Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and Evolution of Two Models

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Federations have traditionally divided powers either along policy lines, in which case a dual system results, or along functional lines with the central government legislating and the constituent units implementing, in which case a system of administrative federalism results. Although this distinction is widely used, we know little of its specific origins, the degree to which it accurately portrays federal practice today, or even its implications. This article examines the origins and traces the evolution of these two models in six federations since their formation: the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Germany, and India. Two questions are addressed. First, what explains the choice for either the one or the other type, and is administrative federalism really sui generis to Germany, as often argued in the literature? And second, how have they evolved over time and has there been a convergence?

The division of powers is fundamental to federal systems. Traditionally, that has been organized in two different ways. In systems of dual federalism, the division of powers empowers each order of government with full responsibility for legislation, implementation, and administration in its assigned policy domains (Hueglin and Fenna 2015, 136). Wheare (1946, 35) described this as a system where the two orders of government are “co-ordinate with and not subordinate to the other”. As a result, each level of government—and indeed each government—makes policy and disposes of its own administration and justice apparatus to implement and administer that policy. In systems of administrative federalism, by contrast, different functions or roles, rather than entire policy domains, are assigned to the respective orders of government (Brecht 1945, 51 and passim). The central government primarily legislates, while the constituent units implement. The first model has also been labelled the “direct method”, the second the “indirect method” of federal administration (MacMahon 1972, 22).

Two main questions arise from this basic distinction. First, what explains political choices for either the dual or the administrative model? The former has its
origins in the foundation of the United States, while the administrative model belongs to the “Continental European federal tradition” (Burgess 2006, 166) for which “Germany serves almost as a ‘prototype’” (Börzel 2005, 249). But precisely which factors—structural, societal, contextual, and/or ideological—are responsible for those choices remains unclear (e.g., Mueller and Hechter 2021). Indeed, we show below that while the literature on comparative federalism has a great deal to say about why federal systems emerge in the first place, we know far less about why a certain model of dividing power is chosen (see, however, Broschek 2012).

The second question pertains to change over time. MacMahon (1972, 23) argued that “one of the most significant trends in the varied applications of federalism is the merging of methods,” with dual systems becoming more “indirect” and indirect systems becoming more dual. But we know neither the extent to which there has indeed been movement away from the dual towards the administrative pole across countries or vice versa, nor the precise reasons for such movement. In other words, we currently lack both a theory and comparative data on the longue durée of either model that would allow us to conclude that Germany, for instance, has remained an administrative federalism archetype, or that the US is no longer the most dual of all democratic federations—or even simply not properly dual anymore (Corwin 1950; Young 2014).

The next section thus synthesizes our current understanding of the dual/administrative federalism dichotomy and discusses existing comparative theories in that regard. We then look at the historical origins of the two models in their paradigmatic countries, the United States and Germany, and briefly test our explanations against other cases. The final section focuses on dynamics and change over time, presenting the key insights provided by the de/centralization database developed by Dardanelli and colleagues (2019a). This allows us to trace the evolution of the two models in six federations (the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Germany, and India) ever since their creation in contemporary form—over more than two centuries in the U.S. case. Our enquiry into both the origins and the evolution of the two models thus addresses important aspects of comparative federalism as it leads us to consider power struggles, degrees of de/centralization, and socio-economic as well as cultural diversity.

Our findings confirm the two main working assumptions prevalent in the field: first, that historically dual federalism is the rule, and the German model of administrative federalism the exception; second, that in many countries—the United States and Switzerland, but also India and Australia—dualism has become significantly less pure, with a substantial degree of de facto administrative federalism being introduced over time. We do not, however (pace MacMahon 1972, 23), observe a move towards the middle, but rather a slow and steady “Germanisation”, at least as regards the six “classic” federations studied here.
Finally, we confirm that the main factor responsible for the trend towards administrative federalism is centralization of policy-making.

**The Two Models: What We Know so Far**

While closely related to the question of *which* powers to allocate to the central and the constituent unit governments respectively, the *mode* of this allocation is a conceptually distinct matter (Schütze 2009, 5). The main choice in that regard may be summarized as follows:

The US model of ‘legislative [i.e., dual] federalism’, applied with variation in both the Canadian and Australian systems, assigns global responsibility for policy domains to the respective level of government. By contrast, the German model of ‘administrative federalism’ assigns a broad policy-making authority to the central government and leaves responsibility for implementation and administration to the constituent units . . . . (Fenna 2012, 752)

Each model has its prerequisites, and each has distinctive ways in which it may generate dysfunctionalities. While assessment of the effects and pathologies of each model must be left to further research, it is still necessary to clarify the differences between them if we are to understand their origins and subsequent evolution.

**Dual Federalism: The U.S. Model**

The American approach was once interpreted as meaning that “the Federal Government . . . has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it, for if it possessed this power, it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the State” (Kentucky v. Denison 1861, 65). This was then elevated by Wheare (1963, 2) to archetypal status: a “division of powers between distinct and co-ordinate governments” being for him definitional to federalism itself. For Corwin (1950, 4), who characterized this as “dual federalism”, it entailed a situation where “[w]ithin their respective spheres the two centers of government are ‘sovereign’ and hence ‘equal’,” and where their relationship “is one of tension rather than collaboration.” Such an approach to dividing powers is predicated, though, on: (i) the ability to categorize state action into mutually exclusive policy domains; (ii) broad agreement on which ones are most appropriately assigned to which level of government; (iii) a substantial range of tasks being accepted as local and not national in their character or dimensions; and (iv) a corresponding degree of fiscal autonomy for each level of government to ensure policy independence.

The importance of point (iii) is abundantly clear in Article I(8) of the U.S. Constitution, which enumerates powers assigned to Congress. Those enumerated
powers leave almost all domestic governance responsibilities to the individual States and thus create, on paper at least, quite distinct spheres of operation. This was feasible in an age when governments played so much less a role than they came to do in the twentieth century. Even in “the age of federalism” at the end of the eighteenth century, to borrow a felicitous characterization of those pre-industrial times (Elkins and McKitrick 1993), though, there were unavoidable dilemmas about where to “draw the line” between, and within, broad policy areas and/or conflicts over which level of government should exercise authority. Grodzins (1966) and Elazar (1969) were at pains to stress that some degree of cooperation always existed—though this can be exaggerated (Scheiber 1978). Over time, the “lines” separating different policy areas increasingly blurred and the resulting need for cooperation increased.

