Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems: Conceptual Lessons from Subnational Switzerland

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This article reconceptualizes shared rule and uses novel data to measure it, thus addressing two shortcomings of federal literature. First, while most studies focus on self-rule, one question that is largely neglected is how lower-level governments can influence politics at a higher level in the absence of "second" chambers. The answer is through shared rule. A second shortcoming is that even when addressing this question, scholars concentrate on constitutional-administrative aspects of vertical intergovernmentalism, neglecting more informal, "political" dynamics. Comparing the twenty-six Swiss cantons allows drawing two lessons for federal studies: That shared rule is multifaceted and complex, and that to study informal territorial actors as well as direct political processes is indispensable to understand how power is actually distributed in federal political systems.

Federal political system is a "descriptive term referring to the genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule" (Watts 1998, 120). The universe of cases encompassed by this term includes federations as much as a "gray zone" between fully federal and unitary-centralized systems (e.g., Swenden 2006). For Elazar (1987), this genus included "unions, constitutionally decentralized unions, federations, confederations, federacies, associated statehood, [and] condominiums" (also Watts 1998, 7). While some of these polities are "less" federal than federations, they all possess certain, some, or many federal elements. In others, an element of subordination by lower-level units to a higher level remains. In positive terms, federal political systems describe a partial realization of goals "recommended" by federalism as "ideology in the weak sense" (King 1982, 20), which is the realization of key federalist principles. Chief among them is the "[i]nstitutional recognition of territorial communities" (Duchacek 1987, 94), from ethnic, cultural, and/or civic to—always—"historical" communities, nations, or nationalities. With such recognition usually comes autonomy or self-rule: At the very minimum, lower-level units are "fully able to decide" over at least one policy area (Riker 1964, 6). However, in all federal
political systems there is also participation or shared rule: Indeed, this “is probably the most decisive feature of federal government” (Auer 2005, 422). And yet this second element has not received the kind of attention it deserves.

Why is it important to know about federal political systems and their structure? Because they are en vogue, especially in Europe: Ever since the (re)territorialization of politics in the 1970s (Keating 1998), different models of accommodating territorial communities within democratic polities have emerged, from French décentralisation through Italian regionalismo and Spanish autonomismo to British devolution and the Belgian (con)federation. In these and similar cases, much is known about the extent, causes and effects of self-rule, but only little about forms and effects of shared rule. It might be that the absence of second chambers in the sense of direct territorial representation has blinded scholars toward thinking that regions have no means to partake in national decision, or even that they prefer bypassing the national altogether in working toward a “Europe of the regions” (e.g., Hepburn 2010).

However, because arguably the nation-state level is there to remain, shared rule at the national level should be studied more closely, but differently. My aim in this article is thus twofold. First, I intend to show why including an actor and process-related dimension into the concept of shared rule is important. Second, in taking this debate to the subnational level of Switzerland, I provide empirical data that can be used to refine our conceptual understanding of shared rule. It will emerge that to study territorial actors—lobby groups and individual members of parliament (MPs)—as well as to pay attention to political processes channeling shared rule more directly—such as veto and agenda-setting powers—is crucial for achieving a better understanding of how political power is vertically distributed in and across federal political systems.

The next section outlines current conceptualizations and measurements of shared rule in the federal and territorial politics literature. I will argue why we ought to know about shared rule in the first place and that we need to adopt a broader idea of what the concept must capture. The third section introduces the twenty-six Swiss cantons as a comparative template. The assumption behind this method is that federal political systems exist at subnational as much as at national and supra-national levels, for example, the EU (Hix and Hoyland 2011). If so, the concept of shared rule as an essential element must equally be flexible enough to travel “upward” and “downward.” In the fourth section, I discuss the effects of shared rule in the same empirical context, that is, consequences of the influence of municipalities on cantonal politics. I will then show how one can draw two lessons for the future study of (shared rule in) federal political systems beyond (subnational) Switzerland. It is not my purpose to explain local government power in Switzerland, nor to render an exhaustive picture of its exercise. My goal is primarily conceptual and my approach utilitarian, meaning that I will use a specific
set of real-world observations to make “friendly amendments” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 533) to the concept of shared rule.

Conceptualizing Shared Rule

Traditionally, “shared rule” is understood as the possibility of lower-level units to influence decisions at a higher level (Watts 1998; Elazar 1987). Given the focus of most comparative work on the nation-state (Keating 2008), these lower-level polities denote Länder, States, provinces, regions, or cantons. The higher level encompasses the federal, national, or “Union”-wide realm. However, the principle of shared rule, as but one aspect of intergovernmental relations in multilevel systems, can also be transferred upward or downward: The influence over EU-decisions by any, some, or all of its member states (Auer 2005, 429); or the possibility of local governments to influence decisions in “their” region or province (Page 1991, 2). But what exactly should the concept of shared rule convey? Getting to the core of a concept requires four steps (Adcock and Collier 2001, 531): Clarify its background, systematize its meaning (definition), delineate its dimensionality (indicators), and finally actual measurement (observations). Steps one to three are discussed in this section, and the fourth one in the next section.

A “background,” for Adcock and Collier (2001, 530), “encompasses the constellation of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept.” Fortunately, scholars largely agree on the general meaning of shared rule as participation of lower-level units in higher-level decision making. For once, a term is given the same content across a range of disciplines, from constitutional law (Fleiner 2002, 110; Saunders 2002, 69) and conflict studies (McGarry and O’Leary 1994, 112; Wolff 2009, 6) to party politics (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010, 115) and federal studies (Beramendi 2009, 766; Galligan 2008, 274; Kincaid 2005, 409–10; Requejo 2005, 44; Boadway and Shah 2009, 6). Even a critical Anderson (2008, 34) questions less the understanding than the usefulness of the concept:

[...] does it truly help to distinguish between self-rule and shared-rule among the orders of government in most federations? What does shared-rule imply? That the regional units participate in some central decisions, as in Germany? Or that linguistic or cultural communities have defined roles in sharing central decisions? [...] “Shared-rule” does not capture the reality of how central governments function in most federations, whose central governments are made and unmade through direct elections.

