especially – local governments. In that sense Switzerland is a hard test: if not even here, with such strongly autonomous subnational governments, the need is felt to use this channel, then it is likely to be even less important elsewhere.

Second, the Swiss governmental system largely defies the logic of parliamentarianism where the executive depends on a more or less permanent majority. Although the seven-member executive is elected by the two houses of parliament in joint session, once installed it cannot be revoked during four years, nor can it dissolve parliament (Linder and Mueller 2017; Vatter 2018). As a result, much like in presidential systems, MPs have more freedom to vote against both the government and their party and for their canton or municipality, in turn. This also means that we cannot directly infer, were we to find that multiple-mandate holders indeed defended their area, that this also applies to other democracies. For not only are Swiss MPs – in theory – systemically freer to deviate from their party than their colleagues in parliamentary systems, but the frequent use of direct democracy to challenge their decisions also puts them in a much brighter spotlight. So the behaviour of Swiss MPs provides a weak test – that only given these enabling circumstances, the ‘cumul des mandats’ has an effect. We return to the generalisability of our findings in the concluding section.

3.2. Hypotheses

Why would multiple-mandate holders behave differently in parliament, and when and what kind of effect can we reasonably expect? To develop our hypotheses, we draw on a simple principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Since every MP is elected directly, and assuming they are all interested in re-election (cf. Strøm 1997), they must somehow satisfy their voter’s policy preferences. At the same time, MPs will (also) need the support
of their party. In fact, given that voters themselves might make their electoral choice based more on a person’s party than her individual achievement (or use the former to assess the latter; e.g. Bochsler and Bousbah 2015), the default option for MPs is to behave in a disciplined manner.

Matters become more interesting once we introduce two factors: multiple-mandate holders and regionalised items of business. We already explained why we expect the former to be more party-independent in their parliamentary behaviour (section 2.2). In short, a dual-mandate MP acts upon the principles of ‘substantive representation’ (Powell 2004), i.e. with her region/locality, if she behaves based on what she thinks her subnational entity wants her to do. Such an MP acts as a true mouthpiece for the wishes of her home territory and regards the national parliament as yet another arena to cater to its needs. ‘Simple’ MPs, in turn, have only one electoral relationship to honour and, given the importance of partisan labels and support, will cosy up more closely to their party.

We expect this difference to show particularly well on clearly territorial items of business. Here it should be especially likely that multiple-mandate holders stick to the abovementioned notion of ‘substantive representation’ (Powell 2004), all the more so if the business for consideration has been submitted by one or several subnational polities themselves – notably via a cantonal initiative. That instrument allows any one canton to petition the federal parliament. Hence,

H1a: In votes on ‘regionalised’ items of business, multiple-mandate holders are more likely to embrace the respective measure than single-mandate MPs.

However, as stated above all Swiss MPs are elected in the cantons as undivided constituencies, the only difference being the number of available seats (1–35 for the National Council, 1–2 for the Council of States) and the electoral system (proportionality vs. majority/plurality). In line with our power-based approach to parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Strom 1997), we could thus equally well imagine that the constituency, and not a second mandate, is responsible for an MP’s behaviour. In short, cantonal initiatives incentivise all MPs elected in the proposing canton to approve due to territorial homophily, i.e. congruence between the submitter and the MP’s constituency (Mueller and Bernauer 2018; cf. section 2.2). Cantonal initiatives also offer MPs from the submitting canton an easy and attractive opportunity to signal territorial responsiveness (Waggoner 2019; Zittel, Nyhuis, and Baumann 2019) to voters in their own electoral district. Thus,

H1b: In votes on ‘regionalised’ items of business, MPs from the submitting canton are more likely to embrace the respective measure than MPs from other cantons.
Finally, even in non-parliamentary systems such as the U.S. and Switzerland, polarisation, professionalisation, and increasing partisanship unfold strong disciplinary effects (e.g. Connelly, Pitney, and Schmitt 2017; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016; Wood and Jordan 2017; Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Kam 2009). Another way to assess whether multiple mandates matter is to directly play territorial against party loyalty. If party ties are stronger, multiple-mandate holders will even vote against their region if so demanded. Partisanism might limit the potential of the ‘cumul des mandats’ to safeguard multi-level governance. In turn, under very specific conditions – i.e. on clearly ‘regionalised’ items of business – territorial interests might still weigh more heavily. Thus, in analogy to H1:

\[ H2a: \text{In votes on ‘regionalised’ items of business, multiple-mandate holders are more likely to deviate from their party compared to single-mandate holders.} \]

\[ H2b: \text{In votes on ‘regionalised’ items of business, MPs from the submitting canton are more likely to deviate from their party than MPs from other cantons.} \]