In Sawer’s (1969, 64) view, increasing entanglement led to the evolution of dualist systems “involving three successive stages; first co-ordinate or dual federalism, secondly co-operative federalism, and thirdly organic or integrated federalism.” Consensus holds that the Great Depression and the New Deal represented the turning point in the United States, although it was only in the 1960s that cooperative federalism really became the order of the day (Clark 1938; Scheiber 1978, 644; Glendening and Reeves 1984; Walker 2000, 90; Kincaid 2019). For Corwin (1950, 19), dual federalism expressed a “competitive theory of federalism”, whereas the development of “cooperative federalism” in the United States was manifest through grants-in-aid and the increasingly dominant view that “the National Government and the States are mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism” (emphasis in original; see also Kincaid 2017).

Viewing U.S. federalism from a legal perspective, Corwin (1950, 17) saw the system as “in ruins”, and perhaps in those terms it was. However, the larger picture must be seen a bit differently. While extensively changed in its operation, not only does it remain dual in constitutional design, but it retains a dual quality in several important policy spheres (e.g., Conlan et al. 2015 as well as below). The result is a situation—in the U.S. as much as in other dual federations—where the “federal spending power” as well as other forms of central government authority create an ongoing set of issues about “coercive” and “opportunistic” federalism (Kincaid 1990, 2012; Conlan 2006).

Administrative Federalism: The German Model

Whereas dual federalism emphasizes policy independence and political competition through a strict division of powers, “gaining and retaining autonomy of action in policy implementation” is of the essence in administrative federalism (Behnke 2020, 187). Under administrative federalism, the constituent units are responsible for applying or “executing” federal law, hence its characterization in German-
speaking countries as Vollzugsföderalismus—“executory” or “implementational” federalism. The constituent units do not just apply federal law as if they were the central government’s executive agencies, however. Instead, “federal law allows legislative choices at the implementation level” so that “[i]n regulating its ‘people’, the State acts as its ‘government’” (Schütze 2009, 8). Article 83 of the German Constitution (the Grundgesetz) accordingly declares that “The Länder shall execute Federal laws as matters of their own concern insofar as this Grundgesetz does not otherwise provide or permit.” The Länder apply national law via so called “implementation Acts” (Ausführungsgesetze), which typically further specify various technicalities such as eligibility, deadlines, and appeals procedures.

In Germany, the Constitution further differentiates between cases where the Länder implement federal laws as “their own matter” (Article 84) and those where they are under closer supervision as express agents of the federal government (Article 85). In Switzerland, where cantons possess even greater discretion, implementation Acts have the same character as “ordinary” cantonal law (Braun 2010, 175). They can thus also be challenged by direct-democratic instruments at that level. Implementation also depends greatly on the political will of individual cantons (Linder and Vatter 2001, 107ff.). In Austria, where the administrative approach also prevails, the Constitution distinguishes between “direct” and “indirect federal administration”, the latter amounting to “a complex, in parts even stratarchical negotiating system with the states [the Länder] controlling the execution of federal law” (Karlhofer 2017, 19).

Unlike in dual federalism, sub-national governments have no “choice” in accepting this federal leadership; they are legally bound to do so. Subnational courts, too, will be first instances for all legal disputes as there is generally no separate federal jurisdiction in parallel to regional domains as we know it from dual systems. What characterizes administrative federalism, then, is not a vertical division of powers along policy areas, but rather a functional division within each area: rule-making by the central government, implementation and ongoing administration (including adjudication) by the constituent units. Yet, unlike dual systems, which in theory can exist without any element of administrative federalism, no federation will have an exclusively administrative division of powers. There will always be some areas in which the constituent units are assigned autonomous authority to make, as well as implement, policy; and, obversely, the central government will inevitably have distinct areas of jurisdiction where it implements its own policy decisions by means of its own administrative apparatus—the army and diplomatic corps being two obvious examples.

In Germany, however, such areas were originally a rare exception. After unification in 1871, the only physical presence the Reich had on the ground was the postal service—and even that did not extend into Bavaria and Württemberg, which continued to operate their own systems (Brecht 1945, 48; Broschek 2012,
“Not even the military was federal” (Brecht 1945, 48)—although the Kaiser was commander-in-chief and consistency with Prussian military rules and regulations was required. At the same time, the Reich did not hesitate to exercise wide-ranging regulatory powers; accordingly, it was the Reich that introduced Bismarck’s path-breaking welfare state program. By the time of the Weimar Republic, however, this pure form of administrative federalism had started to erode as the federal government increasingly implemented directly.

With hindsight, the advantage of administrative federalism is that it anticipated what later became a key problem for dual federalism, namely the increasing entanglement of policy areas. For instance, financial support for disabled school children is less of a problem if there is a national law on disability that provides the constituent units with significant leeway as to how they work this into their education systems (administrative federalism) than when the disability and education domains “belong” to the national and the regional level, respectively (dual federalism). The disadvantages of administrative federalism, meanwhile, can be unclear responsibility, diluted accountability, and suboptimal decision-making since each level can blame the other for policy failure: decision-makers can fault the implementors and vice versa (Scharpf 1988, 249).