The critique is a valid one and can be extended from federations to federal political systems more broadly. It reveals the core tension which federalism (and, a fortiori, shared rule) was meant to institutionally resolve: that between territory and democracy. This tension is ever-present unless territory or place is eliminated as a
factor in deciding on the weight attached to a citizen’s political rights, which is the case only in direct-democratic settings such as town meetings. In all other cases, location filters through constituency drawing, weighed representation, or malapportionment and outright discrimination in territorial chambers (Rodden 2004, 490).

However, rather than dismissing shared rule as not helpful to understand “the reality of [...] central governments,” analysts are better off in trying to capture variations in the way lower-level territorial communities actually influence the centre. On this, Burgess and Gagnon (2010, 18) observe how sometimes there is “a tendency to encourage self-rule for both constituent member states and the central state, whereas in some other contexts [...] shared rule is the main integrative principle.” Understanding the extent of each and the balance between them is important, because they influence both the legitimacy (Hooghe et al. 2008, 111) and efficiency (Braun 2009) of collectively binding decisions—and therefore also their viability.

Having clarified the concept’s background, I now move on to the second step in Adcock’s and Collier’s (2001, 530) “series of research tasks.” The best elaboration on the dimensionality of shared rule is contained in the “Regional Authority Index” (RAI) by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2008; also Hooghe and Marks 2013). Shared rule is one of the two elements of the RAI, alongside self-rule, intended to capture the “[a]uthority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole” (Hooghe et al. 2008, 115). Authority is explicitly distinguished from power of which authority is but the formal face. The RAI understands shared rule in this way when measuring its four dimensions: “Law Making” refers to the presence, size, relative, and absolute weight of an upper chamber or its functional equivalent; “Executive Control” captures the presence and binding force of meetings between national and regional executives; “Fiscal Control” refers to the extent to which regional governments can influence “the distribution of tax revenues” across the whole country; and “Constitutional Reform” taps the extent of regional (popular or executive) veto power over constitutional change as setting “the rules of the game” (Hooghe et al. 2008: 130–35).

For all its merits—namely successfully developing a universally applicable classification of regional authority, disaggregating subnational levels, as well as taking asymmetries into account—the RAI is left with two shortcomings. The first is acknowledged by its creators and was already hinted at: The informal dimension of political power in its countrywide exercise is disregarded. The second shortcoming is that except for the fourth dimension of shared rule, the RAI focuses on regional governments at the expense of precisely those regional electorates that have put them into power in the first place. It should therefore more aptly be called a Regional Government Authority Index.
Switzerland—arguably an exceptional case but certainly one in which, as a long-established federation, shared rule ought to be validly measured—can be used to show why these limitations matter. The Swiss cantons score 1.5 (of a maximum of 2), 1 (of 2), 1 (of 2), and again 1 (of 3) in the four dimensions of shared rule, respectively. In terms of overall shared rule, Switzerland scores lowest of all federations covered, and lower even than two unitary states, The Netherlands and Sweden. However, precisely because the RAI only captures governmental influence over central policy making, a crucial aspect of Swiss democracy is underestimated. As the authors correctly report (Hooghe et al. 2008, 136), in Switzerland, every constitutional change at the national level requires a majority of both citizens and cantons. No less than nine constitutional amendments have since 1866 failed to take the cantonal hurdle, of which six in the past forty years and the last one on March 3, 2013. Incidentally, one of these (in 1994) proposed to simplify nationalization procedures for young foreigners. Therefore if, as the RAI authors rightly argue, deciding on citizenship as the “[a]uthority over who can be a member of a self-governing community is conceptually prior to authority over the provision of collective goods to that community” (Hooghe et al. 2008, 126), then surely exercising that authority matters. Besides, the conservativeness of cantonal electorates is consistent with the political orientation of their governments (Linder, Zürcher, and Bolliger 2008). This is hardly surprising, given that governments are themselves put in place by the people who have elected them. In fact, because of the electoral accountability of cantonal governments to their citizens, regional electorates ought to be given more weight than the executive branch (“government,” for Hooghe and Marks 2013, 184) in measuring the influence of lower-level polities over decisions taken at a higher level. In other words, my broader criticism leveled at the RAI is this: To confine shared rule to a governmental dimension may yield methodological advantages—conceptually, however, it means falling back into a Whearean (Wheare 1963) focus long overcome (Stein 1968).

Moreover, by focusing on parliamentary processes, the RAI neglects pre- and post-parliamentary phases. Not just the Swiss people, but also Swiss cantons qua lower-level entities can refer a federal law to the people for a vote (the “cantonal referendum” of Article 141 of the Federal Constitution). Cantons are also regularly and extensively included in pre-parliamentary consultation procedures—many a law does not even see the parliamentary light if not “approved” beforehand by the Conference of Cantonal Governments (Bolleyer 2006, 490), an informal but powerful association of cantonal ministers. In addition, because the cantons execute federal laws—cantonal courts and the police act on behalf of the federation (Fleiner 2000) and all direct taxes are collected by them (Dafflon 2007)—the voice of their official representatives carries more weight than that of other interest groups, even more so when expressed publicly by all twenty-six (Fleiner 2002, 101). It is conceivable that while in Switzerland this organization is a response to the loss of
its territorial character by the Council of States (senate), in other countries such territorial lobbying may arise in the absence of a second chamber. My discussion of shared rule within the Swiss cantons (below) seems to confirm this hypothesis.

In sum, extra-parliamentary political processes and nongovernmental actors need to be given more, and more prominent, attention in a study of regional power, at least if the purpose is to capture how federal political systems really work as regards the “sharing” of power between upper and lower-level polities. The study of politics not only refers to institutions, but also to actors that operate them and processes in which both are involved. From this widened understanding, two amendments as to how shared rule should be measured emerge. First, regarding territorial actors, there are “pressure groups”: If there are any and how they “act on the central and regional decision-making centers” in defense of their claims (Stein 1968, 739) needs to be systematically assessed. Second, to understand how shared rule works in the absence of a “territorial chamber” such as the U.S. Senate or the German Bundesrat, one should study informal representation as the balance between lower- and higher-level “interests” or loyalties within the single chamber (Stein 1968, 733, 739). In addition to this, both amendments need to take direct democracy into account, if foreseen at all.