4. Research design

The effects of multiple-mandate holding are tested using MPs’ voting behaviour on cantonal initiatives within the Swiss lower house. According to Art. 160.1 of the Swiss Constitution, any canton has the right to submit such an initiative.\(^4\) Indeed, this is ‘the only official instrument to territorially lobby the Swiss parliament in a proactive way’ (Mueller and Mazzoleni 2016, 50). Thus, in analysing cantonal initiatives, we can hold constant the context since we look at territorial interests only. Thanks to this formal criterion, i.e. considering the submitting principal which are the regions themselves, we seek to handle the rather diffuse notion of ‘territorial’ items of business.

Our data come from different sources. The interest ties of all MPs are taken from the ‘public register of members’ interests’, compiled and published yearly by the Parliamentary Services at the start of every calendar year.\(^5\) Data was validated by means of an encompassing data set on Swiss elites’ biographies (Université de Lausanne, 2018). This provides us with exhaustive information on the multiple mandates of all 246 MPs in both houses of the federal parliament for each year between 1985 and 2018. Our final dataset contains 8,364 observations on 986 different MPs.

Due to limited data availability on parliamentary vote results, testing the hypotheses is restricted to the period of 2008 to 2018 and the lower house
only. The number of cantonal initiatives submitted and treated during this period comes from the official parliamentary database. Individual voting decisions on these initiatives, i.e. approval or rejection, are taken from the ‘Database on Parliamentary Votes’. The explanatory analysis relies on a total of 84 cantonal initiatives. The dependent variable is a dummy assessing an MP’s approval (=1, 0 otherwise) of a cantonal initiative.

Multiple-mandate holding, the first of two independent variables, is a dummy taking the value of 1 when an MP has a second or third mandate at cantonal and/or local level, and 0 otherwise. While subnational mandates can be of legislative or executive nature, we disregard that distinction in the analyses. Instead, dual-mandate holding is assessed via two further differentiations: the first variable assesses cantonal-national (=1; 0 otherwise), the second local-national mandate accumulation (=1; 0 otherwise).

Our second indicator of territorial loyalty measures whether the canton an MP is elected in, i.e. her constituency, corresponds to the canton that submitted the respective initiative: the value of 1 indicates territorial homophily. Note that the same value is assigned when an MP belongs to a canton that submitted a substantively identical initiative voted at the same time (item linkage). Cantonal origin is also assessed separately by including a variable displaying an MP’s home canton as well as the submitting canton.

To analyse conflict, we assess two types of group pressure. A first variable measures the approval rate of each item by all MPs from the same canton – the vote of the respective MP excluded. This captures the extent of group pressure in each cantonal delegation to approve the initiative. In turn, the approval rate of each cantonal initiative within each party – again, the vote of the respective MP excluded – measures partisan pressure. Finally, an MP’s parliamentary group affiliation is also controlled for.

The approval probability of a business item can be highly path dependent. The (possibly) prior decision by the upper house, which can be disapproving, still pending or approving, as well as the vote share in favour of a proposal in the legislative committee of the lower house, both affect its chances in the National Council. Lastly, a dummy variable controls for connected proposals so that no identical or substantively similar votes are counted twice.

In principle, our data structure demands a multilevel regression model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002): individual vote choice (level-1) is nested in the respective MP (level-2), possibly participating in more than one vote, but also the cantonal initiative at stake (fixed effects). The rationale for including the latter as fixed effects estimators is that there is a set of characteristics unique to each measure – notably the submitting canton, the preceding decisions by the upper house, and the lower house’s specialist committee. Other group variables, e.g. party group affiliation and an MP’s home canton, are checked for by including respective fixed effects into the model.
However, first analyses revealed that only a negligibly small share of the overall variance in the multilevel model originates from level-2-estimation (intraclass correlation ICC/rho). This means that level-1 observations within the same level-2 cluster are not more similar than level-1 observations from different level-2 clusters. To simplify our models, a ‘single level’ logistic regression with clustered standard errors (i.e. an MP, formerly level-2) was thus chosen. Cantonal initiatives are not included as unit dummies to avoid multicollinearity with other item-specific measures. A second model estimates interaction terms to test H2a and H2b. A final logistic regression is calculated against the background of only eight initiatives that are typical cases. All coefficients are displayed as odds ratios to ease their interpretation (cf. Giger and Klüver 2016).