The quid pro quo in the German system for a loss of regional policy making autonomy is greater policy making influence, or “co-decision making” (Behnke 2020, 191). Direct representation of the Länder executives in the federal parliament via the second chamber, the Bundesrat (Federal Council), means they have a collective veto over policies that affect them. The result is a system of integrated federalism, or Politikverflechtung, that Hesse (1962) characterized in a nicely paradoxical way as a “unitary federal state” (unitarischer Bundesstaat). Integrated federalism has been accused of its own pathology: the Politikverflechtungsfalle or “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 1988; Scharpf et al. 1976). To agree on policy reforms, a de facto consensus among the actors that profit from the currently entangled situation is needed: the Länder governments and their delegates in the Bundesrat. Yet the joint-decision trap is only partially a consequence of administrative federalism as such. While the inclusion of Land governments in central policy making is justified by the administrative model in Germany, the Swiss and Austrian cases show that such inclusion need not always be the case, or that at least it can take different forms—with traps more easily avoided (Mueller 2021; Karlhofer 2017). The direct political representation of subnational executives at national level is thus no definiens of administrative federalism.

In Search of Explanations

The dichotomy of dual versus administrative federalism remains prominent in the literature to this day, albeit often only implicitly and descriptively. Thus, whereas
scholars in the United States alternatively deplore or celebrate “the passing of dual federalism” (Corwin 1950), German federalists decry the Politikverflechtungsfalle (e.g., Benz 2020). A return to the dual age before roughly the 1960s would remove the coercive elements of U.S. federalism so pervasive today (Kincaid 2017, 1067). Rolling back the clock in that regard is periodically mooted also in other dual federations such as Canada (Simmons 2017; Lecours 2021, 167f.) and Australia (e.g., NCA 2014). In turn, dividing Land and national powers more clearly in Germany—more dualism—would lessen the need for regional, federal and partisan actors to agree on almost everything (Benz 2016, 77ff). The same debate can be observed in Switzerland, another (by now) paradigmatic case of administrative federalism: although the 2008 federal reform “unbundled” a number of task (Vatter 2018, 188ff.), the federal and cantonal governments formed a joint working commission to study further “disentanglement”, or Entflechtung (KdK 2019).

Despite the prevalence of the dual/administrative dichotomy, there has been surprisingly little effort to explain the emergence and subsequent evolution of either one or the other model—let alone empirical investigation thereof. Scholars have long focused attention on why federal systems emerge in the first place. For Wheare (1946, 1964), it was the desire for enhanced external security and/or economic advantage in a situation where certain prerequisites were in place such as political and cultural commonalities and the capacity for regional self-government. For others, it was because of a “bargain” in which regional leaders consciously trade their independence for joint military strength (Riker 1964); because of territorially entrenched and politically salient socio-cultural diversity (Livingston 1952; Erk 2008; Gagnon 2021); or because of population and area size (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2013) and center–periphery relations broadly understood (e.g., Swenden 2006). Nothing like the equivalent attention has been given to explaining what form the resulting federation took.

One exception is Broschek (2012, 667), who disentangles the mode of power division from constituent unit participation in central government decision-making and intergovernmental relations at the inception of the Canadian and German federations. His explanation rests on “critical antecedents” such as the political deadlock experienced under the de facto entangled United Province of Canada (p. 673f.), which led to a dual model being acceptable to both unitarists and decentralists. In turn, the “pre-existing bureaucratic capacities” of the German Länder meant that “the federal level . . . could not adequately implement legislation without the support of the states.” (p. 670f.; see also below). The subsequent evolution of each federation is then largely predetermined, in his view, by such initial decisions—although “critical junctures” may open new possibilities (see also Broschek 2015).

In the following section, we look more closely at the formation of these two paradigmatic cases to understand what factors were responsible for the choice of
Choosing One or the Other

Being the original federal rather than confederal system, the United States has tended to serve as the model not only of one type of federalism, but of federalism in general (Stepan 1999; Riker 1964). From that vantage point, Germany is a deviation, and indeed there has been some tendency in the literature to treat it that way (e.g., Wheare 1946). However, this should not pre-empt the question why dualism was the model adopted for the U.S. Constitution of 1789. Given the lack of a general theory on why a particular model was adopted when creating a federation, our investigations are inductive rather than deductive but relate to existing hypotheses where appropriate.

Origins of Dual Federalism

There would appear to be three main reasons for the American choice of the dual model, perhaps individually sufficient in themselves, but collectively certainly so: unhappy experience with indirect administration; preference for greater state autonomy; and a form of deep diversity.

The first and most obvious reason for the emergence of dual federalism in the United States is that the current U.S. Constitution was drafted in an explicit effort to escape the limitations and frustrations of the confederal first U.S. Constitution, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. In particular, the framers were intent on rescuing Congress from its dependence on indirect operation through the States, an arrangement that had severely hobbled national action (MacMahon 1972, 25; Rakove 1982, 1997, 167–68; Van Cleve 2017). This impulsion was so powerful that the framers “were ... concerned less with broadening the objects of the national government than with guaranteeing that it would possess the powers necessary to secure its ends” (Rakove 1997, 179). Reinforcing this desire was the perception that the States were not necessarily reliable partners and susceptible to democratic ructions, thus there must be a central government that could stand apart from them and serve as a counterweight (Rakove 1997, 168). From this followed the need to equip the new central government not only with (further) policy-making powers, but also with its own, independent set of bureaucratic, fiscal and judicial structures.

The second reason was manifest in the Convention’s rejection of the highly centralizing “Virginia Plan”. As is well known, constitution-making resulted in a temporary impasse given two mutually exclusive “plans”: that from Virginia...
incorporating Madison’s idea of a “federal negative” into a strong central
government versus that from New Jersey advocating little more than a
confederation (Rakove 1997, 169–72; Robertson 2013, 57–80; LaCroix 2011,
147ff). The resulting compromise was manifold (Kincaid 2019, 171f.), including
most notably a bicameral structure where both large and small States were
adequately represented, and a more limited set of federal powers than the
advocates of a strong “republic” had demanded.

Put differently, the framers were creating a decentralized system with little
acceptance of any overarching federal government authority in respect of
responsibilities being executed by the States. It is apparent from the enumerated
powers assigned to Congress that the domestic responsibilities of the federal
government were to be minimal. A new national government was created, and its
purpose was to manage the union’s external relations and provide the basic
framework for a national economy—nothing more, nothing less. Thus, right from
the start there was a close connexion between dual federalism and non-
centralization: the transition from confederation to federation is less abrupt and
thus easier to sell if a new national bureaucracy and accompanying fiscal structure
apply only in a few policy areas such as, in the U.S. case, defence and external
affairs (Kincaid 2019, 172).