Why would one want to know about these additional two aspects, actors and processes, in a study of shared rule? Because if, as was defined at the outset of this article, federal political systems entail constitutionally divided political power between at least two governmental levels (which, by definition, are territorial; e.g., Weber 1992 [1919]), the question for political science then becomes how this power is exercised, controlled, and influenced. Federalism is a two-sided coin: On the one side, self-rule or autonomy, even “sovereignty” in certain matters of public policy making (Duchacek 1987); on the other, shared rule and cooperation, “organic” or “executive” (Hueglin and Fenna 2006). To distinguish federal from nonfederal power sharing, the criterion of “constitutional entrenchment” (Burgess 2006, 2) is usually added, that is an extra degree of protection is afforded because constitutions are harder to amend than laws.

But this is not to say that once divided and secured, power cannot (also) be exercised outside the constitution. The distinction between authority and power by Hutchcroft (2001, 26) is useful in this regard: “the former refers to the formal roles conferred upon individuals in their official capacities, while the latter brings analysis into the far more informal means” of collectively binding decision making. It is with the second dimension that political science ought to be concerned, if not exclusively then surely primarily. Because self-rule has been dealt with extensively in the literature on federalism (e.g., Burgess 2006; Erk and Swenden 2010), regionalism (e.g., Swenden 2006; Keating 1998; Bulpitt 1983) and local government (e.g., Fiechter 2010; Polsby 1979; Rhodes 1981; Page 1991), my focus here lies with
shared rule and its political dimension. The comparative template on which I draw are the twenty-six Swiss cantons, presented next.

Shared Rule in the Swiss Cantons

It might seem odd and unfamiliar to continue a discussion of shared rule with a comparison of Swiss cantons. However, there are at least two reasons for this. The first is that they fall squarely into the “gray zone” of federal political systems mentioned above: Neither fully federal nor fully unitary-centralized, and yet largely autonomous political systems. Like in the United States, Swiss local governments are “creatures of the state” (Bowman and Kearney 2011, 563), that is the degree of local autonomy solely depends on the cantonal political system. There are thus twenty-six systems of local government. And although none of the Swiss cantons has a second chamber, local governments fulfill important public tasks in all of them (Horber-Papazian 2006), so that a horizontal comparison of the variation in shared rule becomes conceptually meaningful.\(^{5}\)

The second reason is that by moving to the subnational level, several methodological advantages are gained (Snyder 2001). The most important is increased confidence in the spatial travel ability of concepts such as (local and cantonal) governments and constitutional flexibility. Another is control for omitted variables that might undermine my understanding of shared rule: All twenty-six “cantonal democracies” (Vatter 2002) formally enjoy the same competencies in taxing, education, health, police, or infrastructure. Even political parties are primarily cantonal organizations (Thorlakson 2009).\(^{6}\)

Applying, in a first step, the RAI to the Swiss cantons as twenty-six unit-independent federal political systems in their own right reveals the following:

(a) There are no second chambers (Vatter 2006). However, “intra-cantonal federalism” (Linder 1999, 156) exists precisely to the extent that communes informally exercise shared rule.

(b) No meetings of cantonal and local government executives with binding force exist. However, the latter are extensively consulted in the pre-parliamentary phase (Horber-Papazian 2004), especially in fiscal matters (Dafflon 2007).

(c) Some cantons do provide their municipalities with the means to initiate and/or block legislation or even constitutions directly (Schmitt and Gassmann 2005).

Thus, the current measurement of shared rule as conceptualized by the RAI not only inadequately captures shared rule as exercised by the cantons (see above), but it also fails to pick up significant attributes of vertical power sharing within them. At the very least, the formal dimensionality proposed by the RAI thus needs to be supplemented to take into account how political power—and not simply authority—can be exercised by territorial actors informally, through channels
other than intergovernmental meetings or upper chambers. The remainder of this section undertakes this for the Swiss cantonal context.

To do so, I draw on an understanding of local power that divides local influence over decision making at a higher level into “direct” and “indirect localism,” with localism referring to the complete set of “opportunities for local political élites to shape public services.” In general, there are “two broad ways in which local government politicians can influence local decisions”: A first consists in “using their constitutional or legal position at the head of a government organization and directing it according to their own priorities”; a second in “using their political authority [...] to influence national decisions in so far as they affect their locality” (Page 1991, 5–6). It is through this latter way of exercising power that we are better able to conceptualize shared rule. Thus, in its most direct form, lower-level authorities can lobby for their interests, threaten to block policy innovation, and/or engage in proposing alternative solutions. I shall speak of direct localism whenever local government authorities qua local entities influence higher-level decisions. In the absence of a territorial chamber such influence can, according to this definition, only take place in the pre- and/or post-parliamentary phase.

However, local governments are not monolithic blocks, though for the sake of measurement validity we often assume they are. Therefore, when individual members of a local polity attempt to influence higher-level decisions through an official mandate different from the one exercised at the local level, I will speak of indirect localism instead. Referring to “polity” in this context allows disaggregating local “government” (the focus of the RAI) into its different political components: the executive and legislative branches, individual local politicians (e.g., mayors), and the electorate. All are potentially able to exercise shared rule, so all should be included in its conceptualization.