5. Results

The left of Figure 1 displays the overall share of MPs per year that held a subnational next to their national mandate, from 1985 to 2018. Holding more than just the national parliamentary mandate is, with 19%, rather the exception. Within the group of multiple mandate-holders, local-national MPs dominate cantonal-national ones (right of Figure 1). Less than 5% of mandate accumulators combine all three levels.

It thus seems that the ‘cumul des mandats’ is, for the cantons whose access to the federal level is constitutionally protected, indeed just another federal

![Figure 1. Types of the ‘cumul des mandats’, 1985–2018.](image-url)
safeguard. For municipalities, by contrast, multiple-mandate holding is one of only few channels available and hence more frequent. However, this first glance somewhat underestimates the phenomenon: Nearly 40% of all Swiss MPs held a subnational office in at least one year of their national term. They did so especially during transition times, at the beginning of their national career.

Figure 2 plots the annual share of all MPs holding a local and/or cantonal office. While the overall share steadily decreases, this is mainly due to the decline of simultaneously holding a cantonal mandate. Starting in the mid-19th century, a growing number of Swiss cantons has introduced legal provisions governing the propriety of multiple-mandate holding. Today, combining a cantonal executive with a national mandate is prohibited in some cantons (e.g. Vaud) and restricted elsewhere (e.g. Zurich; Arens and Freiburghaus 2019; cf. Di Capua et al. 2020, 5, for details). The share of local-national MPs, in turn, slightly increases, especially since the early 1990s. Interestingly, since then the overall number of Swiss municipalities has been decreasing. After 1995, the share of local-national MPs always exceeds the share of cantonal-national mandate holders, and the gap is widening. We interpret this as further evidence that, for the cantons, the ‘cumul des mandats’ is indeed just another federal safeguard, while for municipalities it is one of only few available access routes.

Table 1 next displays the results of a logistic regression for the impact of multiple-mandate holding on individual approval of a cantonal initiative. Model 1 shows that concurrently holding a local office does not have a significant effect. Cantonal-national mandate holding, in turn, even

Figure 2. The ‘cumul des mandats’ over time, 1985–2018.
significantly decreases the chances of approving a cantonal initiative ceteris paribus. H1a is falsified.

By contrast, the overlap of canton of electoral origin and the canton submitting a demand matters as hypothesised (H1b): The odds of approving ‘one’s own’ cantonal initiative are five to six times higher compared to MPs from another canton. While the probability that an MP elected in another

Table 1. Explanatory model of an MP’s vote choice on cantonal initiatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of cantonal initiative [0,1]</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>3.030**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Mandate [0,1]</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(1.486)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cantonal Mandate [0,1]</td>
<td>0.514***</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Territorial homophily [0,1]</td>
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<td>7.728***</td>
<td>26.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.587)</td>
<td>(1.876)</td>
<td>(14.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary group (Ref.: C)</td>
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<td>No affiliation</td>
<td>3.224**</td>
<td>3.497**</td>
<td>1.335</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.507)</td>
<td>(1.709)</td>
<td>(0.748)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVP (V)</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>1.102</td>
<td>1.622</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.533)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP (L)</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>1.202</td>
<td>2.392**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.850)</td>
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<td>SPS (S)</td>
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<td>1.103</td>
<td>1.102</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
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<td>Greens (G)</td>
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<td>1.171</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vote: Council of States (Ref.: Disapproval)</td>
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<td>Pending</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td>1.206</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote of legislative committee (in %) [0;100]</td>
<td>0.988*</td>
<td>0.989*</td>
<td>0.990</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00686)</td>
<td>(0.00661)</td>
<td>(0.0378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File linkage [0,1]</td>
<td>0.739**</td>
<td>0.762*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote of an MP’s own party (in %) [0;100]</td>
<td>1.082***</td>
<td>1.085***</td>
<td>1.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00373)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
<td>(0.00568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loc. Man. [1] * Vote of an MP’s own party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00643)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00862)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cant. Man. [1] * Vote of an MP’s own party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.022*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territ. Hom. [1] * Vote of an MP’s own party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.986*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00686)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote of an MP’s own canton (in %) [0;100]</td>
<td>1.017***</td>
<td>1.017***</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00428)</td>
<td>(0.00428)</td>
<td>(0.00564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.00451***</td>
<td>0.00409***</td>
<td>0.0111***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00218)</td>
<td>(0.00207)</td>
<td>(0.0170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>14,170</td>
<td>14,170</td>
<td>1,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.7156</td>
<td>0.7171</td>
<td>0.6010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clustered standard errors (by MP) in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The table displays odds ratios from the two logistic regressions on all cantonal initiatives and the one on the eight single initiatives with file numbers 09.321, 10.319, 10.321, 11.304, 12.307, 14.316, 16.308 and 16.313. The following controls are included in the models but not displayed: canton of MP and submitting canton.
than the submitting canton votes in favour of the initiative is 41%, it rises to some 51% in the case of territorial homophily. That difference is statistically significant.