The third reason for dual federalism in the United States is that greater national
law-making and implementation in respect of domestic governance would have
been intolerable to the slave States (Robertson 2013, 11ff.; Van Cleve 2010).
Slavery alone is probably sufficient to explain the choice of a dualist system in the U.S.
case. However, given that the United States is the only federation to have been
designed to accommodate slavery, this might be seen as providing little help in
understanding the broader tendency towards dualism. On further reflection,
though, we can read this in more generalizable terms as an extreme form of deep
diversity and propose that such diversity is conducive to a dual rather than
administrative approach to dividing powers. As we show below, territorially
entrenched socio-economic diversity also played an important role in the
federation-making processes of Switzerland (1848) and Canada (1867), in terms of
both demanding and legitimizing the dual model.

**Germany’s Administrative Approach**

What, then, explains the different approach taken in Germany when adopting the
administrative model? The answer might seem to lie in the timing, as the German
federation in its current form was founded in 1949, and from the outset provided
for greater centralization than either the United States or Switzerland over a
century before (Kaiser and Vogel 2019, 88, and below). However, the roots of
German federalism stretch back into the nineteenth century. Indeed, they can be
traced right back to the Holy Roman Empire—a political structure that was famously neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire, but which was in some ways proto-federal (Whaley 2002; Broschek 2012, 669ff.). The reality is that none of the three factors that played such an important role in pushing the United States towards the dualist model was present in Germany’s formative period of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the situation was very different in regard to each.

The Napoleonic wars and the termination of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 left central Europe an unstable kaleidoscope of large and small Germanic states dominated by two antagonistic hegemons, Austria and Prussia. Management of this situation was achieved via a succession of confederal arrangements that eventually culminated in the formation of the modern German state, skilfully engineered by Otto von Bismarck. In 1815, the Germanic Confederation was established as “an unsatisfactory compromise between the reality of local sovereignty and the semblance of national union” (Bryce 1928, 411). The hostility between Prussia and Austria obstructing a peaceful transition, two further wars were needed to bring about, first, the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund), in 1866, and then the more extensive “German Empire” (Deutsches Reich) under Prussian hegemony, in 1871 (Koch 1984; Weichlein 2012, 112). In the lead up to those developments, the Prussians had orchestrated the Zollverein, or customs union that substantially increased the economic integration of a number of the German states. Throughout this time, the direct representation of member-state governments—their kings, princes, and the mayors of the free cities—in the central government remained a constant (Renzsch 1989). In fact, this feature has become so closely associated with German federalism that it is often presented as an integral element of administrative federalism tout court—though, again, the Swiss and Austrian cases show that this is a metonymy too far.

The process of creating the German union of 1871 thus differed in crucial ways from the American experience, including in respect of each of the three drivers of dualism in the U.S. First of all, in sharp contrast to the incipient United States, the 1871 German constitution was not drafted to rectify the problems of a dysfunctional system of indirect federal administration, but to extend an entirely satisfactory one (Frowein 1985, 576; Boldt 1990). Both the North German Confederation and the Zollverein had functioned successfully via indirect administration (Boldt 1990, 269).

Secondly, there was nothing like the same insistence on non-centralization; indeed, a considerably more centralized union than eventuated was a distinct possibility. This reflected the reality that unification was (i) dominated by a hegemon, the large and militarily powerful state of Prussia; and (ii) resulted from military conflict and conquest (Koch 1984). Note here that the name adopted in 1871 was not Deutscher Bund (German federation), but Deutsches Reich (German Empire)—although Bismarck sweetened the pill by retaining the name Bundesrat or
“Federal Council” for the new upper house despite the Kaiser’s wish that it be the Reichsrat (Koch 1984, 122). Having defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870–71, Prussia could then unite the other German states under its leadership. That this was accomplished via negotiation and treaty rather than force, in a federal rather than unitary form, despite Prussia’s military preponderance, reflected a combination of domestic considerations and constraints imposed by other great powers (Koch 1984, 105–106; Green 2001, 301; also Ziblatt 2006).

Most importantly for our purposes here, the other German states, including some quite significant ones such as Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, each had their own developed, established, and highly functional political and administrative systems (Ziblatt 2006; Broschek 2012). There was no need to replace or displace these with a new federal administration on top and in parallel; indeed, to do so would have been an affront to the various kings and princes of those states (Boldt 1990, 268–69). What little there was of federal administration was “furnished predominantly by Prussia” (Renzsch 1989, 21; also Koch 1984, 124), where almost two thirds of the Reich’s population resided anyway.

So why not follow the American example and establish a dualist system where the states continued to exercise primary responsibility over domestic matters while in exchange the federal government was free to establish its own administration? The answer would seem to lie in the existence and desire by the hegemon to exercise greater control. Those advising Bismarck were recommending that Prussia impose something close to a unitary state, as demanded by liberal political interests (Koch 1984, 108). The compromise was to leave the states with all their administrative responsibilities (including the judiciary and tax collection), yet create room for overarching policy-making authority through legislative centralization. When enumerating Reich powers, the 1871 Constitution framed them in terms of “oversight” and “superintendence” (Hucko 1987). Bryce (1928, 411) thus remarked on the gap between the two kinds of power:

though comparatively little legislative power is left to the States, administration remains almost entirely in their hands, and it is they who appoint and dismiss nearly all the executive officials, a concession to their rulers which may be deemed illogical, but which the political circumstances of the country prescribed.

Further making this palatable to the various dynastic rulers was the representation they would have in national policy-making via their direct representation in the Bundesrat—an institution well established in German practice since the German Confederation (1815–66).