In what follows, direct localism within the twenty-six Swiss cantons is measured through the presence and type of local government associations (LGAs). Indirect localism on the other hand is measured through the number of Members of Cantonal Parliament (MCPs) that also exercise an executive mandate at local level (known in French as cumul des mandats). The electoral system functions as an antecedent variable facilitating or obstructing the presence of communal politicians in cantonal parliaments (Rodden 2004), but is, as a structural condition, not itself capable of exercising shared rule. For lack of space I also disregard political parties, which by the way model their internal territorial organization largely after the electoral system of each canton. Direct democracy, however, captures as a third element the extent to which local governments can veto and/or initiate a law or constitutional amendment at the cantonal level (Schmitt and Gassmann 2005). Such localism is direct insofar as it is local government authorities that initiate a direct-democratic process, even if the whole cantonal electorate ultimately decides. However, because the threat of a territorial veto can be used as a bargaining chip
both in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary negotiations, direct democracy also functions as indirect localism. I now proceed to measurement, the fourth and last of Adcock’s and Collier’s (2001, 530) “research tasks.”

**Local Government Associations**

Not only since the political system approach to the EU (Hix and Hoyland 2011, 159) have organized interests received academic attention, but their potential danger has also been brought to light as far back as in the Federalist Paper No. 10 (*Federalist Papers [1787–88]*). By definition, interest groups organize to influence policy making. Insofar as their “interest” is congruent with that of lower-level polities, they fall into the category of shared rule. That they mostly operate outside the formal dimension of politics does not deny their potential relevance for the exercise of power—quite the contrary since such power, by definition, refers to relations between actors in the process of making collectively binding decisions. Hence, that they *could* matter justifies their inclusion in an exploratory measure of shared rule such as this one here.

In other words, LGAs are those “pressure groups” mentioned by Stein (1968) which lobby for “local” interests to be taken into account in “central,” that is, here cantonal decision making (Page 1991, 6). Mayors, clerks, and local councilors “use their political authority as local representatives” (Page 1991, 5) in lobbying for projects or support (Tarrow 1977). In this, LGAs are different from other interest groups—trade unions, farmers, teachers, doctors, self-employed, and so on—because they represent *public* authorities that are *territorially* anchored. This can be turned into a powerful claim to democratic exclusivity in the public discourse.

At the extreme, in a “clientelistic/patronage model,” argued by students of local government to exist in France or Italy, “the primary duty of local politicians is to deliver specific public goods and services […] and to see that the interests of their community are well represented and protected, especially at higher levels of government” (Goldsmith 1990, 21). This type of shared rule is deliberately not formally channeled, but plays through informal networks, personal and collective lobbying, and even the media (Page 1991, 43–50). The existence of one or several LGAs in a canton, their coverage and internal unity, and the authority the group can exert over its members (binding or consultative), thus represent the first dimension of my actor-centered (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) understanding of shared rule.

Except for Basel-City and Glarus (both with only three communes), there is in all cantons at least one organization or “conference” reuniting the municipalities or mayors. (See table A2 in the supplementary data available at *Publius* online for a list of all currently existing and only recently dissolved LGAs.) All LGAs have the status of private associations or are simple coordinative forums where the mayors
occasionally meet; none of them has the capacity to bind its members to its decisions. By far the most cantonal LGAs represent all local governments (and districts, in Schwyz) or mayors of their respective canton. The picture of one exclusive and exhaustive LGA per canton has only three deviations. In Grisons, a mere 66 percent of local governments participate in the “interest-group for smallest communes.” In Ticino, two previously separate LGAs (one for mountain communes, the other grouping cities) have merged in October 2012, but this LGA has not (yet) achieved full coverage. Finally, Vaud is the only canton with two rivaling LGAs and overlapping membership, with one LGA for the richer and another for the poorer communes—the split occurred in 2002 on the revision of the intercommunal fiscal equalization scheme. This matters because the legitimacy to speak on behalf of all local entities can be questioned if membership is only partial; hence one’s impact is potentially lower.

A second distinction can be made between political, functional, and LGAs with both purposes. Political LGAs group the mayors of local governments and explicitly lobby (vertically) for their interests at the cantonal level. More than half the LGAs fall into this category. In political LGAs, at the very minimum a common position is taken in the consultation phase and, at the maximum, decisions are influenced before they are even formulated in draft version. Oftentimes a functional association of local staff exists in parallel to, but organizationally detached from, these political LGAs (e.g., in Zurich, Aargau, and Berne). Of the seven LGAs operating in exclusively or predominantly French-speaking cantons, four are purely political. Noteworthy is the case of Vaud, where a cantonal-communal “platform” was set up in 2008 to reach “political agreements” between the cantonal government and both LGAs even before a law was drafted. Agreements on the financing of music schools, police reform, and intra-cantonal fiscal equalization were struck in this way.

Purely functional LGAs, in turn, exist to (horizontally) coordinate and exchange services among communes. Both LGAs in this category are German-speaking: The Schwyz LGA, created in 2005, advertises local vacancies on its website and publishes an online handbook on how best to deliver local tasks. The Grisons LGA, in turn, held, for example, a meeting in November 2011, attended by some seventy communes, on how to cope with exploding health care costs.

Finally, eight LGAs fulfill both political and functional purposes. The Geneva LGA, for example, located in an anonymous office building in Carouge and staffed by eight persons, runs the IT, extra-school care, and rubbish collection for its communes with a budget of over fifty million Swiss Francs, while also lobbying the cantonal government and parliament (see also Horber-Papazian 2004, 90). In Fribourg, the LGA has since 2011 provided trainings for newly elected local councilors who also sit in the cantonal parliament. Moreover, thanks to a club des communes (“communal club”), a parliamentary caucus that MCPs can opt in and
whose secretariat is run by the very same LGA, a direct entry point into
the cantonal parliament exists—essentially a second chamber in all but name. And
even the new LGA of Basel-Country was created for the very purpose of
better lobbying the cantonal authorities while maintaining its interlocal character
of service delivery. This merging of the political with the functional brings me
to consider a second aspect of shared rule: local influence within cantonal
parliaments.