The strength of this measure could also explain the negative effect of cantonal-national mandate-holding: canton-specific interests filed by means of an initiative are likely to challenge especially subnational office holders from other cantons. The pressure originating from an MP’s own canton further emphasises that territoriality in this narrow sense matters: An MP’s chance to embrace a canton-specific, ‘regionalised’ proposal significantly increases with the approval rate within her own cantonal delegation.

Thus, territorial interests – being with their canton – are highly relevant here, although party politics generally dominate the lower slightly more than the upper house (cf. Linder and Mueller 2017; Vatter 2018). However, partisanship is not gone when cantonal initiatives are at stake: The odds of an MP approving a cantonal initiative nearly evenly increase by 1.1 given an increase in the approval rate of one percentage point within an MP’s own party.

The final question to tackle is whether territoriality outweighs partisanship (H2a+b). We therefore include interaction terms of the dummies measuring local-national and cantonal-national mandate holding and territorial homophily, on the one hand, and approval rate within the respective party, on the other. Model 2 in Table 1 shows that the effects of all variables for themselves as well as of the other covariates are rather stable, as direction and strength do not change considerably.

The effect of territorial homophily given party approval, the two strongest predictors in model 1, is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows the predicted probability of approving a cantonal initiative by party pressure in the absence and presence of congruence between one’s own constituency and the submitting canton. Given varying degrees of party pressure, from complete rejection to unanimous approval, territorial homophily at nearly all stages raises an MP’s probability to approve a cantonal initiative by a significant proportion. Hence, territorial homophily does play a role within parliamentary parties by outweighing partisan ties. We thus fail to find falsifying evidence for H2b.

What remains open is the question of whether the ‘cumul des mandats’ is really irrelevant for an MP’s vote or even negatively associated to it, or whether there may still be a positive effect which, however, is non-systematically and only occurs under specific circumstances. Model 3 in Table 1 thus shows an explanatory model for initiatives that (empirically) stand out due to varying majorities: proposals that were approved by a majority of local-national mandate holders while failing to convince a majority of ‘simple’ MPs. Cantonal-national mandate holding is not considered due to the phenomenon’s small number in this very reduced set. Unsurprisingly, simultaneously occupying a local besides the national
Office triples the chances of favouring such an initiative (odds ratios = 3.0).

Figure 4 accordingly displays the predicted probabilities of item approval by the absence/presence of local-national ‘cumul des mandats’ given varying
degrees of party pressure, i.e. the effects of the interaction term as calculated in Model 3. While differences in the outcome point in the hypothesised direction, they fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Surely, these results have to be read with caution since they are based on outlying cases and cover an even smaller number of observations. However, when looking at the content of the matters at stake it seems implausible that they are mere statistical artefacts – more likely is a territorial coalition of dual local-national mandate holders.

Two cantonal initiatives within this reduced set stand out and can be regarded as paradigmatic for such a coalition of dual mandate holders: The first was submitted by the Canton of Lucerne in 2011 (file number 11.304) and sought more generous federal funding for the Swiss Museum of Transport located in Lucerne city. The legislative committee of the upper chamber opposed the measure unanimously (one abstention). In the plenary of the upper house, it was, not surprisingly, a Christian-Democrat MP from the Canton of Lucerne who defended the initiative. However, he failed to convince his colleagues and the measure was rejected. The lower house buried the cantonal initiative with a slim majority. Nonetheless, it was approved by 19 out of 30 multiple-mandate holders, while a majority of 57% among single-mandate holders rejected it. All eleven MPs from the Canton of Lucerne – albeit from six different parties – approved it.