Third, while there certainly were differences between the different parts of the Reich, these did not take the form of the deep diversity that was so unavoidably a part of U.S. Constitution making. These differences were important, but they were
primarily cultural and very effectively accommodated by the degree of autonomy the Reich allowed member states in cultural matters—as well as direct governmental representation in the central institutions. Evidently, then, timing is not a factor that can account for the choice of one over the other model. The Canadian and Australian federations, much like the German Reich, were also founded in the nineteenth century, yet the dual model was adopted in all three former British colonies, whereas Germany after 1945 reverted to the administrative pattern established earlier. Notwithstanding the push by the Allied powers—and particularly the United States—for German federalism to be reconstructed in a more dualist fashion, the outcome was “essentially a German construction” (Golay 1958, 108). In post-war Germany, the need to find a compromise between those desiring greater unity (mainly Social-Democrats from the North and former Prussia) and those desiring regional autonomy (South-German parties and especially the Bavarian CSU) resulted in administrative federalism with a strong Bundesrat (Renzsch 1989, 29–31). While the Allies insisted that each level of government have its own “fiscal administration in order to secure the financial independence” of the Länder (ibid. 31), that was soon undone. With reforms in 1955 and 1969, the fiscal unity of the two levels was re-established and German reversion to the administrative model completed (Renzsch 1989, 31; Weichlein 2019, 39).

Supplementary Cases and Summary

Dual federalism thus emerges as the natural choice for aggregative unions where central government oversight is not desired or would not be widely accepted and where power and resources are sufficiently well distributed among the constituent units to avoid a regional hegemon. The framers of the Australian constitution also envisaged such a decentralized union (Aroney 2009, 276ff.). There, the other two factors contributing to dualism in the United States—an unsuccessful experiment with indirect administration and deep diversity—were lacking, but the absence of any centralizing need or power was sufficient. All of the colonies were democratically self-governing—indeed most had been so for decades. They traded little with each other; and there was no pressing strategic need.

The balance of factors was quite different in Canada, where deep diversity was the key factor. While some key figures behind the Canadian constitution sought a more centralized system, bicultural realities and the need to accommodate Québec meant that was out of the question. For Québec leaders, a co-ordinate division of powers with no federal government oversight over their own administration was a non-negotiable requirement for the preservation of their national identity (Silver 1997, 33–36; Broschek 2012, 674).
A similar desire to protect linguistic and other minorities from the political majority characterized the formation of the Swiss federation. Here, just like in the United States, formerly independent territories had chosen to enter a loose confederal alliance in 1815, in turn building on earlier confederal arrangements and under military and diplomatic pressure from abroad (Vatter 2018, 14ff.). In 1848, the type of institutions chosen helped accommodate the Catholic-rural losers of the civil war: minimal central government powers in defence, foreign affairs and single-market policies (tariffs, weights, currency; Dardanelli and Mueller 2019); legislative influence for the cantons through a bicameral system copied from the United States; and a collective veto over constitutional change. Such an arrangement also suited the French- and Italian-speaking minority cantons, paralleling the case of Canada.

India, finally, is an interesting case where a substantial element of administrative federalism was introduced into what was overall a dual system, as part of a constitution designed such that it “avoided the ‘tight mould of federalism’ in which the American Constitution was caught, and could be ‘both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances’” (Austin 1966, 188). This was achieved by means of a lengthy list of concurrent powers and an explicit provision for implementation to be delegated to the states (Austin 1966, 204; Swenden and Saxena 2017, 45). By contrast with the United States, Canada and Australia, there was a very strong desire for centralized authority and no counterbalancing demands (yet) for constituent unit autonomy.

In sum, we can confirm two of the main working hypotheses commonly held in the literature on comparative federalism: when modern federations were created, two different models were invented, one dual and the other administrative; and except for Germany, all largely adopted U.S. dualism. However, the next section shows that once an outlier is slowly becoming the new norm. The third insight we add to the literature is explanatory: the main factors explaining the choice of a dual model are a balance of power between regional players; no desire for federal supervision of regional agency; and deep societal divisions with political salience. In turn, the adoption of administrative federalism rests on the presence of a hegemon and its desire to exert greater control over state-wide affairs.

Mapping the Evolution of Administrative and Dual Federalism

To what extent does the distinction between dual and administrative federalism hold once we compare different federations with each other and over an extended period of time? While acknowledging that the distinction is ideal-typical and extrapolated from actual practice, there remains nonetheless the question of how accurately the two types reflect reality. Was there ever a pure model of dual
federalism? Which one is (or was) the most dual of them all? Have some federations changed from one type to the other, and, if so, why?

**General Trends**

To gain such an empirical overview, we draw on the De/Centralization dataset developed by Dardanelli and colleagues (2019a). It assesses the degree of decentralization of twenty-two different policy areas on a seven-point scale in ten-year intervals for six federations from the time of their founding until 2010: the United States (1787), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), Australia (1901), Germany (1949), and India (1950). For each policy area, degrees of decentralization are observed for both legislation and administration separately, with 1 amounting to full centralization and 7 to full decentralization. For illustration purposes, Table A1 in the Supplementary Material provides the scores for all twenty-two policy areas in all six countries for the decade ending in 2010, separated by legislation and administration (hence forty-four rows). The twenty-two policy areas are listed in the note beneath Table A1.7

Two indicators are calculated based on these raw scores. First, the degree of administrative federalism corresponds to the mean difference between the legislation and administration scores across all policy areas. For instance, in 2010 U.S. legislation on agriculture was “almost exclusively federal” (P1l = 2), whereas implementation was only “predominantly” so (p1a = 3). The corresponding score for administrative federalism in this domain is (3–2=) 1. The theoretical minimum for administrative federalism so calculated is 0 (=dual federalism: n–n), the maximum 6 (=7–1). The degree of decentralization, in turn, corresponds to the mean of the two policy values—a score of ((2 + 3)/2=) 1.5 in the example given. The theoretical minimum here is 1, if both legislation and administration are fully centralized, the maximum 7, if both functions are fully decentralized. To aggregate to the level of countries, we then simply take the mean of all 22 administrative federalism (or decentralization) scores per decade.