Mayors as MCPs

Even in “consensus democracies” (Lijphart 2012, 33–40) like Switzerland and the
Swiss cantons (Vatter 2002), parliaments fulfill important roles. The hypothesis of
this section is that the presence of mayors in the cantonal legislative indicates a
“representation and defense of communal interests” (Meylan, Gottraux, and
Dahinden 1972, 279–81; own translation). The problem with the double-tenure of
local and cantonal office is of course to know whether that has any relevance
(Page 1991, 57). That MCPs have once served, or are still serving, as mayors does
not necessarily indicate that their “primary loyalty” (Stein 1968) lies with the local
rather than the cantonal level. Page (1991, 59) argues that previous tenure wrongly
assumes that past affiliation leads to present sympathies—an assumption that
“confuses past environment with current motivation.” I thus restrict my further
discussion to MCPs who are at the same time mayor of a commune, to avoid at
least some “confusion.” Mayors in the parliament matter at least potentially for
shared rule, and it is better to measure their presence and then systematically assess
their effect in a second step, rather than dismiss them at this early stage. Moreover,
for Switzerland at least some supporting evidence already exists.

Horber-Papazian (2004, 54) reports that mayor MPs in the national parliament
managed to insert an article protecting local autonomy into the new Federal
between the federal parliament and the cantons is secured not through the second
chamber, but by means of the cumul des mandats.” Neidhart (2002, 269) equally
draws attention to the fact that personal contacts between cantonal and local
officials are an important element in Swiss politics, and posits that “local officials”
(Gemeindefunktionäre) constitute one of the most influential groups in cantonal
parliaments.

Nevertheless, current, reliable data are scarce. Meylan, Gottraux, and Dahinden
(1972, 281) mention that in 1950 one-third of MCPs in Vaud were also local
officials. Horber-Papazian (2004, 54) reports their share in the cantonal parliaments
for Fribourg (29 percent), Vaud (24 percent), Valais (22 percent), Neuchâtel
(17 percent), Jura (10 percent), and Geneva (9 percent). Only Rühli (2012, 57) has
most recently surveyed all cantons to find out the share of MCPs who are, at the
same time, mayors. His findings are largely consistent with those reported here, only that I have used the “declaration of interest” published by each MCP rather than relying on cantonal experts. This, for my purposes, gives my data strong validity.¹²

Table 1 lists the size of cantonal parliaments, the number of MCPs who are at the same time mayors, and two relative sizes of that “group” (per MCPs and per local governments). All cantons except Uri and Basel-City have at least one mayor sitting in their parliament. However, while in Thurgau mayors account for a fifth in the whole chamber, in six cantons they barely constitute 2 percent and in nine others barely 10 percent of the chamber. In eight cantons mayor MCPs make for between 12 and 16 percent of the total number of MCPs. This relative weight (share 1) matters because with it the likelihood to sit prominently in key committees increases. This indicator can thus be regarded as capturing two potentials. First, the higher the number of mayor MCPs, the greater the chances to form issue-specific coalitions uniting different political parties. Indeed, it is a policy of the LGA of Thurgau to have in its executive board mayor MCPs from all political parties for precisely this reason. Second, the efficiency to speak on behalf of communes rises the more MCPs defending the local cause there are. The “voice of the communes” is less likely to be heard (or to be well received) if always the same two or three mayor MCPs speak up than when twenty-six MCPs (as in Thurgau) take turns.

A second indicator that can easily be calculated relates the number of mayor MCPs to the total number of municipalities in a canton (share 2). The figure reaches 100 percent in Glarus, where all three mayors sit in the cantonal parliament. Appenzell Inner-Rhodes obtains a share of 83 percent, but the only other two cantons with very high scores are Appenzell Outer-Rhodes and Thurgau. If share 1 captures efficiency potential, share 2 captures representativeness. To combine both indicators using the mean would obscure high values on either. Instead, I convert the interval variable into a nominal scale using the three categories low, middle, and high. Despite some loss of information, the emerging classification better represents shared rule because, at this stage at least, it is not clear which of the two, if any, matters more for bringing local interest to bear on cantonal politics in such an indirect way.

Table 2 thus shows the two leaders in terms of the potential of local governments to both (i) efficiently influence a cantonal parliament and (ii) with a high degree of representativeness. In Thurgau and Appenzell Outer-Rhodes, municipalities are, through “their” MCPs, clearly in a better place to exercise shared rule in this way than communes in Uri and Basel-City or the two French-speaking cantons Geneva and Neuchâtel. In addition, while in Appenzell Inner-Rhodes and Glarus representativeness comes at the expense of efficiency potential, in Vaud the opposite is the case.
Finally, to fully capture the influence communes exercise over cantonal politics, one simply cannot omit direct democracy. This may be peculiar to Switzerland, but other polities know these instruments as well; even in the EU it has recently been added to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the polity (Regulation 211/2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>Total MCPs</th>
<th>Mayor MCPs</th>
<th>Share 1</th>
<th>Share 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>140</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>8.7%</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
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<td>Basel-Country</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fribourg</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grisons</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3.8%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obwalden</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Gall</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaffhausen</td>
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<td>Uri</td>
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<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zug</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>1.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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</table>


Note. Share 1 = Mayor MCPs per total MCPs; Share 2 = Mayor MCPs per total number of Local Governments (as of 1 April 2012, see table A1 in supplementary data available at Publius online). Number of Mayor MCPs as of June 2011.

\textsuperscript{a}Updated in September 2012 because of discrepancies with Rühli (2012).

**Direct Democracy**

Finally, to fully capture the influence communes exercise over cantonal politics, one simply cannot omit direct democracy. This may be peculiar to Switzerland, but other polities know these instruments as well; even in the EU it has recently been added to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the polity (Regulation 211/2011).
For the Swiss cantons, Fiechter (2010, 76) lists how in several cantons, local
governments have the possibility to (i) amend the cantonal constitution, (ii)
propose a new cantonal law, and/or (iii) challenge a legal, fiscal, or “otherwise
important” decision by the cantonal parliament. The first two options are
summarized as “communal initiative,” the last as “communal referendum”
(Schmitt and Gassmann 2005, XVII). In most cases, this power is exercised by the
local executive; however, usually communes are free to organize who within them
can demand the instrument. Only if the cities of Zurich or Winterthur alone
challenge a cantonal decision must this be decided by their local parliaments. This
shows the value of broadening a governmental focus. In Obwalden, even an
individual member of the (collective) local executive can activate the process. In all
but two cases, the procedure ends with a binding popular vote regardless of what
the cantonal parliament says, that is, the cantonal electorate has the final say. In
Zurich, the communal initiative only ensues in a popular vote if a majority of
MCPs are supportive; the same in Obwalden for both instruments. Table A3
available in the supplementary data at Publius online lists the type, requirement,
and only ever usages to date of such direct-democratic local power over cantonal
politics.