The second noteworthy initiative also included in Model 3 was submitted by the Canton of St. Gall in 2016 (file number 16.313), requesting cantonal leeway to delegate powers over certain building permits to the local level. Again, the opposing majority in the lower house was challenged by a minority lead by a right-wing MP from the submitting canton. Eventually, eleven out of 19 MPs from the Canton of St. Gall and 15 out of 23 dual mandate holders approved the initiative. Yet it was rejected by 54% each among MPs from outside the Canton of St. Gall and single-mandate holders.

6. Concluding discussion

Can multiple-mandate holding cure the twofold imperfection of existing federal safeguards? In theory, national MPs who simultaneously hold a regional office may better defend proper ‘states’ needs’ (Jensen 2016, 27) than senators. Multiple-mandate holding is also open to local governments, which do not usually possess formal influence at the centre. This paper has put this idea to an empirical test. Given high levels of decentralisation (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019), a fragmented territorial structure and the presence of both federal imperfections, Switzerland makes for an ideal case-study.

Indeed, the number of local-national Swiss MPs has come to exceed that of cantonal-national MPs, indicating greater demand by the lowest level. To see whether subnational loyalty is constrained by party pressure, multiple-
mandate holders’ parliamentary behaviour on ‘regionalised’ items of business was analysed using logistic regressions. Our main finding is that territoriality matters for explaining national-level MPs voting behaviour on regional issues and, in doing so, is capable of outweighing party ties. However, not the ‘cumul des mandats’ but rather territorial homophily – the congruence between an MP’s canton of origin and the canton submitting a proposal – is what influences individual vote choice. Dual-mandate holding ‘only’ matters for an MP’s dis-/approval of cantonal initiatives in special cases. That multiple-mandate holders are not in all cases with their region may be related to the scope conditions of this analysis: Cantonal initiatives are ‘regionalised’ items of business insofar as they are submitted by subnational units (sometimes for sheer signalling purposes; cf. Mueller and Mazzoleni 2016), but they do not necessarily represent genuine cantonal and/or local interests. The continuum ranges from highly specific interests of single cantons (e.g. federal funding for a particular museum) to non-regional demands (e.g. ban of palm oil in Indonesia; cf. Graf 2001).

Moreover, multiple-mandate holding and territorial homophily are no panacea for subnational influence at the centre. Even if genuine territorial interests are at stake, MPs do not automatically, but rather selectively leave their party camp. There are also some democratic dangers associated with the phenomenon, such as increased elitism or propensity for corruption (Hájek 2017, 488). However, if used strategically, multiple-mandate holding can complement the full system of territorial safeguards, which in large parts draws its strength from a certain redundancy of different mechanisms (Bednar 2009). For instance, the (temporary) (dis-)functionality of a single channel could be remedied.

Findings from the Swiss case also need to be properly contextualised. The phenomenon’s prevalence might seem less surprising here given extensive levels of both local and regional autonomy, which even permeate political parties in that they, too, are organised in a bottom-up fashion. Beyond the Swiss case, then, we would expect double mandates to matter even more in two types of contexts: countries that are strongly (re-)centralising, and where subnational autonomy therefore needs all the defences it can get; and those where legislative and administrative powers are decentralised but the fiscal means (still) centralised. Here, double-mandate holders would operate less as safeguards than lobbyists for subsidies (cf. Payson 2020). After all, better and cheaper still than hiring somebody else to do a good job is doing an even better job oneself.

Notes

1. We use the female pronoun throughout, without of course wanting to imply that all MPs are women.
2. Accumulation may also refer to spheres other than the political (e.g. private sector). However, we exclusively focus on holding multiple political mandates:
not only is this ‘the most controversial dimension’ (Dewoghélaëre, Berton, and Navarro 2006, 313) but also the only relevant from the perspective of territorial politics.

3. Note that voting instructions are forbidden by the Federal Constitution (Art. 161 para. 1).
4. Note that cantonal initiatives do not propose final and definite measures but demand the elaboration of a certain action or draft bill instead.


Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Rahel Freiburghaus http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4793-3989
Alexander Arens http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5987-0527
Sean Mueller http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4369-1449

References