**Figure 1** thus plots the evolution of administrative federalism so defined and calculated. While administrative federalism has gained in all the countries assessed here except Germany, change has clearly been more pronounced in some. The steepest increase has taken place in Switzerland—originally as dual as the United States, now as administrative as Germany. However, as we discuss in more detail below, the Swiss evolution is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different since it has resulted from a series of conscious choices to move towards the administrative model de jure: the only federation to ‘re-design’ its system in that way. By contrast, in the three (once) truly dual federations—United States, Canada, and Australia—a degree of de facto administrative federalism has resulted.
from unacknowledged, unplanned, and often unrecognized processes (e.g., Zimmerman 2001).

The case of India is more difficult to assess. While only 14 percent of the overall public workforce are employed by the central government and the rest by the States (Ghosh 2019) and the original constitutional idea may well have been one of “cooperative”, that is, administrative, federalism (Tillin 2019, 16), all civil servants and police force members are recruited centrally and States cannot dismiss those assigned to them (Swenden and Adeney 2021, 226). Moreover, the extensive use of “presidential powers” and other majoritarian manifestations of democracy have repeatedly undermined Indian federalism (Swenden and Adeney 2021, 237). Ironically, however, it was precisely the hybrid nature of the Indian Constitution, which blended rather strong de jure centralization with the idea of vertical cooperation, that enabled “a more genuinely federal polity” to emerge (Tillin 2019, 17).

Furthermore, there seems to be a connexion with overall degrees of decentralization, as Figure 2 shows. Here, degrees of administrative federalism are plotted by overall decentralization, comparing 1950 (the first decade for which all six countries are covered) with 2010. Two movements are visible: one to the top (=more administrative federalism), the other to the left (=more centralization). The correlation coefficients for both periods are basically identical: as one changes,
so does the other. Yet again not all countries were affected equally. Notably Australia has moved from being the third most decentralized federation in 1950 to the most centralized, in 2010, and in the process become slightly more administrative. Canada has moved the least, which given how much all others have centralized has turned it into the most decentralized federation today (even before we consider finances, see below). Here, not only the original degrees of decentralization were largely preserved (Lecours 2019), but also the dual character was best maintained, ahead of Australia and India.

Illustrating this is the case of education, where over the past two decades in Australia the Commonwealth government has assumed a distinctly supervisory role and established regulatory bodies such as ACARA, the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, while in Canada the federal government does not even have an education minister. These developments have led to the suggestion that Australia has become “a federation . . . of a more integrated kind” (Saunders 2013, 398). If understood as referring to the degree of “indirect federal administration” creeping in, then this captures something of the change. However, it is misleading in an important way in that unlike integrated federalism of the German kind, it allows for very little input by the states into national policymaking. Additional analyses (Figure A1 in the Supplementary Material) confirm that an increase in administrative federalism has indeed occurred where centralization in legislation happened to a greater extent than in implementation.

Figure 2 Administrative federalism by decentralization, 1950 vs. 2010.
Mechanisms

A look at Switzerland, which by 2010 had completed its conversion to administrative federalism, provides some insights into the mechanism behind these processes. In fact, until the 1940s the Swiss and the U.S. paths towards both centralization and administrative federalism largely overlap (see Figure 1). It was the development of the social welfare state since then that has pulled Switzerland ever more towards the German model. Why? Just as in Germany, compromises were needed if the central government was to acquire new legislative powers, and the main element of those compromises was to leave the cantons in charge of implementing most of the new social policies.

Accordingly, administrative federalism in Switzerland is strongest in areas that necessitate uniform rules on social entitlements and protection while also involving face-to-face interactions between government and citizens. That is the case for social welfare; agriculture; health care; environmental protection; natural resources; and economic regulation (Freiburghaus and Buchli 2003, 44ff.). The same is true of previously cantonal policy areas such as civil and criminal law. The quid pro quo for having a single Swiss civil and criminal code, for instance, was to leave the cantons in charge of running law enforcement and the judiciary (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019, 149 and supplemental file p. 39ff.). This had the double advantage of making the new federal powers seem cheaper, since running costs would accrue at the subnational level, and lessening the opposition to centralization, since cantonal structures were actually strengthened.

The need for negotiations between the federal and cantonal governments, or between the advocates for centralization and those defending regional autonomy more generally, is a consequence of Switzerland’s extensive direct-democratic instruments (Mueller 2021; Vatter 2018, 177). Because of the enumerative principle, all new powers of the federal government and extensions thereof necessitate a constitutional modification. Changing the federal constitution, in turn, requires a popular vote in which a majority of both total votes cast and of cantons must approve. In parallel, since 1874 every Act of Parliament can be challenged by 50,000 (until 1977: 30,000) citizens or eight cantons to be submitted to a nationwide referendum. Finally, since 1891 also 100,000 citizens (until 1977: 50,000) can themselves propose constitutional modification, for which again a double majority is needed. Between 1848 and 2021, the Swiss thus voted on 466 constitutional and 200 legislative proposals (Swissvotes 2021).

However, while becoming as administrative in its way of dividing power as Germany, Switzerland does not have a Bundesrat of the German kind, where regional governments are directly represented. Instead, all the 46 members of the Swiss senate are popularly elected in the cantons (again like in the United States, although the Swiss cantons all voluntarily adopted that method). The ever-greater
centralization in the legislative sphere (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019) has pushed the cantonal governments to create alternative channels through which to influence national policy making. Most important here is their own, unofficial second chamber in the form of the Conference of Cantonal Governments (Schnabel and Mueller 2017). Indeed, one key argument for cantonal voices to be taken seriously when formulating country-wide policies is precisely that they then subsequently have to apply those laws.

There are a number of other structural features of the Swiss system, however, that ensure the kind of regional co-decision at the national level that we saw in Germany (Linder and Vatter 2001, 102f.). Direct democracy forces national-decision makers to take regional sentiments into account, especially when changing the constitution: citizens of the many small, conservative, and German-speaking cantons have de facto veto power. The same is true of the perfectly symmetrical bicameral system, where centralization-averse voters are over-represented (Mueller and Vatter 2020). All this leaves the federal government little choice but to bring (a majority of) the cantonal governments on board if they are to win the ensuing popular vote. Thus, next to designating the cantons as administrative agents, the federal government also often compensates them financially for this. Typically, this is by providing them with a share in federal tax revenue—again just like in Germany (Behnke 2020, 195ff).