Table 2 Effectiveness potential by representativeness of mayor MCPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness potential (¼ share 1)</th>
<th>Representativeness (¼ share 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (&lt;4%)</td>
<td>Basel-City, Geneva, Neuchâtel, Nidwalden, Uri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Berne, Jura, Valais, Zurich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (&gt;12%)</td>
<td>Vaud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (&lt;9%)</td>
<td>Schwyz, Zug, Obwalden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Basel-Country, Schaffhausen, Ticino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (&gt;26%)</td>
<td>Aargau, Fribourg, Grisons, Solothurn, Lucerne, St. Gall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cut-points for both dimensions determined by respective mean values M (8.08% for share 1, 17.23% for share 2) ±.05*M (rounded).

In all this, communes do not have to act through bilateral negotiations or
second chambers. Instead, they can directly influence cantonal policy making, all
but bypassing the cantonal authorities. And, although their veto is suspensive
only—because the cantonal electorate has the final say and no “double majority”
(as for constitutional amendments at the federal level) is required—it is conceivable
that the local referendum “hangs, like the sword of Damocles, as a permanent threat above the political process” (Trechsel and Kriesi 1996, 192).

Indeed, communal referendums have been successful in two out of three attempts. In Jura, it was used for the first time in May 2008, when seventeen (out of then eighty-three) communes called for a popular vote on a new framework law for water (Gassmann 2005). In the ensuing popular vote, 54 percent of the citizens rejected the new law. In Zurich, the Gemeindereferendum was used for the first time in December 2010, when the city parliament of Zurich challenged a new fiscal law. The electorate then narrowly rejected the law on June 17, 2012: Although 111 local governments (60 percent) and 154,075 citizens accepted it, since only a popular majority was required the 43,441 no-votes from within the city of Zurich were enough to tip the final score against the law to 154,982. However, in Solothurn the LGA was unable to mobilize a popular majority, after it had previously coordinated a referendum in which thirty-three local governments (out of 126) challenged the repartition of user charges for issuing new passports as “unfair”: In the popular vote of May 16, 2004, more than 60 percent agreed with the new directive, thus rejecting the local veto.13

Communal initiatives, in turn, have failed twice out of the only four times in which they have ever been attempted, and even the two successes are partial only. In Obwalden, all seven municipalities recently petitioned the canton to reconsider the shifting of additional health care costs “downward.” However, because the cantonal parliament flatly rejected this Volksmotion, no popular vote took place. In Zurich, in 2006 forty-two local governments demanded a stop to the further extension of Zurich Airport by modifying the respective legislative act. The cantonal parliament accepted the motion by 100:64, but a popular vote took place because demanded so by a parliamentary minority. On November 27, 2011, 58 percent of the electorate rejected the communal initiative.14

The only two successful examples of communal initiatives are indirect. The first comes from Ticino, where in 2005 seventeen municipalities demanded a modification of the repartition of water charges between communes and canton. Eventually, fifty-nine other communes supported the initiative. The cantonal government rejected the demand but proposed to modify the law on fiscal equalization. In fact, the communes had launched the initiative on water charges simply to put pressure on the cantonal government in this policy area. This is proven by the fact that after the cantonal parliament accepted an indirect counter-proposal with 60:16, the initiative was withdrawn in October 2010. Without a popular vote, the initiative was thus successful in reorganizing the water charges in a way that would get mountain communes a bigger share in “their” water. A similar indirect success took place in Solothurn: In May 2009, the LGA launched a legislative initiative, signed up for by eighty-six local governments, to more than double the contribution of the canton toward teachers’ salaries, from 25 to 55
percent. As in Ticino, the initiative was withdrawn after the cantonal government agreed to a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme—an only indirectly related area. So although few in number, direct democracy had a detectable effect in four out of seven cases: two on water, one on taxes, and one on schools. All of them had to do with the vertical repartition of money and took place within the past four years. I next discuss where all this leaves us in reconceptualizing shared rule.

Discussion

To matter, shared rule must have an effect. To matter theoretically, it must have the expected effect, that is, relate the concept to a set of coherently reasoned hypotheses. In this section, I draw on a series of interviews conducted with local and cantonal representatives over summer 2011 to illustrate consequences of shared rule. With this I intend to show why including an actor- and process-related dimension into the concept of shared rule is important.

To begin with, from a more normative point of view, shared rule can be regarded as an integrative mechanism (Treisman 2007). Mayor MCPs function as informants for both sides: They profit from their local experience when making cantonal laws, on the one hand, and ensure that “their” polity is up to date as regards cantonal requirements, on the other. The secretary general of the Fribourg LGA stated that “we depend on ‘our’ MCPs to tell us what is going on in the cantonal parliament, that is why we have decided to organize them into a Club des Communes.” The members of this Club ensure that cantonal information flows directly to the LGA, while the LGA informs and mobilizes its members through an online newsletter. In April 2012, the Club had fifty-one members—corresponding to 46 percent of the total parliamentary membership—from all five parties represented there. LGAs in other cantons have started organizing into a similar framework. In Grisons, for example, mayor MCPs are already today regularly meeting before each parliamentary session, and in Thurgau “we [the mayor MCPs] regularly ask for a break to quickly sit together.” Personal contacts remain indispensable to acquiring first-hand information, which in turn is a condition of influence.

Thus, the moment political power is distributed—vertically between canton and communes, horizontally between different communes—the need arises to ensure coordinative “re-integration” (Nüssli 1985), at the least, and corporate lobbying, at the most. Mayor MCPs, especially when backed up by a well-organized LGA, are in a better position to influence cantonal politics in favor of communes. They (claim to) know exactly what the consequences of this or that policy will be for the lower level. We currently lack data on the voting behavior of (mayor and nonmayor) MCPs to fully assess whether this hypothesis is true. In the expert survey conducted by Rühli (2012, 56), local influence is reported to be high in all cantons, regardless
of the number or share of mayor MCPs. Communes, in turn, perceive their influence to be highest when they can delegate a member of a permanent or project-specific working group, not when working through “their” representatives in the cantonal parliament (Rühli 2012, 176), where they have to compete with party ties. But as stated above, the likelihood or effectiveness potential to sit in these groups rises in proportion to the number of mayor MCPs.

Extra-parliamentary power, in turn, is either formal or informal. Communal referendums and initiatives are formal instruments of (direct) democracy while LGAs allow for informal, horizontal as well as vertical cooperation and contestation. Like other pressure groups, LGAs are created for a purpose. The president of the Zurich LGA formulated this as follows:

They also call us “the Council of States [Senate] of Canton Zurich”! Our policy is not to work through the media, on the contrary: we always try to negotiate with the canton—executive, bureaucracy, or committees of the cantonal parliament. Of course, this does not always work, but it often leads to better solutions. Before, we simply received draft laws on which we were allowed to comment—and then still got ignored! Today, when there are important projects, we are often included in the elaboration phase already.

LGAs allow communes to coordinate their answer to cantonal requests, whether during pre-parliamentary consultations on draft laws or even before a first draft is adopted, as can most clearly be seen in the example of Vaud with its permanent “platform.” Like political parties, LGAs provide resources, infrastructure, regular exchange, and strengthened identification to their members—with the only difference that they are not “part-of-a-whole” (Sartori 2005 [1976], 23), but represent “the whole,” in the sense of covering—ideally—the entire territory and all communes. Moreover, formal and informal local power may be complementary. The case of Solothurn shows this best: Both initiative and referendum were coordinated by the LGA, although formally the communes had to sign up individually. The secretary general of the Solothurn LGA justified this as follows: “We deliberately chose the path of a communal referendum because that was easier […] you only need five communal assemblies to vote on that!” And when in May 2011 that LGA disagreed with a cantonal reform proposal on social care, the “threat with the communal referendum” was used “to make the cantonal bureaucracy nervous.” Moreover, the LGA “deliberately accumulated a reserve of 250,000 Swiss Francs, and we are very happy to tell everybody about it. We will only use this for campaigning […]. We have to be able to launch two or three popular votes without the need for support from a political party.”

As on the federal level, it may thus suffice that the possibility of a referendum exists, without actors actually having to resort to it. Like the federal government, cantons anticipate potential “veto players” (Tsebelis 1995) and include them in the
drafting process early on. It goes without saying that such a threat is all the more credible if backed up by a precedent and/or a coherent organization with significant own resources. It is confirmed by the experience in another canton. As the president of the St. Gall LGA explained, although they had lost their referendum for a bigger local share of cantonal money, “the consequence was quite beneficial nevertheless: today, the cantonal government tries hard to get the communes on board. We only have to threaten with the referendum and they give in a little.” This goes to show that the instruments of direct democracy serve the interests of the communes like any other pressure group. And since citizens are directly able to launch a constitutional initiative or legislative referendum in all twenty-six cantons, it may not even need the special instrument of a communal bearer of this right, although the support of a few local governments may be more quickly and—in an instantaneous media age equally important—more spectacularly arranged for.

Finally, the presence of LGAs can also work for the canton, not just against it. In Thurgau, the view prevails that “to some extent, the LGA functions as an unofficial cantonal office for communes—not officially, because there is no legal basis for that, but in the perception. There are five [cantonal] ministries and we have good working relationships with each. We don’t play one against the other […] but are there to help and assist in the preparation of new policies” (president of the Thurgau LGA). This more policy- and less politics-oriented approach is present also in Schwyz, where this is even the only purpose of the LGA: “we try to maintain an active network between communes. […] In fact, this is the one big task that we have set ourselves: to build the network between communes and districts so that flexible policy solutions become possible” (president of the Schwyz LGA).

Enabling communes to organize and—individually or collectively, directly or indirectly—to influence cantonal politics is thus not necessarily a zero-sum game, especially not if the practical experience of a lower level can be made use of in the formulation of abstract norms at a higher level, a typical principle of “executive federalism” (Braun 2009). On this cooperative aspect of vertical intergovernmentalism, Hooghe and Marks (2013, 182) remind us how often information is “difficult to standardize, resistant to batching, and correspondingly expensive to pass up an organizational hierarchy.” To the extent that communes are more “proximate” to their citizens (Tiebout 1956), passing this kind of information “upward” directly works to the benefit of all those involved. In Switzerland as the embodiment of “organic federalism” (Elazar 1993), the view still prevails that “if the canton is well, the communes are well, too” (president of the “rich” Vaud LGA). It is hardly surprising then that the more political LGAs are all found in cantons with a large population (Solothurn, Zurich, Saint Gall, Ticino, Vaud, Fribourg), where anonymity, confrontation, and polarization rise proportionally. In the smaller, rural cantons (Thurgau, Schwyz, Grisons), relations are still personal,
direct, more practical, and less ideological. However, these are elements of an explanation that must be addressed in a future analysis.

What can we learn from these instances of local power in Swiss cantons that is relevant for a general discussion of shared rule? If shared rule and self-rule serve as “constitutional principles to distribute power among both the general governing body and the constituent governing bodies” (Moots 2009: 400), one needs to understand this power more broadly. That is, not simply as something to be found in second chambers or intergovernmental meetings, but also assess it through the behavior of MPs with a double mandate, territorial pressure groups, and policy-specific veto rights. Regional “paradiplomacy” in Brussels (Aldecoa and Keating 1999), the informal power of the Austrian Conference of Ländler Governors (Bussjäger 2003), or the “General Committee of the Autonomous Communities” (where half the members are regionally appointed) within the Spanish Senate (Bourne 2006, 11) are examples of how increasingly complex territorial politics has come to operate in federal political systems. This has consequences for shared rule as well.