**Differences across Policy Areas**

Figure 3, finally, looks at the 22 policy areas across the entire sample separately (Figure A2 does the same for each of the six countries). Very centralized domains such as currency, defence and external affairs are consistently organized using the dual principle, even in otherwise administrative federations. Dualism here means that only the central government has the civil servants it needs to run those sectors. Lower levels neither legislate nor implement in these domains: the entire policy is assigned to the central government. The same applies, even if to a lesser extent, to very decentralized areas such as law enforcement and education—only that here, of course, the teachers and police officers applying the law are regionally (or even locally) hired. In both very centralized and decentralized cases, public bureaucracies operate at the level that also sets the rules.

Most policy areas lie in the middle of de/centralization spectrum, however—around the theoretical mean of four—and it is here that administrative federalism tends to be greatest, in areas such as agriculture, criminal and civil law, health care, and natural resources. In these domains the legislative power tends to be located at the higher level, with the central government, while the lower levels implement. Thus, as state activity has grown overall, so has administrative federalism.
Assuming that the patterns revealed in the De/Centralization database are reasonably faithful to reality, four main insights emerge from this look at the evolution of the two models over some two centuries. First, the original distinction still holds, by and large: the former British colonies are all still the most dual in their organization, with Canada, Australia and India replicating the original U.S. model. At the same time, Germany was and remains the most administrative in federal organization, building on its own, centuries-old tradition of cooperation and integration. Second, within the dual fold, the United States has shed its original clothing the most, being situated somewhere in the middle of the real-world spectrum by 2010, if we look all policies combined. By contrast, India, Australia, and most distinctively Canada have managed to retain their dual character. Third, the one case to have completely changed categories is Switzerland: once as dual as the United States, now as administrative as Germany. Fourth and finally, the trend towards administrative federalism is largely driven by centralization, in general, with administrative federalism the greatest in policy domains that are neither fully national nor exclusively regional.

Figure 3  Administrative federalism by policy area decentralization, 2010.

Note: LOESS line shown.
Conclusions and Way Forward

There are, in both principle and practice, two quite different ways of organizing the division of powers that is the core element of a federal system. The “dual” or “co-ordinate” design allocates discrete policy domains; the “administrative” design allocates distinct roles to the two orders of government. Dualism was the form adopted in the United States, followed by Switzerland, Canada, and Australia. Administrative federalism originated in Germany: in dynastic form in the nineteenth century Deutsches Reich created by the Prussian hegemon, democratically in post-war Germany. Here, administrative federalism was one half of a coherent system of “integrated federalism” or Politikverflechtung whereby local policy autonomy was exchanged for direct influence at the federal level (Fenna 2020).

While federalism scholars such as Wheare (1946, 1963) saw the German case as at best anomalous for these reasons, the trends identified here provide strong indication that Germany was in fact ahead of its time. Its adoption of the administrative approach anticipated the developments Sawer (1969) later identified as universal tendencies in dual systems, flowing from modernization and the increasing role of the state, and which were confirmed here (also Hesse 1962, 33; Schütze 2009, 351). Centralization has been the dominant tendency in dualist systems and that has occurred to a large extent by the central government asserting a policy-making (i.e., legislative) role in areas of State or provincial jurisdiction without assuming commensurate implementation and administrative responsibility (Dardanelli et al. 2019b).

In many instances, this has been an exercise in “coercive federalism” (Kincaid 2017), accompanied by little or no political quid pro quo whereby the constituent units are compensated with greater influence over that state-wide policy-making. This pattern is also evident in the way that the least centralized of all the (dual) federations, Canada, also has the lowest degree of administrative federalism. We are now better able to understand the pressing need for subnational units in the United States or Switzerland to seek greater influence in the central government (Schnabel and Mueller 2017; Bowman 2017). Moving towards a system of administrative federalism has meant fighting to avoid unfunded service–delivery obligations (which, by definition, do not exist in strict dual federalism, as both policy spheres and fiscal resources are kept apart) in exchange for greater discretion in terms of implementation.

While the Swiss cases provides a striking illustration of the rise of administrative federalism as instigated by policy centralization, it also offers further nuance. Switzerland’s move from dual to administrative federalism—slowly, gradually, and almost imperceptibly—was the result of a series of political compromises. Instead of centralizing both the legislative and administrative functions as they pertain to
previously cantonal or entirely new government functions, the cantons were politically ‘bought off’ by allowing them to remain in charge at least in terms of administration.

Two caveats and calls for further research conclude this discussion. First, our insights are drawn from a limited number of cases. This is difficult to avoid given the limited pool from which to draw (Fenna 2019). In addition, the mapping exercise relies on the data quality provided by Dardanelli et al. (2019a,b) and there is always room to question the coding used in that project in respect of any given domain or period. Also, policy sectors could have been weighted by their fiscal or political importance. Second, there are several aspects that we were unable to cover fully, such as the pathologies of each model; the way political actors act, adjust, and seek to reform their system; or also the role of courts as an integral yet functionally distinct element of bureaucracies. The fiscal dimension calls for its own, proper investigation, too.

In concluding, we thus highlight some promising avenues for further research, one relating to the impact and operation of the two models in general, the other to multinationalism more specifically.

First, it is striking how differently political struggles for subnational authority materialize given the preponderance of one or the other model. Under dual federalism, constituent units strive to protect the borders of their “watertight compartments”, as its policy division was once described, and resist becoming agents of the central government. The typical villain is the “federal spending power” that threatens to encroach upon subnational policy domains (self-rule dimension). In turn, under administrative federalism the constituent units attempt to enlarge and consolidate their influence at central level over the decisions they later need to apply (shared rule dimension). Moreover, often the exact opposite from subnational struggles in dual federations is feared: unfunded service delivery obligations or, in other words, insufficient federal funds.

Second, given our confirmation of Canadian exceptionalism in connection with Québec nationalism, another natural extension would be to examine what the preponderance of each model means for subnational autonomy in multinational states. The choice to be made, if ever there was one, would seem to lie between (i) being ‘forced’ by the central government to act on its behalf—with or without compensation, in the case of what in the United States are known as “unfunded mandates”—in exchange for less federal presence on the ground and the freedom to adjust central policies to local needs in the administrative mode; and (ii) freedom from central supervision while accepting the duality of both federal and subnational governments sharing and operating upon the same territory and its inhabitants yet in mutual isolation and even competition with each other, as the original U.S. model of dual federalism had it.
Intuitively, it may seem unlikely that minority nations would find administrative federalism at all acceptable. After all, for them key policies are all about nation-building and quasi-independence, thus replicating the original U.S. move away from “the Empire” (LaCroix 2011). However, as not least the EU integration process has shown (Schütze 2009; Mueller and Hechter 2021), administrative federalism might actually be preferable if considerable room for implementational discretion gets backed up by substantial equalization transfers. This provides constituent units with both freedom of action and financial support. One might even go as far as claiming that the various “opt-outs” practiced, for instance, in the Canadian federation amount to de facto administrative federalism, since the federal government foots the bill but provinces get all the credit for the services they deliver. Again, however, that is a subject deserving of a much fuller consideration than we are able to provide here.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary data are available at *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* online.

Notes

We are most grateful to the Journal’s four reviewers for their thorough, thoughtful, and very helpful comments as well as to Katherine Adeney, Andreas Balthasar, and Thomas Hueglin for feedback on an earlier version.

1. There exist other labels to capture the same distinction. Hueglin and Fenna (2015, 53ff.), for instance, opt for “legislative federalism” to describe the division of powers characteristic of dualist systems.

2. The allusion here is to Royal Governor of Massachusetts Bay, Thomas Hutchinson’s, use of the term in January 1773: “I know of no line that can be drawn between the supreme authority of Parliament and the total independence of the colonies”. LaCroix (2011) beautifully traces how the political debates preceding Independence paved the way for constitutionalizing a division of powers along policy areas—notably by distinguishing between internal (colonial) and external (imperial) matters (e.g. p. 71).

3. The term cooperative federalism does not refer to a type of system, but to a mode in which a system finds itself functioning.

4. *Die Länder führen die Bundesgesetze als eigene Angelegenheit aus, soweit dieses Grundgesetz nichts anderes bestimmt oder zuläßt.* (Own translation)

5. In 1871, for instance, Prussia had 25 million inhabitants, Bavaria 5m, Saxonia 2.5m, Württemberg 1.8m, and Baden 1.4m out of a total of 41 million inhabitants (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1880, 1).

6. Confusingly, this confederal forerunner to the Bundesrat was also called the Bundestag (officially Bundesversammlung), which today is the name of the German Lower Chamber representing the people.
7. In attempting to provide an overview over six countries and well over two centuries, in the case of the United States, we necessarily had to synthesize the vast amount of state activity into just 22 policy areas and two main functions, legislation and administration. One option to enlarge the current approach would thus be to weigh the different policy areas as to their importance, either by total expenditure or political saliency or both.

8. Meaning that the federal government can only exercise powers that have been explicitly assigned to it.


10. Of course, the difference is that under administrative federalism subnational units have no choice but to implement central policy (although with more or less administrative discretion), whereas opt-outs result from bilateral negotiation. See also *Lecours (2021)* for a similar conclusion.

References


Hueglin, Thomas O., and Alan Fenna. 2015. Comparative federalism: A systematic inquiry. 2nd ed. Toronto ON: University of Toronto Press.


Table A-1: Decentralization by policy area and function in six federations, year 2010

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</tbody>
</table>

**Policy areas:**
- p1l: Agriculture – legislative; p1a: Agriculture – administrative
- p2l: Citizenship and immigration – legislative; p2a: Citizenship and immigration – administrative
- p3l: Culture – legislative; p3a: Culture – administrative
- p4l: Currency and money supply – legislative; p4a: Currency and money supply – administrative
- p5l: Defence – legislative; p5a: Defence – administrative
- p6l: Economic activity – legislative; p6a: Economic activity – administrative
- p7l: Pre-tertiary education – legislative; p7a: Pre-tertiary education – administrative
- p8l: Tertiary education – legislative; p8a: Tertiary education – administrative
- p9l: Elections and voting – legislative; p9a: Elections and voting – administrative
- p10l: Employment relations – legislative; p10a: Employment relations – administrative
- p11l: Environmental protection – legislative; p11a: Environmental protection – administrative
- p12l: External affairs – legislative; p12a: External affairs – administrative
- p13l: Finance and securities – legislative; p13a: Finance and securities – administrative
- p14l: Health care – legislative; p14a: Health care – administrative
- p15l: Language – legislative; p15a: Language – administrative
- p16l: Civil law – legislative; p16a: Civil law – administrative
- p17l: Criminal law – legislative; p17a: Criminal law – administrative
- p18l: Law enforcement – legislative; p18a: Law enforcement – administrative
- p19l: Media – legislative; p19a: Media – administrative
- p20l: Natural resources – legislative; p20a: Natural resources – administrative
- p21l: Social welfare – legislative; p21a: Social welfare – administrative
- p22l: Transport – legislative; p22a: Transport – administrative

**Codes:**
1 = exclusively central government; 2 = almost exclusively central government; 3 = predominantly central government; 4 = equally central government and constituent units; 5 = predominantly constituent units; 6 = almost exclusively constituent units; 7 = exclusively constituent units. *n.a.* = not available

**Source:** Dardanelli et al. (2019)
Annex for “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and evolution of two models”

Figure A-1: Evolution of legislative and administrative decentralization, by country
Annex for “Dual versus Administrative Federalism: Origins and evolution of two models”

Figure A-2: Administrative federalism by decentralization for 22 policy areas, by country in 2010

Note: LOESS line shown.