If the key task for scholars is to understand the ways, reasons, and consequences of collectively binding decision making (Easton 1968 [1953]), then the “rule” in shared rule equally needs to be understood in such a broad way. “Sharing” on the other hand requires the divisibility of that which is to be shared, in this case political power (Maass 1959). This means that to conceptualize shared rule is to define the object, subjects, and processes by which rule is shared in federal political systems. The object refers to decisions with system-wide applicability. The (political) subjects are public (governments, parliaments), public–private (LGAs), public–individual (mayors MCPs/MPs), or collective (groupings of MCPs/MPs) political actors (Benz 2009). The processes of shared rule, finally, can be divided into formal institutions, for example, upper chambers or direct democracy, and informal politics, for example, bargaining within intergovernmental meetings (Beramendi 2009) or corporate lobbying.

In sum, shared rule has several dimensions. They all relate to the concept’s core, which captures how lower-level entities influence politics at higher levels. While this article has focused on local influence over cantonal decisions, conceptually the goal was to generalize to the way regional polities influence national decisions. Speaking in these general terms, sometimes shared rule takes formal channels, for example, in the German Bundesrat. Sometimes it is expressed in inter-executive meetings, for example, in Canada. And at other times, for example, in Switzerland and several of its cantons, direct-democratic channels matter most, operated (or not) by LGAs that can build (or not) on a strong local representation among MCPs. The chief lesson to be learned, then, is that it is simply not enough to study upper chambers if decisions are (also) taken in extra-parliamentary arenas; or to focus on governments if individual executive members have other, direct and
informal means to influence upper-level policies. Shared rule’s political dimensions ought to be given more, and more careful, attention.

Conclusion

In this article I first discussed conceptualizations and measurements of shared rule as an essential element of federal political systems. I then showed how applied to Switzerland and its cantons, the RAI does not render an accurate picture of how strong both cantonal and local polities really are in influencing politics at a higher level. Finally, I provided data on direct and indirect localism in all Swiss cantons using the number of mayor MCPs, types of cantonal LGAs, and the existence and usages of communal referendums and initiatives. There are two implications from this subnational analysis. First, shared rule is a multifaceted and complex concept. The city parliament of Zurich single-handedly vetoed a new cantonal tax law and was confirmed in its stance by the cantonal electorate. Communes also influence policies through “their” parliamentary representatives or through special negotiation forums such as the “platform” in Vaud. Action and reaction may also be supported by strong, politically oriented LGAs.

Of course there are limitations to the extent to which these findings are able to travel beyond Switzerland. Only few countries possess both extended regional and local autonomy for their interplay to become an interesting object of study. However, my main argument is not empirical but conceptual, for a second implication is that measuring shared rule needs to be extended from governments and formal channels (“authority”) to subnational polities—distinguishing, as I have done, the executive from the legislative, and individual actors such as mayors from collective actors such as LGAs. As important, legitimate, and measurable as the former dimensions are, political power is equally—or even more so—a personal, direct, and informal matter. Thus, an analysis of shared rule needs to adopt a holistic perspective.

This neatly paves the way for further studies. Only through linking individual actors and informal processes to formal institutions can we fully assess shared rule and, by implication, better understand the reality of federal political systems. For Switzerland and the study of Swiss federalism, a first step would certainly be to devise ways in which the several indicators can meaningfully and reliably be aggregated, so that cross-cantonal comparisons become possible. In a second step, the same indicators can be transposed back to the cantonal level, assessing the effect of cantonal lobbying, usages of direct democracy and double mandates at federal level. Beyond Switzerland and for the study of federal political systems, conceptually equivalent processes of direct and indirect regionalism must be distilled from the country-specific literature, before one can start measuring and later assessing the cause and effect of the political dimension of shared rule. This
might seem onerous, but if the end result is a more realistic picture of forms and exercise of territorial power, it will be worth it.

**Supplementary Data**

Supplementary data can be found at www.publius.oxfordjournals.org.

**Notes**

I thank Michael Burgess, Paolo Dardanelli, and Adrian Vatter for comments on a much prior version of this text and the editor of *Publius*, Carol S. Weissert, as well as the journal’s three anonymous reviewers for their very constructive suggestions. All remaining inaccuracies and misrepresentations are attributable to me alone.

1. I use “local governments,” “municipalities,” and “communes” interchangeably. These refer to the political type of communes, that is, general-purpose entities at the lowest Swiss level reuniting all residents. By contrast, in Bürgergemeinden membership is confined to local citizens, “corporations” have a single purpose, for example, maintenance of forests, rivers, or alpine pastures, and Schulgemeinden exist to run schools only (Ladner 2009). This article disregards these other types of communes; however, in some cantons they are still very important.

2. Or not even here, for people still have to travel to the gathering, a fact which disadvantages less mobile and elderly persons (see Schaub 2012 for a discussion).


5. Figure A1, in supplementary data available at *Publius* online, shows the location and territorial extension of the twenty-six cantons as well as the year in which each became full member of the Swiss Confederation.

6. For the purpose of studying shared rule as the power of local governments to influence cantonal politics, some basic attributes of the Swiss cantons need to be known (see table A1 in supplementary data available at *Publius* online).

7. In this and the next section I draw on interviews conducted with over fifty local officials, clerks, cantonal civil servants, MCPs, and party members in all twenty-six cantons during May and June 2011. Interviews were conducted in German, French, and Italian; all translations into English are mine.


12. The declarations of interests by MCPs are obligatory but no check on their accuracy or completeness is carried out. However, because MCPs have to fill them in by themselves, that somebody would “forget” to mention his mayoral office could be taken as *prima facie* evidence that for him/her local affiliation simply does not matter.


References


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